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CONTENTS

VOL. XI, PART I

ARTICLES :	Pages
1 Bhāvanāsaṁdhi-Prakaranam of Jayadevamuni (An Apabhramśa Poem), by M. C. Modi, M.A. ...	1-31
2 The Sohgaṛa Copper-Plate Inscription, by B. M. Barua, M. A., D. Litt. ...	32-48
3 A Fragmentary Inscription of Maṇḍu, by K. K. Lele ...	49-53
4 The Jātinirākṛti of Jitāri, by Prof. Giuseppe Tucci, Ph. D. ...	54-58
5 The Age of Pāṇini and Sanskrit as a spoken Language, by K. B. Pathak, B. A., Ph. D. ...	59-83
6 Were the Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā and Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa unknown to Pāṇini ? by K. B. Pathak, B. A., Ph. D. ...	84-89
7 Further Remarks on the Unādi Sūtras of Pāṇini, by K. B. Pathak, B. A., Ph. D. ...	90-93
MISCELLANEA	
8 Date of Gaṇitāmṛtalaharī of Rāmakṛṣṇa, by P. K. Gode, M. A. ...	94-95
9 The Terminus ad quem for the Date of Kula- pradīpa of Śivānanda by P. K. Gode M. A. ...	95-96
10 Date of Mallaparakāśa ascribed to Malladeva by P. K. Gode, M. A. ...	96-99
REVIEWS	
11 The Marāṭha Rajas of Tanjore edited by K. R. Subramanian, reviewed by D. V. Apte, B. A., ...	100

Annals of the BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL Research Institute, Poona

Vol. XI]

October 1929.

[Part I

BHĀVANĀSAMDHĪ-PRAKARANĀM

OF

JAYADEVAMUNI

(An Apabhramśa Poem)

BY

M. C. MODI, M. A.

It is gratifying to note the keen interest that is being taken now-a-days in अपभ्रंश. But, however, the studies in अपभ्रंश are still in their infancy. It is a credit to this journal that it published संजयमञ्जरी of महेश्वरसूरी 'an Apabh-Poem' (ed. Gune Annals of Bhand. Inst. I. 157) at the time when it was still embryonic. With the rising consciousness of the individuality and the historico-national importance which the modern provincial vernaculars are by strides gaining day by day, a philologist and a historian shall have to co-ordinate their task to the changing values. अपभ्रंश, therefore, will demand deeper attention, analysis and investigation from the philologists and grammarians of the future. The अपभ्रंश of हेमचन्द्र (so we call it for convenience) is the only अपभ्रंश which is so thoroughly and abundantly accessible to us. This अपभ्रंश is the direct ancestor of the oldest forms of the Western Vernaculars of India; and it will be therefore a fruitful study if the former is comparatively studied from the view-point of philology with the latter. The literary works of these old Western Vernaculars, especially old Gujarati and also अपभ्रंश works are still so many in MSS. unpublished that if they are published thoroughly and carefully, we can have a complete idea as to what these languages and their literatures are. प्राचीनगुर्जरकाव्यसंग्रह (ed. C. D. Dalal. Gaek. Ori. Series.) or the Old Dingala Poems (ed. Tessitori. Bibliotheca Indica Series) are for example the rare and stray attempts towards this aim.

The अपभ्रंश poem with which we have to deal is called भावनासंधिप्रकरणम्. The poem consists of 6 कडवक and each कडवक contains 10 stanzas. The last कडवक contains one stanza more ; and one additional stanza of the nature of a prayer is at the beginning. Thus in all there are 62 Stanzas. It is very difficult to decide the date of the poem though there is only one definite evidence in the poem to establish the earliest limit: the St. 5.

मन (त)रखि रमणिरमणयिदेहि वसमंसरुहिरमलसुत्तगेह
दह देविरत्तु मालवुनरिंद गयरज्जपाण हुय पुहविचंडु ॥

refers to the amours of विलासवती and मुञ्ज (Sam. 1054 death) which occupy a prominent place in अपभ्रंश tradition. The poem is later therefore than the 11th century; and looking to the nature of the language, it can be conveniently said to have been written in 13th to 14th century. The name of the author together with that of his preceptor is mentioned in the last stanza :

निम्मलगुणभूरिहिं सिवदिवसूरिहिं पढमसीसु जयदेवगुणि ।
किय भावणसंधी सिभावुसुगंधी निखणवि अन्न वि घरउ मणि ॥

The writer's name therefore is जयदेवसुनि the first pupil of शिवदेवसूरी. Beyond this we know nothing about the author. As for the merit of the poem, it does not belong to the stratum of high poetry. It is the poem of popular preaching in bitter and at times vulgar tones, denouncing the worldly life and describing the harrowing pains of hell and the miseries of birth and death. The author offers in the poem to describe भावनाs (See. St. 11. quoted below) and to elucidate the greatness of human life by 10 illustrations. But he does not give either the systematic exposition of भावनाs and their proper enumeration or the exposition of 10 illustrations. The St. 11. runs :

इय बारह भावण सुवणसुहावण भणवि हेव जीवहंस किडु
दुलहु मणुयत्तणु धम्मपवित्तणु दसदिहंतिहि वज्जरिखु ॥

Herein it is said that there are 12 भावनाs. But the poet does not take them up for systematic and orderly exposition. The भावनाs have been described as 12 in आयरंगसुत्त (श्रुतिस्कंध २: चूलिका ३) The enumeration runs as :

पढममणिच्च (१) मसरणं (२) संसारो (३) एगया य (४) अन्नत्तं (५)
असुइत्तं (६) आसव (७) संवरो (८) य तह निज्जरा (९) नवमा ॥ १६ ॥
लोगसहावो (१०) बोहि य दुलुहा (११) धम्मसाहओ अरहा (१२)
एयाई हुंति बारस जहकम्म भावणीयाओ ॥ ११ ॥

[प्रथममनित्यत्व (१) मशरण (२) संसार (३) एकता (४) चान्यत्वश्च
अशुचित्व (६) माश्रवः (७) संवत् (८) श्रव तथा निर्जरा (९) नवमा ॥
लोकस्वभावो (१०) बोधिश्च दुर्लभा (११) धर्मस्वभावोऽर्हतः
एतानि भवन्ति द्वादश यथाकर्म भावनीकाः ॥]

The fullest explanation of all these terms is impossible to be given here. It can be found in great details in the encyclopaedic works like अभिधानराजेन्द्र.

The language does not differ so much from Hemcandra's grammar. However, it does seem undergoing the process of syntactical and grammatical looseness. Its run seems towards the old forms of Western Vernaculars. The phonological irregularities are not less and so too the grammatical. The constructional looseness etc. can be exemplified from St. 26. 1. पंचासवि अज्जिय पई जि दुक्ख अणुहवसि ताई तवेव तिकख १; St. 46; St. 62; separation of the compound-members in an arbitrary way—St. 14. चुल्लागाइयदिदं दसदुल्ले; St. 5 मालवुनरिंद; addition of ए a metrical expletive which is used in Vernaculars: धरि पलित्तिमि खणि सकइ को कुव ए ॥. etc.

Grammar

I Nouns:—

- Nom : (sing) वज्झभावु, नरिंद, णायिओ (12 Prktism) सत्तउ (6) (Plu) नरय, तिरियह (8) Neu. (Plu) सहियाई, तज्जणाई.
Acc : (sing) सायर, चउवीसइ, अप्पं, मणुयत्तणं गत्तु (Plu) अट्टकम्म, भावणु, सुवणसुहावण (11)
Inst : (Sing) मणि (1) इक्केण (Sktsm) नयण (8 drop. due to metre) अप्पेण मुच्चगेहिं (27) (Plu) दिदंतिहि, कम्मेहि, विसएहि.
Dat : मुत्तिए (मौक्तिकाय) & मुत्तए (मुक्तये; also Gen.) (52)
Abl : जमह (यमेभ्यः) अणंतउ कालउ (12) मोहाउ (60).
Gen : वसुहु, अप्पणं, लोगह (Plu) मणुयभवत्तह (Sing? St. 15) दाहस्स (20) निम्मलगुणभूरिहिं सिवदिवसुरिहिं (Plu. 62)
Loc : संसारि, लोइ (3) मन (4) गलए (7) मणुयत्तणे दुल्ले (14) विसाए (13) (Sktsm) खाईमि (St. 40. a).

अणायंमि (12) संखकालंमि (13) (Maharashtrism) गोलेसु जलणजालासु (Plu : Sanskritism)

Voc ; जीव, जीय, स्रूढ etc.

II Pronouns.

A Nom: कोइ (कोऽपि) सहु (सर्वम्—provincialism? of. सौ Gtj?) (२)
तं तउं, तुम् (त्वम्; st. 3. 18 12.) एहु (4. एषः) सों, सुं स (२६),

Sing. सः) सा (fem. सा) जो, जि (यः both Mas. Neu. Sing.) जे (Plu. ये) ते (Plu: तद् Mas.) ताई (New. Plu. तानि st. 26.)

Acc : is almost similar to Nom. though no specific instance can be particularly pointed out from this poem.

Inst : इण (अनेन St. 4) पई पई (त्वया) जिणि जेण (येन) तिणि (तेन) जेहि एहि, सबोहि (Plu.)

Abl. : तह (st. 40 ?) (तस्मात् see Pronom. Deriv. below.)

Gen : तुह, तुज्झ (तव) तासु (St. 40.) तस, तस्स (तस्य) इह (अस्य see Prono. Deriv.) जस्स (यस्य).

Loc : साब्बि (सर्वस्मिन् St. 3)

B. Pronominal derivatives:

ह—इह (इत्थं ved. इत्था) तह (तथा) कह (कथा Ved. कथं) जह (यथा not in this poem but found elsewhere.) अह (अथ)

त्थ—इत्थ (अत्र) (38) इत्थ इत्थेमि (redundant loc. st. 20.) तत्थ (तत्र) कत्थ (कुत्र) अन्नत्थ (अन्यत्र) (47).

इस—एसि (एतादृशी) किस्सु (किदृशः) कीस (कथं)

य—इय (St. 11. 12.) (इदानीं ? or case-form ? probably the former.) इति (Hom.)

जिज—This is the peculiar and is hardly found elsewhere: जिज=यदि.) and it is curiously joined up to सः & यः. The ill : जुज्जि (6. 17. यो यदि.) तिज्जि (st. 19 तद् यदि i. e. तस्मात् 'therefore.') जि secondarily also means एव or mere expletive in अपभ्रंश. cf. M. एकव or Guj. एक ज and O. Guj एक जि. ('only one')

Other pronominal derivatives which are not very peculiar are cited under indeclinables.

III Nominal suffixes.

उळ—एक्कुलउ (एकाकी)

वण—सुहावण (शोभनं)

त्तण—मणुयत्तणु (मनुजत्वं) पवित्तणु (पवित्रत्वं)

ओ (कः sk.)—माणुस्सओ (मनुष्यकः) कम्मंसओ (कर्माशकः)

इळ—गाळिळ (गाढम्) (24).

इर—सोडीर (54) cf. Sk शौण्डीर

IV. Indeclinables.

रे, पुण (पुनः) च, य, अ, (च) नवि (नापि: the expression is used as if it were one and the force of वि is lost at times) सिजि (सयः ? St. 4) ता also जा—ता (यावत्-तावत् or यदा-तदा not authorised by grammarians.) जिम-तिम (यथा-तथा) जं-तं (यद्-तद्) St. 7. Some-

times तद् is used separately as an expletive only) जो-तो (in Apa. यदा-तदा at times; तो in Apa. separately as ततः तदा; in other प्राकृतस also as meaning तु.) अह (अथ) ति (इति) वि (अपि) झत्ति (झटिति) रोसि (an expletive peculiar to अपभ्रंश alone having the meaning of तादर्थ्यसूचन acc. to grammarians. It is also written रोसि. cf. St 7) झरि (Sktsm भूरि) बहु (used with मंनसे Sktsm) कहवि and कहकहवि (कथमपि and कथं कथमपि) व्व (इव St. 18) जइ (यदि) सययमेव (सततमेव St. 26) इंत (हन्त Skt. 27) हि (ही Skt. हे) संपइ (संप्रति St. 31) पास (पार्श्वे 31. cf. Guj. पासे so commonly used) युगव (युगपत् 33.) नो (नो or न Sktsm 35) नेगहा (अनेकधा) किर (किल) मज्झि (मध्ये) लहु (लघु St. 55 'soon') तव (ताव St. 35, 58 and so तावत् or a sporadic form ? cf. तव Guj. 'then' St 57) हेव (the classical Apbh. form is हव्वं =Skt हव्यम् thus meaning 'soon' =शीघ्रम् cf. Guj. हवे or हव in old Guj. poetry meaning 'now'. Indeed this is however unusual : St. 11,) एवम्. वा Sktsms. etc. ए (a metrical expletive peculiar to Vernaculars See 54, 57 but it mixes with the nouns as a case termination at times) मत (मा St. 4-5 cf. Hindi मत) समठां (=समं 33)

V Verbs

Present Tense: 1st. pers. (sing) मंनामि

2nd pers (sing) सहसि, सवरोसि, वाहसि, (असि 'Thou art' St. 13) अवमंनसे, होसि (भवसि २०) नोयसि (न स्वपिषि ? but has the force of Imperative 2nd pers sing. cf. St. 24.)

3rd pers. (sing) पडिबोहइ, निरोहइ, अत्थि, पडिइ, होइ, भणइ, वव्वए, हारए, विक्कए (See St. 16. 17) (Plu) सदहंति हूं (हुं ?) ति (St. 9)

It is remarkable that the अपभ्रंश, has thrown overboard the Skt. niceties of Conjugations and the diff. bet. परस्मैपद and आत्मनेपद. The verbs have been made परस्मै० or आत्मने० acc. to metrical exigencies (cf. St. 16. 17.)

Imperative: 2nd pers. (sing.) निमुणि, करि, सज्जि, धरि, रवि (रज्य) निदेसु (61 ?) सुणहं (२०) कुणह, पामह (51)

3rd. Pers. (sing) अच्छउ, धरउ. (Plu) निवडंतु.

Imperfect: आसि (2nd pers. sing.) (11. 33,)

Present passive: 2nd. pers. (sing) रज्जसे, पच्चसे, वाहिज्जसे, भक्खिज्जसे 3rd pers. (sing) पाविज्ज, भज्ज (St. 10 are these potential passive participles ? probably so ; but the meaning is as 3rd pers. sing Pass. Present. Hence put here.) निहिण्णिज्ज (St 37. as before) खिज्जए, लुज्जए, भिज्जए, किज्जए, भुज्जए, वाविज्जए, वाहिज्जइ.

Future : 1st Pers. Plu : वज्जरिषु (12)

3rd pers. sing : सहिसइ, देसइ, पडिसिइ.

VI Verbal Derivatives

Present participles : रुयंत, पडंता, किलकिलंत, तडफडंत (onometo poetic verbs) etc (See. St. 46.)

Infinitive of purpose: गिन्हिउं (St. 17. Sktsm.); Otherwise it is expressed by the case forms, like acc. or Dat. or Gen. treating the verb as if it were a noun; sometimes absolutive is made to represent the Inf. of purpose e. g. खणि St. 57.4.

Past Passive Part : This is freely used to denote past tense. निज्जरिय, हुय (21) कड्डिओ, द्विओ, उत्पन्न, चत्तु खध (26) etc.

Absolutive : पणमवि मिल्हेविणु, सिद्धिलेवि (a denominative) पयडवि (प्रकटयित्वा) मरवि, तोडि (16) छंडि (59) छंडेविणु, अणुहूय (28 Sktsm.) भत्तण (61. a Prktsm.) गिन्हिय

Potential Pass. Part : देयं (Sktsm.) (See however forms like : पाविज्ज, भज्ज, निहिणिज्ज under Pres. Pass.). The termination इज्ज is a universal termination in अपभ्रंश. It can be added for any person in any tense-form almost.

There are three metres in the poem. The कडवक 1, 3, and 5 are in one metre ; and the rest of the कडवक i. e. 2, 4, 6 are in the different metre. The verses at the end of all the six कडवक together with the first stanza are in the same metre different from the above two. The names and systems of these metres are as follows :

(i) पड्डिअ :¹ This metre acc. to पिङ्गल consists of 4 गण of 4 मात्राs, in each of the 4 feet with ~ — at the end. कडवक 1,3,5, are in this metre. e. g.

रजी।⁴ व निखुणि।⁴ चंचल।⁴ सहाव⁴ etc. (St. 2)

(ii) The metre in कडवक 2,4,6 has 4 गण of 5 मात्राs each in every foot with—~—at the end. पिङ्गल does not mention this

१. (प्राकृतापङ्कलसूत्राणि : Kāvya-Mālā Series) P. 60.

चउमत्त करहु गण चारि लौइ ठवि अन्त पओहर पाँइ पाँइ ।

चउसडि मत्त पज्झरइ इन्दु एम चारि पाअ पज्झाडिअ छन्दु ॥ १०२ ॥

metre by name. The only metre in पिङ्गल that comes near to this is perhaps = निशिपालछन्दः¹ (See Page 171, Nirn. Press.) which however is rigid in first 3 गण with the system— $\sim\sim\sim$ in each and the 4th गण—U—.

इय⁵ अणा । यंमि⁵सं । सारतम⁵ । णाइओ⁵
आसि गो । लेसुक । म्मेहि सु । छाइओ । (St. 12.)

(iii) घत्ताः² This metre occurs at the end of every कडवक in the prayer-stanza. The metre has 7 गण of 4 मात्रा each plus 3 लघुमात्रा at the end. Thus each half contains 31 मात्रा i. e. the whole stanza consists of 62 मात्रा. Divided acc. to caesurae, the system of मात्रा will be $10+8+13=31$ in each half, with the metrical endings of first two caesurae similar. घत्ता metre is thus a sort of दुवङ्. E. g.

पणमवि । युणसायर । भुवणदिवायर । जिणचउवासइ इक्कमानि¹³
अणं पडिबोहइ । मोह नरोहइ । कोइ भव्व भावणविसण्ण ॥ (St. 1)

The present text is based upon the copy of the poem kindly given to me by Mr. M. D. Desai. He received from मुनिश्री अमरविजय the copy of this poem in Gujarati script, taken down from the original Ms. of the poem which is in the Jain Bhandar of Sinor—a small town in Gujarat. The Ms. is of 4 leaves. One leaf and a half i. e. 3 pages are taken up by our poem. There are at the average 20 lines on one page, each line generally consisting of 60 letters. The whole Ms. contains following poems :

- (१) सुर्वावलीरासः गा. ३६ अपभ्रंश
- (२) आवकविधिप्रकरणम् गा. २२
- (३) पवज्जाविहणम् गा. २८
- (४) दानकुलकम् गा. २०
- (५) शान्तिनाथनमस्काराष्टकम् गा. ८ अपभ्रंश
- (६) चारित्रमनोरथमाला गा. ३०
- (७) भावनासंधिप्रकरणम् गा. ६२—अपभ्रंश

In the end, I should not forget to thank the erudite Jain Pandit of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, Mr. L. B. Gandhi without whose timely and ungrudging help, this work would have been so incomplete. I must also acknowledge with gratitude my indebtedness to Mr. M. D. Desai who supplied me the copy of the poem for my use.

1. Ibid : P. 171.

हार धरु तिणिण सरु हिणिण परि तिगणा
पश्च युरु दुण्ण लहु अन्त कुरु रग्गणा ।
एत्थ सहि चन्दमुहि वसि लहुमालआ
कव्ववर सप्प भण छन्द णिसिपालआ ॥

२. Ibid P. 46. 47 :

पिङ्गलकडिदिट्ठ छन्द उकिट्ठ घत्त मत्त वासट्ठि करु
चउमत्तसत्तगण बेवि पाअ भण तिणिण तिणिण लहु अंत धरि ॥ ८२ ॥
पढमं दसं वीसामो बी मत्ताइं अद्दाइं । तीए तेरह विरईं वतामत्ताइं वासट्ठी ॥ ८३ ॥

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
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इक्केण वि आसवि पुंरिस मत्तु अह पडिइ झत्ति सिद्धिलेवि गत्तु । पंचासवसत्तउ जुज्जि होइ तस का गइ त्ति नवि मणइ कोइ ॥ ६ ॥ पंचिंदियविसयपसंग रेसि मणवयणकाय नवि संवरेसि । तं वाहसि कत्ती गलए एसि जं अट्टकम्मं नवि निज्जरेसि ॥ ७ ॥ अह सत्त नरय तिरियरु पञ्च अस्संखदीवसायरपवंच । बारह नव सगग पञ्च उणुत्तराई ^३ इह (य) लोगह वित्थरु नयण जाणि॥८॥ चउविहकसायँविसहरणमंत जिणवयण सुणइ जे पुन्नवंत । घणपुलइयअंग मणि सइहंति सिवलच्छिवाच्छि हार हं (हुं) ति ॥९॥ वरहरिकरिभड सज्जु पाविज्ज इभविभवि भूरि भ(भु?)ज्ज । नवि लब्भइ दुलहउ पुण पवित्तु अरिहंतदेवगुरुसाहु तत्त ॥ १० ॥ इय बारह भावणु सुवणसुहावण भणवि हेव जीवहंस किंसु । दुलहु मणयत्तणु धम्मपवित्तणु इसदिठ्ठंतिहि वज्जरिसु ॥ ११ ॥ १ ॥	एकेनापि आस(अ)वेन पुरुषो मत्तः अथ पतति झटिति शिथिलयित्वा गात्रम् । पञ्चाश्रव (आसव) सक्तो यो यदि भवति तस्य का गतिरिति न मनुते कोऽपि ॥६॥ पञ्चेन्द्रियविषयप्रसङ्गे खलु मनोवचनकायं नाऽपि संवृणोषि । तेन वाहयसि कृत्तिं (कर्तरी?) गलके ईदृशीं येनाष्टकर्माणि नापि निर्जरयसि ॥ ७ ॥ अथ सप्त नरकास्तिर्यञ्चः पञ्च असंख्यद्वीपसागरप्रपञ्चः । द्वादश नव स्वर्गाः पञ्चानुत्तराः इति लोकानां विस्तारं नयनाभ्यां जानिहि चतुर्विधकषायविषहरणमन्त्रं जिनवचनं ये शृण्वन्ति पुण्यवन्तः । घनपुलकिताङ्गा मनसा श्रद्धते शिवलक्ष्मीवक्षासि हारा भवन्ति ॥ ९ ॥ वरहरिकरिभटाः सज्जाः प्राप्यन्ते इभविभवे(वः?)भूरिभ(भु)ज्यते(भार्याः?)। नापि लभ्यते दुर्लभं पुनः पवित्रं अर्हद्देवगुरुसाधुतत्त्वम् ॥ १० ॥ इति द्वादशभावनाःसुवर्ण(श्रवण?)शोभना भणित्वा शीघ्रं अथ जीवहंस कीदृशीः । दुर्लभं मनुजत्वं धर्मपवित्रत्वं दशदृष्टान्तैर्वक्ष्यामः ॥ ११ ॥ १ ॥
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१. There is pun on the word आसव (आसव- wine or आश्रव = कर्मागमद्वार) मिथ्यात्व, अविरति, प्रमाद, कषाय, अशुभयोग are five आश्रवस according to Jain Scripture.

२. See नायागमसुत्तः १ : ८ कम्म-ज्ञानावरणीय, दर्शनावरणीय, वेदनीय, मोहनिय, आयुष्य, नाम, गोत्र, अन्तराय.

३. i. e. पञ्च अनुत्तरस्वर्गाः; they are also called पञ्च अनुत्तरविमानः They are विजय, वैजयन्त, जयन्त, अपराजित and सर्वार्थसिद्ध.

*. 4 कषायs are : क्रोध, मान, माया and लोभ.

इय ह अणायंमि संसारतम णाइओ - अस्मिन्ननादौ संसारतमसि नायितः
(अनादिकः)
आसि गोलेसु कम्मेहि मुच्छाइओ । आसीर्गोलेषु कर्मभिर्मूर्च्छायितः ।
तो अणंतउ कालउ पावड्ढिओ ततोऽनन्तात्कालात् प्रावर्धित-
तं निग्गे(र)याउभविद्यव्वयाकड्ढिओ॥१२॥ स्त्वंनिगोदाद्भवितव्यताकर्षितः ॥ १२ ॥
पुढाविकायाइछक्कायकायड्ढि(ट्ट?)ओ पृथ्वीकायादिषट्कायकायस्थितः
संखकालंमि पुण मरवि तत्थ ठिओ । असंख्यकाले पुनर्भूत्वा तत्र स्थितः ।
तो अकामेण निज्जरियक्कम्मंसओ ततोऽकामेन निर्जरितकर्माशकः
तं सि उपपन्न कहकहवि माणुस्सओ ॥१३॥ त्वमसि उत्पन्नः कथं कथमपि मानुष्यकः १३
*जुल्लगाइयदिठंतदसदुल्लहे चोल्लगादिकदशदृष्टान्तदुर्लभे
जीव संपत्ति मणुयत्तणे वल्लहे जीव संप्राप्ते मनुजत्वे वल्लभे ।
जं जिणधम्मसामग्गि मुखंकरी येन जिनधमसामग्गी मोक्षंकरीं
सज्जि तुह जाय(इ)सग्गोवरि मंजरी १४ सज्ज तव जायते स्वर्गोपरि मञ्जरी ॥ १४ ॥
पुणवि रे जीव सामग्गि एवंविहा पुनरपि रे जीव सामग्गी एवंविधा
अन्नजंममि मंनामि तुह दुल्लहा । अन्यजन्मनि मन्ये तव दुर्लभा ।
ता पमाएण सा कीस विहलिज्जे तावत्प्रमादेन सा कथं विफलीक्रियते
मणुयभवतरुह धम्मफलं लिज्जे ॥१५॥ मनुजभवतरोर्धर्मफलं लभ्यते ॥ १५ ॥
दहइ गोसीसु सिरिखंड छारक्कए दहति गोशीर्षे श्रीखण्डं क्षारकृते
छगलगहणट्टमेरावणं विक्कए । छागग्रहणार्थमैरावणं विक्रीणीते ।
कप्पतरु तोडि एरंडु सो वव्वए कल्पतरुं छित्त्वा एरण्डं स वपते
जुज्जि विसएहि मणुयत्तणं हारए ॥१६॥ यो यदि विषयैर्मनुजत्वं हारयते ॥१६॥
सुमिणपत्तंमि रज्जंमि सो मुच्छए स्वप्नप्राप्ते राज्ये स मूर्च्छति
सलिलसंकं ससि गिन्निहउं वंछए । सलिलसंकान्तं शशिनं ग्रहीतुं वाञ्छति
अबियस्वित्तेसु धन्नाइ सो कंसए अबीजक्षेत्रेषु धान्यानि स काङ्क्षते
जुज्जि धम्मेण विण मुक्ख आविक्खए १७ यो यदि धर्मेण विना मोक्षमावीक्षते १७
किं तुमंधो सि किं वा वि धन्नुुरिओ किं त्वमन्धोऽसि किं वाऽपि धनुर्वातिकः
अहव किं संनिवाएण आउरिओ । अथवा किं संनिपातेनातुरितः ।
अमयसम धम्मु जं विस व्व अवमंनसे अमृतसमं धर्मं येन विषमिवावमन्यसे
विसयविस विसमु अमयं च (व) बहु विषयविषं विषमममृतं च (इव) बहु
मंनसे ॥ १८ ॥ मन्यसे ॥ १८ ॥

१. ६. कायऽः पृथ्वीकाय, अप्काय, तेजःकाय, वायुकाय, वनस्पतिकाय, असकाय.

*See additional notes.

तिज्जि तुह नाणविन्नाणगुणढंभरा तस्मात्तव ज्ञानविज्ञानगुणढम्बरा
जलणजालासु निवडंतु जीय निम्भरा । ज्वलनज्वालासु निपतन्तु जीव निर्भराः॥
पयइवामेसु कामेसु जं रज्जसे प्रकृतिवामेषु कामेषु येन रज्जसे
जं पुणपुणवि नरयानले पच्चसे ॥ १९ ॥ येन पुनः पुनरपि नरकानले पच्यसे॥१९॥
असुरसुररमणिभोगेहिं जं न तुट्ठओ असुरसुररमणीभोगैः यदा न तुष्टकः
मणुयविसएहि ता किं होसि जीय पुट्ठओ । मनुजविषयैस्तावत्किं भवसि जीव पुष्टकः
इत्थइ (अ?) त्थंमि जिणभणियसिद्धंतओ अत्रात्र (थै) जिणभणितसिद्धान्तः
सुणहं इंगालदाहस्स दिठंतओ ॥ २० ॥ शृणुताङ्गारदाहस्य दृष्टान्तकम् ॥ २० ॥
जिम तुह मणु रिद्धिहिं विसयसमिद्धिहिं यथा तव मन ऋद्धिभिर्विषयसमृद्धै-
तिम जइ धंमि वि होइ जीय । स्तथा यदि धर्मेऽपि भवति जीव ।
ता सिव उक्कंठिय करयलसंठिय तर्हि शिवमुत्कण्ठितं करतलसंस्थितं
सुरनरसुह अणुसंमि (गि) हुय ॥ २१ ॥ २ ॥ सुरनरसुखमनुषङ्गि भूतम् ॥ २१ ॥
सा धन्नउ धन्नउ सालिभट्ट स धन्यो धन्यः शालिभद्रः

× × × × । × × × ×

ते सरह भरहसगराइराय तान् स्मरत् भरतसगरादिराजान्
खचरिंदिनरिंदिहिं नमियपाय ॥ २२ ॥ खेचरेन्द्रनरेन्द्रैर्नतपादान् ॥ २२ ॥
अप्पेण वि कारणि झत्ति जेहिं अल्पेनापि कारणेन झटिति यैः
थे (वे) रग्गाउरियमाणसेहिं । वैराग्यापूरितमानसैः ।
छंडेविणु घरपुररमणिसत्थ त्यक्त्वा गृहपुररमणीसार्थं
च(व)उ गिन्हिय साहिय परमअत्थु ॥ २३ ॥ व्रतं गृहीत्वा साधितः परमोऽर्थः ॥ २३ ॥
तं पुण पियपरभवताडिओ सि त्वं पुनः प्रियपराभवताडितोऽसि
दालिद्रोगसयपीडिओ सि दारिद्र्यरोगशतपीडितोसि ।
नोग्धसि *गद्धिळ कुकुरव्व न स्वपिहि गाढं कुक्कुर इव
जं अच्छसि गद्धा (त्ता) सूयर व्व ॥ २४ ॥ येन आस्से गर्त्ताशूकर इव ॥ २४ ॥
किं लोहई घडिउं हियं तुज्झ किं लोहेन घटितं हृदयं तव
ज(जं)न विमुणीइ तुह तु(त)णउं यन्न विज्ञायते त्वदीयं गूढं ।
गइत्तु(?ज्झु) ।

जं पत्तइं पियमरणाइ दुक्खि येन प्राप्ते प्रियमरणादिदुःखे
नवि फुट्ठइ नवि लट्ठइ मुक्खि ॥ २५ ॥ नापि स्फुटति नापि लुप्यति मोक्षे ॥ २५ ॥

*a peculiar word : न + उभयतिः न स्वपिषि but has the sense न स्वपिहि. It is however doubtful.

पंचासवि अज्जिय पइं जि दुक्ख
अणुहवसि ताई तवेव तिक्ख ।
जिणि जीवि करंबउ खन्ध एव
सहिसइ स विलंबउं सययमेव ॥ २६ ॥
जं अंनं जंम करुणं रुयंत
पइ मारिय निग्घण जंतु हंत ।
तं रोगसोगडुहविधुरदेह
अककाल वि वच्चसि मुच्चगेहिं ॥ २७ ॥
जं कूढकवड पयडवि असार
पर वंचिय किउ दव्वावहार ।
तिणि तुज्झ जड सडिय जिह
अणुहूय दलिदीमज्झि लीह ॥ २८ ॥
नवजुव्वाणि मयणपरावसेण
परदार विडंबिय तंनि जेण ।
तं जयउ क(कु)ट्टिण गालियगनु
सोहगुरूवलाइन्नव(च)त्तु ॥ २९ ॥
घरदारपरिग्घ(ग)हवावडेण
पइं धम्म चत्तु धणलंपडेण ।
हि नरय पडंता तुज्झ मूढ
को देसइ हत्थालंबु गूढ ॥ ३० ॥
आरंभ करेविणु जीव विहेविणु
विविहवाहि किम सहसि जीय ।
सलसलंता संपइ हियडउं कंपइ
वंका पडिसिइ डंभ तुह ॥ ३१ ॥ ३ ॥
अप्परोगेहिं किं होसि जीय कायरो
जेण तुह पास नियमायपियभायरो ।
किं न संभरसि निग्गोअपुढवाइयं
डुक्खमणुहूय पुवंतए णाइयम् ॥ ३२ ॥

समगमाहारनीहारकयवेयणो
जुगवउसासनीसासनिच्चैयणो ।
तं निग्गोएसु अन्नभवभीडिओ
आसि रे जीव सीयतावपरिपीडिओ ३३ आसीः रे जीव शीततावपरिपीडितः ३३

पञ्चाश्रवैरर्जितं त्वया यदुःखं
अनुभवसि तत्(तानि lit)तापमिव तीक्ष्णम्
येन जीवेन करम्बः खादित एव
सहिष्यते स विडम्बकः सततमेव ॥ २६ ॥
येनान्यस्मिन्नन्मनि करुणं रुदन्त—
स्त्वया मारिता निर्घृण जन्तवो हन्त ।
तेन रोगशोकदुःखविधुरदेहः
अकालमपि व्रजसि मृत्युगेहम् ॥ २७ ॥
येन कूटकपटानि प्रकटय्यासाराणि
परान्वञ्चित्वा कृतो द्रव्यापहारः ।
तेन तव जड शटिता जिह्वा
अनुभूता दरिद्रिमध्ये लेखा ॥ २८ ॥
नवयौवने मदनपरवशेन
परदारा विडम्बितास्तनुषु येन ।
तद्भवतु (?) कुष्ठेन गलितगात्रम्
सौभाग्यरूपलावण्यवत् (त्यक्तम्) ॥ २९ ॥
गृहदारपरिग्रहव्यापृतेन
त्वया धर्मस्त्यक्तो धनलम्पटेन ।
हे नरकं पततस्तव मूढ
को दास्यति हस्तालम्बं गूढ ॥ ३० ॥
आरम्भं कृत्वा जीवं विहन्त्य
विविधव्याधीन् किं सहसे जीव ।
शल्यशलयायितं संप्रति हृदयं कम्पते
वक्राः पतिष्यन्ति दम्भास्तव ॥ ३१ ॥ ३ ॥
अल्परोगैः किं भवसि जीव कातरो
येन तव पार्श्वे निजमातृपितृभ्रातरः ।
किं न संस्मरसि निगोदपृथ्व्यादिकं
दुःखमनुभूय (तं) पूर्वतया नायितम्
(अनादिकं) ॥ ३२ ॥

समाग(समक)माहारनीहारकृतवेदनो
युगपदुच्छ्वासनिःश्वासनिश्चेतनः ।
त्वं निगोदेष्वन्यनभवाक्रान्तः

अहमूलो अ सत्तावरी प(ग?)ज्जरो आर्द्रमूलश्च शतावरी गृजन-
 णंतकाएसु तं विहिवसय जज्जरो । अनन्तकायेषु त्वं विधिवशेन जर्जरः ।
 किसलक (प?) नि नववत्थलो^१ सूरणो किसलयपर्णैः नवः वस्तुलः सूरणः
 तिष्ठतिलिओ सि कटिओ सि कयपूरणो^२ तैलतलितो ऽसि कथितो ऽसि कृतपूरणः
 तो समुप्पन्नपत्ते(१)य तरुसंगओ । ततः समुत्पन्नपत्रश्च तरुसंगतः
 मूलफलबिंददलबीयपुष्पं(प्फं)गओ । मूलफलवृन्तदलबीजपुष्पं गतः ।
 जो कुहाडेहि नो वड्डिओ अट्ट(इ)ओ यः कुठारैर्न छिन्नः आर्त(र्द्र)कः
 ताव हिमजलणजालावलिदट्ठओ ॥ ३५ ॥ तावद् हिमज्वलनज्वालावलिदग्धकः ३५
 पुढाविकायं पीलिय पलिहोवलो पृथ्वीकायेन पीडितः परिस्रोपलः
 लवाणि मणिरयणि हरियालहयहिंणुलो । लवणे मणिरत्ने हरितालहतहिङ्गुलः ।
 कुसयकुद्दालहलचंचुचयच्चुन्निओ कुसयकुद्दालचञ्चुचयच्चूर्णितः
 सपरसत्थेहितिक्खेहि तंतत्थि(च्छि)ओ^३ स्वपरशस्त्रैस्तीक्ष्णैस्त्वं तष्टः ॥ ३६ ॥
 नीर नीरेण तिक्खेण सारण वा नीरं नीरेण तीक्ष्णेन क्षारेण वा
 कुडुयकसाएण अंबिलेण मधुरेण वा । कटुककषायेणाम्लेन मधुरेण वा ।
 सिसिर उन्हेण उन्हा वि सिसिरेण वा शिशिरमुष्णेनोष्णमपि शिशिरेण वा ।
 पवण पवणेण निहिणिज्ज खलणेणवा^४ पवनः पवनेन निहन्यते स्खलनेन वा^५
 जलणु सलिलेण अन्नेण वा खिज्जए ज्वलनःसलिलेनान्येन वा खिद्यते
 एवमिह सपरसत्थेहि जीय भिज्जए । एवमिह स्वपरशस्त्रैर्जीवो भिद्यते ।
 इत्थ उप्पन्नअन्नाण तं ताडिओ अत्रोत्पन्नाज्ञानस्त्वं ताडितो-
 रोगलेसेण किं मूअसि आराडिओ ॥ ३८ ॥ रोगलेशेन किं मुञ्चासि आराटीः ॥ ३८ ॥
 कहवि बेइंदि तेइंदि चउरिंदिओ कथमपि द्वीन्द्रियस्त्रीन्द्रियश्चतुरिन्द्रिय-
 तं जि जाओ सि अस्सन्नि पंचिंदिओ स्त्वंयद् जातो ऽसि असंज्ञी पञ्चेन्द्रियः ।
 तत्थ सीयतावच्छुहजलणसंताविओ तत्र शीततापक्षुधाज्वलनसंतापितः
 णेगहा जीव पंचत्तणं पाविओ ॥ ३९ ॥ अनेकधा जीव पञ्चत्वं प्राप्तः ॥ ३९ ॥
 असणपाणंमि खाइंमि तह साइमे अशनपानेषु खाद्ये तथा स्वाद्ये
 तं जि दलिउ तलिओ सि उग्गाहिमे । त्वमेव दलितस्तलितो ऽसि अवगाह्ये
 थेवडुक्खेहि मनि होसि जीय कायरो स्तोक्कुःसैर्मनसि भवसि जीव कातरः
 तासु को विद(बिंद)जो पीइ किर तस्य को बिन्दुः यःपिबति किल सागरम्
 सायरो ॥ ४० ॥

१. वत्थल, = वत्थुल, = वस्तुलः 'a kind of vegetable called 'वत्थुवा' in Guj. .

२. कुसयः A kind of agricultural implement cf. 'कोस' Guj.

घणकंमिहि छाडु पाणियामोइ (-उ ?) घनकर्मभिश्छादितः प्राणी आमोचितः(?)
तह कालमिच्छत्त जीअ तथा कालमिथ्यात्वं जीव ।
जगि नत्थि ठाउं जीवह काउ जगति नास्ति स्थानं जीवानां किमपि
जहिं न हूय जंमण मरण ॥ ४१ ॥ ४ ॥ यत्र न भूतं जन्म मरणम् ॥ ४१ ॥
अह हुय पारद्धि पुहविपाल अथ भूतः पारद्धिकः पृथ्वीपालो
मच्छउ अनु मच्छउ गुत्तिवालु । मत्स्यमनु मात्स्यिको गुप्तिपालः ।
अहिवगधसीह चिउ(त्त)विचित्त अहिव्याघ्रसिंहांश्चित्रविचित्रान्
मारेवि जन्तु तं नरय पत्तु ॥ ४२ ॥ मारयित्वा जन्तून् त्वं नरके प्राप्तः ॥ ४२ ॥
पनरह परहंमिय तत्थ तत्थ हुंति पञ्चदश परमाधार्मिकाः तत्र तत्र भवन्ति
ता धाइय दिसि दिसि किलकिलंत । तावद् धावितो दिशि दिशि किलकिलन् ।
घडियाला कड्डु तेउहिं तेम घटिकालयात्कर्षितं तैजसैस्तथा ।
नालैरमज्झि खडहडिय जेम ॥ ४३ ॥ नालिकेरमध्ये खटखटिता यथा ॥ ४३ ॥
ते खंडिय तक्खणि मिलियखंड ते खण्डितास्तत्क्षणं मिलितखण्डाः ।
पारय जिम नारहुय (न रहिय ?) पिंड । पारदो यथा न भवति पिण्डः ।
खरतावदावदहणेण दीणु खरतापदावदहनेन दीनः
लूणीपिंडउ जिम तावि लीणु ॥ ४४ ॥ प्रक्षणापिण्डो यथा तापे लीनः ॥ ४४ ॥
असिपत्ति गहिणि आसीण जाव असिपत्रे गहने आसीनो यावद्
उवविट्टउ पहरणनियरि ताव । उपविष्टः प्रहरणनिकरे तावद् ।
जा सरइ जंतु वेयरणिं सिंधु यदा सरति जन्तुर्वैतरणीं सिन्धुं
ता वेळु य गलि भग्गउ मुद्ध ॥ ४५ ॥ तदा वेणुश्च गले भग्गो मुग्ध ॥ ४५ ॥
अनुदक्कहि भुत्तउ तडफडंत अनुद्वौकसे भुक्तः तडफडन्
जंतेहि निपीडिय कडयडंत । यन्त्रैर्निपीडिताः कडकडन् ।
रहि जुत्तउ तुड्डउ तडयडंत रथे युक्तः त्रुटितः तडतडन्
वज्जावलिपक्कउ कडकडंतु ॥ ४६ ॥ वज्रावलिपक्वो मुहुः क्वथ्यमानः ॥ ४६ ॥
कत्थ य घणमुग्गरमारिओ सि कुत्र च घनमुद्गरमारितोऽसि
खरसिंबलिसूलियविंधओ सि खरशाल्मलिशूलिकाविन्दोऽसि ।
कत्थ य नियमंसं खाइओ सि कुत्र च निजमांसं खादितोऽसि
अन्नत्थ य तउओ पाइओ सि ॥ ४७ ॥ अन्यन्न च त्रपुकं पायितोऽसि ॥ ४७ ॥
तह खंडो खंड वि खंडखंड तथा खण्डः खण्डोऽपि खण्डखण्डः
दिसिपालह प(ब)लिकिय तं जि भंड । दिक्पालानां बलिकृतस्त्वं यथा भाण्डाः
इय कित्ति कहिज्जइ तरइ डुक्ख इदं कियत्कथ्यते तरति दुःखं
जं जीव सहिय पइं अइव तिक्खु ॥ ४८ ॥ येन जीव सोढं त्वयाऽतीव तीक्ष्णम् ॥ ४८ ॥

वहवाहन (ण) बंधणतज्जणाई लुहउन्हतिन्हदहणंकणाई । आरंकुसकुसलइ ताडणाई सहियाई जीव तिरिएसु ताई ॥ ४९ ॥ मणुएसु वि दीहररोगसोग— दालिदपराहवविप्पयोग । धणहरणमरणचाररनिरोह सहियाई परच्चव्व(सि) विवहदोह ॥ ५० ॥ परभवपेसत्तणि सुरदासत्तणि देवत्तणि पत्तइ सहिय । ता जिणवरधम्म कुणह सुरम्म जिम नवि पामह डुक्ख जीव ॥ ५१ ॥ ५१ ॥ धंमु न करेसि चित्तेसि सुह मुत्तिए चणय विकेसि वंछेसि वरमुत्तिए । जं जि वाविज्जए तं जि (ति?) खलु लुज्जए येन यद्वाप्यते तेन तत्खलु लूयते भुज्जए जं जि उगार तस्स किज्जए ॥ ५२ ॥ भुज्जते येन यडुद्धारस्तस्य क्रियते ॥ ५२ ॥ पुव्वकयकम्मदोसेण वाहिगणो ता न धीरेण देयं विसाए मणो । सुणि सणंकुमारचक्किस्स अहिचा(या) सिया	वधवाहनबन्धनतर्जनानि क्षुधोष्णवृष्णादहनाङ्गनानि । आराङ्कुशकुशल्यैस्ताडनानि सोढानि जीव तिर्यक्षु तानि ॥ ४९ ॥ मनुजेष्वपि दीर्घरोगशोक— दारिद्र्यपराभवविप्रयोगाः । धनहरणमरणचारकनिरोधाः सोढानि परवशेन विविधदुःखानि ॥ ५० ॥ पराभवप्रेष्यत्वे सुरदासत्वे देवत्वे प्राप्ते सोढम् तज्जिनवरधर्मं कुरुत सुरम्यं यथा नाऽपि प्राप्नुत दुःखानि जीव ॥ ५१ ॥ धर्मं न करोषि चिन्तयसि सुखं मुक्तेः चणकान्विक्रीणासि वाञ्छसि वरमौक्तिकानि पूर्वकृतकर्मदोषेण व्याधिगण— स्तावन्न धीरेण देयं विषादे मनः । शृणु सनत्कुमारचक्रिणा अध्यासिताः श्रुत्वा श्रीवीरजिनसोढोपसर्गान् कथं तव मूढ उन्मार्गे मनो लगति । सुभटचरितेन श्रुतेनेह कातरो भवसि खलु येन शौण्डीर्यगुणसा(ग)दरः शुद्धध्यानेन लघु लब्धसिद्धालयः तथा च स्मर्यते स गजसुकुमारकः । यस्य शिरो ज्वलितज्वलनेन चिरंरुढकं अष्टघनकर्मकान्तारमपि दुष्टकम् ॥ ५५ ॥
× × × × ॥ ५३ ॥	× × × × ॥ ५३ ॥
सुणवि सिरिवीरजिनसहियउवसगए कीस तुह मूढ उम्मगि मण लगए । सुहडचरिएण सुणिएण इह कायरो होसि खलुजेण सोडीरगुणसायरो ॥ ५४ ॥ सुद्धज्ञाणेण लहु लहियसिद्धालओ तह य समरिज्जए सु गयसुकुमालओ । जस्स सिर जालियजलणेण चिररुढयं अट्ठघणकंमकन्तारमवि डुट्ठयं ॥ ५५ ॥	श्रुत्वा श्रीवीरजिनसोढोपसर्गान् कथं तव मूढ उन्मार्गे मनो लगति । सुभटचरितेन श्रुतेनेह कातरो भवसि खलु येन शौण्डीर्यगुणसा(ग)दरः शुद्धध्यानेन लघु लब्धसिद्धालयः तथा च स्मर्यते स गजसुकुमारकः । यस्य शिरो ज्वलितज्वलनेन चिरंरुढकं अष्टघनकर्मकान्तारमपि दुष्टकम् ॥ ५५ ॥

१. चारकः “ a prison.

२. for the accounts of the persons see. त्रिषष्टिशलाकापुस्तक-
चरित्र of हेमचन्द्र पृष्ठ १०.

ज्ञाणमद्वं च रुद्रं च ता वज्जए ध्यानमार्तं च रौद्रं च तावद् वज्ज्यते
जेण जोगेसु मनसुद्धि सहिलि(लहि)ज्जए। येन योगेषु मनःशुद्धिः श्लाघ्यते ।
इत्थ पुंडरिअ मरुदेवि भरहेसरो अत्र पुण्डरीको मरुदेवी भरतेश्वरः
पसंनचंदो य दिट्ठंत समणोहरो ॥५६॥ प्रसन्नचन्द्रश्च दृष्टान्तः सुमनोहरः ॥५६॥
जा न रोगेहिं सोगेहिं वाहिज्जसे यावन्न रोगैः शोकैः बाह्य(बाध्य)से
जा न जरमरणरक्खेहि भक्खिज्जसे । यावन्न जरामरणरक्षोभ्यां भक्ष्यसे ।
त(१)व मुणिधम्म धरि अहव गेहिव्वए तावन्मुनिधर्मं धारयाऽथवा गेहिब्रतानि
धरि पलित्तंमि खणि सकइ को कूवए ५७ गृहे प्रदीप्ते खानितुं शक्नोति कः कूपम् ५७
जाव करचरणनयणेहि तं सज्जओ यावत्करचरणनयनेऽस्त्वं सज्जकः
ताव जीय होसि आवस्सए उज्जुओ । तावज्जीव भवसि आवश्यके उद्यतः ।
बुद्धभावंमि पुण मलिसि नियहत्थए वृद्धभावे पुनर्मर्दयसि निजहस्तौ
तुट्ठि गुणि जेम धारणकरणमत्थए ५८ त्रुटिते गुणे यथा धारणकरणमर्थ्यते
छंडि घरघरणिभइभत्तिज्जए त्यक्त्वा गृहगृहिणीभ्रातृभ्रातृव्यान्
देह दाणाणि जीय धंम संचिज्जए । देहि दानानि जीव धर्मः संचयीते ।
एहिं सव्वेहिं नवि जमह रिक्खिज्जए एभिः सर्वैर्नापि यमाद्रक्ष्यते
इत्थ दिट्ठंत नंदो वि निसुणिज्जए ५९ अत्र दृष्टान्तो नन्दोऽपि निश्चयते ॥५९॥
सरह जिणसिद्धमुणिधम्मचउसरणयं स्मरत जिनसिद्धमुनिधर्मचतुःशरणकम्
जेण नवि होइ मोहाउ पुण मरणयं । येन नापि भवति मोहात् पुनर्मरणकम् ।
सुहड एगो वि सरणागयं रक्खए सुभट एकोऽपि शरणागतं रक्षति
किं पुण बहु रे जीव रिउणो जए ॥६०॥ किं पुनर्बहवो रे जीव रिपोर्जये ॥६०॥
बुकय निंदेसु करि सुकयअणुमोयणं दुष्कृतं निन्द कुरु सुकृतानुमोदनं
सयलजीवेसु मित्ती य सुणि चोयणं । सकलजीवेषु मैत्रीं च शृणु चोदनाम् ।
जेण भ(भु)त्तूण सुरसुक्ख नीसल्लयं येन भक्त्वा(भुक्त्वा?)सुरसुखं निःशल्यकं
लहसि केवल्लकल्लाणबाहुल्लयं ॥ ६१ ॥ लभसे कैवल्यकल्याणबाहुल्यकम् ६१
निम्मलगुणभूरिहिं सिवदेवसूरिहिं निर्मलगुणभूरीणां शिवदेवसूरीणां
पढमसीसु जयदेवमुणि । प्रथमशिष्यो जयदेवमुनिः ।
किय भावणसंधी सिभावुसुगंधी कृतो भावनासंधिः स्वभावसुगन्धः
निसुणावि अन्न वि धरउ माणि ॥६२॥६॥ निःश्रुत्याऽन्योऽपि धरतु मनासि॥६२॥

इति भावनासंधिप्रकरणम्

VOCABULARY

Abbreviations: D. = Deshi words. Sk = Sanskrit
M. = Marathi Guj = Gujarati.

अ

अइव	अतीव	अनुद्वक्कहि	D. अनुच्छादयन्ति or अनु-
अच्छउ	अस् 'to be'भवतुor अस्तु		द्वौकन्ते (st 46. l. i.)
	or आस्ताम्	अनुमोयणं	अनुमोदनम्
अच्छसि	आसि आस्से	अर्प्यं	आत्मानम् or अल्पम्
अज्जिय	अर्जित	अप्पणु	आत्मनः
अट्टं	आर्तम्	अंबिल	आम्ल
अट्ट	अष्ट	अमयं	अमृतं
अणंत	अनंत	अवि य	अपि च
अणायंमि	अनादौ Loc. sing.	अरिहंत	अर्हत्
अणुहवइ	अनुभवति	असणं	अशनं
अत्थ	अर्थः	अस्सन्नि	असंज्ञि(पञ्चेन्द्रियst.39l.2
अन्न	अन्य	असिपत्ति	असिपत्रे loc. Sing. a kind of hell..
अन्नत्थ	अन्यत्र	अस्संख	असंख्य
अन्नाण	अज्ञान	अह, अहवा	अथ, अथवा.
अन्नुण	अन्यून	अहि	अहि

आ

आउरिओ	आतुरितः or आकुलितः	आविकखए	आवीक्षते
	or अपूरितः	आसव	आसंव (Sk.) आश्रव see
आरंकुसकुस-	आराङ्कुशकुशल्यानि लइ		St. 6 l. 1. and also note. 4.
आराडिओ	आराट्टी: 'screams'	आसि	आसीत् आसीः
आवस्सए	आवह्यके 'in daily	आसीण'	आसीन Pr. P. आस् to
	duties' St. 58. l. 1,		'sit.'

इ

इक्क	एक	इत्थ, इत्थ(अ) इत्थंमि अत्र, अत्रअत्र. अर्थे
इक्कुलउ	एकाकी cf. Guj. एकलो M. एकला H. इकला	इभ (Sk.) 'Elephant' st. 10 l. I.
इंगाल D.	अङ्गार	
इंदिय	इन्द्रिय	इय इदानीं or इति (See.
इंदियालु	इन्द्रजालम्	Intro. Gram.)

उ

उक्कंठिय	उत्कण्ठित	उवसग्ग	उपसर्गः St. 54. l. I
उग्गाहिमे	अवगाह्ये things that are used for frying 6-9. oil.		refers to the उपसर्ग 'a calamity brought about on महावीर by gods or the calamity of two devout prie- sts by गोशाळा with his तेजोलश्या in the समवसरण or the assem- bly of महावीर. See त्रिष- ष्टिशलाकापुरुषचरित्र पर्व १०
उग्गार	उद्गारः Cf. Guj: 'आडेकार		
उज्जुओ	उद्यतः		
उणुत्तराई	अनुत्तरस्वर्गाः See note 6.		
उन्ह	उष्ण		
उप्पन्न	उत्पन्न		
उम्मग्ग	उन्मार्ग		
उवविटुउ	उपविष्टः	उसास	उच्छ्वासः

ए

एगो	एकः	एवं विहा	एवं विधा
एरंडु	एरण्डः	एसि	एतादृशी
एरावणः	ऐरावणः	एहु	एषः

क

करयल	करतल	कम्म कम्मंसओ कर्मन्. कर्माशिकः
करंबउ	करम्बः 'a kind of food preparation of rice and curds '	कडयडंत Onometo poetic words See. 46. 2.
कत्ति	कृत्ति 'a hide' or कर्तरी 'an instrument for cutting'-e. g. 'a knife.'	क(कु)द्विण कुष्ठेन-by leprosy महुः क्वथ्यमानः St. 46. l. 4. कल्लाण केवल्ल कल्याणकैवल्य

कहइ	कथयति	किलकिलंत an onomoto poetic word
कथ्य य	कुत्र च	किसल क(प?)नैः किसलय पणैः
कह, कहवि & कथं, कथमपि, कथंकथमपि	किउ	कृत
कहकहवि	कीसु	कीदृक्
कसाय	कषाय See. note. 7.	कुक्कुर
कट्टिओ	कृष्टः or कत्रथितः	कुहाडेहि
कप्पतरु	कल्पतरुः	कुठारैः
कवड	कपट	कुसय. D. an iron agricultural implement.
ककए	कृते	कुडाल
कंसए	काडूते	कुडुय
कंपइ	कम्पते	कुडक
काउ	किमपि St. 41. 1. 3.	कुसल
कायरो	कातरः	कुशल्य
काय	काया	कूड
कित्ति	कियदिति	कूट
किर	किल	कूव
		कृतपूरणो
		कोइ
		कोऽपि
		कोवि(विं)द-कोविन्दुः

ख

खचरिंद	खेचरेन्द्र	खार	क्षार
खन्द्र	खादित	खाईमि	खाद्ये
खलण	स्खलन	खाइओ	खादितः
खडहडिय	खटखटायितः onomoto	खिज्जए	खिद्यते
खणि	खनितुम्	खित्त	क्षेत्र
खंडिय	खण्डित		

ग

गइ	गति	गत्ता	गर्ता
गय	गज, गत	गलए	गलके
गलइ	गलति	गहिणी	गहने 45. 1
गहणटुम्	ग्रहणार्थम्.	गत्तु	गात्रम्
गहिम्	गृहीत	गिन्हिउ	गृहीतुम्
गइत्तु(ञ्छु?) गुह्यम्		गुत्तिवाल	गुत्तिपाल

गुणि	गुणे loc. sing. 'a string.'	गोलेसु	गोलेषु st. 12.2
गेहु	गृहं	गोसीसु	' in grooves.
गेहिब्वए	गृहिनतं st.57.3.	गोशीष	' a sort of, sandal. '

घ

घर	गृहं	गढियाला	घटिकालयम् ' a sand-
घरणि	गृहिणी	bottle for measuring time.'	Guj.
घण	घन	घडियाळु	St. 43. 3.
घट्टिछ	गाढम् 24. 2.	घडिउ	घटितः

च

चतु	त्यक्तः	चउविह	चतुर्विधः
चंदु	चन्द्रः	चउरिंदियो	चतुरिन्द्रियः
चारय	चारक ' a prison	चुल्लगाइय	चोल्लकादिक
च(व)उ	व्रतम्—a vow	चुन्निओ	चूर्णितः
चउवीसइ	चतुर्विंशतिः	चोयणं	चोदनाम्
चउसरणयं	चतुःशरणकं		

छ

छकाय	षट्कायः	छाइउ	छादितः
छगल	छागः	छार	क्षार 'Ashes.' Guj. छार
छंडइ D.	त्यजति	छुह	क्षुधा

ज

जइ	यदि	जंतेहि	यन्त्रैः
जलण	ज्वलन	जाय	जात
जड	जड Sk.	जाणइ	जानाति
जज्जरो	जर्जरः	जालासु	ज्वालासु
जलिय	ज्वलित	जाओ	जातः
जर	जरा	जि	यद्, an expletive
जमह	यमात्	जिम	यथा
जयउ. D.	भवतु	जिह	जिह्वा
जए	जये	जीवहंस	Sk.
जंम, जंमण	जन्मन्	जीय	जीव
जंतु	Sk.		

जुज्जि	यो यदि or यः एव	जुत्तउ	युक्तः
जुव्वणि	यौवने	जे	ये
जुगव	युगपद्	जोगेसु	योगेषु
		झ	
झत्ति	झटिति	झाण	ध्यानं
		ठ	
ठिओ	स्थितः	ठाउ	स्थानम्
		ड	
डंबरा	दम्बरः 'hubbub. '	डंभे	दम्भः
		ण	
णंतकाएसु	अनन्तकायेषु		ginning
णाथिओ-	नायित 'led, brought.' गिय		निज
णाइयं	अनादिकं=without be-णेगहा		अनेकधा
		त	
तउं,तं	त्वम्	तिरियउ	तिर्यच्
तत्तु	तत्त्वम्	तिज्जि	तस्माद् (तद् + यदि)
तम	तमस्		See. Intro: Gram, त एव
तत्थ	तत्र	तिकस्स	तीक्ष्णं
तवेव	तापमिव	तिष्ठ	तिल
तकस्सणि	तत्क्षणे	तिलिओ	तिलितः 'pounded for extracting oil. '
तडफडंत	onometo. cf. Gaj 'तडफडतुं' M. तडफडणे तिन्ह		वृष्णा
तंनि	तनौ 'in the body.'	तुह	तव
तत्थिओ	स्थितः	तुम	त्वम्
तडयडंतु	Onometo.	तुट्टु	तुष्टः
तउओ	त्रपुकम् 'melted lead'	तुज्झ	तव
तरइ	तरति	तुणउ	तणउ (a Gen. Suffix)
ता	तावद्	तुड्डउ	त्रुटित
ताडिओ	ताडितः	तेइंदि	त्रीन्द्रिय
ताव	तावद्	तो	ततः
तावज्जए	तप्यते	तोडि D.	डित्त्वा
धि	इति		

		थ	
थे(वे)रग	स्थविराग्र; वैराग्य	थेव	स्तोक
		द	
दह्	दग्ध	दीव	द्वीप
दस	दशन् 'ten'	दीहर	दीर्घ
दहइ	दहति	दुक्ख	दुःखं
दव्वावहारु	द्रव्यापहारः	दुल्लहउ	दुर्लभः
दलिउ	दलितः	दुह	दुःखं
दहणांकणाइ	दहनाङ्कणानि	दुट्ठयं	दुष्टकं
दलिट्ठी	दरिद्रिन्	दुकय	दुष्कृतं
दिवायर	दिवाकरं	देसइ	दास्यति
दिट्ठंत	दृष्टान्त	दोह	दुःख cf. Guj. 'दोह्यलां'
दिसि	दिशि		
		ध	
धम्म	धर्मः	धन्नउ	धन्यः a proper name also
धन्नाइं	धान्यानि St. 17. 3.	धरउ	धरतु
धन्नूरिओ	(? D.) (धनुर्वातिक)	धाइय	धावितः
	St. 18. 1.		
		न	
नयण	नयन	निसुणिज्जए	निश्चयते
नरय	नरक	निम्मल	निर्मलः
नरिंद	नरेन्द्र	नियर	निकर
नववत्थल	नववस्तुलः 'a kind of vegetable.'	नीहार	नीहार 'Evacuation of the natural excrements of the body (opp. आहार)'
नवि	नापि		
नाण	ज्ञान	नीसास	निःश्वास
नारहुय	न भूतः 44. 2.	नीसल्लयं	निःशल्यकम्
(नरहिय ?)		निग्घण	निर्घृणः
निब्भरा	निर्भराः	निव	नृप 4. 4 ?
निग्गोअ	निगोद	निहिणिज्ज	निहन्यः or निहन्यते
निच्चेयणो	निश्चेतन	नोग्धासि	न स्वपिषि-
निरोह	निरोधः		

प

पडिबोहइ	प्रतिबोधति	पाबु	पापः
परिगह	परिग्रहः	पाण	प्राणाः
पत्थयालु	पृथ्वीपालः? See note. 2.	पावड्डिओ	प्रावर्धितः
पडिइ	पतति	पाय	पाद
पसंग	प्रसङ्गः	पास	पार्श्व
पवंच	प्रपञ्चः	पाविओ	प्रापितः
पवण	पवनः	पाणियामोइ	प्राणी आमोचितः
पमाण	प्रमादेन	(उ?) ? st.	
पत्त	प्राप्त	41. 1.	
पयइवामेसु	प्रकृतिवामेषु	पारद्धी	पारार्द्धिकः ' a fowler '
पच्चसे	पच्यसे	पारय	पारद
परभव	पराभव	पामह D.	प्राप्तुत Imp. 2 nd per plu 'St. 51. 5.' Guj.
पइं	त्वया		पामवु
पयड	प्रकट		
परावस	परवश	पुण, पुणप-	पुण्य, पुनः पवित्र
पडंत	पतन्तः	वित्तु	
प(ग?)ज्जरो गृज्जनं		पुहवि, पुह-	पृथ्वी पृथ्वीपालः
पत्ते	पत्रे	विपाल	
पलिहोवलो	परिखोपल (a stone of a pit)	पुरिस	पुरुष
पंचत्तणं	पञ्चत्वं	पुन्नयंत	पुण्यवन्तः
पनरह	पञ्चदश	पिय	प्रिय
परहंमिय	परमाधार्मिकाः gods of hell.' They are 15 acc. to Jainism. See. St. 43. 1.	पिइ	पिबति
पहरण	प्रहरण	पिंड	Sk.
पक्कउ	पक्व	पीडइ	पीड्यति
प(व)लिकिय बलीकृता 'sacrificed'		पीलिय	पीडितः
परच्च(व्व)सि परवशेन		पेसत्ताणि	प्रेष्यत्वे
पलित्त	प्रदीप्त cf. Guj 'पलितो.'	पुलइय	पुलकित
पढम	प्रथम	पुढवि	पृथ्वी
पाविज्ज	प्राप्य or प्राप्यते	पुण वि	पुनरपि
		पुढओ	पुष्टः
		पुव्वंतए	पूर्वतया or पूर्व त्वय
		—पुष्पंगओ	—पुष्पंगतः

फ

फुट्टइ स्फुटति

बारह द्वादश
बिंट वृन्त

भव्व भव्य
भड्ड भट
भज्ज भज्य, भज्यते, भार्या
भवियव्वया भवितव्यता
भणिय भणित
भग्गउ भग्गः
भंड भाण्डः cf. M. 'a vessel. D. भीडइ
भक्खिज्जसे भक्ष्यसे
भइ भ्रातृ cf. Guj 'भाई'
भत्तिज्जए भ्रातृव्यः

मत्तु मत्तः
मणइ मन्यते
मण मनः
मंस मांसम्
मंत मन्त्र
मच्छउ मत्स्यः
मच्छिउ मात्स्यिकः
मणुयत्तणु मनुजत्वम्
मणुय मनुज
मरइ म्रियते
मंनामि मन्ये
मज्झि मध्ये
मयण मदन
मणि माणिः or मनसि
मड्डुर मधुरः

व

वीय बीज
वेइंदि वान्द्रियः

भ

भत्तूण भुक्त्वा
भायरो भ्रातृ
भावणु भावना
भिज्जए भिद्यते
भीडिओ आक्रान्तः cf भीडवुं Guj
Past.Part. भीडणें M.

भुज्जए भुज्यते

भुत्तउ भुक्तः 46.I.
भेय भेद.

म

माय मातृ Cf. Guj माय(Poe.)
माणस मनुष्यः Cf. Guj माणस
माणुस्सओ मनुष्यकः
मिच्छत्त मिथ्यात्व
मिच्ची मैत्री
मुत्त मुक्त
मुच्छाइयो मूर्च्छायितः
मुखंकरी मोक्षकरी
मुअसि मुञ्चसि
मुध्द मुग्ध
मुग्गर मुद्गरः
मुत्तिए मुक्तये, मौक्तिकानि
मुच्छए मूर्च्छति
मुक्ख मोक्ष
मुच्चगेहिं मृत्युगेहे or -गेहेन

य

य

च

रत्तु	रक्तः
रज्ज	राज्यम्
रज्जइ	रज्यते
रहि	रथे
रयणि	रत्ने
रक्खेहि	रक्षोभिः
राय	राजन्
रिद्धि	ऋद्धिः

र

रिक्खिज्जए	रक्ष्यते
रिउणो	रिपोः
रुहिर	रुधिर
रयंत	रुदन्तः
रुहयं	रूढकम्
रूव	रूप
रे	रे Expletive
रेसि	an Expletive

ल

लच्छि	लक्ष्मी
लब्भइ	लभते
लट्टेइ	लुट्यति
लवणि	लवणे
लग्गए	लगति
लहिय	लब्ध
लहसि	लभसे
लपड	लम्पटः
लाइन्नवत्तु	लावण्यवान्

लिज्जए	लभ्यते, लीयते
लीह	लेखा
लीणु	लीनः
लुणी. D.	मृक्षणं Cf. M. लोणी
लुज्जए	लूयते 52. 3.
लेस	लेशः
लोइ	लोके
लोग	लोक
लोहइ	लोहेन

व

ववज्झ	बाह्य
वयण	वचन
वच्छि	वक्षासि
वट्ठिओ	वर्धितः s D. छिन्नः
वग्घ	व्याघ्रः
वहवाहण	वधवाहन
वावड	व्यापृत Cf. Guj. 'वावड'
वाहइ	वाहयति or बाधते
वाहि	व्याधि
वि	अपि
विच्चित्त	विचित्र
विक्खओ	विद्धः
विवह	विविध
विप्पयोग	विप्रयोगः

विसाए	विषादे
विडंबउ	विडम्बकः See note on stanza 26
विडंबिय	विडम्बित
विसणु	विषण्णः
विसय	विषयः
वित्थरु	विस्तारः
विस	विषं
उड्ड	वृद्ध
वज्जरिसु D.	वक्ष्यामः
वल्लहे	वल्लभे
वव्वए	वाप्यते
वच्छए	वाञ्छयते
वेयरणि	वैतरणी The river of hell.'

स

स, सो	सः	संठिय	संस्थित
सहाव	स्वभावः	सायर	सागर, सादर
सयल	सकल	साहु	साधु
सव्व	सर्व	सामग्गि	सामग्री
सराणि	शरणे	साइमे	स्वाधे
सहसि	सहसे	साहिय	साधित
सत्तउ	सक्तः	सिजि	सज्ज(or सद्यः?)St. 4. l. 4
सत्त	सप्त	सिदिलेवि	शिथिलयित्वा
सग्ग	स्वर्ग	सिव	शिव
सद्दहंति	श्रद्धधते	सि	असि
सज्जु	सज्जः	सिद्धंतओ	सिद्धान्तकः
सग्गोवरो?रि	स्वर्गोपरि	सिसिर	शिशिर
सग्गः	स्वर्गः	सिरि	श्री
सलिलसंकं	सलिलसंक्रान्तं	सिरिखंड	श्रीखण्ड 'a kiind of sāndal St. 16.
ससि	शशिन	सिभावु सुगंधि	स्वभावसुगन्धः
समिद्धिहिं	समृद्धैः	सीय	शीत
सत्थ	सार्थः शस्त्रः	सुणइ	श्रुणोति
सपरसत्थेहिं	स्वपरशस्त्रैः	सुवण	सुवर्ण, श्रवण
सय	शत	सुहावणु	शोभनम्
सययमेव	सततमेव	सुह	सुखम्
सडिय	शटित	सुद्धि	शुद्धिः
सरइ	सरति	सुहड	सुभटः
सत्तावरी	A kind of vegetable.	सूयर	शूकरः
सहिय	सोढ	सूरणो	a kind of vegetable.
सहिलिज्जए	श्लाघ्यते	सोग	शोकः
संखकालंमि	असंख्यकाले		
संनिवाएण	संनिपातेन		

ह

हरि	Skt.	हेव(हव्वं=	शीघ्रं, अथ
हं(हं)ति	भवन्ति	हव्यम्)D.	
हुय	भूतः	होई	भवति

N. B. Proper names have not been included in this glossory
They are in the text with the first letter written in bold type.

Appendix. A.

The chief purpose of this appendix is to explain the theological technicalities of this poem without the proper elucidation of which the proper understanding of the poem is very difficult. In the notes below the text I have added notes on some points of the like nature. The rest of the points have been explained here.

इह बारह भावणु सुवणसुहावण भणवि हेव जीवहंस किंसु ।

दुलहु मणयत्तणु धम्मपवित्तणु दसादिहंतिहि वज्जरिखु ॥ ११ ॥

1. For बारह भावणु : See Intro : All these 12 भावनाs have been noted from आयरंगसुत्त there systematically : but they are also hinted in the 1st कडवक of the poem. St. 1-2 lines. 2. अणिच्चं (cf. चंचलसहाव) St. 2. lines 3-4. संसार (cf. संसारि) St. 3. lines 1-3. असरणं (cf. सरणे) St. 3. line. 4. एगया (एकुल्लउ) St. 4. अन्नत्तं (cf. नविअप्पणं) St. 5 असुहत्तं (cf. वसमंससहरिमलमुत्तगेह etc.) St. 6 आसव. St. 7. संवरो (cf. संवरोसि) line. 1-2. St. 7. line. 3-4. निज्जरा (cf. निज्जरोसि) St. 8 लोगसहावो. St. 9. बोहि दुल्लाहा (cf. जिणवयण सुणइ जे पुनवंत) St. 10 धम्मसाहवो अरहा (cf. अरिहंतदेवगुरुसाहुत्तत्.).

2. दसदिहंतिहि i. e. by 10 illustrations showing the दुर्लभत्व of human life (मणयत्तण). The ref. has also been made in the St. 14 of this poem : चुल्लागाइयदिहंतदसदुल्लहे जीवसंपत्ति मणयत्तणे वल्लहे etc. These 10 illustrations have not been fully elucidated in the poem. These have been thoroughly described in the उपदेशपद् of हरिभद्रसूरि गाथा—4-15 (published : श्रीमन्मुक्तिकमलजैनमोहनमाला : कोठीपोल : वडोदरा). I must quote them all with some explanation here. (मनुजत्वदुर्लभत्वमेवाह—) :—

अइदुल्लहं च एयं चोल्लगपसुहेहिं अत्थसमयंमि ।

भणियं दिहंतिहि अहमावि ते संपविकखामि ॥ ४ ॥

[अतिदुर्लभं च एतद् चोल्लक प्रसुखैः अस्मिन् समये

भणितं दृष्टान्तैः अहमपि ते संप्रवक्ष्यामि ॥ ४ ॥]

चोल्लग-पासग-धण्णे-जुए रयणे य सुमिण-चक्रेय

चम्म-जुगे परमाणु दस दिहंता मणयलभे ॥ ५ ॥

चोल्लक (rice-food) पाशक (dice) धान्यानि (grains) दूत

(Gambling) रत्नानि (jewels) च स्वप्न (a dream) चक्रे (a wheel) च चर्म (a hide—also moss) युगे (a yoke) परमाणवः (atoms)—दशदृष्टान्ता मनुजलभे ॥ ५ ॥

Each of the illustrations enumerated above have the connection with certain stories. It is very difficult to form any idea as to their significance without knowing the stories connected with them. The stories have been very briefly noted in the following गाथाs :—

चोलु त्ति भोयणं बंभदत्तपरिवार भारहजणंम्मि
सयमेव पुणो दुल्लहं जह तत्थ तहेत्थ मणुयत्तं ॥ ६ ॥
[चोलुकमिति भोजनं ब्रह्मदत्तपरिवारस्य भारतजने
स्वयमेव पुनर्दुर्लभं यथा तथा तवेदं मनुजत्वं ॥ ६ ॥]

i. e. There was a certain king who was much pleased with a mendicant named ब्रह्मदत्त and asked him to choose anything he liked. The mendicant asked for the boon that he should be supplied every day with food by each house of the country of भारत beginning from the house of the King. It is impossible that the turn of the King for supplying food to the Brahman would come—the turn which can only be possible after the completion of the turns of the crores of the houses of भारत. But, says the author, this may be possible by some superhuman chance, but the human life (मणुयत्त) is still more difficult to be obtained (दुल्लह). The other illustrations are of the same type. I must content myself by merely giving the *gaṭṭas* with संस्कृत छाया for the other illustrations.

जोगियपासिच्छियपाढरमणदीणारपात्ति जूयम्मि
जह च्वेव जओ दुल्लहो धीरस्स तहेव मणुयत्तं ॥ ७ ॥
[योगिकपाशकेप्पिसत्तपातरमणे दीनारप्राप्तिः यत्ते।
यथा एव जयो दुर्लभो धीरस्य तथैव मनुजत्वं ॥ ७ ॥]

Refers to the story that the infallible dice-throwing due to the divine influence, is possible to be fallible but far more difficult than this is to obtain human existence.

धण्णे त्ति भरहधण्णे सिद्धत्थगपत्थखेव थेरिए
अवगिचणमेलणओ एमेव ठिओ मणुयलाभो ॥ ८ ॥
[धान्यानि इति; भारत धान्येषु सिद्धार्थक (i-e सर्षप) प्रस्थक्षेपः;
स्थविर्या अवचयेन (सर्षपाणां) मिलनकं—एवमेव स्थितो
मनुजलाभः ॥ ८ ॥]

जूयम्मि थेरनिवसुयरज्जसहट्टसययंसिदाएण ।
एत्तो जयाउ अहिओ मुहाइ नेओ मणुयलाभो ॥ ९ ॥
[धत्ते स्थविरनृपसुतराज्ये सहिताष्टशतकं श्रीदायेण (by money-bet)
एतद् जयतु अधिकः मुधानकं; नेयो मनुजलाभः]
स्यणे त्ति भिन्नपोयस्स तेसि नात्तो समुट्टमज्झम्मि
अण्णेसणंमि भणियं तल्लाहसमं खु मणुयत्तं ॥ १० ॥
[रत्नानि इति; भिन्नपोतस्य तेषां नाशः समुद्रमध्ये
अन्वेषणे भणितं तल्लाभसमं खलु मनुजत्वं ॥]

Ref. to the story of a merchant named समुद्रदत्त who lost his jewels in the sea on account of the wreck,

सुमिणम्मि चंदगिलणे मंडगरजाई दोण्ह वीणणओ

नाएण्णुताव सुमिणे तल्लाहसमं खु मणुयत्तं ॥ ११ ॥

[स्वप्ने चन्द्रगलने मंडक (loaf) राजे द्वे व्यञ्जनाद् (by astrological revelation) ज्ञातेऽनुतापेन स्वप्ने तल्लाभसमं खलु मनुजत्वं ॥]

Ref. is to the story of देशिक and मूलदेव ; both of them by swallowing moon-light in dream got different results by astrological revelations, देशिक getting a loaf while मूलदेव the kingdom. देशिक knowing this tried again to get the result which मूलदेव obtained. It is possible that देशिक might per chance obtain his desire : but it is impossible to obtain मनुजत्व.

चक्रेण वि कणहरण अफिडियमच्छिगहचक्रनालाहे

अन्नत्थ णट्ट तच्छेदणोवमो मणुयलामो त्ति ॥ १२ ॥

[चक्रेणापि कन्याहरणे अस्तिरुदितनाक्षणा ग्रहचक्रणालाभे अन्यत्र नष्टे तच्छेदनीयमो मनुजलामः इति ॥]

Refers to राधावेध (similar to मत्स्यवेध).

Moss चम्मावणद्धदहमज्झाड्डिड्डुलिगीव चंदपासण्या

अण्णत्थ बुडुणगवेसणोवमो मणुयलामो उ ॥ १३ ॥

[चर्मावनद्धदहमध्ये छिद्रे कूर्मग्रीवा चन्द्रप्रेक्षणया अन्यत्र बुडनगवेषणोपमो मनुजलामो खलु ॥]

This refers to the story of a tortoise which dwelling in a lake fully covered over by thick moss saw the moon through a hole. The tortoise seeing this went down in the water to call its relatives ; but after coming up could not find the hole which was again covered up by moss. It is possible says the author that the tortoise may find the self-same hole : but it is more difficult than that to obtain मनुजत्व.

उदहि जुगे एव्वावरसमिलाड्डिड्डुप्पवेसदिट्ठंता

अणुवार्यं मणुयत्तमिह दुल्लहं भवसमुदम्भि ॥ १४ ॥

[उदधौ युगं (yoke) पूर्वे; अपरे समिलायाः (the strick in which the leather yoke is kept fixed) छिद्रप्रवेशदृष्टान्तः । अनुपायं मनुजत्वं इह दुर्लभं भवसमुद्रे ॥ १४ ॥]

परमाणु खंभपीसण सूरनालियामेरुखेव-दिट्ठंता

तग्गड्डणे वाऽनुचया मणुयत्तं भवसमुदम्भि ॥ १५ ॥

[परमाणुस्तंभपेषणसूरनलिका (यां आधानं तदनन्तरं) मेरुक्षेप-दृष्टान्तः तद्धटने वाऽनुचयो मनुजत्वं भवसमुद्रे ॥]

Ref. The atoms are pounded by a pestle ; are then filled in a small tube ; and the same is thrown for the top of मेरु. It may be possible to gather these atoms ; but it is मनुजत्व that is more दुर्लभ.

For further details see हरिभद्रसूरि's उपदेशपद. The work in the commentary gives the illustrations in detail. It is worth going through.

St. 8.

अह सत्त नरय तिरियरु पञ्च अस्संखदीवसायरपवंच

बारह नव सग्ग पञ्च उणुत्तराई इय लोकह बित्थरु नयण जाणि ॥

Seven hells : रत्न-शर्करा-वालुका-पंक-धूम-तमः प्रभा

महातमः प्रभा चेत्येधोऽधो नरकभूमयः ॥ ३ ॥

क्रमानुवृत्ततराः सप्त (अभिधानचिन्तामणि of हेमचन्द्र नारककाण्ड ५)
(add प्रभा to first five i-e रत्नप्रभा etc.)

पञ्च तिरियक् (lower beings) : एक-द्वि-त्रि-चतुः-पञ्च (असंज्ञिन्) इन्द्रिय beings:

बारह नव सग्गः i-e 12 and 9 Heavens :

12 heavens : सौधर्म, ईशान, सनत्कुमार, माहेन्द्र, ब्रह्मलोक, लान्तक, महाशुक सहस्रार, आनत, प्राणत, आरण and अच्युत.

9 heavens: are called गैवेयकः सुदर्श, सुप्रतिबद्ध, मनोरम, सर्वतोभद्र विशाल, सुमन, सौमनस, प्रीतिकर, आदित्य.

(अभिधानचिन्तामणि of हेमचन्द्र २ देवकाण्ड 6-8.)

पञ्च अउत्तरविमानस : See note 3 on page 9.

St. 20 ईगालदाहस्स दिहंतओः The illustration of charcoal-burning (thirst) : The story here referred to is the story of a man who was so much parched with thirst that he was feeling as if he was burnt by a charcoal. The water was not available in the waste land in which he was. He tried to allay his thirst by extracting the liquid juice out of grass. It is impossible that so little juice will allay so mighty thirst. He had—the story runs—also a dream that he drank of the water of Oceans and great seas, and still his thirst was not allayed. How can the thirst of a man be allayed by insignificant juice of grass when it was not allayed by all seas and oceans ?

Apply this illustration to the St. in question. Cf- also St. 40 of this poem.

असणपाणंमि खाईमि तह साई मे तं जिदलिउतलिओसि उग्गाहिमे

These expressions are found in the पञ्चप्रतिक्रमणसूत्र. When Jainas take पञ्चकखाणु (sk. प्रत्याख्यानम्)—something like a ' vow ' at the time of पडिकमणु or वंदणा, they repeat in answer to the गुरु who gives them पञ्चकखाणु, e. g.

नमुककामुद्धिसिहि.....असणं पाणं, खाइमं साइमं ...सव्वसमाहि
वत्तिआगारेणं बोसिरामि ॥...

These expressions occur in all पञ्चवक्त्राणः.

St 43 पनरह परहम्मिय तत्थ तत्थ हुंति etc.

पञ्चदश परमाधार्मिका : i. e. 15 hell-gods. They are enumerated in समवायांग-सुत्त. सूत्र. २८ (in the group of 15) :

अंबे अंबरिसी चेव साम-सवले त्ति आवरे

रुद्रावरुद्रकाले अ महाकाले त्ति आवरे ॥

असिपत्ते धण्डुकुंभे वाळुए बेअरणी त्ति य

खरस्सरे महाधोसे एते पन्नरसहिहया ॥

i. e. अंब, अंबरिषि, श्याम, शबल, रौद्र, उपरौद्र, काल, महाकाल, असिपन्न, धनुः,

कुंभ, वाळुकह, वैतरणी, खरस्वर, महाघोष.

Much light can be thrown on the subject e. g. descriptions of hells, the illustration of प्रसन्नचन्द्र, नन्द, सनतकुमार etc.—by giving further references from Jain works. I do not deem it necessary here, where the paper has already exceeded its due length.

Appendix B.

The list of Proper Names in the text of the Poem.

जयदेवमुनि (62)

धन्य : (22)

गुण्डरीक (56)

प्रसन्नचंद्र (56)

भरत (22)

भरतेश्वर (the same as भरत) (56)

सनत्कुमारचक्रिन् (58),

मरुदेवी (56)

मालकुनरिन्द (5)

शालिभद्र (22)

शिवदेवसूरि (62)

श्रीवीरजिन (54)

सगर (22)

THE SOHGAURA COPPER-PLATE INSCRIPTION

BY

PROF. B. M. BARUA, M. A., D. Lit.



The inscription on the Sohgaura copper-plate is a curious short record, which was secured by Mr. Hoey in 1893 and has been preserved in the Asiatic Society of Bengal as a precious and unique Indian relic of antiquity. Sohgaura or Soghaura is "a village on the right (western) bank of the Rāptī, about fourteen miles south-east from Gorakhpur."¹ It is situated in a locality presenting indications of a large settlement of olden times. The copper-plate which was unearthed about half a century ago in digging a foundation for a house is itself a small thing measuring not more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches by $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches. The record which has over it an ornamental row of six symbols consists of four straight and equal lines, in which the Brāhmī letters are inscribed as closely as possible, without least intention to separate the words from one another. The result is that two letters, *ka-da* or *va-la*, representing two syllables of a disyllabic word, have occurred in two separate lines, one below the other, the first syllable at the end of one line and the second at the beginning of the other.


The copper-plate was cast in a mould. There are some dot-like projections between some of the letters, a phenomenon which, in Dr. Höernle's opinion, might be accounted for by the hypothesis that the plate was cast in a mould of sand of imperfect smoothness². But there is much force in Dr. Fleet's contention that " it is difficult to see how the details of such small lettering could have been satisfactorily arranged in even fine moist sand", and there is much truth in his impression that " the plate was cast from a hard or fairly hard mould"³. Three of the letters are proportionately very small: the final letter *ka* in L 1, and the second and third letters, *na* and *ya*, in L3. Had the mould been soft, these letters could not have been so cramped for want of space.

Dr. Fleet also rightly points out that the record was not incised, and that the letters of it, and the devices above them, " stand up in relief, and for the most part in fairly high relief " ⁴. It would seem that the designer of the plate with

1 JRAS., 1907, P. 508.

2 *Proceedings* of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1894 p. 84 foll.

3-4 JRAS 1907, p. 527.



its record and devices had done his work at one stretch, after having made up his mind to render a permanent work of art with its linear and floral effects, to compose an enigma to exercise the wits of the epigraphists of modern times, to present an epigraphic riddle with a key to its solution in the devices.

The record must be treated as a precious and unique Indian relic of antiquity and its rescuer thanked for reasons more than one. In the first place, this archæological find affords the oldest known and clear example of the use of a copper-plate as a material for writing, especially for inscribing a record in Brāhmī characters. The numerous earthen seals, found at Harappa and Mohen-jo-derro and inscribed apparently in two different characters awaiting decipherment, furnish us with earliest examples of the use of burnt clay as a writing material. The pre-historic pots bearing different letter-marks and found in Megalithic cairns in the Nizam's dominions and similar pots and potsherds collected from the fourteen districts of the Madras Presidency and the various sites of the Mysore and Travancore States serve equally as ancient examples of the use of burnt clay or pottery as a writing material. The famous Piprahwa vase inscription vying in antiquity and importance with the record on the Sohgaura copper-plate illustrates the use of stone for writing purpose.

Secondly, the record has its uniqueness and importance for the standard of Brāhmī characters which it presents, the standard which, in the opinion of Dr. Fleet, 'refers it to at any rate an early date in the Maurya period, B. C. 320 to about 180". Among the Brāhmī letters of this inscription one may notice all the characteristics of a palæography of an early age. The letter *ka* is a perfect cross or plus sign, in which the vertical and horizontal lines of equal length intersect each other. The letters *ga* and *ta* are sharply angular. The letter *va* is a well-drawn circle with a straight vertical line over it. In the letter *bha*, the upper stroke, instead of being continuous with the right vertical line, meets it in a slanting manner to form an obtuse angle. There is little fear of contradiction in equalising this standard with that of the Piprahwa vase inscription. The identity of the two standards might have been placed beyond all doubt if the three letters, *ma*, *cha* and *u*, and the *o*-mark had occurred in the Piprahwa vase inscription and were found to be similar to those on the Sohgaura copper-plate. Here the

letter *ma*, instead of resembling the numerical figure 8 with an open top (8), is a wine-glass standing upon a circle 8. Such a form of *ma* is nowhere to be found in any of the Aśokan ancient inscriptions excluding the solitary instance of the recently discovered Kapileswar copy of the Rummindei inscription, nor in any of the known coin-legends, and seems to represent a Parent type, which is pre-Aśokan. The letter *cha*, mistaken by both Professor Bühler and Dr. Fleet for *ca* or *cu* has a unique form of its own. The standard Aśokan Brāhmī letter *cha* is a circle or round curve bisected or cut across by a vertical line elongated in the upper direction (ϕ). As Rai Bahadur Ramprasad Chanda has ably shown, this kind of *cha* tended subsequently to become double-looped, of a butter-fly pattern (ϕ). The process of transformation proceeding along this line of change cannot adequately account for the origin of the Deva-nāgarī *cha* (ϕ) or the Bengali *cha* (ϕ, ϕ, ϕ). The letter *cha* on the Sohgaura copper-plate indicates another line of change with a different starting point. Here the letter *cha* is represented as (ϕ). Keeping this form in view, one can easily determine how the Deva-nāgarī *cha* (ϕ) resulted from the process of transformation which started from it. And inverting the letter, it is not at all difficult to understand that the Bengali *cha* (ϕ, ϕ, ϕ) is nothing but a later transformation thereof, the inverted *cha* on the Sohgaura copper-plate appearing as (ϕ). Thus the letter *cha* on this copper-plate may be shown to have supplied the missing Parent type of both the Deva-nāgarī (ϕ) and the Bengali (ϕ, ϕ, ϕ). I maintain that the letter on the Sohgaura copper-plate is *cha*, and not *ca* or *cu* as suggested by Professor Bühler and Dr. Fleet, for this twofold reason: (1) that the main letter is unlike the Brāhmī *ca* (d), and (2) that *cu* has invariably been represented in the Brāhmī system of writing as (d) and never as (ϕ). The letter *u*, has this peculiarity about it that, instead of resembling a right angle (└), it is just an inverted Brāhmī *ca* with an open mouth (v). I cannot but agree with Dr. Fleet in reading *Usagame* in L 2, instead of reading *Vasagame* with Professor Bühler, for two simple reasons: (1) that the first letter is quite different from *va*, and (2) that there is no other letter with which it may be identified.

In the Aśokan or post-Aśokan Brāhmī alphabet, the o-mark is represented, except in the singular case of *na* (l)

where it is apt to be confounded with *na* (I) if not carefully guarded, by the *e*-stroke and the \bar{a} stroke meeting each other from two opposite sides in a straight line at the top of a letter, to which it is intended to be attached, notably in the case of the letter *ka* 𑀓. Now, what is an exception in the Aśokan or post-Aśokan system is found to be the rule in the system of the Sohgaura copper-plate where both *ko* and *no* have been represented alike as (𑀓) and (𑀓), the *ko* of *kothagalani* in L 2 and the *no* of *no* in L 4. Even in the case of *no*, there is a point of difference between the *o*-mark of this copper-plate and that of the Aśokan and post-Aśokan Brāhmī inscriptions. Here the *e*-stroke stands, on the left, below the \bar{a} -stroke which is attached, on the right, to the top of the letter *na* (𑀓), while in the Aśokan or post-Aśokan system, the \bar{a} -stroke stands, on the right, below the *e*-stroke which is attached, on the left, to the top of the letter (𑀓).

Thirdly, in the matter of orthography or method of spelling, the Brāhmī alphabet of the Sohgaura copper-plate inscription appears to have the same twofold defect as that noticed by Professor Rhys Davids in connection with the Brāhmī alphabet of the Piprahwa vase inscription (Peppé's edict)', namely, (1) that its general tendency is to dispense with such long vowel-marks as \bar{a} , \bar{i} and \bar{u} . and (2) that it is conspicuous by the absence of all conjoint consonants. It may be contended that in the word *atīyāyikaya* in L 4, one has a clear use of the long vowel-mark \bar{a} -*kāra*, and that, on this ground, the record on the Sohgaura copper-plate ought to be regarded as a little posterior to Peppé's edict. But one may contend as well that the Sohgaura record hardly makes use of the dot-stroke for representing *anusvāra* (ṁ), while the Piprahwa vase inscription does, and that on this ground, the former ought to be assigned to a little earlier date than the latter. I for myself do not see if much can be made out of such hair-splitting discussions, though I do not deny at the same time that these are not without their importance.

Fourthly, the language of the record, precisely like that of the Piprahwa vase inscription, is "a dialect, a local Prakrit, with some of the features (as Dr. Fleet puts it) of Māgadhī."¹ It differs from Pāli by the substitution of *l* for

1 JRAS., 1907, p. 109.

r sound, e. g., in *kothaṇṇāni* = *kotthāṇūrāni*, *bhalakan* [i] = *bhārakāni*, and no less by the use of *e* as masculine or neuter Nominative singular case-ending of stems ending in *a*, e. g., *sasane* = *sāsanaṃ*. In *kaḍa* = *kata* or *kata*, we find a form standing midway between the Pāli *ka u* and the °*gaḍa* of Aśoka's Rummindei pillar inscription. Both *kaḍa* and *gaḍa* are to be found in the Ardha-Māgadhī or Jaina Prakrit. It differs from Pali also by the phonetic change of *vya* into *vva*, e. g., *gahitavaya*.

Lastly, with regard to its subject-matter, the inscription is found to be a public notification about the judicious use of certain things in two storehouses by persons carrying on traffic along the high roads leading to Śrāvastī, or it may be, by persons carrying on traffic by all the three kinds of vehicles along the high roads, in times of urgent need. The record is of unique importance because nothing like it has, as yet, been found in India proper.¹ The four holes observed in four corners of the plate, one in each of the corners, "were obviously made with a view to nailing the notice up, or riveting it, in some place where it could be easily seen and read."²

The first photo-etching of the copper-plate was published with some remarks on it and a photo-etching by Mr. Hoey, Mr. Vincent A-Smith and Dr. Höernle in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for 1894 p. 84 foll. Dr. Höernle was able to take the first step to our knowledge of the contents of this interesting find by observing that the record appeared to him to have been 'an edict or order' concerning two storehouses. But Professor Bühler is the first to publish the *editio princeps* of the record and to attempt a systematic interpretation of it in the Vienna Oriental Journal for 1896, Vol. X, p. 138 foll., and the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XXV, p. 261 foll. His efforts were based upon the photo-etching and an electro-type copy of the copper-plate which Dr. Grierson kindly supplied him with. Using similar materials, Dr. Fleet published a lengthy discussion in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1907, p. 509 foll., suggesting a better reading of the plate,

1 *Proceedings* of A. S. B., 1894, p. 87: Mr. Vincent A. Smith, says, "No copper-plate inscription of nearly equal antiquity has ever been found, so far as I am aware."

2 JRAS, 1907, p. 527. For other points of interest, the reader must be referred to Dr. Fleet's learned discussions in JRAS, 1907, pp. 523-25 and p. 527.

offering a new interpretation of the record, and threshing the matter from all points of view. He subsequently published a short note in the same Journal for 1908, substantiating his interpretation of *tike* in L 1 in the sense of 'a triangular place', of 'a junction of three roads', by the citation of passages from some of the books of the Jaina Āgama, notably of one from the Kalpa-Sūtra, to which his attention was drawn by Professor Jacobi. Though confident of the advance which he made upon what had previously been written about the plate, Dr. Fleet was fully conscious of the incompleteness of his explanation of the record, and in all earnestness he hoped that some one else would take up the work to attempt a final decision of the disputed points. But so far as I am aware, our knowledge of the record has remained up till the present just where he left it in 1907 and 1908.

I cannot surely claim the credit of first detection of the key to the solution of the riddle of the copper-plate in its floral device of symbols. The credit is really due, in some measure, to Dr. Fleet, and, in some measure, to Professor Bühler. The credit is not due, in full measure, to Professor Bühler for the simple reason that his interest was unevenly distributed between the text and the floral device, the larger amount of it having been shared by the text. He utilised just two of the symbols, *viz.*, the representations of two sheds, and that very imperfectly, for justifying his reading *ete duve kothagalani tighavani* in lines 2-3, and his rendering of the same as "these two storehouses with three partitions", the expression *tighavani* having been equated with the Sanskrit *trigarbhāni*. He disposed of all of the remaining symbols as floral devices having a religious significance. His study of these symbols is, nevertheless, of some value to us as carrying with it the precious suggestion that all of them have no bearing upon the text, some only have. Actually how many of them had bearing upon the text and in what manner, and how many of them had not and why not he failed to satisfactorily determine.

What we owe to Dr. Fleet's study of the nature of the devices is the recognition in all of them a significance other than that of religious symbols. To quote him in his words: "Two of them obviously represent the storehouses themselves, which are shown as sheds with double roofs. The lower roof in each case is supported by four rows of posts; and these perhaps stand for

four rows of posts, the front posts hiding those behind them.¹ In the other devices I recognise, not religious emblems, Buddhist or otherwise, -(I mean, not religious emblems employed here as such),-nor Mangalas, auspicious symbols, but the arms of the three towns mentioned in L 3 of the record." Continuing, he says, "It has long been understood, from the constant occurrence of certain devices on coins found mostly in particular localities only, that the cities of ancient India had their special cognizances. We here have definite evidence of the fact. On the left we have a tree or plant, in leaf, in a railed enclosure or box. With the devices taken in the order in which the places are mentioned in L 3, this will be the mark of the town Tryavani."²

Proceeding in this manner, he takes the symbol in the centre to stand for the arms of Mathurā, a device "which is usually regarded as a *Caitya* or memorial over some sacred object, but in respect of which Professor Buhler suggested that it may be meant for a rude representation of Mount Meru. " In laying stress upon the device in the centre, he completely ignores the separate importance, except as an arm of Mathurā, of another device to the left, when, in respect of it, he says that the central device " is accompanied by something which resembles a spoon with a long handle ending apparently with a nob,³ but was considered by Professor Bühler to be a toilet-mirror."

To complete his study of the symbols in this manner keeping consistency with his hypothesis, he explains the device on the right as signifying the special cognizance of a place known by the name of Cañcu, the device which has been represented as "another tree or plant, in this case leafless, again in a railed enclosure or box."

With this last device, rather than with the arms of Mathurā, he couples the remaining object which is apparently like the Brāhmi letter *ma*, or stands, as he puts it, like "a sun

1 Sir G. A. Grierson in his note on the Sohgaura Inscription (JRAS, 1907, p. 684), suggests that "the four posts apparently in the front of each of these buildings are an attempt at perspective, the two centre ones representing corner posts behind two front ones."

2 JRAS, 1907, pp. 528-29. Mr. Vincent A. Smith took the first device to be nothing but a conventional representation of a tree-symbol, See *Proceedings* of ASB, 1894, p. 86.

3 Mr. Vincent A. Smith is the first to describe this symbol as "an object like a long-handled spoon, with a nob at the end of the handle." See *Proceedings* of ASB, 1894, p. 86.

with the moon above it", justifying the connection by the fact that the symbol lies above the leafless tree, "sloping slightly to the right". He couples this with that without any attempt at bringing out its significance, as to whether it is meant to represent the whole or part of Cañcu, a name which is taken by him to ordinarily mean "a beak", and which is also used as "the name of the castor-oil plant, of a red kind of the same plant".

Thus enthusiasm led Dr. Fleet to adopt an ingenious method in making a study of the symbolic devices, which is best suited to the solving of the Riddles of Trios confronting him on the Sohgaoura copper-plate: (1) that of *ti-yāna mahāmagga*, of "the three great roads for vehicles"; (2) that of *Manavasi-tika*, of the junction, (named) Manavasi, of the three roads; (3) that of *Tiyavani*, "the three-land"; and (4) that of three places, *Tiyavani* (*Tryavani*), *Mathulā* (*Maturā*) and *Caṃcu* (*Cañcu*).

Though his study of the symbols is forced and fantastic, it has some value for us as it serves to emphasize the fact that some of the symbols other than those recognized by Professor Buhler, also have bearing upon the text.

It will, however, be a mistake to presume, from these preliminary remarks, that with the key in the symbolic devices I proceeded to solve the riddle of the copper-plate. For as a matter of fact, I proceeded quite the other way. I essayed at first with the record itself to settle its reading and to suggest a cogent interpretation of the text as made out, unmindful of the devices. It occurred to me that these three expressions, occurring consecutively in the text, (1) *ete duve koṭhagalani*, (2) *ti??vani*, and (3) *mathul?c?a?ma-bhalakan* [i], were somehow in apposition. Repeatedly observing the plates, the photo-etchings and electro-type copies, with the naked eye and with the aid of a magnifying glass, I was able to detect that there was not one letter, *gha* or *ya*, as made out by Professor Bühler and Dr. Fleet, but a set of two smaller letters, which seemed at first to consist of *sa* and *na* in the electro-type copies, and were finally made out as *na* and *ya* in the photo etchings. Thus I came to read *tina-yavari* (*tr̥ṇa-yavāṇi*) for Professor Bühler's *tighavani* (*trigarbhāṇi*) and Dr. Fleet's *Tiyavani* (*Tryavani*). The belief at once grew in me that Dr. Fleet was in the wrong to suggest *Tryavani*, *Mathulā* and *Caṃcu* as names of three different places, especially when he failed to account,

by this procedure, for the occurrence of *medama*, a word read by him after *Caṃcu*; and that Professor Bühler was equally in the wrong to read *tighavani*, taking it in the sense of *trigar-bhūṇi* or "tripartite," connecting it as an adjective with *koṭha-galani* preceding, and trying to justify himself by a reference to representations of the two sheds above the record, none of which appeared to be either three-chambered or three-storeyed, in short, tripartite, but was certainly in the right to suggest that the words that followed his *tighavani*, such words as *mathu*, a shortening from *mathukā* or *madhukā* (Black-Panicum), *lacha*, a Prakrit form of *lājā* (parched grain) *Camoda* (cumin seed) and *aṃma* or *āmba* (some kind of grain) denoted the contents of the two storehouses. Sure about the reading and meaning of *tina-yani* (grass and wheat), I became reluctant to accept Professor Buhler's explanations of these words which seemed to me rather wide of the mark. Examining closely the plates, I found that the correct readings would be not *mathulaca* but *mathuloca* a samdhi of *matha* and *uloca*, and not *camodamma* or *Caṃcumedama* but *chama-dama*, a compound of *chama* and *dama*. The task became easier as I succeeded in ascertaining the correct meaning of each of these four words, that *matha* was no other than the Prakrit *maṃtha*, meaning "the ladle," that *ulocha*, was no other than *ulloca* meaning *vitāna* or *candrātapa*, "the canopy or awning," that *cama* was no other than *chamā* or *samyā* meaning "the pin of a yoke," and that *dama* was no other than *dāma*, meaning "the rope".

The occurrence of the word *matha* or *maṃtha* in the text in the sense of a ladle was found to be corroborated by the spoon-like device recognized by Mr. Vincent A. Smith and Dr. Fleet. Why the ladles were specially needed to be provided in storehouses on the high roads, whether for easily taking out the grains of wheat stored up there or for some other purposes¹ remained a matter of conjecture. From provisions of the stocks of fodder and wheat, which were evidently meant for feeding the bullocks that drew the carts and the horses that drew the chariots or carriages, it appeared that the ladles were

1 For other uses of ladles, see the text and translation of the Bedaḍi copper ladle inscription published by Mr. N. G. Mujumdar in *JASB* (NS.) Vol. XIX, p. 345, the inscription found in the Hazara District and recording the gift (of the ladle) to the Kāśyapiya sect of the Buddhists.

primarily needed for handling the grains of wheat for these animals. The need of canopies or awnings for the convenience of caravans, chariot-drivers or travellers in general became evident from a Buddhist description of a caravan journey across a sandy wilderness in the Vāṇṇupatha or Jāṇṇupatha Jātaka (Fausböll's No. 2) which ran as follows:—

“ As soon as the sun got up, it (the sandy wilderness) grew as hot as a bed of charcoal embers and no body could walk upon it. Accordingly, those traversing it used to take fire-wood, water, oil, rice and so forth on their carts, and only travelled by night. At dawn they used to range their carts in a circle to form a laager with an awning spread overhead. ‘ All our wood and water is gone, and we are lost ’. So saying, they unyoked their carts and made a laager and spread the awning overhead; then each man flung himself down in despair beneath his own cart ”¹.

The word which I made out on the copper-plate was *uloca* or *ulloca*, and the word which occurred in the Jātaka happened to be *maṇḍapa*. Mr. Robert Chalmers was perfectly justified in translating *maṇḍapa* of the Jātaka by “ an awning ”, that is to say, in treating it as a synonym of *ulloca*, of which *vitāna*, according to Amarasimha, was another synonym. I did not know the process whereby *candrāṭapa* came to be suggested as a synonym for *uloca* in modern lexicons, or how *ulloca* fell into disuse and *candrāṭapa* took its place. I became interested to see if any clue thereto might be obtained from any of the devices above the record. The device in the centre which was taken by Dr. Fleet to be a local cognizance of Mathurā showed a crescent-shaped moon horizontally placed in a semi-circular curve at the top. There was no reason for doubting that this particular device was the same as one met with on the punch-marked coins, either standing by itself or in association with one or both of the *Svastika* device and the one resembling the Brāhmī character *ma*. On the copper-plate this device was associated with the device resem-

1 Suriyuggamānato paṭṭhāya aṅgararāsi viya uphā hoti, na sakka akkamitum, tasmā tam paṭipajjantā dārūḍaka-tela-taṇḍulādāni sakatehi ādāya rattiṃ eva gantvā aruṇuggamane sakatāni parivaṭṭaṃ katvā *maṇḍapaṃ* karetvā kāsasseva-gacchhanti. “ Dārūḍakaṃ pi no khinaṃ idāni ’mha naṭṭhā ” ti-sakatāni mochetvā parivaṭṭakena tṭhapetvā matthake *maṇḍapaṃ* katvā attano attano sakatassa heṭṭhā anusohantā nipaṭṭipsu.

bling the Brāhmi character *ma* which was seen standing a little above on the right and slightly sloping towards it. Whatever the reason for such an association, it seemed that Sir Alexander Cunningham had not made the right hit to interpret the similar devices on the punch-marked coins as representations of Mount Meru, and that other numismatists, too, failed to make the right hit in interpreting the same as representations of a mountain. Seen in the light of the Jātaka description of a caravan journey across a sandy wilderness, it appeared that the device was symbolical of the camp of a caravan, of a laager of unyoked carts under a canopy or awning spread overhead, the form of the device representing not the piling up of rocks with the moon above them but juxtaposition of arched coverings of three village carts under a canopy.

It became easy to understand why the storehouses on the high roads contained provisions of *chama* or *chammā* (pins of yokes) and *dama* or *dāmā* (ropes). For those were obviously to oblige the drivers of carts and carriages in times of urgent need¹. But I found no devices to symbolise either the provisions of fodder and wheat or those of yoke-pins and ropes.

I could not help welcoming the suggestion from both Professor Bühler and Dr. Fleet that the two sheds were devices for representing the two storehouses (*duve kothagalani*) mentioned in the record. It was clear from the text that those storehouses were connected with two different localities. And among the devices, too, I noticed that the two sheds stood beside two trees or tree-shrines (*rukka-chetiyaṇi*), each of them having appeared on the right of the corresponding tree-device. The symmetry seemed to have been of some importance. It appeared at once that the two sheds were inseparably associated with the tree-devices, that in other words, the tree-devices were to indicate the localities where the storehouses were situated. From the manner in which each of the sheds was placed in relation to each of the tree-devices, it appeared that the purpose of each of the two sets of these

1 Buddhaghoṣa in his commentary on the Rāhavinīta Sutta, says that on his departure from Kapillavatthu for a journey to Sāvathī, the Buddha had provided himself with clarified butter, oil, honey, molasses and the like (*sappi-tela-madhu-phāṇitādāni gāhāpetvā*) (The provisions referred to in the Soghaura record were evidently not meant for such travellers.

devices was to indicate that each of the two storehouses mentioned in the record was built, and, in fact, stood by the roadside of a particular locality. But the question remained what those two localities could be.

Professor Bühler made out the names of two localities as *Silima* (*Śrīmat*) and *Vasaḡama* (*Vamśagrāma*, identified with the village 'Bansgaon' about six miles on the west of Sohgaura), and Dr. Fleet, as *Dasilmata* and *Usagama* (*Uñchagrāma*, a place shewn in the atlas as 'Oonchgaon,' near the right bank of the Rāptī, about eleven miles north-north-west-half-west from Sohgaura).

I could not but agree with Dr. Fleet in reading the name of the second locality as *Usaḡama* or *Ussagāma*. But I also perceived with him the difficulty in accounting for the phonetic change of *uñcha* into *ussa*. I looked into Pandit Haragovind Seth's Prakrit Dictionary, in which the word *ussa* was found explained in the sense of *hima* or "cold". I felt that, perhaps, *Usagama* was just the place shewn in the map as 'Oska' on the right bank of the Rāptī.

As regards the name of the first locality, I found reasons to differ from both Professor Buhler and Dr. Fleet in reading it as *Manavasitikaḡasilmata* (*Mānavāsīti-kṛta-śrīmanta*), though I had no means of determining where it was and what was its modern identity.

Thus I completed my study of the devices having bearing upon the text. As for the symbol resembling the Brāhmī letter *ma* and appearing above the second tree-device sloping slightly to the left, it occurred to me that, whatever its origin, it was used on the copper-plate as a *maṅgala* or auspicious symbol, and that, had there been space, we would have seen also a *Svastika*, which was sadly missed.

As to opening words of the record, there was a wide difference of opinion between Professor Bühler and Dr. Fleet. The former read *Savatiyana-mahama(ta)na sasane*, having taken the record to be an order from, or issued by, the *Mahāmātras* of Śrāvastī. The latter read *Sava-ti-yāna-mahāmagana sāsane*, having taken the record to be an order concerning all the three great roads for vehicles. The latter suggested that the first word might also have been read *sava-tiyāna-mahāmagana*, explaining *tiyāna* as denoting the three vehicles of Buddhism: the *Śrāvaka-yāna*, the *Pratyekabuddha-yāna* and the *Bōdhisattva-*

yāna. As the record had nothing to do with Buddhism or the Buddhists, such an interpretation of *tiyāna* as this was uncalled for. I realised, moreover, that Dr. Fleet's reading of *sava ti-yāna* as *sava-ti-yāna* was fantastic. The choice really lay between *Savatryāna* and *Sava-tiyāna*, on the one hand, and between *mahama(ta)na* and *mahamagana*, on the other.

Between these two sets of alternatives, one seemed to have been as good as the other. So far as the photo-etchings of the place were concerned, the reading could not but be *mahamagana*. But who knew that the letter *ga* of *mahamagana* in L 1 was not a *ta* with its upper vertical line entirely effaced, precisely like the letter *ta* of *gahi(ta)vaya* in L 4. Taking the letters as they appeared in the photo-etchings, I came to conceive the alternatives between *Savatīyana mahamagana* and *sava-tiyāna-mahamagana*, having taken *tiyāna* or *triyāna* to denote the *go-yāna*, *aśva-yāna* and *hasti-yāna*. A second thought sufficed to make clear to me that the use of *yāna* or *tiyāna* as an adjunct of *mahāmagga* was redundant. For the very word *mahāmagga* or "high road" implied that it was a road for the vehicles of all kinds. So, ultimately, I came to conceive the alternatives between *savatīyana mahama(ta)na sasane* and *Savatīyana mahamagana sasane*. I preferred the former, because the latter, *mahamagana sasane* or *mahāmārgāṇaṃ sāsanaṃ*, was not sanctioned by literary usage, according to which, it was expected to be mentioned whose *sāsana* the *sāsana* was, whether of a king (*rāja-sāsanaṃ*), or of a Buddha (*etaṃ Buddhassa sāsanaṃ*), or of some other persons (*e. g. mātugāmānaṃ sāsanaṃ* in Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Kaṇṇakatthala-sutta*, *Majjhima-Nikāya*). I could not, of course, deny that the order of the *Mahāmātras* of Śrāvastī was for the judicious use of provisions in storehouses on the high roads.

My predilection for the reading *Savatīyana Mahamatana* (*Sāvatthiyānaṃ Mahāmattānaṃ*) or *Savatīyana mahamagana* (*Sāvatthiyānaṃ mahāmaggaṇaṃ*) was greatly aroused by the *Rathavinita-Sutta* and the *Dhammacetiya-sutta* in the *Majjhima-Nikāya*, the former giving a description of King Pasenadi's journey by carriages from Sāvattthī to Sāketa by a high road, no doubt, by the Southern Road (*Dakkhināpatha*), of which Sāvattthī and Sāketa were two of the chief halting places, and the latter giving a description of King Pasenadi's journey by similar vehicles from Sāvattthī to Nāgaraka and

from Naṅgaraka to Medaḷumpa or Uḷumpa, a market town in Kapilavatthu, evidently by the same high road, Dakkhināpatha, of which Sāvatti and Kapilavatthu were two of the chief halting places.¹ I realised the importance of these two Suttas, particularly of the former, by the fact that they enabled me to account for a notice or order from the High Functionaries of Śrāvastī regarding the judicious use of the provisions of fodder and wheat, and the bundles of ladles, canopies, yoke-pins and ropes in storehouses on the high roads, the use in times of urgent need only. The Rathavinīta-Sutta which was accurately identified by Dr. Neumann with the Discourse recommended by King Aśoka in his Bhābru Edict under the title *Upatisa-Pasine* went to show that King Pasenadi of Kosala set out on a journey from Sāvatti to Sāketa, proceeding as quickly as possible, on an urgent state business, by an arrangement of seven rathavinītas, by seven relays as one might say.² The required arrangement could not have been made if the provisions of such things as were mentioned in the Sohgaura record had not already been made in storehouses on the high road by which the king had to proceed.

Professor Bühler treated *Manavasitikaḍa* as an Ablative case, that is, as *Manavasitikaḍā*, "from Mānavasitikaḍa or Mānavasitikaṭa", and was inclined to think that the order which was the subject-matter of the record was issued by the *Mahāmātras* of Śrāvastī from Mānavasitikaṭa, a seat of their office like Suvannagiri, wherefrom the Maurya Viceroy and *Mahāmātras* were to communicate the message of King Aśoka to the Maurya *Mahāmātras* at Isila. In other words, he was inclined to read and interpret the introductory statement of the Sohgaura record on the analogy of that of the Siddāpura text of Aśoka's First Minor Rock Edict, which, though not altogether impossible, seemed incongruous. For, comparing the two statements, I noticed that in the Siddāpura or Jātīṅga-Rāmeśvara text of Aśoka's First Minor Rock Edict, the Ablative form of Suvannagiri (*Suvannagiritte*) or the Locative form of Isila (*Isilasi*) was used to indicate the place to which the *Mahāmātras* concerned were attached, a

1 *Sutta-Nipāta*, *Parāyāṇa-vagga*, Vatthugāthā.

2 *Majjhima-Nikāya*, I. pp. 148-9: Seyyathā pi āvuso raṇṇo Pasenadissa Kosalassa Sāvattihīyaṃ paṭivasantassa Sāketē kiñcid eva aśchayikam karaṇīyam uppajjeyya, tassa antarā ca Sāketam satta rathavinītāni upaṭṭhāpeyyuṃ.

purpose, which was well served in the Sohgaure record by the Genitive form of Savati (*Savāṭṭiya*). Looked at from this point of view, the mention of *Manavasitikaḍa* as the issuing office of the *Mahāmūtras*' order appeared redundant.

Lastly, I agreed with Dr. Fleet in reading *vala kayiyati* for Professor Bühler's *cala kayiyati*, though I differed from both in respect of the meaning of the phrase. The point which went in favour of Professor Bühler's reading *cala* was that the circle of the first letter appeared somewhat larger than those other letters representing *va* in the record. But if it were conceded that the Sohgaure form of *cha* was like (ḥ) and not like (ḥ), it was impossible to read *chala*. Further, his rendering of *chala kayiyati* as "require the storage" on the authority of the Dhātupāṭha explaining the root $\sqrt{\text{ksāl}}$ as meaning "to accumulate" (*kṣāl caye*) seemed untenable. His case would have been strong, if it could be supported by any ancient literary usage of *kṣālāṇ* or *chālāṇ* in the sense of "storage". The Bengali *chālā* in the sense of a gunny bag was, after all, a modern word. In the same way, Dr. Fleet's explanation of *vala* in the sense of *vārāya*, "for the sheltering" was unwarranted by any literary usage. It became evident that both of them adapted their renderings to a genitive construction of *bhalakana* (*bhūrakāṇam*). Such a construction was against the force of Passive voice in the use of the verbal form *kayiyati*, which appeared as a hybrid of Pali *kayirati* and *kayyati*. *Bhalakana* was apparently the mould-designer's mistake for *bhalakani*, a case in apposition with *koṭhagalani* and *tina-yarani* preceding it. To me, *vala* or *valam* appeared to have been just another form of the Pali *valaṇṇam*, meaning "use", "expenditure" the phrase *valaṇṇam karoti* meaning "makes use of". Viewed in this light, the phrase *vala kayiyati* would mean "are used", suiting the context.

Thus I completed my study of the record, independently of the symbolic devices, the results of which, I mean the text and the translation, are being presented in contradistinction to those offered by Professor Bühler and Dr. Fleet.

TEXT

[as it reads in a *pho'o-e'ching*]

1. Savatiyanama(ha)¹maganasasane manavasitika²
2. ³dasilimate ⁴usagameva⁵etedu⁶vekoṭṭhagalāni
3. ti(naya)⁷vanimathul (o⁸cacha⁹ma¹⁰da¹¹mabhal¹² aka-
nava¹³
4. lak¹⁴ayiyatiatiyāyikayanogahigavaya

TEXT

[as made out by Professor Bühler]

1. Savatiyana mahama(ta)na sasane Manavasitika-
 2. ḍa [1] Silimāte Vasagame va ete duve koṭṭhagalāni-
 3. tighavani mathu-laca-camodamma-bhāḷakanacha-
 4. la kayiyati atiyāyikaya [1] No gahi(ta)vaya [1]
- Sāvatiyāna Mahāma(tā)na sāsane Mānavasitikāḍa [1]
 Silimāte Vamsagāme va ete duve
 Kothāgalāni tighavani mathu-lācā-camodāmmabhāḷakāna
 calam kayiyati atiyāyikāya [1] No gahitāvayam [1]

"The order of the great officials of Śrāvastī, (issued) from (their camp at) Mānavasitikāṭa; 'These two storehouses with three partitions, (which are situated) even in famous Vamśagrāma, require the storage of loads of Black Panicum, parched grain, cummin seed and āmba (some kind of grain) for (times of) urgent (need). One should not take (anything from the grain stored)."

TEXT

[as made out by Dr. Fleet]

1. Savva-ti-yāna-mahāmaggānaṃ sāsane[!]Manavasitike
2. Dasilimate Usagāme va ete duve koṭṭhāgalāni
3. Tiyavani-Mathulā-Camcu-Medama-bhāḷakānaṃ vālā
4. kayyiyamti atiyāyikāya [,] no gahitavvāya [1]

-
- 1 V. A. Smith reads *aha* for *ha*.
 - 2 Fleet reads *ke* for *ka*.
 - 3 V. A. Smith reads *re* for *ḍa*.
 - 4 V. A. Smith reads *dhe* and Bühler *va* for *u*.
 - 5 V. A. Smith reads *vam* for *va*.
 - 6 V. A. Smith reads *di* for *du*.
 - 7 V. A. Smith and Bühler read *gha* and Fleet reads *ya* for *naya*.
 - 8 V. A. Smith and others read *la* for *lo*.
 - 9 V. A. Smith and Bühler read *ca* and Fleet reads *cu* for *cha*.
 - 10 Fleet reads *me* for *ma*.
 - 11 Bühler reads *dam* for *da*.
 - 12 V. A. Smith reads *le* for *la*.
 - 13 V. A. Smith and Bühler read *cha* for *va*.
 - 14 V. A. Smith *pa* for *la*.

"Notice for all the three great roads for vehicles ! At the junction, (named) Manavasi of the three roads, in actually the villages) Dasilimata and Usagāma, these two storehouses are prepared for the sheltering of loads of commodities of (i. e., from and to) Tiyavani, Mathulā and camcu, to meet any case of urgent need, but not for permanent use."

TEXT

[as should be made out]

1. Sāvatiyānam Mahāma(ttā)nam¹sāsane[:]Mānavāsītika-
2. ḍasilimate Ussagāme va ete duve koṭṭhāgālāni ;
3. tina-yavāni mamthullocā-chammā-dāma-bhālakān
[i] va
4. lam kayiyati atiyāyikāya[;]no gahi(ta)vvāya [1]

"The order of the High Functionaries of Śrāvastī² !

These two storehouses, (which are situated, one) in Mānavāsītikṛtsāmanta (and the other) in Uṣagrāma, (the provisions of) fodder and wheat, (and) the loads of ladles, canopies, yoke-pins and ropes are used in (times of) urgent need (these are) not to be taken away".

Or, *Mahāmaggaṇam*.

² Adopting *mahāmaggaṇam* as a correct reading, one must translate "The order concerning the persons carrying on traffic along the high roads leading to Śrāvastī."

A FRAGMENTARY INSCRIPTION OF MANDU

BY

K. K. LELE, DHAR

This inscription was found at Mandu in the debris of fallen houses some 30 years ago and brought to Dhar by Pandit Vaman Shastri Islampurkar. The Shastri being engaged in some other historical research work, the inscription remained undeciphered and has been lying with me since the Shastri's departure from Dhar in about 1901. It is a hymn to God Visṇu. The stone being broken, more than half of the earlier portion has been lost. As it stands, it is nine inches in height and about 26 inches in breadth and contains some 17 lines containing about 85 letters in each. The whole fragment may thus be calculated to contain 1445 letters or 45 s'lokas of the Anuṣṭubh, metre. Supposing about two-thirds have been lost, the amount of lost matter may be estimated to be equal to 100 s'lokas.

The stone being broken at the top and being much rubbed away in the middle, it is impossible to decipher the inscription fully. The decipherment was attempted by me and the learned Śvetāmbara Jati Manakchand of Sarapha Indore, who is well up in the art of deciphering old Sanskrit and Prakrit inscriptions. It is a pity that the verses have not been numbered as they usually are. Had they been numbered as in the Bhoja Shala inscriptions of Dhar, a more correct estimate of the lost portion could be easily made.

The deciphered portions stand as under :—

... ..
... ..
.....

१ पुंसाकारमैक्यंगतंक षतनमाम्यर्द्धविम्बे ॥
२ सूक्तिः प्रथयति न चतुर्वर्गमर्द्धप्रसादात्*लक्ष्मी वक्षसि
... .. तामत्रैव समानयेति विमुखीर्नाभि
स्वयंभूस्पृशा येनैकहृदा—

३ यं ममेति विहिता पुष्टा स मां रक्षतु ॥ उत्कुलांबुज
... .. ननु वेत्ति किं न विदितं मालेति तेजल्पतस्त
द्वामेति सहासया कम—

५ लयाश्लिष्टो हरिः पातु वः ॥ धर्मध्वसकराम मत्स्येन्द्र
तलादशेष जलधिव्यापिव्युदन्ताम्भासि । जायते व्रज नाम वारिधिपदव्योमैन्दुता
भास्करः शब्दज्योतिर्गगाच्चतुर्मुखमदः पा—

५ यादपायात्स मां । मज्जत्साद्रिमहीतरोहृदिकृतः श्रीमद्वराहाकृतेर्वारं कुक्षि-
निलीनसर्वभुवनस्याधः पदान्यस्यतः सप्ताम्भोधितलावरोधिकमठाकारोति पृष्ठे वहन् जज्ञे
यो ननु यादसां भ्रमवशात्सोर्त्तिं हता—

६ न्मेच्युतः क्रीडामात्रकमेव मज्जति महीचक्रे वराहाकृते सद्भावं कृतकेतुविभ्रम-
कृता यस्यो ... ते दंष्ट्रया अप्यैक्यं गतमर्णवाम्बनसहं यद्रोमकूपा भवेत्
... .. सवार्त्तिं यतात् ॥ कल्पांताध—

७ रवः शिखाभिन्नयनः प्रक्षिप्तनारोत्सवः प्रल्हादावनयः द्रुतमयः
श्रीमद्वराहाकृतिः प्रव्हीद्रोद्रुतकंधरस्य विलसद्विद्युत्सजिह्वोज्ज्वलद्वेवः कूधनख
... .. जिह्वक्षाहत्तान्मेभयः भक्तेर्निः फलतानतावदु

८ चितास्वभूमिराज्यः श्रियः पाताल
लोकं श्रीमान्मकपरायणः कराळनील
जलद्रोहाम संघोष

९ नः सर्वाशागगनावरोधनस
... .. मनोरमबन स्यामले
गुंजागुच्छककर्णपूरु—

१० चिरे गोपीदशां दोहदे बहर्पाङ्गितशेखरे कालिदीवनगोचरे
विहरति श्यामाध्र को ग द्यः प्रीणन सत्यानृ मन्नात्मनि
... ..

११ दुत्सुकमिलद्रोपिजनप्रावृते श्रीरुष्णे
वहिमे वां पेत्य दुर्व्वह
गिरिप्रायस्तनीभिर्मिषा

१२ हस्य वृत्तोत्परा भिरुरसा श्रीगोप
... .. सादृशक्तोसि नः एकान्ते परिरम्यकापि मुदिता गोपीभिरिच्छं स्फुरद्रोमाचि
ननिरस्त शैशवमिषं

१३ पातु वः ॥ आपादान्तविलम्बिनीम नाभिहृदं
कालियं सयमुनं सख्यः क्वयास्यामया अत्युग्रेपि मुखीकृतकम पियो
दधत्याहसन् गोण्या गोपजनार्दनः सहरतां मेहां सुखं यच्छतु ॥ क्षीराब्धे

१४ वृत्त भृतात्सौवर्णकुम्भानिमाश्विन्यासाः पुरतः पञ्चधरमिवोबुंदावने किंस्थिताः ॥
सख्यो धर्मतम हरिहृदयं गोपालचौरेण मे अप्येवं परितर्जितो पि बिहसन्
रुष्णः शिवायास्तुवः ॥ यो रक्षैकरसे सुखेषु विषयप्राप्येवना

१५ रिमाह्ना परिचिते रुष्णे कथं रम्यते सख्योऽर्थं चिद्यते कृतात्तदधिनी सो-

यानिकं सोमना गोपीनामुपकर्णयन्निति समुद्राणीः श्रिये मेस्तु सः ॥ श्रीशः श्रीभवंदेक
हृन्निलयिनी तस्याः प्रभां शैस्ततै स्पृष्टायै विहरन्ति कर्म

१६ तैख्यात्मन त्वदेकचरणयानैः पुगत्मा कृतः पात्रं
पुण्यसुखश्रियां निरयतोष्येषां भयं कीदृशं ॥ विरचितमिह विष्णोर्दाम वाक्य प्रसूनैश्व-
रणसततपूजा वाक्कृता बिल्हणेन । निरवधि कविसार्थैः कोटिशैः

१७ विध्यवर्मनृपतेः प्रसादभूः सार्धिविग्रहिकबिल्हणकविः ॥
भौतिकं वपुरवेक्ष्य भंगुरं निर्ममेऽमरमयं सुवाङ्मयं ॥ विध्यवर्मननयेन राजता मानितः
सु भट भुभुजा वाटिकाद्वयमकारि [सुन्दरम्]

Most of the earlier deciphered portions of the hymn proper being disconnected and of no historical interest the translation of them is not given. But from the broken threads we can gather that the verses contain a highly poetical description of God Visnu in his different incarnations. The truly historical portion (lines 16 and 17) forms the concluding part of the inscription, which is fortunately, less mutilated than the earlier portion and can be read and interpreted with greater fullness and clearness ; It may be translated as follows. Here Bilhana has strung together his flowery verses in a wreath for Visnu and has thus by word of mouth, offered his deep and lasting devotion at his (holy) feet (as has been done before him) by crores of large number of great poets.

The poet Bilhana the favourite and trusted prime minister of King Vindhya Varmadeva (of Dhārā) observing that his material body was frail and mortal, has composed this poem full of the immortal glories of the Deity. Subhaṭavarmā the glorious son and (successor) of Vindhya Varmā highly respected the poet and donated two (*vāṭikās*) gardens for the use of the temple of Viṣṇu.

REMARKS.

Vindhya Varmadeva (1160-1180) was the 16th King of the renowned Parmāra dynasty that ruled in Mālwa for about 500 years i. e. from the 9th century to the beginning of the 14th with Ujjain as its political Capital and Dhar as a favourite family residence. The line is well known for the encouragement it gave to learning and art. Muñja and Bhoja were the most prominent figures and their age may well claim to be considered " The Augustan age " of Sanskrit literature. Several eminent poets and authors in Sanskrit and Prakrit flourished at their courts and their taste and appreciation of scholarship were inherited by most of their successors. The history of the

Parmāras of Malwa which I have been able to compile mainly by the information and hints kindly supplied to me by Dr. Bhandarkar is given in appendix c of the Dhar State Gazetteer prepared under the Superintendence of Col. Luard. It may be referred to for fuller information.

In the time of Vindhyaavarmadeva, next to Ujjain, Dhar, Nalakachapura (Naleha) and Mandapadurga (Mandu) appear to have been great seats of learning.

About this time Ajmer being conquered by Shihābu-d-Dīn Muhammad of Ghūr several Hindu and Jaina families left that country to save themselves from persecution and fanaticism, came down to Mālwa and found protection at Dhār. One of these new comers was a Jain Pandit Āśādhara who, living for some time at Dhār, finally settled at Naleha and there living in Neminātha's temple wrote several of his Jain religious works, which have provided us several dates and facts of the time. He was highly admired by Bilhana the Minister and Rajaguru Madana learned scholars of the time. The time of Vindhya Varmadeva and some of his predecessors and successors was a troubled one and several Kings had short reigns. Pandit Āśādhara has referred to five generations of Kings from Vindhyaavarmadeva (1160-1180) to Jayatugideva (1240-1256) (Jayaśimhadeva II) in his works.

Mr. Nathuram Premi has published in Hindi a short sketch of the life of Āśādhara in his Vidvadratnamālā or string of six Jaina authors printed in 1912. In a *praśasti* or eulogistic note Āśādhara has attached to some one of his works, he has quoted the opinions of noted authors of the time about his own performance. Among them he has prized most the appreciation of Bilhana which is as follows:—

आशाधर त्वं मयि, विद्धि सिद्धं
निसर्गसौंदर्यमजर्यमार्य ।
सरस्वतीपुत्रतया यदेतद्
अर्थेपरं वाच्यमयं प्रपञ्चः ॥

“Dear Āśhādhara, let me tell you that we are not only fast friends, but brothers as we are both the [Sons of Sarasvatī the Goddess of Learning”

इत्युपश्लोकितो विद्वद्विल्हणेन कबीशिना ।
श्रीविन्ध्यभूपति महासांघिविशिष्टिकेन यः ॥ ७ ॥

“ In this way was Āśadhara highly praised by learned Bilhana the King of Poets, the great Prime Minister of king Vindhyavarmadeva. ’

From this it becomes plain how highly was Bilhana ranked among men of genius at the time.

It is regrettable that we know so little about this great-man. The Mandu inscription we are publishing, is, therefore of very great value. Besides this it throws strong side light on Kings Vindhyavarmadeva and his worthy Son Subhata-varmadeva who both patronized him and held him in high respect. Mandu, as it now stands, is a ruined relic of the Mohamadan period. But vestiges of the previous Hindu period are turned up now and then to furnish us with eloquent glimpses of that time. One such is this Bilhana's inscription.

THE JĀTINIRĀKRTI OF JĪTĀRI

BY

PROF. GIUSEPPE TUCCI, Ph. D.



PART I

No original work of Jitāri is known to have been preserved in India; though, if we are to judge from the "Tibetan tradition," he was a very prolific writer and was considered as one of the greatest pandits of his time.

A *résumé* of his life has been given by Vidyābhūṣana¹ who drew his information from the history of Tārānātha and the compilation of Sum. pa. mkhan. po; it is therefore only necessary for me to refer to that book, where, in accordance with the data furnished by Tibetan authorities, his time is fixed between 940-980. We are not yet in a condition to verify how far the synchronism given by Tārānātha is correct; nor can we gather very much from the fragment here edited, which contains, as we shall see, allusion to older authors only.

As regards the literary activity of Jitāri it must be noted that more than as a writer on *nyāya*² he was known as a commentator on Tantras and *sādhana*s; many of his treatises are preserved in the *bsTan-āgyur*.

The *nyāya* tract edited here has no Tibetan translation; it is written on a palm-leaf manuscript found in Nepal and now preserved in the Durbar Library. This ms. written in Newari characters, presumably of the 14th century, consists of six leaves only; it is incomplete. It is quite possible that it contained other *nyāya* tracts by the same author; this hypothesis can be supported by the statement contained in the second verse of the *maṅgalācarana* of the treatise here edited and the beginning of the same: °*likhyante vādasthānāni kāmicit; tatra tavad ādau jātivāda eva nirākriyate*. From this we may deduce that Jitāri wrote a polemical work separately discussing various topics and trying to refute the theories of the opponents.

The *jāti* or *sāmānya* doctrine always represented, as it is known, one of the chief arguments for discussion among the various schools of Indian philosophy: the point of view of

(1) *History of Indian Logic*, P. 33f.

(2) One of his *nyāya* treatises (*Hetutattvopades'a*) has been restored into Sanskrit and translated by Mr. Durgacarana Chatterji.

the Buddhist denying the existence of *sāmānya* as a real entity was strongly attacked by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas (*Nyāyavārttika* NS. II, II. 65-70, Kāśī Sanskrit Series pp. 314 ff. and Vācaspati thereon p. 477, in the same series. *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 307 f.); the Mīmāṃsakas (*Śloka-vārttika*, in *ākrativāda* and *apohavāda*, *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha, Benares ed. p. 18. ff.; and the Jainas, Commentary by Vidyānandi on *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, p. 138 ff., p. 208, *Prameyakamalamārtanda*, (pp. 136 ff.);

Jitāri begins his polemical treatise by refuting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, according to which *sāmānya* is an *arthāntara*, though inherent in the various *vyaktis* in a particular relation called *samavāya*. Then he criticizes, but in a more concise way, the theory held by Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas (called by him Jaiminiyas) that he includes under the same category¹. The conclusion is that the Buddhist point of view only is right, according to which *sāmānya* is a mere construction of mind.

It is quite evident that we do not find anything original in the treatise of Jitāri; he only gives a synthetical survey of the criticism already raised by the greatest masters of Buddhism against the *sāmānya* or *jāti* theory, and it is quite evident that he is chiefly dependent on Dharmakīrti, who, developing and completing the *apoha* doctrine elaborated by Dinnāga in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (Chapter V), dealt very largely with the *sāmānya* theory in the third Chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika*.²

Though the treatise is so small still some quotations are traceable in it as it has been indicated by me in the footnotes to the text. One is from *Nyāyasūtras* II, 2. 70; two others are from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra two others from the *Śloka-vārttika*. From the colophon of the treatise it appears evident that the name of the author was Jitāri and not Jetāri as given in the Tibetan sources and, after them, by Vidyābhūṣaṇa; for the meaning of the name one must remember the classical defini-

(1) But, as it is known, the notion of *jāti* or *sāmānya* as held by the Mīmāṃsakas is different from that accepted by the Jainas I refer to the long criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka point of view (chiefly Kumārila) contained in the *Prameyakamalamārtanda*.

(2) On the argument of. also *Sāmānyadūṣanādikprasāritā* by Aśoka and *Apohasiddhi* by Ratnākaraśānti in " Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts " edited by H. P. Śastri.

tion of the arhat: "*hatāritvād arhat.*" Before concluding these introductory remarks I must express again my deep gratitude to His Highness the Mahārāja of Nepal for the facilities I was afforded in studying the mss. preserved in the unparalleled collection of the Durbar Library, during my rather long sojourn in Nepal.

PART II

नमो मञ्जुश्रिये ॥

मुग्धाङ्गुलीकिसलयाङ्घ्रिसुवर्णकुम्भ [1d]

वान्तेन कान्तिपयसा युसृणारुणेन ।

यो वन्दमानमभिसिञ्चति धर्मराज्ये

जागर्तुं वो हितसुखाय स मञ्जुनाथः ¹ ॥

सुहृदामनुरोधेन यथामति यथास्मृति ।

द्विं विहाय लिख्यन्ते वादस्थानानि कानिचित् ॥

तत्र तावदादौ जातिवाद एव निराक्रियते । इह यद्वस्तुनो भेदाभेदाभ्यामभिधेयं न भवति तद्वस्तु न भवति । यथा व्योमकमलम् । न च वस्तुनो भेदाभेदाभ्यामभिधेयं सामान्यमिति । व्यापकानुपलब्धिः । न तावदयमसिद्धो हेतुः । न हि व्यक्तिभ्यो भिन्नमभिन्नं वा सामान्यं शक्यमभिधातुम् । उभयथाप्यसामान्यात्मतास्वभावप्रसङ्गात् । तथा हि यदि तावद्व्यक्तिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव सामान्याभिमतं वस्तु तदा कथं तत्तासां सामान्यं नाम । यत् खलु यतोऽर्थान्तरं न तत्तस्य सामान्यम् । यथा गोरश्वः । अर्थान्तरं च गोरगोत्वमिति । विरुद्धव्याप्तोपलम्भः । ननु च व्यक्तिभ्योऽर्थान्तरं च स्यात् सामान्यं च तासामिति । न विरोधमिह पश्यामः । न चैतन्मन्तव्यम् । अर्थान्तरं चेदर्थान्तरस्य सामान्यं सर्वं सर्वस्य [2 a] सामान्यं स्याद्विशेषाभावादिति । यद्विषयत्वेकं वस्त्वनेकत्र समवेतं तत्तदीयं सामान्यम् । गोषु चाश्वो न समवेत इति कथमसौ गवां सामान्यं स्यादिति कुतो विशेषाभावः । तदयमनैकान्तिको हेतुः कथमिष्टसिद्धये पर्याप्त्यात् । तदेतदपि बालप्रलापमनुहरति । स हि विशेषो बुद्धिमता वक्तव्यो यः सामान्याभिमतपदार्थमात्रभावी सन्नसंकरेण व्यवस्थामुपपादयेत् । अयं चानेकार्थसमवायः संख्यासंयोगकार्यद्रव्यादिष्वप्यस्तीति तान्यपि सांख्यादिसंमतानि सामान्यानि स्युः । अथैवं मन्येथाः । सत्यप्यनेकार्थसमवाये यदेव समानज्ञानाभिधानप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तदेव सामान्यं नान्यत् । समानानां हि भावः सामान्यम् । भवतोऽस्मादभिधानप्रत्ययावितिभावः । तदाह ।⁽²⁾ समानज्ञानाभिधानप्रसवात्मिका जातिरिति ⁽³⁾ । एतदपि स्वप्रक्रियामात्रप्रदीपनम् । तथा ह्यत्र विकल्पद्वयमुदयते । किं ते स्वरूपेण समानाः [2 b] ...⁽⁴⁾ तोरुपन्नायेषु तत्सामान्यं तथाविधबोधाभिधानप्रवणम् । आहोस्विदसमाना एवेति ।

(1) The invocation to Mañjuśhoṣa must be particularly noted here; in fact it is from Mañjuśrī that Jitāri, after long *sādhana*, got his *siddhis*

(2) About four *akṣaras* missing.

(3) This is a quotation from NS. II, II, 70.

(4) Three or four *akṣaras* missing; read [he]tor

न सामान्यात्मनोदेति न व्येति व्यक्तमन्वयात् ।
 व्येत्युदेति विशेषेण सहेकत्रोदयादि सत् ॥ २ ॥
 यथा कल्माषवर्णस्य यथेष्टवर्णविग्रहः ।
 चित्रत्वाद्वस्तुनोऽप्येवं भेदाभेदाधारणां ॥ ३ ॥
 यदा तु शबलं वस्तु युगवत्प्रतिपद्यते ।
 तदान्यानन्यभेदादि सर्वमेव प्रतीयते ॥ ४ ॥
 एकात्मकं भवेदेकमिति नेश्वरभाषितम् ।
 तथा हि तदुपेतव्यं यद्यथैवोपलभ्यते (^१) ५ ॥ इति ॥


अत्र प्रतिविधीयते [4 b] । भेदाभेदयोरन्योन्यप्रतिषेधरूपत्वादेकविधेरपरनिषेध-
 नान्तरीयकत्वात्कथमनयोरेकाधिकरणत्वं मत्तोन्मत्तेतरः प्रतिपद्येत । तथाहि । तन्नाम
 तस्मादभिन्नं यदेव यत् । भिन्नं च तत्तस्माद्यद्यन्न भवति । अतश्च व्यक्तिभ्यः सामान्यं भिन्नम-
 भिन्नं चेति ब्रुवाणो व्यक्तयः सामान्यं न च व्यक्तयः सामान्यमिति ब्रूते । कथं च स्वस्थ-
 चेतनश्चेतस्यपि तदेतद्वदोपयेत् । प्रयोगः । यद्यदेवं न तदतद्भवति यथोष्णं वह्निरूपं नानु-
 षणम् । व्यक्तय एव सामान्यमिति स्वभावविरुद्धोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः । उभयथा प्रतीतेरुभयोप-
 गम इति चेत् । ननु प्रतीतिरप्रतीतेर्बाधिका न तु मिथ्याप्रतीतिः । वितथस्यापि प्रतीति-
 दर्शनात् । अन्यथा हि प्रतीतियथानुसारिणा भवता द्विचन्द्रादयो वशासे
 निह्नूयन्त इति चेत् । इहाप्येतदनुमानमसिद्ध्यादिदोषत्रयरहितलिङ्गजं किं न पश्यति
 देवानामियः । [5 a] न संविदो युक्तिभिरस्ति बाधेति चेत् । ननु किमियं राज्ञामाज्ञा
 येनाविचार्य गृह्येत प्रत्यक्षस्वभावा संवित् । तच्च ज्येष्ठप्रमाणमतो न बाध्यत इति चेत् । न
 तर्हि तदनुमानं प्रमाणं स्यात् । लक्षणयुक्ते बाधासंभवे तल्लक्षणमेव दूषितं स्यादिति सर्व-
 ग्रानाश्वासः । यथानुमानाभासो बाध्यते प्रत्यक्षाभासोऽपि किं न बाध्यते । बाध्यतामध्य-
 क्षाभासः । प्रत्यक्षैव पुनरियं संवित्तिस्तत्कथं न बाध्यत इति चेत् । नन्विममपि प्रत्यक्षाभा-
 सवानुमानेन बाध्यमानत्वात् । अथ प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रत्यक्षस्य तदाभासतां बाध्यत्वात्साधयति
 न त्वनुमानमित्यभिनिवेशः । कथं तर्हि ज्वालादिविषयायाः प्रत्यभिज्ञाया व्यक्त्यपेक्षया
 प्रत्यक्षाभासता व्यवस्थाप्यते । न सलु ज्वालादीनामक्षणिकत्वमध्यक्षमवधारयेत् । तस्माद-
 नुमानमेव ज्वालादीनां क्षणिकतां साधयेत् । बाधकमेतस्या इत्यकामकेनापि कुमारिले-
 नाभ्युपेतव्यम् [6 a] । न शक्यं वक्तुं सामान्यमेव केवलं तया विषयीक्रियत इति
 तथाभावे हि तदेवेदं बुद्धिज्वालात्वमिति स्यात् न तु सैवेयं ज्वालोति । तस्मान्नानैकान्तिको
 हेतुरित्यलं बहुभाषितयेति ॥ ॥ जातिनिराकृतिरियं जितारिपादनाम् ॥

(1) Verse 1 is=verse 4 of third *pariccheda* of 10 *Āptamīmāṃsā* and
 verse 2=verse 2 *ibid.* Verse 3=vv. 57 c,d, and 58 a, b of *Ārtiśāstra* of
 Ślokaśārttika, verse 4=vv. c, d, of 62 and a, b, of 63, *ibid.* (Chowkhamba
 ed.) I cannot trace the fifth śloka. The śloka: *Yathā kalmāṣa etc.* is
 also quoted by Jayanta p. 311.

THE AGE OF PĀNINI AND SANSKRIT AS A SPOKEN LANGUAGE

BY

Dr. K. B. PATHAK, B. A., Ph. D.



I shall first deal with the question, was Sanskrit a spoken language? This is an interesting problem. It has been discussed by M. Senart and Prof. Rhys Davids. The conclusion arrived at by these two scholars after a life long study of Indian literature and inscriptions is that classical Sanskrit was never a real, living language. It was a dead language. Pali was the only living language of the people. The oldest inscription in pure Sanskrit, that of Rudradāman, belongs to the middle of the second century after Christ. "It had taken four centuries from Aśoka's time to reach this stage. And though the end was not yet, and inscriptions in the vernacular, pedantically contorted, are still met with, from the fifth century onwards the dead language reigns supreme." ¹

Rhys Davids adds that things should not be looked at through the spectacles of Mediaeval Brahmans. Let us accept his advice and turn to the Mahābhāṣya, a work written before the birth of Christ. The most interesting feature of this literary monument is that both Kātyāyana and Patañjali make very frequent appeals to the "real, living" speech of the people in order to elucidate the rules of Pānini. In one of the Vārtikas on Pānini 1, 2, 4, 5 Kātyāyana says यथा लोके Patañjali explains यथा लोके आढ्यमिदं नगरं गोमदिदं नगरमित्युच्यते न च तत्र सर्वे आढ्या भवन्ति सर्वे वा गोमन्तः As it is said among the people "This is an opulent city," "This city is rich in cows." It is plain that the people in the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali spoke of "an opulent city," exactly in the same sense in which Bombay may be spoken of as an opulent city though it is a fact that every man in Bombay is not opulent or rich.

In the 2nd and 3rd Vārtikas on Pānini, III, 3, 133 the question is discussed whether it is correct to say देवश्चेद्दृष्टो निष्पन्नाः शाल्यः or देवश्चेद्दृष्टः संपत्स्यन्ते शाल्यः

(1) Buddhist India, p. 135.

The decision given is that the former sentence alone is correct. Kātyāyana says सिद्धं तु भविष्यत्प्रतिषेधात्.

Patañjali explains

सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् । भविष्यत्प्रतिषेधात् । यल्लोको भविष्यद्वाचिनः शब्दस्य प्रयोगं न मृष्यति । कश्चिदाह । देवश्चेद्वृष्टः संपत्त्यन्ते शालय इति । स उच्यते । मैवं वोचः संपन्नाः शालय इत्येवं ब्रूहि । Kielhorn's 2nd ed. Vol. II. pp. 159, 160

Patañjali assures us that the future tense here is not allowed by the usage of the people. In the same discussion he tells us न हीह कश्चित्कूपोस्तीति प्रयोक्तव्ये कूपोऽभूदिति प्रयुज्जे ॥

In giving the reasons for the study of Sanskrit grammar Patañjali says that in former ages the Brahmins used to study Sanskrit grammar after the performance of their thread ceremony; this is no longer the case; they say:

वेदानो वैदिकाः शब्दाः

सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः

अनर्थकं व्याकरणम्.

“ We know Vedic words from the Vedas (which we study) non-vedic Sanskrit ¹ words we easily learn from the usage of the people (because Sanskrit is the spoken language), it is therefore, needless to study Sanskrit Grammar.” The reason given here for not studying Sanskrit grammar is intelligible to us only on the supposition that Sanskrit was spoken in the time of Patañjali. At the present day, in the twentieth century after Christ, the Brahmins still perform all their religious ceremonies in Sanskrit though Sanskrit is a dead language now and the vernaculars are spoken throughout India. And no Brahmin at the present day will give the above reason for not learning Sanskrit grammar. In the following passage we are told that the use of लिङ्, to convey the sense of a condition, is sanctioned by the usage of the people:—

अपर आहुः । वक्तव्य एवैतस्मिन्विशेषे लिङ् । प्रयुज्यते हि लोके । “ यदि मे भवानिदं कुर्यादहमपि त इदं दद्याम् ” ।

Pāṇini III, 4, 8

Kielhorn's 2nd ed. Vol. II, p, 171.

(1) The expression लौकिक शब्द is used by Yāska and Kātyāyana in the sense of Sanskrit words spoken by the people.

लौकिकेण्येतद्येन्द्राग्नी पितापुत्राविति ॥ 4 ॥

लौकिकेण्येतद्यथा सपत्नोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽनमित्रो राजेति

लौकिकानामर्थपूर्वकत्वात्

Nirukta, I, 16.

Śuklayajuhpratishakhyā, I, 2.

एवं हि दृश्यते लोके अनिर्ज्ञातार्थे गुणमन्दहे च नपुंसकलिङ्गं प्रयुज्यते । किं जातमित्युच्यते । द्वयं चैव हि जायते । स्त्री वा पुमान्वा ॥

Mahābhāṣya I, 9, 69.

Nirnaysagar ed. Vol. II p. 105.

When the birth of a child takes place in a family, the relatives make inquiries as to whether the child born is a male or female and use the neuter gender किं जातम्. In Marathi also exactly the same thing is said काय झालें ?

When Kātyāyana and Patañjali use the expression यथा लोके they refer not to the learned few but to the people in general including the villagers, as is evident from the following passages.

In sūtra, I, 1, 22 Pāṇini defines the term संख्या. Kātyāyana says that the definition is too narrow and should be amended so as to include the well-known words एक, द्वि etc. by which the people understand संख्या. This word as defined by Pāṇini is called कृत्रिम (technical or artificial) while the popular word is called अकृत्रिम (natural). According to a well-known maxim, if a word has two meanings, one technical and the other, popular, it should be taken in the former sense. Kātyāyana says that if this be the case, the more well-known word संख्या meaning एक द्वि etc. will be entirely overlooked. Patañjali illustrates this view by the following example :

यथा लोके । तद्यथा लोके “गोपालकमानय” “कटजकमानय” इति यस्यैषा संज्ञा भवति स आनीयते, न यो गाः पालयति यो वा कटे जातः ॥

He adds that people are guided in this matter by considerations of sense or suitability to the context

अर्थोत्प्रेरणाद्वा लोके कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययो भवति । आतश्चार्थोत्प्रेरणाद्वा । अङ्ग हि भवान् ग्राम्यं पाण्डुलपादमप्रकरणज्ञमागतं ब्रवीतु गोपालकमानय कटजकमानयेति । उभयगतिस्तस्य भवति । साधीयो वा यष्टिहस्तं गमिष्यति ॥

Mahābhāṣya Nirṇaya-sagar ed.

Vol. I. p. 226.

Patañjali proposes the following test. “ Say to a villager who is come with his feet covered with dust, and who is (therefore) unaware of the context, “ गोपालकमानय ” the villager will feel doubts, probably he will understand by the word गोपालक a cow-herd यो गाः पालयतीति.

This was the case in the days of Patañjali. But at the present day the word गोपाल as the name of a person, is as usual as in the time of Patañjali. The other meaning of the word has disappeared, Sanskrit being no longer spoken. If we utter the words गोपालात् आण in Marathi in the presence of any man in the city of Poona, the word गोपाल will be taken as the name of a person, the other meaning of the word will never be suspected, because Sanskrit is now a dead language. But the case was quite the reverse in the second century B. C. when Sanskrit was a living language. Even village potters and mat-makers knew Sanskrit: says Patañjali:—

अङ्ग हि भवान्ग्राम्यं पांसुरपादमप्रकरणज्ञमागतं ब्रवीत्वनयोः प्लव्योः कटं कुर्वनयोर्मृ-
त्पिण्डयोर्धटं कुर्वित्येकमेवासौ करिष्यति ।

Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's ed. Vol. III

p. 57 Pāṇini, Vo. 1, 84.

From the last two illustrations given above it is not to be inferred that villagers, though they understood Sanskrit could speak correct Sanskrit in the second century B. C. That Pali and other Prakrit dialects were also in use, follows from the statements of Kātyāyana and Patañjali who tell us

भूवादि पाठः प्रातिपदिकाणवयत्यादि निवृत्त्यर्थः ॥के पुनराणवयत्यादयः ?
आणवयति वदति वड्ढयतीति ॥

Pāṇini, I, 3, 1

Mahābhāṣya, Nirṇaya-saṅgṛhaṇḍī ed. p. 125.

शिष्टप्रयोगादाणवयत्यादीनां निवृत्तिः ॥

शिष्टप्रयोगादाणवयत्यादीनां निवृत्तिर्भविष्यति । स चावश्यं शिष्टप्रयोग उपास्यः ।
येपि पठन्ते तेषामपि विपर्ययसं निवृत्त्यर्थः । लोके हि कृष्यर्थे कसिं प्रयुज्जते, दृश्यर्थे च
दिसिम् ॥ १

The words mentioned above as being current are the Prakrit forms of the Sanskrit words.....आज्ञापयति वर्तते वर्धयति
वृषति and दृश्यते.

We are here recommended to accept as our guide the usage of cultured men.

Who are शिष्ट or cultured Men? Patañjali replies:—

एतास्मिन्नार्यनिवासे ये ब्राह्मणाः कुम्भीधान्या^१ अलोलुपा अग्रहणकारणाः किञ्चि-

(1) शास्त्रान्विताऽशास्त्रान्वितस्य निवर्तको भवति । तद्यथा देवदत्तशब्दो देव दिण्ण शब्दं निवर्तयति
एव दिण्ण is a hybrid compound. Prakrit or Pali दिण्ण=Sanskrit. दृष

(2) यस्य कुम्भ्यामेव धान्यं स कुम्भीधान्यः । यस्य पुन कुम्भ्या चान्यत्र च धान्यं नासौ कुम्भीधान्यः
Mahābhāṣya (I, 3, 7.)

दन्तरेण कस्याश्चिद्विद्यायाः पारगास्तत्र भवन्तः शिष्टाः ॥ यदि तर्हि शिष्टाः शब्देषु प्रमाणं किमष्टाध्याय्या क्रियते । शिष्टज्ञानार्थाष्टाध्यायी । कथं पुनरष्टाध्याय्या शिष्टाः शक्या विज्ञातुम् । अष्टाध्यायीमधीयानोऽन्यं पश्यत्यनधीयानं येऽत्र विहिताः शब्दास्तान्प्रयुञ्जानम् । स पश्यति । नूनमस्य दैवानुग्रहः स्वभावो योऽयं न चाष्टाध्यायीमधीते ये चात्र विहिताः शब्दास्तांश्च प्रयुङ्क्ते । अयं नूनमन्यानपि जानाति । एवमेषा शिष्टज्ञानार्थाष्टाध्यायी ॥

Mahābhāṣya VI, 3,109.

Kielhorn's ed. Vol. III, p. 174.

From the above passage we learn that in the second century B. C. there were Brahmins in Āryāvarta, who spoke Sanskrit pure and undefiled without learning Aṣṭādhyāyī. This was possible only because Sanskrit was a living language in those days. In confirmation of this view I may mention the fact that in the sixties of the last century an Englishman was my teacher. He told me that in his younger days he did not learn English grammar, because only the classical languages, Greek and Latin, were taught in the schools in England.

Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, who wrote in the seventeenth century says in his Siddhānta-kaumudī, that there are 108 variant forms of the word संस्कृती¹ and gives reasons why all these forms are correct. This discussion would have been rendered unnecessary if Sanskrit had been then a living language. That it was the lingua franca of literary India in Bhaṭṭoji's time can be easily admitted. But the case was quite different in the second century B. C. Let us appeal to Patañjali.

Pāṇini, I, 3, 51.....अवाद् अः, अवाद् ओ गिरतेः

तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम् । न वक्तव्यम् । प्रयोगाभावात् । अवाद् अ इत्युच्यते । न चावपूर्वस्य गृणातेः प्रयोगोऽस्ति ।²

Mahābhāṣya, Nirṇayasagar ed. Vol. II
p: 165.

Patañjali says प्रसुलभम् । नैषोऽस्ति प्रयोगः

Mahābhāṣya (VII, 1, 68), Kielhorn, Vol. III, p. 262.

.....शरहस्त इति च लोके शरहस्तमुपाचरन्ति.

Mahābhāṣya (VI, 1, 83)

Kielhorn, Vol. III. p. 55.

(1) Siddhāntakaumudī, Nirṇaya-sagar Edi. p. 80.

(2) The root वृ (6th Conj.) with अव takes the Ātmanepada अवगिरते "he devours". But वृ (9th conj.) to speak, is never found with अव; so Kātyāyana's amendment is unnecessary according to Patañjali.

.....उक्तार्थानामपि प्रयोगो दृश्यते । तद्यथा ।अपूपौ द्वावानय । ब्राह्मणौ द्वावानय

Mahābhāṣya (VIII, 2,83), Kielhorn. Vol. III. p. 417.

In the first two passages Patañjali says that the people in his time did not use the forms अवगृणाति and प्रसुलम्भम्. They only used अवगिरते and सुप्रलम्भम्.

In the last passage, though the dual forms of the words convey the idea of two, the people persisted in using the word द्वौ. Very similar to this are the following two illustrations.

न हि कश्चित् प्रपचतीति प्रयोक्तव्ये पचतिप्रेति प्रयुक्ते

Mahābhāṣya, I, 4,79.

न हि कश्चिद्राजपुरुष इति प्रयोक्तव्ये पुरुषराज इति प्रयुक्ते

Mahābhāṣya, II, 2, 30

Let us turn to another sūtra of Pāṇini.

स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता I, 4, 54.

किं यस्य तन्त्रम् स स्वतन्त्रः ? किं चातः ?

तन्नुवाये प्राप्नोति.

I understand this sūtra very easily because the words स्वतन्त्र (independent) and कर्ता (doer) are used in Marathi in the senses in which Pāṇini uses them. But I fail to understand why तन्नुवाय (weaver) is introduced here in the Bhāṣya.

Patañjali explains.

नैष दोषः । अयं तन्त्रशब्दोऽस्त्येव विताने वर्तते । तद्यथा । आस्तीर्णं तन्त्रम् । प्रोतं तन्त्रमिति । वितानमिति गम्यते । अस्ति प्राधान्ये वर्तते । तद्यथा स्वतन्त्रोऽसौ ब्राह्मण इत्युच्यते । स्वप्रधान इति गम्यते ॥ तद्यः प्राधान्ये वर्तते तन्त्रशब्दस्तस्येदं द्रहणम् ।

Patañjali says that in his time the word तन्त्र was used in two senses¹ "loom" and "independence" and there was a likelihood of the word तन्त्र (independence) being mistaken for that which meant a loom. But the word in the latter sense being now obsolete, Patañjali's remarks do not add to my knowledge of the sūtra. None the less they afford valuable evidence that in the second century B. C. Sanskrit was a spoken language, as the word is used in two senses in Sanskrit.

Kātyāyana says under Pāṇini (VIII, 1, 12).

(चापले)

चापले द्वे भवत इति वक्तव्यम् । अहिरहिः बुध्यस्व बुध्यस्व ॥ न चावश्यं द्वे एव । यावद्भिः शब्दैः सोऽर्थो गम्यते तावन्तः प्रयोक्तव्याः । अहिरहिरहिः बुध्यस्व बुध्यस्व बुध्यस्वेति ॥

(1) तन्त्रशब्दोऽस्त्येव विताने वर्तते तन्त्रकः पटः प्रत्यगो नव उच्यते Kāṭhikā, Pāṇini, V, 2, 70.

Kātyāyana says that when a man wishes to say something quickly he should repeat words twice, Patañjali says that words expressive of fear and excitement should be uttered not only twice but many times till the cause of fear is understood by the person, to whom the words are addressed.

Two men are staying in a room, one of them is fast asleep. A cobra appears suddenly there. The other man, anxious to save the life of his companion, utters the words "Awake, awake, awake; cobra, a cobra." Under such circumstances, any man with a particle of common sense will use a spoken language widely understood. It follows, therefore, that in the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali Sanskrit was a living language. Candra explains this idea thus

संभ्रमे यावद्बोधम् ¹ VI, 3, 14.

प्रयोक्तुः संभ्रमे सति यावद्भिः शब्दैः सौस्थ्योऽवगम्यते तावन्तः शब्दाः प्रयोक्तव्याः
अहिरहिरहिः बुध्यस्व बुध्यस्व बुध्यस्व ।

Pāṇini explains the form पत्नी thus :—

पत्युर्नो यज्ञसंयोगे IV, 1, 33.

Patañjali says this explanation is in conflict with the usage of the people.

एवमपि पुषकस्य पत्नीति न सिध्यति । उपमानात्सिद्धम् । पत्नीव पत्नीति

Jinendrabuddhi says

एवं मन्यते । शूद्रस्यैव तावद् यज्ञेऽनधिकृतत्वाद् यज्ञेन संयोगो नास्ति । किं पुनस्तस्य भार्यायाः । अतो वृषलस्य पत्नीत्येष प्रयोगो नोपपद्यते इति ।

Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta are unanimous in upholding this interpretation.

Kaiyaṭa remarks,

त्रैवर्गिकानामेव सभार्याणां यज्ञेऽधिकारो न तु शूद्रस्य । उपमानादिति । अभिसाक्षिपूर्वक-
पाणिग्रहणाश्रयणादिति भावः ॥

But the Buddhist and Jain grammarians, who had no faith in the efficacy of sacrifices, amend the sūtra of Pāṇini thus :—

Candra 11, 3, 30 पत्युर्न ऊढायाम्

Pūjyapāda I, 3, 58 पाणिगृहीत्यादिः पत्नी

Jaina Śakaṭīyana, I, 3, 25 पाणीगृहीतीति पत्नी.

Hemacandra II, 4, 57 ऊढायाम्.

(1) Sanskrit was spoken in Candra's time, as will be proved further on.

From the above discussion it is obvious that Patañjali is trying to reconcile the expression वृषलस्य पत्नी which was sanctioned by the usage of the people with Pāṇini's Sūtra.

The termination क्त is always used in a passive sense. It is used in an active sense only in the case of roots enumerated by Pāṇini (III, 4, 72). But the roots विभञ्ज् and पृ to drink are not found among them. In spite of this fact people in the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali used the expressions विभक्ता भ्रातरः पीता गावः Patañjali offers the following solution. अकारो मत्वर्थीयः । विभक्तमेषामस्ति विभक्ताः । पीतमेषामस्ति पीता इति ।

अथवोत्तरपदलोपोऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः । विभक्तधना विभक्ताः । पातादकाः पीता इति ॥

Mahābhāṣya, (III, 4, 67).

Kielhorn's ed. Vol. II, p. 177.

The word विभक्त is used in this sense in all the Indian vernaculars at the present day.

Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali draw their illustrations from the living speech of the people.

तद्यथा चित्रगुरानीयतामित्युक्ते यस्य ता गावः सन्ति स आनीयते न गावः ।

तद्यथा लोके शुक्रवाससमानय लोहितोष्णीषाः प्रचरन्तीति तद्वृणं आनीयते तद्वृणाश्च प्रचरन्ति । एवमिहापि ॥

Mahābhāṣya Pāṇini VI. 1, 1.

तद्यथा । अब्राह्मणमानयेत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृशं क्षत्रियमानयति नासौ लोष्ट्रमानीय कृती भवति । एवमिहापि ।

Mahābhāṣya Pāṇini, VI, 1, 135.

तद्यथा । अब्राह्मणमानयेत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृशं पुरुषमानयति नासौ लोष्ट्रमानीय कृती भवति । एवमिहापि

Mahābhāṣya, Pāṇini, III, 3, 19.

Kātyāyana and Patañjali give these illustrations in order to elucidate difficult points in Sanskrit grammar. Therefore such appeals would never have been made in a dead language, as they would have failed to facilitate the study of Sanskrit grammar.

The subject of genders is dealt with by Patañjali under Pāṇini, IV, 1, 3—he says,.....लोकत एते शब्दाः प्रसिद्धाः स्त्रीपुमान्पुंसकमिति ।

His remarks on the genders of खट्वा and वृक्ष are most interesting. He cites some verses discussing this subject, in which it is stated that there is no reason why खट्वा " a cot " should be feminine, and वृक्ष ' a tree ', masculine. In the absence of any reason,

तदभावे नपुंसकम्
तदभावे स्त्रीपुंसलिङ्गाभावे नपुंसकलिङ्गे न्याय्यम्

both these nouns ought to be neuter. But they are not neuter; because the genders of nouns can not be taught; they depend upon the usage of the people. Patañjali says that in this opinion he is supported by the authority of Kātyāyana.

न चैतन्मन्तव्यं स्वमनीषिकयोच्यत इति ।

पठिष्यति ह्याचार्यो लिङ्गमशिष्यं लोकाश्रयत्वाल्लिङ्गस्येति । पुनः पठिष्यत्येकार्थे शब्दान्य-
त्वादृष्टं लिङ्गाम्यत्वमवयवान्यत्वाच्चेति ॥

Mahābhāṣya, Pāṇini, IV, 1, 3.

It may be stated here that with a few exceptions the genders of Marathi nouns are the same as those of their Sanskrit equivalents. Men from Madras and Mysore who come to Poona can easily pick up a knowledge of Marathi but they can not overcome the difficulty caused by genders without a prolonged study of the subject. A European gentleman once inquired of me " what is the easiest way of learning Marathi genders, " I replied that he could learn them by frequent conversation with educated gentlemen whose mother tongue was Marathi. These facts will enable us to understand the excellence of the advice given by Kātyāyana and Patañjali when they tell us to learn genders from people who spoke Sanskrit.

Patañjali reiterates this maxim लिङ्गमशिष्यं लोकाश्रयत्वाल्लिङ्गस्य very frequently in the *Mahābhāṣya*. He never mentions any treatise with the help of which the genders of nouns could be learnt in the second century B. C. This was due to the fact that the language of the *Mahābhāṣya* was spoken in those days. This state of things continued till the fifth century. In proof of this we may appeal to the Buddhist grammarian Candra who belongs to the middle of the same century. His testimony is most valuable as he was not a mediaeval Brahman. He was besides an author of independent judgment. He rejects Pāṇini's sūtra पत्युर्नो यज्ञसंयोगे as we have seen, and says ¹ that विश्राम alone is correct and not विश्रम as Pāṇini maintains. Candra has प्रज्ञः संज्ञः for Pāṇini's प्रज्ञुः संज्ञुः. As regards genders this Buddhist authority tells us that अर्धर्चादिगण ² is unneces-

(1) विश्राम Pāṇini (VII, 3, 34); Candra, VI, 1, 42.

संशास्त्रादुक्तो ज्ञः Pāṇini. V. 4, 129 ; Candra IV, 4, 119.

(2) अर्धर्चा. दुस्ति च Pāṇini, II, 4, 31.

sary as such words depend upon popular usage अथ तेषां लोकतो लिङ्गाडशासनतो वा सिद्धिरिष्टा.....कानि पुनस्तानि स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकानि ?

इयमयमिदमिति येषु प्रसिद्धिरर्थेषु भवति लोकस्य । स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकानि प्रोच्यन्ते तानि लोकेन.

Candravṛtti, II, 2, 83.

द्विनावम्, त्रिनावम्. लोकाश्रयत्वालिङ्गस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गं न भवति

Candravṛtti IV, 4. 84.

The *Lingānuśāsanam* mentioned above must be the *Nāma-lingānuśāsa* of Amarasimha as the last named work does not contain many words sanctioned by Candra. This Buddhist author also tells us

भाग इति रूपकार्थे रुढिः

Candravṛtti, IV, 1, 61,

पङ्क्तिः, विंशतिः, त्रिंशत्, चत्वारिंशत्, पञ्चाशत्, षष्टिः, सप्ततिः, अशीतिः. नवतिः शतमिति संज्ञाशब्दा एवैते अयुत प्रयुत नियुतादिवत् लोकप्रसिद्धाः

Candravṛtti IV, 1, 62.

षष्टिर्दिनानि पाकपरिमाणमेषामिति षष्टिकाः शालयः, रुढित्वान्न मुद्रादिष्वतिप्रसङ्गः

Candravṛtti IV, 1, 104

The *Kāśikā* (V, 1, 90) says षष्टिरात्रेण पच्यन्ते षष्टिकाः । संज्ञैषा धान्य-विशेषस्य । तेन मुद्रादिष्वतिप्रसङ्गो न भवति Benares ed. Part II, p. 24.

The use of the words रुढि and लोकप्रसिद्ध 'shows that Sanskrit was a spoken language in Candra's time. The subject of accents is as important as that of genders. Patañjali says

द्वौ स्वरौ भवतः वाक्ये राज्ञः पुरुष इति । समासे पुनरेक एव राजपुरुष इति

Mahābhāṣya, II, 1, 1,

Here the words राजन् and पुरुष have the udātta accent on the first syllable, while the compound राजपुरुष has the accent on the last syllable. Pāṇini says.

एकश्चुतिद्वात्संबुद्धौ I, 2, 33.

A sentence addressed to a person from a distance should be pronounced without accents.

आगच्छ भो माणवक देवदत्ता३

This same sentence addressed to a person standing near the speaker, should have the proper accents

आगच्छ भो माणवक देवदत्त.

Jinendrabuddhi says that in the counter example the आ in आगच्छ and the ओ in भो are उदात्त, all the other vowels in the sentence being अनुदात्त. But in the first example the हुत् of the आ in देवदत्ता३ is retained according to Pāṇini's *Sūtra*

द्वाद्धृते च VIII, 2, 84.

In the two Sūtras of Pāṇini cited above there occurs the word दूर the meaning of which is uncertain. Patañjali says, under Pāṇini's sūtra, VIII, 2, 84.

तदेव हि कंचित्प्रति दूरं कंचित्प्रत्यन्तिकं भवति । एवं हि कश्चित्कंचिदाह । एष पार्श्वतः
क्रूरकस्तमानयेति । स आह । उत्थाय गृहाण दूरं न शक्यामीति

How then is the meaning of the word to be determined ? Patañjali replies :—

हयति प्रसङ्गे यदूरम् । किं पुनस्तत् । यत्र प्राकृतात्प्रयत्नात्प्रयत्नाविशेषे उपादीयमाने
(अनुपादीयमाने) संदेहो भवति श्रोष्यति न श्रोष्यतीति तदूरमिहावगम्यते

Kielhorn's ed. vol. III, p. 417.

Kāśika, VIII, 2, 84.

Under the circumstances supposed in the above example common sense would dictate that a dead language should never be employed.

We learn from Pāṇini and Kātyāyana that when a teacher is saluted by a pupil अभिवादये देवदत्तोऽहम् the teacher should use ह्युत in returning the salutation, सो आयुष्मन्नेधि देवदत्ता ३. But this rule should not be observed in the case of women and Śūdras :—

अभिवादये गार्ग्यहं सो आयुष्मती भव गार्गि ।
अभिवादये तुषजकोहं सो आयुष्मन्नेधि तुषजक ।

In the case of the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas the rule is optional

आयुष्मन्नेधीन्द्रवर्मा ३न् or इन्द्रवर्मेन्
आयुष्मन्नेधीन्द्रपालिता ३ or इन्द्रपालित्.

Mahābhāṣya, VIII, 2, 83 and Kāśika

Candra VII, 3, 119.

Patañjali says that in saluting women, one should say अभिवादयेऽस्यमहम्, and not अभिवादये देवदत्तोऽहम् Men, who were ignorant of the rules of ह्युत would be treated like women, and would thus be exposed to ridicule. For this reason, says Patañjali, every one should study grammar.

Mahābhāṣya, Nirṇaya-sagar ed.

Vol. I. p. 11.

If these rules had no relation to the realities of life and referred only to a state of society which existed in the imagination of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, these three authors

would never have received the homage of more than twenty centuries, the homage of the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Brahmans alike, and would never have continued to be studied at the different religious centres in India today.

From the point of view of the historian and the philologist, the retention of the accents of ordinary Sanskrit words to the middle of the fifth century is interesting and instructive. Let us remember that Candrar belongs to the middle of the 5th century. Pūjyapāda, who copies him, lived before the end of that century, while Jaina Śākaṭāyana lived in the first half of the ninth century. Candrar tells us expressly that he retains Pāṇini's indicatory letters denoting उदात्त, अङ्, and स्वरित because in his time these accents were used :

उदात्तादयः स्वरा विसर्जनीयादिवत् प्रसिद्धाः

Candravṛtti, III, 3, 39.

Kāśikā, IV. 3. 67.

Candra-sūtra III, 3, 39 is only a copy of Pāṇini's sūtra. बहुचोन्तोदात्ताङ् IV, 3, 67.

After the middle of the fifth century the accents of Sanskrit words entirely disappeared. Accordingly Pūjyapāda and Jaina Śākaṭāyana have their corresponding Sūtra thus :—

बहुचष्टन् प्रायः Jainendra, III, 3, 50

Amoghavṛtti. III, 1, 131.

Pāṇini (III, 3, 10) and Candrar (I, 3, 6) have the infinite termination, तुमुन्; Candrar says तुमुनो नकारः स्वार्थः¹ Pūjyapāda (Jainendra, II, 1, 5) and Jaina Śākaṭāyana (IV, 4, 183) have only तुम्; Pāṇini (III, 4, 36) and Candrar (I, 3, 136) have the termination णमुल्.² while Pūjyapāda (Jainendra II 4, 15) and Jaina Śākaṭāyana (IV, 4, 151) have only णम्. Pāṇini (V, 3, 23) and Candrar (IV, 3, 19) have थाल्.

On the other hand Pūjyapāda (Jainendra, IV, 1, 131) and Jaina Śākaṭāyana (III, 4, 25) have only था.

Patañjali in his introduction says that without a knowledge of accents, it is not possible to know whether स्थूलपृषती is बहुव्रीहि or तत्पुरुष and its meaning can not be made out on that account. Kumārila says that this statement is most absurd :—

(1) जिनित्यादिर्नित्यम् Pāṇini (VI, 1, 197).

(2) ळिति Pāṇini (VI, 1, 193).

यथैवावस्थितो वेदस्तथा व्याख्यापि सर्वदा ।
अतः स्थूलपृषत्यादिव्याख्या व्याकरणादते ॥

“Just as the Veda is ever existing, so also is its explanation.
Hence the explanation of स्थूलपृषती etc. without grammar.”

न च लोके प्रयुक्तानां पदानां दृश्यते स्वरः
व्यवहाराद्बहिर्भूतात्स्वरान्नातोऽर्थनिश्चयः ॥

बृहद्व्यवहाराधीनं शब्दार्थाविधारणं तत्र च समासान्तोदात्तत्वपूर्वपदप्रकृतिस्वरत्वादि प्रयोग-
विभागाभावात् तत्कृतार्थविशेषव्यवस्था

Tantravārtika, Benares ed. p. 212.

In this passage Kumārila, who belongs to the middle of the eighth century, and lived shortly before the Jaina Śākaṭāyana, assures us that in his time the people spoke Sanskrit without accents and that in the conversation of old men accents were never heard. From these facts the conclusion is inevitable that Sanskrit continued to be a living language, upto the middle of the fifth century, and after that date it must have entered on a new phase in its development as the *lingua franca* of literary India. But this transition must have been extremely slow and gradual.

Another interesting fact in support of my view deserves to be noted here. Kātyāyana tells us that one reason for the retention of लृ in the Śiva Sūtra II ऋलृक् is that when a Brahman woman mispronounces the word ऋतक as लृतक and another man wants to communicate this fact to others thus ब्राह्मणी + लृतकमाह कुमारी + लृतकमाह, we should know how to form the संधि here. Patañjali explains:

अशक्त्या कयाचिद् ब्राह्मण्या ऋतक इति प्रयोक्तव्ये लृतक इति प्रयुक्तम् । तस्यानुकरणम् ब्राह्मण्यु लृतक इत्याह । कुमार्यु लृतक इत्याहेति ।

Candra also retains लृ in his sūtra ऋलृक् and says

ऋतक इति प्रयोक्तव्ये शक्तिवैकल्यात् कुमार्या लृतक इति प्रयुक्तः तमन्योऽकरोति कुमार्यु लृतक इति यमाहेति

The need for such a संधि no longer existed in the days of Pūjyapāda and Jaina Śāktāyana. Accordingly they have the corresponding sūtras thus.

अइउण । ऋक् । Jainendra I. 2.

अइउण । ऋक् । Amoghavṛtti, I, 2

Kālidāsa, who was contemporary with Candra, assures us that in his time men could understand Sanskrit but that women found it hard to understand it and had to be spoken to in Prakrit.

द्विधा प्रयुक्तेन च बाह्येन सरस्वती तन्मिथुनं दुनाव ॥

संस्कारपूतेन वरं वरेण्यं वधुं सुखग्राह्यनिबन्धनेन ॥

Kumārasambhava VII, 90

In the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, villagers, potters, mat-makers could understand Sanskrit. But after the middle of the fifth century even Brahman women had to be talked to in Prakrit; but this change was extremely slow and gradual.

I shall add two more instances. Under Pānini (V, 3, 85 86) Patañjali says:

अल्पं घृतम् अल्पं तैलमित्युच्यते न कश्चिदाह ह्रस्वं घृतम् ह्रस्वं तैलमिति । तथा ह्रस्वः पटः ह्रस्वः शाटक इत्युच्यते न कश्चिदाह अल्पः पटः अल्पः शाटक इति

Under Pānini, V, 2. 29 both Kātyāyana and Patañjali defend the use of the following expressions¹

गोगोष्ठम्, अविगोष्ठम्, उष्ट्रगोयुगम्, खरगोयुगम्, इङ्गदीतैलम्, सर्षपतैलम्, तिलतैलम् Candra (IV, 2, 35) addsमहिषीगोष्ठम्, हस्तिषङ्गवम्, उष्ट्रषङ्गवम् and says घृतादन्यत्र स्नेहे तैलमिति रूढिः

In his opinion such self-contradictory expressions need not be defended as they are sanctioned by the usage of the people.

Patañjali tells us that this language was spoken not only in Northern India but also in Southern India.

अस्ति च लोके सरसीशब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिः । कथम् ? । दक्षिणापथे हि महान्ति सरांसि सरस्य इत्युच्यन्ते ॥

Mahābhāṣya. Nirṇayasagar ed. Vol. I, p. 207.

प्रियतद्धिता दाक्षिणात्याः । यथा लोके वेदे चेति प्रयोक्तव्ये यथा लौकिकवैदिकेष्विति प्रयुज्जते

Idem, p. 23.

In this passage Patañjali says that his predecessor Kātyāyana was a native of Southern India where Sanskrit was a spoken language.

(1) They do not agree with the logical sense of their structural forms. These are idioms of the Sanskrit language, sanctioned by usage, Kātyāyana offers the following solution, Patañjali explains गोष्ठशब्दश्च प्रत्ययो वक्तव्य इति । गोष्ठं गोष्ठम् । यथागोस्तद्वदुष्टस्य । उष्ट्रगोष्ठम् । तैलशब्दश्च प्रत्ययो वक्तव्यः । इङ्गदी-तैलम् । सर्षपतैलम् । प्रकृत्यन्तरं तैलशब्दो विकारे वर्तते । एव च कृत्वा तिलतैलमित्यपि सिद्धं भवति ॥ Cf. "an incorrect orthography", "false verdict", "erroneous etymology," and "nominative case." The Greeks having no word for a rider, apart from "rider on a horse," did not scruple to speak of the horse-man upon an elephant. Trench's English past and present p. 350, note, ed. 1899. The explanation given above only proves that Sanskrit was a living language and thus beyond the control of grammarians.

At present this language is called Sanskrit. It was also spoken of as Sanskrit by Mediaeval authors. But this name is never used in the *Mahābhāṣya*. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are unanimous in assuring us that in their days this language was called भाषा 'a spoken language' in contradistinction to the Vedic dialect which was obsolete, as is evident from the following sūtras :—

भाषायां सदवस श्रुवः	III, 2, 108
विभाषा भाषायाम्	VI, 1, 181
प्रथमायाश्च द्विवचने भाषायाम्	VII, 2, 88
स्थे च भाषायाम्	VI, 3, 20
पूर्वं तु भाषायाम्	VIII, 2, 98.
भाषायां धाञ् कृस्	Vārtika, III, 2, 171
भाषायां शसि	Vārtika, III, 3, 130.
प्रत्यये भाषायां नित्यम्	Vārtika, VIII, 4, 45.
न ह्यन्तरेण छन्द इन्धेरनन्तरो लिट् लभ्यः । अमा भाषायां भवितव्यम्	

Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini (1, 2, 6.)

भाषायामपि प्राप्नोति

Idem. (III, 1, 8).

Yāska who preceded Pāṇini, frequently refers to Sanskrit as भाषा "a spoken language."

इवेति भाषायां चान्वध्यायं च
नेति प्रतिषेधार्थीयो भाषायामुभयमन्वध्यायम्.
नूनमिति विचिकित्सार्थीयो भाषायामुभयमन्वध्यायम् विचिकित्सार्थीयश्च पदपूरणश्च.
Nirukta, I, 5.

Yāska also contrasts the word भाषिक, a derivative of भाषा, with नैगम 'Vedic' thus :—

भाषिकेभ्यो धातुभ्यो वैगमाः कृतो भाष्यन्ते दम्भनाः क्षेत्रसाधा इति; अथापि नैगमेभ्यो भाषिका उष्णं घृतमिति

Nirukta, II. 2.

In the first *aunādika kārīkā* of Pāṇini, III, 3, 1, we read नैगमरूढिभवं हि साधु Jinendrabuddhi says that the compound नैगमरूढिभवं should be dissolved नैगमाः रूढिभवाश्च and that रूढिभवाः means लोकप्रसिद्धाः "current among the people." The word रूढिभवाः is equivalent to Yāska's भाषिकाः. From the facts set forth above it is clear that Sanskrit was a spoken language. The most interesting passage in Yāska is the following :—

अथापि प्रकृतय एवैकेषु भाष्यन्ते विकृतय एकेषु ॥
शवतिर्गतिकर्मा कम्बोजेष्वेव भाष्यते ।

.....
विकारमस्यार्येषु भाषन्ते शव इति ॥
दातिर्लव्नार्थे प्राच्येषु दात्रमुदीच्येषु

Translation

Nirukta, II, 2, 8.

Moreover among some people roots (only) are used ; among others derivatives of such roots (only) are used. The root शवति " to go " is used among the Kambojas ; among the Āryans they use the noun शव the derivative of this root ; among the Eastern people the root दाति " to cut " is in use, while among the Northern people the noun दात्रम्, " a sickle " is employed which is derived from the same root.

This passage is of great importance as it shows that Sanskrit was a spoken language among the different tribes or peoples mentioned, the Kambojas, the Āryas, the Easterners and the Northerners.

In order to escape from this inevitable conclusion Dr. Roth puts a wrong construction on the passage and says ' " the Kambojas (in their grammar) speak of the root " शवतिर्गतिकर्मा " and the Āryas [in their grammar] refer to the same root as " शव इति गति कर्मा " But this is contradicted by the last sentence in which we read the Easterners use the root दाति " to cut " and the Northerners use the noun दात्र, which is not a root.

We find, however, that Dr. Roth is himself not satisfied with this construction as Yāska, who uses शवतिर्गतिकर्मा twice elsewhere, would in that case be a Kāmboja ; " under these circumstances, " says Dr. Roth, " the only possible explanation appears to me to be that we have to banish from our texts the words शवति to शव इति as an unskilful interpolation of a wiser grammarian. " The absurdity of Dr. Roth's speculation is exposed by the light thrown on the passage by Patañjali and Bhaṭṭa Kumārila.

Patañjali says :—

एतस्मिन्श्चातिमहति शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषये ते ते शब्दास्तत्र तत्र नियतविषया दृश्यन्त ।
तद्यथा

शवतिर्गतिकर्मा कम्बोजेष्वेव भाषितो भवति, विकार एनमार्या भाषन्ते शव इति ।

हम्मतिः सुराष्ट्रेषु, रंहतिः प्राच्यमव्येषु, गमिमेवत्वार्याः प्रयुज्यते । दातिर्लव्नार्थे प्राच्येषु,
दात्रमुदीच्येषु

Bhartṛhari and¹ Kaiyaṭa explain

विकार इति । जीवतो मृतावस्था विकारस्तत्रेत्यर्थः ।

Mahābhāṣya Nirṇayasagar ed. Vol. I, p, 27.

Bhaṭṭa Kumārila says :—

तथाचोक्तं । शवति ग (गे) तिकर्म्म कम्बोजेष्वेव दृष्टो विकारापन्नमार्याः प्रयुञ्जते शवमिति मृतशरीराभिधानादित्यादि बहव एव हि धातवो नामशब्दाश्च प्रतिदेशमर्थभेदेषु व्यवस्थिता दृश्यन्ते ।

Tantravārtika, Benares edition, p. 146.

Kumārila implies that शवति is a धातु and शवम् a नामशब्द.

The first point that strikes us here is that while Yāska and Patañjali read शव इति, Kumārila says शवमिति मृतशरीराभिधानान्. This is due to the fact that the noun शव “a dead body”, according to Kumārila and Kaiyaṭa, is both masculine and neuter, as we learn from Amarasimha. “शवमस्त्रियाम्” which Ksīrasvāmi explains शवति यात्यस्माज्जीवः शवः. The second point, that we should note, is that Patañjali and Kumārila use प्रयुञ्जते² as the equivalent of भाषन्ते.

आर्येषु भाषन्ते शव इति
आर्या भाषन्ते शव इति
आर्याः प्रयुञ्जते शवमिति
गमिमेव त्वार्याः प्रयुञ्जते

Yāska.
Patañjali
Kumārila.
Patañjali.

The third point worth considering is the position of the word इति which denotes स्वरूप³ or the kind of change undergone by the root. Therefore it should come immediately before the word विकार in construing the passages thus :

शव इति विकारमस्यार्येषु भाषन्ते
शव इति विकारे एनमार्या भाषन्ते
शवमिति विकारापन्नमार्याः प्रयुञ्जते

Yāska.
Patañjali.
Kumārila.

When Dr. Roth put the misconstruction upon the words in the Nirukta, he seems to have overlooked the well-known rule laid down by Kātyāyana in his Vārtika on Pāṇini, III, 3, 108. इक् क्षिपौ धातुनिर्देशे

इक् क्षिपौ धातुनिर्देशे इति वक्तव्यम्
भिदिः । छिदिः । पचतिः । पठतिः ।

Kāśikā, Benares, ed. Part 1, p. 282.

(1) Kielhorn's ed. of *Mahābhāṣya*, vol. II preface p. 16.

(2) यद्वा भवन्त्यर्थे

यद्वा भवन्त्या अर्थे भाष्यते प्रकृतः कटं देवदत्तः । प्रकरोति कटं देवदत्त इति

Mahābhāṣya, III, 2. 102.

(3) *Gaṇaratna-mahodadhī*. Benares edi. p. 13.

Haradatta remarks.

इक् इतिपौ धातुनिर्देश इति । धात्वुत्करण इत्यर्थः, बहुलवचनाच्च कचिन्न भवति
गुप्तिन् किद्भ्यः सन् Pāṇini, III, 1, 5.
मान् बधदान्दान्यः Pāṇini, III, 1, 6.

Illustrations of this rule will be found in the extracts from the Nirukta and Pāṇini's Unādi Sūtras given side by side by me in another ¹ paper. In the passages under discussion the word गमि is an illustration of इक् while शवति दाति हम्मति and रंहति are illustrations of इतिप. It is thus clear that the words शव इति or शवः इति do not denote a root, but a noun. Śaṅkarācārya gives the meaning of the verb रंहति used in Vedānta ² sūtra, III, 1, 1.

न हि कर्मणि संभवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता । न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जातुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हतीति

Śārirakabhāṣya, III, 1, 10.

The Sanskrit word रंहति in this sense has survived in the Marathi verb रांगणे, मूल रांगते and the word शव meaning "a dead body" is used at the present day not only in Marathi but in many other Indian vernaculars.

The arguments of Dr. Roth being demolished, it follows that in the opinion of Yāska and Patañjali Sanskrit was spoken by the people of Kāmbōja, of Surāstra, by the Āryas, by the people of Prācyamadhyā and by the Eastern and Northern peoples. That it was spoken in Southern India also has been proved above.

Pāṇini tells us that in his time the names of towns, villages, tribes and rivers were Sanskrit. And he lays down rules to explain the formation of derivatives from such names. This proves that in Gāndhāra and the adjacent parts Sanskrit was a spoken language in Pāṇini's time; though at present different vernaculars are spoken there. Similarly, in Kolhapur and its neighbourhood formerly Kanarese was the spoken language. But after Shivaji Kanarese was superseded by Marathi. This accounts for the fact that all the inscriptions in the Kolhapur State, belonging to pre-Marathi times, are in Kanarese or Sanskrit. All the palm-leaf manuscripts in the Jaina Matha at Kolhapur are written in old Kanarese characters, the language employed being Sanskrit, Māgadhi

(1) Pāṇini and the authorship of the Unādi sūtras.

(2) Under this sūtra रंहति is considered by Śaṅkarācārya as synonymous with याति, गच्छति and व्रजति. The roots शव, हम्म, रहि and गम meaning गति are mentioned in Pāṇini's Dhātupāṭha.

or old Kanarese. This subject has been treated by me in another ¹ paper. It is therefore needless to re-iterate my arguments here.

A similar change took place in Gandhara and its neighbourhood. At first Brahminism prevailed; later on there appeared Buddhism; but after the birth of Mahomad both were entirely supplanted by Islam. The truth of these remarks is placed beyond dispute by the following Sūtras of Pāṇini.

- कापिड्याः षक् IV, 2, 99, candra III, 2, 8
 कापिशायनं मधु । कापिशायिनी द्राक्षा.
 काश्यादिभ्यश्छाठौ IV, 2, 116. Candra III, 11, 33.
 काशिकी । काशिका.
 वाहीकग्रामेभ्यश्च IV, 2, 117. Candra III. 2, 34.
 शाकलिकी । शाकलिका.
 रोपधेतोः प्राचाम् IV, 2, 123. Candra III, 2, 37.
 पाटलिपुत्रकः । ऐकचक्रकः
 काकन्दकः । माकन्दकः
 सिन्धुतक्षशिलादिभ्योऽणञौ IV, 3, 93. Candra. III. 3. 61.
 सैन्धवः । वार्णवः । ताक्षशिलः
 मद्रवृज्योः कन् IV, 2, 131. Candra III, 2, 47.
 मद्रकः । वृजिकः ।
 रङ्गोरमनुष्येऽणच् IV, 2, 100, Candra III, 2, 9.
 राङ्गवो गौः । राङ्गवायणो गौः ।
 कन्धायाष्ठक् IV, 2, 102. } Candra III, 2, 11 & 12.
 वर्णौ वुक् IV, 3, 103. }
 कान्थिकः । कान्थकः ।
 वर्णुर्नाम नदस्तस्यादूरभवो जनपदोपि वर्णुः
 सुवास्त्वादिभ्योऽण् IV, 2, 77.
 सुवास्तोरदूरभवं नगरं सौवास्तवम्, वार्णवम् । सौवास्तवी नदी

In a lengthy dissertation contributed to the Indian Antiquary, pp. 163-174 (1904). M. Silvain Levi maintains that Sanskrit was never employed for official or other secular purposes before the year 150 A. D., the date of the inscription of Rudradāman, and that the Sanskrit drama was non-existent before the time of the Ksatrapas who reigned in the second century A. D.

The first statement is contradicted by Patañjali who tells us that

लोकबद्धलादिशेषे सिद्धम् । तद्यथा । लोक ईश्वर आज्ञापयति प्रामाद्वामान्मनुष्या आनी-
यन्ताम् प्रागाङ्गं ग्रामेभ्यो ब्राह्मणा आनीयन्तामिति । येषु तत्र ग्रामेषु ब्राह्मणा न सन्ति न
तर्हीदानीं ततोऽन्यस्यानयनं भवति ।

The ruler of a province issues his orders in Sanskrit.

Mahābhāṣya, VI, 1, 2

Kielhorn's ed. Vol. II, p. 7.

The second assertion of the French scholar that the Sanskrit drama was not existent before A. D. 150 is amply re-
futed by the following passages in the Mahābhāṣya.

व्यञ्जनानि पुनर्नटभार्यावद्भवन्ति । तद्यथा । नटानां स्त्रियोरङ्गं गता यो यः पृच्छति
कस्य यूयं कस्य यूयमिति तं तं तव तवेत्याहुः । एवं व्यञ्जनान्यपि यस्य यस्याचः कार्य-
मुच्यते तं तं भजन्ते ॥

Mahābhāṣya Idem.

इह तु कथं वर्तमानकालता कंसं घातयति बलिं बन्धयतीति चिरहते कंसे चिरबद्धे च
बलौ । अत्रापि युक्ता । ये तावदेते शोभनिका नामैते प्रत्यक्षं कंसं घातयति प्रत्यक्षं च
बलिं बन्धयन्तीति ।

Mahābhāṣya, III, 1, 26

Kielhorn, Vol. II, p. 36.

Haradatta explains

ये तावदेते कंसघाताडुकारिणां नटानां व्याख्यानोपाध्यायास्ते कंसाडुकारिणं नटं सामा-
जिकैः कंसबुद्ध्या गृहीतं तादृशेनैव वासुदेवेन घातयन्ति

Padamañjali, pt. I, p. 539

Benares ed.

Bodhāyana, who is quoted by Patañjali, enumerates
among minor sins

रङ्गोपजीवनं नाट्याचार्यता

Bodhāyana Dharmasūtra, II, 1, 43.

M. Silvain Levi tells us that Sanskrit was never employed
for secular purposes before A. D. 150. But Patañjali assures
us that in his time Sanskrit was used in giving an order for
a pair of thongs to a shoe-maker thus

तथा य एते शिल्पिनो नाम तेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते... ..

यदि तर्हि सर्वे इमे स्वभूत्यर्थं प्रवर्तन्ते कः प्रयोज्यार्थः । यदभिप्रायेषु सज्जन्ते ईदृशौ
वधौ कुरु ईदृशौ पुटकौ कुरु इति

Mahābhāṣya, III, 1, 26

Benares ed. part III, p. 46

Kielhorn's ed. Vol. II, page 36

Thus the splendid superstructure built on the occurrence of such titles as स्वामिन्, भद्रमुख, सुगृहीतनामन् in the Kṣatrapa inscriptions and coins falls to the ground. And the fact that the classical Sanskrit language was spoken in the second century B. C. and continued to be spoken with accents till the time of Candra but without accents even up to the time of Kumārila it is now impossible to dispute in the face of the authorities quoted above.

Kielhorn's first edition of Mahābhāṣya was published several years before M. Silvain Levi's dissertation appeared. But the work is little studied. That Sanskrit was once spoken is obvious to us Brahmans who live near the Tulsibag Temple in Poona where Kirtans are performed or Purāṇas recited, and who hear Marathi expressions corresponding to Patañjali's words गच्छ हन्यते कंसः । गच्छ घनिष्यते कंसः किं गतेन हतः कंस इति

Kielhorn's ed. Mahābhāṣya, III, 1, 26. p. 36.

Was this language in use for some centuries before the time of Pāṇini is the interesting question, which it is necessary to answer.

Pāṇini mentions ten grammarians who preceded him. The sūtras in which he names them deal with the classical Sanskrit language but not with the language of the Vedas. From this fact we may conclude that the works which these ten predecessors composed must have treated of the grammar of the classical Sanskrit. What is still more interesting is that Pāṇini's sūtras mentioning his predecessors are copied by Candra, Pūjyapāda and the Jaina Śākaṭāyana, as is evident from the following synoptical table :—

संबुद्धौ शाकल्यस्येतावनार्षे Pāṇini I, 1, 16.	}	Candra, V, 1, 129 and 132. Jainendra I, 1, 25. Amoghavṛtti. I, 1, 103.
तृषिष्टिषिष्टिषेः काश्यपस्य Pāṇini, I, 2, 25.	}	Candra, VI, 2, 20. Jainendra, I, 1, 110. Amoghavṛtti, IV, 1, 151.
लङः शाकटायनस्यैव Pāṇini, III, 4, 111.	}	Candra. I, 4, 43, Jainendra, II, 4, 93. Amoghavṛtti, I, 4, 105,
गिरेश्च सेनकस्य Pāṇini, V, 4, 112,	}	Candra IV, 4, 93. Jainendra, IV, 2, 140. Amoghavṛtti, II, 1, 155.
वा सुप्यापिशलेः Pāṇini, VI, 1, 92.	}	Candra, V, 1, 94, Jainendra, IV, 3, 92. Amoghavṛtti, I, 1, 92.

अवङ्ग स्फोटायनस्य Pāṇini, VI, 1, 123.	}	Candra, V, 1, 121. Jainendra- IV, 3, 117. Amoghavṛtti, I, 1, 96.
इकोऽसवर्णे शाकल्यस्य ह्रस्वश्च Pāṇini, VI, 1, 127.	}	Candra, V, 1, 135. Jainendra, IV, 3, 122. Amoghavṛtti I, 1, 74.
इ ३ चाकवर्मणस्य Pāṇini, VI, 1, 130.	}	Candra, V, 1, 124,
इको ह्रस्वो ऽङ्यो गालवस्य Pāṇini, VI, 3, 6.	}	Candra, V, 3, 71-72. Jainendra, IV, 3, 127. Amoghavṛtti, II, 2, 82.
तृतीयादिषु भाषितपुंस्कं पुंन्त् गालवस्य Pāṇini, VII, 1, 74.	}	Candra, V, 4, 30. Jainendra, V, 1, 57. Amoghavṛtti, I, 2, 8.
ऋतो भारद्वाजस्य Pāṇini, VII, 2, 63.	}	Candra, V, 4, 160. Jainendra, V, 1, 118. Amoghavṛtti, IV, 2, 91.
अङ्ग गार्ग्यगालवयोः Pāṇini, VII, 3, 99.	}	Candra, VI, 2, 37. Jainendra, V, 2, 104. Amoghavṛtti, IV, 2, 29.
व्योर्लघुप्रयत्नतरः शाकटायनस्य Pāṇini, VIII, 3, 18.	}	Candra, VI, 4, 27. Jainendra, V, 4, 9. Amoghavṛtti, I, 1, 154.
लोपः शाकल्यस्य Pāṇini, VIII, 3, 19.	}	Candra, VI, 4, 27. Jainendra, V, 4, 9. Amoghavṛtti, I, 1, 155.
ओतो गार्ग्यस्य Pāṇini, VIII, 3, 20.	}	Candra, V, 1, 128. Jainendra, I, 1, 24. Amoghavṛtti, I, 1, 102.

In the table given above I have not cited the corresponding Sūtras of Hemacandra as they are almost identical with the Sūtras in the Amoghavṛtti of Jaina Śākatāyana. It is very interesting to note the fact that from the end of the third century to the appearance of King Bhoja of Dhara in the eleventh century the grammar of Pāṇini was copied and preserved by the distinguished Buddhist and Jaina authors whose works have survived to the present day, namely, Candra, Pūjyapāda, Bhartrhari, the author of the Vākyapādiya, Jayāditya and Vāmana, the joint authors of the Kāśikā, the Nyāsakāra Jinendra Buddhi, Jaina Śākatāyana the Nyāsakāra Prabhācandra, Dayāpāla and Hemacandra. The Kāśikā, which belongs to the 7th century, continued to be studied upto the seventeenth century when it was superseded by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's work, the Siddhāntakaumudī.

Now these heretical authors were not mediaeval Brahmans. They did not care for the Vedic literature or Vedic grammar. The four Sūtrakāras, especially Candra, Pūjyapāda, Jaina Śakatāyana and Hemacandra borrowed with slight modifications, only those sūtras of Pāṇini, as amended by Kātyāyana and Patañjali, that dealt with classical Sanskrit. The predecessors of Pāṇini, whose opinions have found their way into the works of these heretical grammarians, must have dealt with classical Sanskrit. In other words classical Sanskrit, as distinct from the Vedic language, was not invented by Pāṇini but existed in the time of his predecessors. These predecessors of Pāṇini were not mere names or imaginary persons as some of them, especially Śākalya, Kāśyapa, Śakatāyana, and Gārgya are prominently mentioned by Yāska in his Nirukta,¹ by Kātyāyana in his Vājasaneyā² Pratisākhya, and by Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya.³

The most ancient of the ten predecessors of Pāṇini was undoubtedly Śākalya, who is believed to have compiled one of the two recensions of the R̥gveda named after him. This belief is alluded to by Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya thus :—

शाकल्येन सुकृतां संहितामनुनिशम्य देवः प्रावर्षत्

Mahābhāṣya, Nirṇaya Sagar edi.

Vol. II, p. 291.

The Chronological relations between some of these predecessors of Pāṇini can be shown thus :—

-
- (1) Nirukta, Venkatesh press edi.
pp. 26, 56, 219 Gārgya.
p. 520 Śākalya.
pp. 25, 56 Śakatāyana.
 - (2) Śuklayajuh pratisākhya, Benares edi.
III, 12, 55, 92 Śakatāyana.
III, 10 Śākalya.
IV, 165 Gārgya.
IV, 5 Kāśyapa.
 - (3) वैयाकरणानां शाकटायनो रथमार्गे आसीत्. शाकटसार्थं यान्तं नोपलेभे
Mahābhāṣya, III, 2, 115.

Śākalya.
|
Śākaṭāyana the elder.
|
Gārgya.
|
Yāska.
|
Pāṇini.
|
Vyādi.

Kātyāyana the author of the Vārtikas on Pāṇini.

Goldstücker has satisfactorily proved that Kātyāyana the author of the Śuklayajuhpratiśākhya is identical with Kātyāyana the Vārtika-kāra of Pāṇini.

Let us now turn to Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra in which we find the following interesting passage :—

वर्णसंघातः पदम् । तच्चतुर्विधम् नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताश्चेति तत्र नाम सत्त्वाभिधायि ।
अविशिष्टलिङ्गमाख्यातं क्रियावाचि । क्रियाविशेषिताः प्रादय उपसर्गाः । अव्ययाश्चादयो निपाताः ॥
II, 10, p. 72.

The concluding words in the above passage will at once remind us of the following Sūtras of Pāṇini.

प्राग्विश्वरान्निपाताः I, 4, 56.
चादयोऽसत्त्वे [निपाताः] I, 4, 57.
प्रादयः [असत्त्वे निपाताः] I, 4, 58.
[प्रादयः] उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे I, 4, 59.

From this it is obvious that Kauṭilya was acquainted with Pāṇini's Sūtras and his गणपाठ which enumerates चादयः. Nor is this all. Kauṭilya also knew the Pratiśākhya of Kātyāyana which says.

तत्समुदायोऽक्षरम् VIII, 39.
तत्समुदायः means वर्णानां समुदायः वर्णों वा VIII, 40.
अक्षरसमुदायः पदम् VIII, 41.
अक्षरं वा VIII, 42.
तच्चतुर्धा VIII 43.
नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः VIII 44.
तत्र प्रति विशेषः VIII, 45,
क्रियावाचकमाख्यातमुपसर्गो विशेषकृत ।
सत्त्वाभिधायकं नाम निपातः पादपूरणः ॥ } VIII, 46,

I must point out here that अक्षर and वर्ण are treated as synonymous by Kātyāyana in the sūtras cited above, and his definition अक्षरसमुदायः पदम् is thus equivalent to वर्णसमुदायः पदम् which is imitated by Kautilya when he says वर्णसंघातः पदम्. Kātyāyana's last verse is also found in the Rkprātisākhya. But this fact will not affect my conclusion, as the last named work¹ also mentions व्याडि or व्याडि; it may therefore be safely concluded that Pāṇini, Vyāḍi and Kātyāyana were considered classical authors in the fourth century.

Let us now proceed to discuss the earliest limit to the age of Pāṇini. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra, II, 1, 70 कुमारश्रमणादिभिः Pāṇini teaches the formation of the compound कुमारी श्रमणा कुमारश्रमणा. This is an allusion to the institution of nuns which is still prevalent among the Śvetāmbara Jaina community at the present day. In the unādi sūtra, III, 130 भन्देर्न लोपश्च the word भदन्त and in another Unādi sūtra III, 2 इण् सिञ् जिदीडु व्यविभ्यो नक् the word जिन are taught by Pāṇini. The two words भदन्त and जिन and the institution of nuns are common both to the Jainas and the Buddhists. But the word अर्हन् had not, in Pāṇini's time, yet acquired the peculiar meanings attached to it by these two sects. Pāṇini² says that it means only deserving in a good sense III, 2. 133. It is also admitted on all hands that Jainism is older than Buddhism. Pāṇini, therefore, alludes to Jainism and not to Buddhism. On these grounds Pāṇini may be assigned to the last quarter of the seventh century B. C. just before the appearance of Mahāvīra and his junior contemporary Gautama Buddha. It must be mentioned here that Mahāvīra was only the renovator of Jainism, the sect having been founded by his predecessor Pārśvanātha.

(1) Rkprātisākhya XIII, 12 व्याडिशाकल्यगार्गाः

(2) अर्हः प्रशंसायाश्च III, 2, 133 प्रशंसा स्तुतिः अर्हतेर्द्वातो. प्रशंसाया शत्रुप्रत्ययो भवति । अर्हन्निह भवान्विद्याश्च । अर्हन्निह भवान्पूजाश्च । प्रशंसायामिति किम् । अर्हति चोरो वधश्च

WERE THE VĀJASANEYĪ SAMHITĀ AND THE ŚĀTAPATHA BRĀHMAṆA UNKNOWN TO PĀṆINI ?

BY

K. B. PATHAK, B. A., Ph. D.



This is a very interesting problem discussed by Goldstücker. The conclusion at which he has arrived is that Pāṇini lived before the composition of the two Vedic works, the Vājasaneyī Samhitā and the Śātapatha Brāhmaṇa. The absurdity of this conclusion becomes manifest to us if we compare the following Sūtras of Pāṇini:

ते प्राग्धातोः 1. 4. 80.

छन्दसि परेऽपि 1. 4. 81.

व्यवहिताश्च 1. 4. 82.

Pāṇini says that in the non-Vedic or classical Sanskrit language π and other particles come always before the verb, but that in the Vedic language such particles may come either before the verb or after it, and that sometimes in the Vedic language other words may intervene between such particles and the verb. Here a contrast is drawn between the grammar of the Vedic language and that of the classical Sanskrit language by Pāṇini. On this ground we can safely assign Pāṇini to the classical period, independently of the question whether or not he mentions the white Yajurveda or the Śātapatha Brāhmaṇa. Similarly an English author who discusses the grammatical peculiarities of the English language as it was spoken and written in the Elizabethan period and compares them with those of the same language belonging to the Victorian era, must be assigned to the nineteenth century.

Let us turn to another Sūtra of Pāṇini:

अध्यायिन्यदेशकालात् IV. 4. 71.

Kāśikā explains:

सप्तमीसमर्थादेशवाचिनः प्रातिपदिकादकालवाचिनश्चाध्यायिन्यभिधेये ठक् प्रत्ययो भवति । अध्ययनस्य यौ देशकालौ शास्त्रेण प्रतिषिद्धौ तावदेशकालशब्देनोच्येते तत इदं प्रत्ययविधानम् । स्मशानेऽधीते स्माशानिकः । चातुष्पथिकः । अकालात् । चतुर्दश्यामधीते चातुर्दशिकः । आमावास्यिकः । अदेशकालादिति किम् । स्नुघ्नेऽधीते । पूर्वाह्णेऽधीते

Candra says:

अदेशकालादधीते III 4. 72.

प्रतिषिद्धदेशकालवाचिनः सप्तम्यन्तादधीत इत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे ठगू भवति स्मशानेऽधीते स्माशानिकः चातुर्दशिकः । अदेशकालादिति किम् । स्नुघ्नेऽधीते पूर्वाह्णेऽधीते ।

This Sūtra is most interesting as Pāṇini here alludes to the practice which is still observed at the present day by the Brahmans, of suspending the recitation of the Vedas on the eighth, the fourteenth and the new and full moon days of the lunar month. From the passage cited above from the Kāśikā we learn that there is a śāstra which forbids the study of the Vedas on certain days and at certain places. This is presupposed by Pāṇini's Sūtra. Though this Sūtra is not remarked upon in the Mahābhāṣya, Kātyāyana and Patañjali vouchsafe to us the necessary information on this point under the following Sūtra :

मतौ छः सूक्तसाम्नोः

V. 2. 59.

In a Vedic text there occur the words अस्य वामस्य. The whole of the first word and part of the second give us the form अस्य वाम. To this is affixed the termination छ (ईयू) and we get the form अस्यवामीयम् ; and we can say अस्यवामीयं सूक्तम् . This new derivative अस्यवामीयम् must be regarded as a different word from the original words अस्य and वामस्य which can not change their relative positions and have different accents. Kātyāyana and Patañjali say :—

आम्रायशब्दानामान्यभाव्यं स्वरवर्णानुपूर्वादेशकालनियतत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

स्वरो नियत आम्रायेऽस्य वामशब्दस्य । वर्णानुपूर्वी खल्वप्याम्राये नियतास्य वामशब्दस्य । देशः खल्वप्याम्राये नियतः । स्मशाने नाध्येयं चतुष्पथे नाध्येयमिति । कालः खल्वप्याम्राये नियतः । नामावास्यायां न चतुर्दश्यामिति

Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's 2nd ed.

Vol. II, p. 386.

The works in which the rules about अनध्याय are laid down are the Dharmasūtras of Āpastamba, Gautama and Bodhāyana. These works are presupposed by Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali. In the Mahābhāṣya we read नैवेश्वर आज्ञापयति नापि धर्म-सूत्रकाराः पठन्ति

Kielhorn Vol. II, p. 365.

Patañjali borrows his definition of Āryāvarta from Bodhāyana's Dharmasūtra: कः पुनरार्यावर्तः । प्रागादर्शात्प्रत्यक्कालकवनाद्दक्षिणेन हिमवन्त-मुत्तरेण पारियात्रम् ।

Mahābhāṣya (VI, 3, 109) } Bodhāyana, Dharmasūtra I, 1, 205
Kielhorn, Vol. II, p. 174. }

Āpastamba in his Dharmasūtra says:

अच्छिष्टाशनवर्जमाचार्यवदाचार्यपुत्रे वृत्तिः

Āpastamba Dh. S. I. 7, 30.

Gautama says :

तद्भार्यापुत्रेषु चैवम् ।

नोच्छिष्टाशनस्नापनप्रसाधनपादप्रक्षालनोन्मर्दनोपसंग्रहणानि

Gautama Dh. S. II, 38, 39.

Bodhāyana says

प्रसाधनाच्छादनस्नापनोच्छिष्टभोजनानीति गुरोः ॥

उच्छिष्टवर्जनं तत्पुत्रेऽनूचाने वा ॥

Bodhāyana Dh. S. I, 2, 36 & 37.

Kātyāyana and Patañjali had before them the above Dharmasūtras as is evident from the following passage.

‘गुख्वद् गुरुपुत्रे’ इति यथा । तद्यथा-गुख्वदस्मिन्गुरुपुत्रे वर्तितव्यमन्यत्रोच्छिष्टभोजना-
त्पादोपसंग्रहणाच्च ।

Mahābhāṣya N. sagar ed. Vol. I p. 352.

Patañjali's words त्रिहृदयंगमाभिरद्भिरशब्दादिभिरुपस्पृशेदिति (VI, 1, 84) are suggested by Bodhāyana's words शब्दमकुर्वन् त्रिरपो हृदयंगमाः पिबेत् (Dh. S. I, 5, 15).

Bodhāyana says :

पद्भ्यां स कुरुते पापं यः कलिङ्गान् प्रपद्यते

Bodhāyana Dh. S. I, 1, 31.

Patañjali explaining the first Vārtika on परोक्षे लिङ्ग III, 2, 115 gives the following illustration नो कलिङ्गान् जगाम. This means that I have not gone to the Kalinga country and have not committed the sin mentioned by Bodhāyana.

Usury is condemned by the Dharmasūtrakāras. Bodhāyana says :

यस्समर्धमृणं गृह्य महार्धं संप्रयोजयेत् ।

स वै वार्षुषिको नाम ब्रह्मवादिषु गर्हितः ॥

Bodhāyana Dh. S. I, 5, 79.

This is alluded to by Pāṇini in the following Sūtra

प्रयच्छति गर्ह्यम्

IV, 4, 30.

Kātyāyana objects to the wording of this Sūtra which he proposes to correct into प्रयच्छति गर्ह्यम्, since lending a sum of money is not censurable ; receiving a larger sum in repayment is really censurable. But Patañjali's defence of Pāṇini is not acceptable to Candra who thus amends his own Sūtra गर्हे III, 4, 36. Kātyāyana tells us the word वार्षुषिक used in the Dharmasūtra is derived from वृद्धि. I have stated that these Dharmasūtrakāras who have laid down rules about अनध्याय are alluded to by Pāṇini in his Sūtra अध्यायिन्यदेशकालात्, IV, 4, 71. I have proved elsewhere that the oldest of these three Dharma-sūtrakāras is Āpastamba who quotes the Vājasaneyi Brāhmaṇa thus :—

अथापि वाजसनेयि ब्राह्मणम् । ब्रह्मयज्ञो ह वा एष यत्स्वाध्यायस्तस्यैते वषट्कारा यत्स्तनयति यद्विद्योतते यदवस्कृजति यद्वानो वानि । तस्मात्स्तनयति विद्योतमानेवस्कृजति वाते वा वायत्यधीयीतैव वषट्काराणामष्टम्बट्कारायति ॥ I, 12, 3, 11.

तस्य शाखान्तरे वाक्यसमाप्तिः ।

I, 12, 4.

Āpastamba then cites a passage from another Brāhmaṇa and winds up thus अध्यायानध्यायं ह्युपदिशन्ति तदनर्थकं स्याद्वाजसनेयि ब्राह्मणं चेदवेक्षेत ।

I, 12, 5.

From these passages we can conclude that the rules for अनध्याय are not found in the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. Such rules are laid down by the Dharmasūtras. These being older than Pāṇini, it is obvious that in the time of this grammarian, the Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā and Brāhmaṇa were well-known to the people.

An additional argument in support of the opinion that the Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā and Brāhmaṇa were regarded as ancient works in the days of Pāṇini is supplied by his two Sūtras.

कलापिवैशंपायनान्तेवासिभ्यश्च ।

IV, 3, 104.

शौनकादिभ्यश्छन्दसि

IV, 3, 106.

In the first of these Sūtras Pāṇini teaches that the names of the pupils of Kalāpi as well as the names of the pupils of Vaiśampāyana receive the termination णिनि. Kātyāyana remarks that here only direct pupils are intended but not pupil's pupils, since Pāṇini mentions कलापि, who was a pupil of Vaiśampāyana, in the first Sūtra and since he also mentions in the शौनकादिगण, attached to the second Sūtra, खाडायन who was a pupil of कठ, the latter being a pupil of Vaiśampāyana. These facts will convince Sanskrit scholars that the names mentioned in the शौनकादिगण must have been preserved with unusual care. While खाडायन is the seventh word in this गण, the name वाजसनेय stands second. It also stands second in the Candravṛtti and Kāśikāvṛtti. The word is also used in the Amoghavṛtti of Jaina Śākaṭāyana, in the Brhadavṛtti of Hemacandra and in the Gaṇaratnamahodadhi of Vardhamāna. As Pāṇini uses the plural form शौनकादिभ्यः it is plain that he must have mentioned the first three words. For these reasons the second word वाजसनेय could never have been a later interpolation. Kāśikā explains the second Sūtra thus :

शौनकादिभ्यश्छन्दसि IV, 3, 106

शौनक इत्येवमादिभ्यो णिनिः प्रत्ययो भवति तेन प्रोक्तमित्येतस्मिन्विषये छन्दस्यभिधेये ।
छाणोरपवादः । शौनकेन प्रोक्तमधीयते शौनकिनः, वाजसनेयिनः ।

Candavrtti III. 3 72

This view is confirmed by another sūtra.

छन्दो ब्राह्मणानि च तद्विषयाणि

Pāṇini IV, 3, 66.

Which means

छन्दांसि ब्राह्मणानि च प्रोक्तप्रत्ययान्तानि तद्विषयाणि स्युः । अध्येतृवेदितृप्रत्ययं विना
न प्रयोज्यानीत्यर्थः । तद्विषयाणि means अध्येतृवेदितृविषयाणि.

The word वाजसनेयिनः means those who recite and study the
white Yajurveda. And as Brhadāranyakopaniṣad says आदि-
त्यानीमानि शुक्लानि यजूंषि वाजसनेयेन याज्ञवल्क्येनऽऽख्यायन्ते

Brhadāranyakopaniṣad

Ānandāśrama ed. p. 810

It is obvious that the compiler of the white Yajurveda had
two names वाजसनेय and याज्ञवल्क्य. .Kātyāyana says that this word
याज्ञवल्क्य does not take णिनि but अण् in the expression,

याज्ञवल्कानि ब्राह्मणानि (Pāṇini IV, 3, 105) Kātyāyana adds that
the derivative याज्ञवल्क is not तद्विषय (अध्येतृवेदितृविषय) ; that is, it is
never applied to those who recite and study the Brāhmaṇa of
the white Yajurveda ; it is restricted to the Brāhmaṇa itself.
On the other hand the word वाजसनेय, though it is the second
name of Yājñavalkya himself, does take णिनि, and its derivative
वाजसनेयिनः means those who recite and study the white Yajur-
veda. Kātyāyana assures us that Yājñavalkya was as ancient
as Śāṭyāyana and others by using the expression तुल्यकालत्वात्
which means याज्ञवल्कादीन्यपि पुराणप्रोक्तान्येव ब्राह्मणानि । ब्राह्मणान्तरैः पुराणप्रोक्तैः
तुल्यत्वात् ।

Jinendrabuddhi

शाट्यायनादिप्रोक्तैः ब्राह्मणैरेककालत्वात्

Kaiyaṭa

याज्ञवल्कादीन्यपि पुराणप्रोक्तान्येव, शाट्यायनकादिभिर्ब्राह्मणान्तरैस्तुल्यकालत्वात् ।

Haradatta

The notion about the posteriority of the Śatapatha Brāh-
maṇa to other Brāhmaṇas, which was unknown to Kātyāyana
and Patañjali is due to Candra who says.

पुराण ऋषेर्ब्राह्मणम् III, 3, 79,

पुराणग्रहणं किम् । याज्ञवल्क्येन प्रोक्तानि, याज्ञवल्कानि ब्राह्मणानि ।

This is copied by the Kāśikā (IV, 3, 105)

पुराण प्रोक्तेष्विति किम् । याज्ञवल्कानि ब्राह्मणानि । याज्ञवल्कादयोऽचिरकाला इत्याख्या-
नेषु वार्त्ता । तथा व्यवहरति सूत्रकारः ।

Jinendrabuddhi says आख्यानादिषु ह्येषा वार्त्ता । याज्ञवल्क्यादयोऽपरकालाः
प्रवक्तारोऽन्येभ्यः प्रवक्तृभ्यः । तथा च वस्तुत्वमनपेक्ष्य व्यवहरति सूत्रकार इत्यदोषः ।

Haradatta says आख्यानानि भारतादीनि । “तथा व्यवहरतीति” । अर्थस्तु
तथा वा भवत्वन्यथा वेति भावः ।

In the *Tattvabodhinī*, (*Nirayāsagar* ed. p. 253) we read
‘याज्ञवल्क्यादयो ह्यचिरकालाः’ इति भारतादिषु व्यवहारः स एवानुसृतः सूत्रकृता ।

In the same work, p. 237, we read—याज्ञवल्क्यादयो हि पाणिन्यपेक्षया
नूतना इति वृत्तिकृता व्यवहारः । This last statement may have misled
Dr. Goldstücker into believing that the *Śuklayajurveda* and
its *Brāhmaṇa* are later than Pāṇini. Nor is there anything in
the *sūtras*, *vārtikas* and the *Bhāṣya*, which will warrant us in
attributing to Pāṇini the belief in the posteriority of *Yājñā-*
valkya to *Śāṭyāyana* and others. The conclusion from the
above discussion is that the *Śukla Yajurveda* and its *Brāh-*
maṇa were considered Vedic works in the days of Pāṇini.

FURTHER REMARKS ON THE UNĀDI SŪTRAS OF PĀNINI.

BY

K. B. PATHAK, B. A., Ph. L.

Goldstucker says " that the Unādi sūtras contain no definition of any technical word, requires no confirmation from me, " " That a treatise like the Unādi sūtras uses those terms which are defined by him (Pānini); " " the only possible conclusion is that this treatise was written later than the grammar of Pānini. " This is amply refuted by Patañjali who tells us that the definitions in the Aṣṭādhyāyī are applicable to the terms in the Unādi sūtras. In his interesting discussion on the sūtra यू स्याख्यौ नदी (1, 4, 3) he says that this definition of the term नदी must be interpreted in such a way that it may apply to the aṇādika termination ई in लक्ष्मी and तन्त्री so that we may have the dative forms लक्ष्म्यै, तन्त्र्यै, according to the Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra आद् नद्याः (VII, 3, 112) लक्ष्मी + आ + ए = लक्ष्म्यैः तन्त्री + आ + ए = तन्त्र्यैः. This is also alluded to in the following passage.

लक्ष्मीतरा तन्त्रीतरेत्येव भवितव्यम् । एवं हि सौनागाः पठन्ति
घादिनद्या ह्रस्वत्वे कृन्नद्याः प्रतिषेध इति ।

Mahābhāṣya (VI, 3, 43)
Kielhorn's ed. Vol III p. 159;

The allusion here is to the aṇādika termination ई.
अविद्वृष्टतन्त्रिभ्यः ई Un III, 159.
लक्ष्मेर्मुद्रच Un. III, 161.

Here is another passage:—

कथमर्कः ।

अर्चैः कविधानात्सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

नैतत्त्वजन्तम् । औणादिक एष शब्दस्तास्मिन्नाष्टमिकं कुत्वम् ।

Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's ed. Vol III p. 332.

Here Kātyāyana and Patañjali hold that according to Unādi sūtra,

कृदाधारार्चिकलिभ्यः कः III, 40

अर्क is formed by adding क to the root अर्च, while in the opinion of Patañjali the च in अर्च is changed into क according to the Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra चोः कुः VIII, 2, 30. The fact that the

Unādi terminations are आर्ध धातुक has been proved in my previous paper.

The Kāśikā, which belongs to the seventh century, says that the Astādhyāyī sūtra श्रोऽन्तः VII, 1, 3, is intended by Pāṇini to explain the unādi termination झच्—

श्रोऽन्तः VII, 1, 3.

..... प्रत्ययावयवस्य अस्य अन्त इत्ययमादेशो भवति कुर्वन्ति.....
जृविशिभ्यां झच् [unādi III, 126] जरन्तो वेशन्तः अस्मिन्नप्यन्तादेशो कृते प्रत्ययाद्युदात्तत्वं भवति । तथा च झचश्चित्करणमर्थवद्भवति ।

In the aunādika Termination झच् the consonant झ without the अ is intended. The अ is added to it in order to make it easily pronounceable. The affixing of च to झ is thus meaningless. The obvious intention of Pāṇini is that the आदेश 'अन्त' but not झ is made अन्तोदात्त by it. Thus जरन्त 'a buffalo' and वेशन्त 'a pond' have the accent on the last syllable. It follows, therefore, that the आदेश 'अन्ति' in कुर्वन्ति is आयुदात्त and therefore the second syllable in कुर्वन्ति has the accent. A similar explanation based upon घच् is given by Kātyāyana in his second vārtika on the preceding sūtra (VII, 1, 2.)

The Mādhaviya Dhātuvṛtti also says—

जृविशिभ्यां झच् इति झच् श्रोऽन्तः ॥

Mādhaviya Dhātuvṛtti
Mysore ed. Vol. II, part 1, p. 121.

The use of the word छन्दसि in the following Unādi sūtras has led scholars to draw erroneous inferences

अशि शकिभ्यां छन्दसि IV, 146.

अस्मा पाषाणः शक्मा इन्द्रः

भूसूधूभ्रस्त्रिभ्यश्छन्दसि II 80.

भुवनम्, सुवनम्, धुवनम्, भञ्जनम्

This difficulty was known to the authors of the Kāśikā who offer the following solution.

रज्जेः क्युन्निति वर्तमाने भूसूधूभ्रस्त्रिभ्यश्छन्दसीति क्युन्नप्रत्ययान्तो भुवनशब्द आयुदात्तो व्युत्पादितः । कथं भुवनपतिरादित्य इति । उणादयो बहुलमिति बहुलवचनाद्भाषाया-
मपि प्रयुज्यते ॥

Kāśikā (VI, 2, 20) Benares ed. part II, p. 211.

As regards the other word अस्मन् Patañjali (I, 3, 1) says “अस्मानमितः कुरु” स्थापयेति गम्यते. This word may also be similarly defended. It is thus clear that the word छन्दसि in the two Unādi sūtras should be connected with those words only which are purely Vedic.

Vimala's opinion that Vararuci (Kātyāyana) composed the unādi sūtras is refuted by Kātyāyana's own Vārtika quoted in the Mahābhāṣya (I, 1, 4)—रकि ज्यः संप्रसारणम्।

ज्यश्चेति । ज्या वयौ हानौ । अस्माद्रक् । ग्रहिज्या इति संप्रसारणम् । हलः इति दीर्घः, Thus we get the word जीर meaning खड्ग. But this word is differently derived in the Unādi sūtra—

जोरी च ॥ १९१ ॥ जीरोऽणुः

जु गतौ सौत्रोऽस्माद्रक् ईकारश्चान्तादेशः ।

Tattvabodhini, Nirnayasagar ed. p. 506.

Nāgojibhatta's attributing the authorship of these sūtras to the older Śakatāyana who preceded Pāṇini, is equally erroneous, as is evident from the following two Unādi sūtras which contain Pāṇini's pratyāhāras—

अमन्तात् ङः Un. I, 115.

इगुपधात् कित् Un IV, 120.

These sūtras are copied by Candrar (Un. II. 30 and I, 52) and by Hemacandra (Un. 168 and 609). Additional evidence confirmatory of this view is found in the following Unādi sūtras:—

हुवः श्रुवच्च II, 228 जुहूः

अङ्गेर्नलोपश्च IV, 499 अग्निः from अगि

भन्देर्नलोपश्च III, 417 भदन्तः from भदि

निन्देर्नलोपश्च II, 184 निद्रा from निदि

The first of these Unādi sūtras presupposes the Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtras जुहोत्यादिभ्यः श्रुः II, 4, 75 and श्लै VII, 1, 10, and the remaining three Unādi sūtras presuppose the Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra इदितो जुम् धातोः VII, 158 and the roots अगि भदि and निदि with the indicatory letter इ affixed to them by Pāṇini in his Dhātupāṭha. Sāyana in his com. on Rg. I, 1, 1, says अगिधातोर्गत्यर्थात् । घा० ५.३८. । अंगेर्नलोपश्च । उ० ४.५० । इत्यौणादिकसूत्रेण निप्रत्ययः । इदित्वान्नुमागमेन प्राप्तस्य नकारस्य । पा० ७.१.५८ । लोपश्च भवति । अंगति स्वर्गे गच्छति हविर्नितुमित्यग्निः ।

Since Kātyāyana very often refers to Unādi words as exceptions to Pāṇini's rules, Goldstücker is led to suppose that Pāṇini must have composed an Unādi list different from these Unādi sūtras. This is due to a misunderstanding of Kātyāyana's vārtikas, in one of which (Vārtika on I, 1, 25) we are told that the past participle त (क्त) can be distinguished from the Unādi termination त (तन्) by the indicatory letter न् affixed to the latter as in the words लोत and

गते. These words have the Udātta accent on the first syllable, which is indicated by the letter न. On the other hand Kātyāyana alludes to the Unādi termination स having no indicatory letter affixed to it in his vārtikas on Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtras I, 1, 60 and IV, 3, 168. How does Pāṇini indicate the accent in the case of स? The only course open to Pāṇini was to embody स in the following Unādi sūtra,

वृत्तुवदिह्निकामिकशिभ्यः सः

Unādi III 349,

and bring it under the अधिकार sūtras

प्रत्ययः III, 1. 1.

परश्च III, 1, 2.

आद्युदात्तश्च III, 1, 3.

Thus the words हंस (+ स) and वत्स (वद् + स) have the Udātta accent on the last syllable. From these facts it is obvious that Goldstücker's view that Kātyāyana alludes to a separate Unādi list from the Unādi sūtras under discussion is untenable. The conclusion that we can draw from the facts set forth in my two papers is that the Unādisūtras were composed by Pāṇini himself.

MISCELLANEA

(i)

DATE OF GANITĀMRTALAHARĪ OF RĀMAKRṢṢṢA

(Śaka 1609 = A. D. 1687).

Dr. Eggeling describes¹ the only Ms. of the *Ganitāmṛtalaharī* in the India Office Library as under :—

“Ganitāmṛtalaharī, Lilāvativṛtti, a commentary on the Lilāvati, composed in 1338 A. D. (?) by Rāmakṛṣṣa, son of Lakṣmana, grandson of Nṛsiṃhadeva, a pupil of Somanātha, who was a native of Jalapura on the Sahyādri range, or Western Ghats.”

The remark “composed in 1338 A. D. (?)” in the above description is based on the chronogram contained in the following lines in the last verse of the colophon :—

“नंदाभ्रतुम १२६० ममिति (!) शकगते वर्षे सहस्रासिते ।
पक्षे सर्वेतिथौ सदाशिवपदार्चार्थं हि भूयात्सदा ॥”

Obviously Dr. Eggeling could not interpret the fragmentary chronogram “नंदाभ्रतुम—” on the basis of a single Ms. of the work. He, therefore, relied in his above mentioned description on the figure “१२६०” as giving the year of the Śaka Era, in which the work was composed. The figure “१२६०” conflicts with the figure indicated by नंद, अत्र, ऋतु, म—(?) [= 9, 0, 6, म—(?)]. The letter म in this fragmentary chronogram is a remnant of the word मही (= 1). The date of the work as based on this chronogram comes to Śaka 1609. It appears that the figure “१२६०” was inserted later by the copyist in his futile attempt to interpret the original chronogram indicated by the line “नंदाभ्रतुमही”.

The above interpretation of the chronogram is further strengthened on other independent grounds. The Government Mss. Library at the B. O. R. Institute has a Ms. of the work viz. No. 281 of Viś I. The line of chronogram in this Ms. is “नंदाभ्रतुम १२६० प्रमिति शकगते वर्षे सहस्रासिते”. The occurrence of the figure “१२६०” in this copy also may lead us to infer that both these Mss. have been copied from the same source. The frag-

1. India Office Library Catalogue, Part V, p. 1002,

mentary chronogram “नदाप्रतुम” is an inaccurate copy of “नदाप्र-
तुम” of the India Office Ms.

Rāmakṛṣṇa wrote a commentary (Bijaprabodha) on the Bijaganita. We have proved already in the last issue of the Annals¹ that this commentary was written in Śaka 1609. The date of the present work as interpreted above comes also to Śaka 1609. This shows that Rāmakṛṣṇa completed both these commentaries in Śaka 1609 (= A. D. 1687). There is nothing unusual if an author keeps himself engaged on two different works on one and the same subject by working alternately on each and carries both of them to completion in one and the same year

(ii)

THE TERMINUS AD QUEM FOR THE DATE OF
KULAPRADĪPA OF ŚIVĀNANDA-SAMVAT 1765
(= A. D. 1709).

Aufrecht mentions five Mss of this work, which is a treatise, in verse, in commendation and exposition of Tantric doctrines, in seven chapters (prakāśa) by Śivānandācārya. Out of this number the following two Mss belong to the Government Mss. Library at the B. O. R. Institute :—

(1) No. 932 of 1887-91, dated Samvat 1925.

(2) No. 474 of 1895-98, dated Samvat 1885.

The other three Mss referred to by Aufrecht are :—

(3) Paris (D 31).

(4) Oudh XII, 48.

(5) IO, 1265.

Aufrecht does not mention the date of composition of this work in all these entries. The India Office Ms. No. 1265 does not give the date of composition of the work. It is dated Samvat 1788. The entry “Paris (D 31)” refers not to a printed catalogue but to a hand-written list and hence is not available for reference. So also the entry Oudh XII, 48.

Besides these five Mss. mentioned by Aufrecht there is a sixth Ms. in the Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras.

It is No. 5585 described on p. 4348 of Vol. XII of the descriptive catalogue of that Library. This Ms. also does not give the date of composition of the work.

Out of the two Mss of the work at the B. O. R. Institute referred to above No. 932 of 1887-91 has the following colophon :—

“ इति श्री शिवानंदाचार्यविरचिते कुलप्रदीपे सप्तमप्रकाशः ॥
॥ पंच षट् सप्त चंद्राब्दे पौषे शुक्लाद्विके बुधे
पुस्तकं कुलप्रदीपस्य नवीनं पूर्णतां ययौ ॥ १ ॥
श्री गोस्वामिचतुर्भुजद्विजपतेभक्ति विलोक्यागमे
सकौलव्रत शालिनी ह नियमाश (स) कैकचित्तस्य हि
विख्यात क्षितिमंडले शुचिमति गोविदनामा जय—
द्वंदादि विलिलेख पुस्तकमिदं कौलप्रदीपाभिधं ॥ १ ॥
सं. १९२५ ”

It appears from the above colophon that this Ms. is a modern copy of an earlier copy completed (पूर्णतां ययौ) in Samvat 1765 (पंच षट् सप्त चंद्राब्दे) by one Govinda.

The dates of the Mss. of this work so far available are the following :—

Samvat 1788 (= A. D. 1732)—India Office Ms. No. 1265.

„ 1885 (= A. D. 1829)—No. 474 of 1895-98 (B. O. R. I. Ms.).

„ 1925 (= A. D. 1869)—No. 932 of 1887-91 (B. O. R. I. Ms.).

Ms. No. 932 of 1887-91, being a copy of another copy completed in Samvat 1765 as remarked above, we must regard Samvat 1765 (= A. D. 1709) as the *terminus ad quem* for the date of composition of *Kulapradīpa* of *Śivānanda*.

(iii)

DATE OF MALLAPRAKĀŚA ASCRIBED TO MALLADEVA (Between A. D. 1551 and 1568)

I. Mss. of the work—Aufrecht mentions three Mss. of *Mallaparakāśa* viz.

(i) W. p. 295 } by Malladeva
(ii) Bik. 649 }

(iii) Peters. 3, 399 by Lokanātha

No. (i) is No. 956 described by Weber in his Catalogue of Mss. in the Berlin Library (1853). This is only a fragment containing folios 27-47.

No. (ii) is No. 1417 described on p. 649 of the Descriptive Catalogue of Bikaner Mss by Rajendralal Mitra (1880) —26 folios—dated *Sainvat 1658*. The work is devoted principally to the examination of the pulse.

End—" निर्मेथ्य मल्लदेवेन सदायुर्वेदसागरम् ।

मल्लप्रकाशनामार्य कारितः सङ्ग्रहः शुभः ॥

इति श्री मल्लप्रकाशनामालोकनार्थं विरचितः सम्पूर्णः ।

सम्बत् १६५८. ॥ ”

No. (iii) is No. 435 of 1884-86 of the Government Mss. Library at the B. O. R. Institute. -58 folios-It is dated *Sainvat 1685*.

End—" निर्मेथ्यमल्लदेवेन.....शुभः ” as in No. ii

इति श्री कायस्थवंशावतंसलोकनाथकविविरचितः श्रीमल्लप्रकाशनामा ग्रंथ समाप्तः ।

Before the verse “निर्मेथ्य मल्लदेवेन etc.” we find the following nine verses containing information about *Malladeva* :—

“ हिमशिशिरवसंतयौष्मवर्षाशरत्सु
स्तनतपनवर्णामो हर्म्यमिष्टाज्यपानैः ।
सुसमनुभवराजस्त्वद्विषो यातु नाशं
दिवसकमललज्जाशर्वरीरेणुपंकैः ॥ १ ॥

शीतोद्भवं दोषचयं वसंते विशोधयन्त्यौष्मजमभ्रकाले ।
घनात्यये वार्षिकमाशु सम्यक् प्राप्नोति रोगानृतुजान्नजातु ॥ २ ॥

श्रुतचरितसमृद्धे कर्मदक्षे दयालो
मिषजि निरनुबन्धे देहरक्षां निवेश्य ।
भवति विपुलचेताः स्वास्थ्यकीर्त्तिप्रभावः
स्वकुशलफलभोगी भूमिपालश्चिरायुः ॥ ३ ॥

अभिनवकवित्वरचनेनादरमिहकोविदायतः कुर्युः ।
तस्मादार्षवचोभिर्निबध्यते नत्वसामर्थ्यात् ॥ ४ ॥

आसीद्योधपुरे पुरंदरपुरी पूर्णार्थिकामे पुरी ।
गीर्वाणागमगानमानवगणा गतिः स गागेयवत् ॥
गंगाहो गुणयानदानरसिको राठोडराजो भु.....
स्यद्रूपशिरोमणिब्रजलसत्पादारविंदः कृती ॥ ५ ॥

तत्पुत्रः पूर्णसत्रः सुरसरिदिमल....वित्रः समित्र-
स्तेजोभिः प्रीतामित्रं मदनरसकलाकल्पनावत्कलधः ।

भूमीशो मल्लदेवो जगति विजयते वैरिभिः प्रार्थ्यसेवो—
 दानांभःकुम्भरिक्तीकृतमितजलधिभ्रांतसत्त्वादिदेवः ॥ ६ ॥
 तेनायुर्वेदरत्नाकरबहुमथनात्कारितो दृष्ट्योगो
 ग्रंथोयं भूरियुक्त्याकुलगदिगदहन्मल्लदेवप्रकाशः ।
 यं दृष्ट्वा वैद्यविद्याकुलनिजमतियुक् स्वस्थबद्धैयपुत्रो—
 राजानं वा जनं वा मुनिजनमथवा वीतरोगं करोतु ॥ ७ ॥
 यदिचरकमुखोक्तं सुश्रुतायुक्तमुक्तं
 वचनमिदमिहार्थं भेदपाराशरायं ।
 ममकथितमिहास्ते किंबुधवैद्यवृद्धाः
 परमिति मम नेत्रायानुभूतिश्चमोस्ति ॥ ८ ॥
 पठतु यदि चिकित्साज्ञानयोगे मनः स्यात्
 निखिलमुनिनिबद्धाः संहिता भूरिवादाः ।
 मम नु मतमिदं यत्प्रत्ययादेव रोगो—
 रशम इह चिकित्सा सत्फलं संयद्भैः किं ॥ ९ ॥”

The verse “ निर्वैथ्यमल्लदेवेन शुभः” occurs at several places, for instance :—

- (1) on folio 3 after verse 23,
- (2) “ ” 12,
- (3) “ ” 18,
- (4) “ ” 30,
- (5) “ ” 39,
- (6) “ ” 50,

The Ms. begins with the verse :—

“ नत्वा गोपालबालं गिरिशगणपतीसारदामांजेनयं
 भानुं रामं भवानीं निजगुरुचरणौ मानसे स्वे निधाय ॥
 ब्रूते हस्तप्रपाटी विधिमिह गदिनामर्त्तिनाशाय पूर्वै—
 रल्पस्तां दृष्ट्योगां विहितबहुकलां लोकनाथः समासात् ॥ १ ॥”

It is clear from this beginning and the end of the Ms. quoted above that the Kāyastha Lokanātha was the composer of the work, who ascribed the work to his patron Malladeva. The father of this Malladeva, we are informed further, belonged to ‘योधपुर’ and was called ‘गांग’ (गांगाह) and that he was a Rathor King (राठोडराजः).

2. Identification of Malladeva with Māladeva of Jodhpur. :—The marks for identification furnished by verse 5

above viz. (1) that the father of this Malladeva belonged to योधपुर, (2) that he was called गंग and (3) that he was a राठौड़ enable us to identify this Malladeva with the prince *Māladeva* of Jodhapur, Son of Gaṅgā, who was a contemporary of the Emperors Humayun and Akbar. *Māladeva* came to the throne in Vikrama *Samvat* 1588 (= A.D. 1551-2) and died in Vikrama *Samvat* 1625 (= A.D. 1568-9). It was this prince that refused asylum to Humayun in his flight and thus forced him to take refuge at Umarkot in the sandy deserts of Thur in 1541-2, but had to submit to Akbar shortly before his death.¹

The dates of accession and death of *Māladeva* mentioned above viz. *Samvat* 1588 and 1625 are in harmony with the dates of the Mss. of *Mallaprakāśa* viz. *Samvat* 1658 and 1635 of the Bikaner and the B. O. R. Institute Mss. respectively. The B. O. R. I. Ms. being written ten years after the death of *Māladeva*, is the oldest dated Ms. of the work so far available. From the foregoing facts we can reasonably infer that Lokanātha must have composed the work *Mallaprakāśa* between A.D. 1551 and 1568.

P. K. Gode.

1. I am indebted to Mr. K. N. Dikshit, Superintendent, Archaeological Survey, Eastern Circle, for this identification.

REVIEWS

THE MARATHA RAJAS OF TANJORE, BY K. R. SUBRAMANIAM, M. A., Price Re. 1. 1928, 60 T. S. V. Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras.

'From the known to the unknown' is a standard maxim in pedagogics; but as observed by the Foreword writer of this small book this maxim is honoured only in the breach so far as the teaching of history in our schools is concerned. This unsatisfactory state of things is due to the absence of text-books on local history by competent research workers. The existing text books deal with the Emperors of Delhi and enumerate the Viceroy's at Calcutta, and a list of these supermen must be learnt by all students young and old, from Kashmere to Cape Comorin. But with the spread of higher education and of genuine interest in the historical method this absurd standardisation of present day text books on history is bound to disappear and a refreshing age of provincial and local histories brimming with new information on various topics must be dawning. The work under review is a good index of the new age. It will, of course, interest all readers on Tanjore side; but students of Maratha history also will be surprised to read that the Maratha Rajas of Tanjore were famous for their patronage of literature and art. "One lesson" remarks the author "above all, this short history conveys and that is, that independence can be preserved only by force actively aided by diplomacy" and further on he adds "immorality, injustice and dishonour lead to the ruin of States." In short this outline of political and cultural history of the epoch 1675-1800 with the aid of the available materials is an attempt in the right direction and should induce scholars in history in various provinces to undertake research work in their localities and embody the results thus obtained in the form of small histories like the one before us.

We may add before concluding that the Tanjore Marathi inscription is a misleading document and does not deserve a place in the bibliography without a word of caution.

D. V. APTE.

Vol. XI]

[Part II

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
Volume XI

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CONTENTS

Vol. XI, Part II

ARTICLES

PAGES

- 1 The place of the Āryasatyas and Pratītyasamutpāda in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by Dr. Nalinaksha Dutt, Ph. D. (Cal.), D. Litt. (Lond.) ... 101-127
- 2 Slow Progress of Islam Power in Ancient India, Part II, by Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, M.A., Ph. D. ... 128-148
- 3 On the Date of Samantabhadra by Dr. K. B. Pathak, B.A., Ph. D. 149-154
- 4 Śāntaraksita's Reference to Kumārila's Attacks on Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka-deva by Dr. K. B. Pathak, B.A., Ph. D. 155-164
- 5 Epic Studies : II, Further Text-Critical Notes by Dr. V. S. Sukthankar, M.A., Ph. D. ... 165-191

MISCELLANEA

- 6 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī: His Life and Works : A Rejoinder by Chintaharan Chakravarti, M. A. 192-193
 - 7 A Note on Rathyāpurusa, by Durgacharan Chatterji, M. A. 194
 - 8 A Note on the Pramāṇasamuccaya by Durgacharan Chatterji, M. A. 195
 - 9 Two Quotations in the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā by Durgacharan Chatterji, M. A. 196-199
 - 10 Exact Date of Dinakara's Commentary Gūdhapra-kāśikā on the Upacārasāra of Mukundadaivajña by P. K. Gode, M. A. 200
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Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona

Vol. XI]

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[Part II

THE PLACE OF THE ĀRYASATYAS AND PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA IN HĪNAYĀNA AND MAHĀYĀNA

BY

DR. NALINAKSHA DUTT, Ph. D. (Cal.), D. Litt. (Lond.)



An important point of difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, as pointed out by the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, is that according to the former, the realisation of the Four *Āryasatyas* (Noble Truths) and the *Pratītyasamutpāda* (Law of Causation) is of primary importance for the attainment of Nirvāṇa while, according to the latter, it is only of secondary importance. The main reason for this difference is that the Mahāyānist consider the real Nirvāṇa to be the realisation of *Śūnyatā* (essencelessness) and *Tathatā* (thatness) or *Samatā* (sameness) of all things *Sarvadharmā*, and not what the Hīnayānist look upon as the attainment of Nirvāṇa, viz., the realisation of the essencelessness of all constituted things (*Pudgala-śūnyatā*) i. e. the absence of any permanently existing entity (*anātmatā*). The Mahāyānist hold that the *āryasatyas* and the *pratītyasamutpāda* are essential to the comprehension of *Pudgala-śūnyatā*, and so far the Hīnayānist are right ; but they cannot enable a being to realise *Dharmaśūnyatā*, the only gate to Nirvāṇa.

What are really the *Āryasatyas* and the *Pratītyasamutpāda*? The *Āryasatyas*, as commonly known, are, — *Duḥkha* (misery), *Samudaya* (origin of misery), *Nirodha* (cessation of misery), and *Mārga* (means of cessation of misery). Of these four, the second and the third include the *Pratītyasamutpāda*, which is, as is popularly known, a series of causes leading to the origination and disappearance of *duḥkha*

(misery).¹ The underlying teaching of these four truths is that they are to be treated as a formula for application to everything perceived. That these four truths constitute merely a formula and not a doctrine has been brought out very clearly in the *Majjhima Nikāya*² and the *Lalitavistāra*.³ In giving an exposition of what is the right view (*sammāditthi*) according to the Buddhists, Sāriputta takes up, for instance, *āhāra* (food), *duḥkha* (misery), *jarāmaraṇa* (old age and death), *taṇhā* (desire), *nāmarūpa* (name and form) and *avijjā* (ignorance), and applies to each of them the fourfold formula examining it in this way: Take up for consideration a material or an immaterial thing. What is its origin? How does it decay? In pursuance of this method Sāriputta defines *Sammāditthi* through *āhāra*. He who knows *āhāra* (food), *āhārasamudaya* (how food originates), *āhāranirodha* (how food decays) and *āhāranirodhagāminīpaṭi-padū* (the way in which the decay of food happens) is said to possess *Sammāditthi*. The first truth relates to *Āhāra* which, in the Buddhist philosophy, is of four kinds.⁴ The second truth is *āhārasamudaya*, i. e. *āhāra* comes into existence on account of *taṇhā*⁵. The third truth is *āhāranirodha*, i. e., the ceasing of *āhāra* when the *taṇhā* is extinct. The fourth truth is the way in which *āhāra* ceases. It happens by the practice of the eightfold path, viz., *sammāditthi*, *saṅkappa*, *vācā*, etc. One who knows correctly these truths gets rid of hatred and attachment, rises above the belief in a self, drives out ignorance, and attains freedom from misery. So, we see that in these four truths there is nothing particularly Buddhistic. They are found in the Brahmanical systems of philosophy as well⁶ For instance

1 Whatever remarks will be applicable to the *Āryasatyas* will apply *mutatis mutandis* to the *Pratītyasamutpāda*. The truth of *Magga*, as usual, refers to *Sammāditthi*, ° *saṅkappa*, ° *vācā*, ° *kammanta*, ° *ājīva*, ° *vāyāma*, ° *saṭi*, ° *samādhi*. For *Mārgasatyas* see *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (text), p. 13.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 261.

3 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 349; see also pp 416-7, cf. *Mahāvastu* II, p. 285; III, p. 53.

4 *Dīgha*, III, pp. 228, 276; *Dhs*, 71.3, *Vis M.*, p. 341.

5 *Taṇhā* (desire) is one of the links of the *Pratītyasamutpāda* which is included in this exposition.

6 Prof. Stecherbatsky remarks; "These four topics—the four noble truths as the term has been very inadequately translated and represented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism—contain in reality no doctrine at all". *Con. of N.*, p. 55.

the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (II, 15) says: *Yathācikitsāsāstram caturvyūham rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaiṣajyam iti evam idam api sāstram caturvyūham eva tad yathā samsārah samsārahetur mokṣo mokṣopāya eveti* (just as the science of medicine has four sections dealing with the diagnosis, cause and cure of diseases, and their remedies so also this science of spiritual healing has four sections dealing with an examination of the nature of the things, of the world, the cause of their origin, their removal and the factors that bring about the removal). The *Abhidharmakośa* also follows up this interpretation. It coalesces the four truths into two, viz., either cause and effect or *Samsāra* (world) and *Nirvāṇa* (cessation). Thus *duḥkha* and *samudaya* relate to *samsāra*, and *nirodha* and *mārga* to *nirvāṇa*. *Samsāra* (world) is the effect while *samudaya* is its cause: so also *Nirvāṇa* (cessation) is the effect while *mārga* is its cause.¹

This position of the Hinayānists with regard to the *Āryasatyas* is logical, for, their cardinal tenet is that a being suffers through wrongly assuming the existence of a self, thus conceiving himself as a separate entity and standing in some form of relation to every other being or thing of the world, to which also he ascribes an individuality similar to his own. The chief aim of Hinayāna teaching is to expel from one's mind all ideas of individuality, whether of himself or any other being or thing of the world, and this can only be effected by an examination of everything of this world under the four aspects mentioned above. Scrutinizing all things in this way, a being gets rid of his wrong assumption and sees things as they really are. This is called *Sammādiṭṭhi* (right view) or *Viññā* (true knowledge). Once this is reached he can be said to have attained freedom from misery, or *Nirvāṇa*.

With regard to the *Āryasatyas*, the Mahāyānists stand on a completely different footing from that of the Hinayānists. Their cardinal tenet is *Dharmanairātmya* or the non-existence of everything perceived. All the things of the world have an existence

The reasons for the inclusion of the *Āryasatyas* and the *Pratītyasamutpāda* in the doctrines of Mahāyāna.

similar to the objects in a dream or a mirage. Thus, if everything be non-existent, the examination of a non-existent thing is absurd; hence the Mahāyānists should show reasons for including the *Āryasatyas* and the *Pratītyasamutpāda*.

1 *Kośa*, vi. 4; see also Sōgen, *Sys. of B. Thought*, pp. 69 ff; *Sūtrā-lankāra* pp. 137-8; it supports the interpretation of the *Kośa*.

tītyasamutpāda in their doctrines. Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, therefore, took up this challenge of the Hinayānists and showed by forcible and illuminating arguments that they were justified in including the Truths in their doctrines.

Nāgārjuna has dealt with the Truths¹ incidentally in his examination of *Pratyaya*, *Karmaphala*, *Ātmā*, etc. and at length in his treatment of the *Āryasatyas*.² He gives this summary of the arguments of his opponents: If everything be

non-existent (*śūnya*), there cannot arise any question about the origin and decay of a thing,—in this case, *duḥkha* (misery). The five constituents of beings which come into existence through pre-existing cause and conditions are called *duḥkha*, because they produce suffering, being subject to change and transformation. That these constituents are a source of suffering is realised by the *Āryas* (i. e. Arhats) only, and not by the common people, for the latter labour under the four misconceptions (*viparyāsas*)³ of considering impure things as pure, impermanent as permanent, unhappy as happy, and egoless as having ego. The common people are like the sick, to whom sweet things appear bitter. A person who is not yet an *arhat* (*anārya*) does not know that the five *upādānaskandhas* are a source of suffering. It is for this reason that the Truths (*satyas*) are called Truths for the perfect only. If everything be *śūnya* (non-existent), there cannot be the first *Āryasatya* called *duḥkha* and consequently there can be no *samudaya* (origin), *nirodha* (destruction), or *mārga* (means of destruction) of suffering. If the four *Āryasatyas* do not exist, there cannot exist true knowledge, exertion, or realisation, the four fruits of sanctification or their enjoyer, the *Saṅgha Dharma*, or even *Buddha*. The assertion of *śūnyatā* (non-existence of everything) goes against the existence of the three *ratnas*, in fact, of all things, good or bad.

1 *M. Vr.*, chs. I XVII, XVIII.

2 *Ibid.*, ch. XXIV.

3 *Bodhic.* ; p. 375; *M. Vr.*, p. 464 & 607 referring to *Netti.*, p. 114 and *Index*; *śikṣā.*, p. 198; *Anguttara*, II, p. 52; *Yogasūtras*. I, 5; *Sarvadarśana* (ed. of Mm. Vasudev Sastri Abhyankar, 1924) p. 361; see also *Infra*.

Nāgārjuna pities his opponents for their inability to grasp the true sense of *śūnyatā*, or his object of establishing *śūnyatā*, and also for their wrong imagination. The object of teaching *śūnyatā* is to bring about a complete cessa-

Nāgārjuna's argu- tion of all *prapañca* (imagination looking
ments to meet charges upon unity as manifold). The view held
made by the Hīna- by his opponents that *mokṣa*, (emancipa-
yānists. tion) is attained by the destruction of

action (*karma*) and passion (*kleśa*) is incorrect. It is a known fact that ordinarily persons are ignorant of the real state of things. They conceive *rūpa* (form), *vedanā* (feeling), etc., and allow passion, hatred and delusion to come into existence. From this statement as also from the *Sūtras*, it is evident that *saṃkalpa* (imagination) is the source of

(i) *Śūnyatā* is nei- all afflictions. From this it follows that
ther *nāstīva* nor *abhāva*. *karma* and *kleśa* are only products of
imagination and have no real existence. Their origin is due to the *prapañca* (thought-creation) which takes hold of the mind of a worldly being, who from the time immemorial is used to a variety of actions and things such as gain and loss, happiness and misery, action and the actor, known and the knower and so forth. All these worldly thought-creations cease to exist when a person realises the non-existence of the things which are commonly supposed to have real existence. Just as a person does not form any idea (*prapañca*) about the ' beauty of a barren woman's daughter ' and consequently does not weave a net of fancies (*kalpanā*) around her, so also a Mahāyānist is not troubled with the conception of " I " and " Mine ", the roots of a belief in self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), nor is he troubled by any cause for the origin of afflictions. If a person realises that afflictions (*kleśas*) do not originate, he cannot have any idea of good or bad action and consequently, of birth, old age, disease and death. Therefore the *Yogins* (ascetics), established in *śūnyatā* do not conceive any real *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, etc. and hence they have no *prapañca*, *vikalpa*, *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, *kleśa*, *karma* or *mṛtyu*. Thus, the realisation of *śūnyatā* brings about the complete cessation of all *prapañcas*, and so it is said that the realisation of *śūnyatā* is the same as the realisation of *Nirvāṇa*.¹

Having dealt with the object of the teaching or *Śūnyatā*, Nāgārjuna proceeds to an exposition of *Śūnyatā* by stating its characteristic marks (*lakṣaṇas*),¹ which are as follows :—

(i) It is *apūrapratyaya*, i. e. it cannot be imparted by one to another ². One is to realise within himself (*pratyātma-vedya*) the Truth, and not to understand it by listening to the instruction of *Āryas* (the Perfect) who can 'speak of the Truth only through superimpositions (*samāropa*).

(ii) It is *śānta*, i. e. it has the nature of cessation.³

(iii) It is *prapañcāraprapañcitam*, i. e. it is inexpressible.⁴ The first *prapañca* is taken as a synonym of speech (*vāk*),⁵ i. e. the sense of *śūnyatā* is not utterable by words.

(iv) It is *nirvikalpa* or unrealisable in concepts. *Vikalpa* is thought-construction; so *śūnyatā* is beyond (lit. devoid of) thought-construction. And, lastly,

(v) It is *anānūrtha* i. e. devoid of different meanings.

Thus he points out that *śūnyatā* is not to be taken in the sense of *nāstitva* (nihilism) or *abhāva* (absence of something) as wrongly supposed by the Hinayānists. He continues his exposition of *śūnyatā* by equating it with the *pratītyasamutpāda* saying

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣamahe |
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā ||⁶

(We say that dependent origination is *śūnyatā*. It is in that sense that the path is middle). All phenomenal things are relatively existent, e. g. sprout and seed, *vijñānas* with reference to cause and condition, hence, Nāgārjuna says that things, which are only relatively existent, have in reality no origina-

1 *M. Vr.* pp. 372-7.

2 Prof Stcherbatsky (*Con.*, of *N.* p. 41) translates it as " un-cognisable from without " but the commentary of Candrakīrti does not seem to warrant the rendering.

3 See *M. Vr.*, p. 160 where it is shown why *śāntam* is taken in the sense of *svabhāva-virahitam*. The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law ; so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence, like the seed and the sprout. Hence both of them can be described as *śānta* or *svabhāvavirahita*. Prof. Stcherbatsky (*op. cit.*) uses the word " quiescent " for *Śānta*.

4 Prof. Stcherbatsky (*op. cit.*) translates it " undifferentiated in words "

5 See *M. Vr.* p. 373.

6 *Ibid.*, P. 491.

tion, and the fact of this non-origination in reality is *sūnyatā*. So it is asserted by the Teacher in the *Anavataptahradupasaṅkramana-sūtra*¹ that whatever is said to have come into existence through cause and condition (i. e. relatively) is really unborn; it cannot have real origination; and whatever is subject to cause and condition is *sūnya*. The statement made in the *Laṅkāvatāra* and elsewhere that all dharmas are *sūnya* (non-existent) refers to the non-origination of things in reality. It is in this sense that the connotation of *sūnyatā* has come into existence. Hence it is said that *sūnyatā*, which bears the sign of non-origination in reality, is the middle path. That which is really non-originated can neither be said to exist nor to vanish; hence is neither existent nor non-existent, and is therefore the Middle path, which keeps clear of the two extremes and is nothing but the non-originating *sūnyatā*.²

We may consider this topic in another way: There is nothing which originates without cause and condition and therefore there is nothing which can be called *asūnya*³ (non-relative). It is said in the *Sātaḥ* and elsewhere that nothing is ever produced without cause and condition, or, in other words, there is nothing eternal. The ignorant only conceive of eternity, etc., in regard to the *Ākāśa*. The wise know that all things are caused and conditioned, and they never fall into the delusion of either of the two extremes. If it be admitted, as is done by some of the Hīnayānists that things (i. e. the elements that constitute a being) are uncaused and unconditioned, then the four *Āryasatyas* are contradicted, for how can there be *duḥkha*, the first truth, if things come into existence without cause and condition (*apratītya*)?

Nāgārjuna, thus establishing that *sūnyatā* is neither *nāstīva* nor *abhāva* but a word signifying the relative existence of things, says that the Hīnayānists, too much engrossed in the studies of texts alone, have misunderstood the sense of *sūnyatā* and do not understand that the Teacher delivered his teachings in two ways, viz. conventional and real, or empirical and transcendental. So it is said by Nāgārjuna:

1 *M. Vr.*, p. 239.

2 Cf. *Bodhic.*, p. 359:

Na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam |
Catuṣkotivīnirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ mādhyaṁikā vīduḥ ||

3 Referring evidently to the Sarvāstivādins.

Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā ।

Lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ¹ ॥

(The teachings of Buddhas are based on two kinds of truth,—the truth of the world, and the truth in the highest sense). Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva

points out that the words in common usage, e.g. *skandha*, *ātmā*, *loka*, etc being enveloped (*samvṛta*,) on all sides are

(ii) Buddha's teachings were delivered in two ways enveloped (*samvṛta*,) on all sides are

(a) *Samvṛti*. called conventional. The expression *Samvṛti* has three different senses, which are as follows:—

(i) *Samvṛti* is the same as ignorance on account of its completely enveloping the reality, or, in other words, it is identical with ignorance (*avidyā*).² In elucidation of this, *Prajñākaramati*, the commentator of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, says that ignorance superimposes a form on a non-existent thing and thus creates an obstacle to the correct view of the reality. In support of his statement he quotes from the *Āryaśūlistambasūtra* a stanza, in which it is stated that ignorance (*avidyā*) is nothing but non-realisation (*apratipatti*) of the truth, and faith in falsehood.

(ii) *Samvṛti* implies a thing which depends on another for existence, i. e. subject to cause and condition,³ for a really self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay, or any kind of transformation; so whatever is caused and conditioned is *Sāmvṛta* (phenomenal).

(iii) *Samvṛti* refers to signs or words current in the world, i. e. accepted by the generality of people and based on direct perception.⁴ Śāntideva points out that *rūpa* (form), *śabda* (sound), etc. should not be supposed

1 *M. Vr.*, p. 492; *Bodhic.*, p. 361. The two kinds of Truth have been exhaustively dealt with in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (chs. v & vi); see also *Le Museon*, 1907, N.S. VIII for summary of ch. v.

2 *Bodhic.*, p. 352. *Samvṛiyata avriyate yathābhūtaparijñānaṃ svabhāvāvaraṇād avṛtaprakāśanāc cānayeti samvṛtiḥ. Avidyā moho viparyāsa iti paryāyāḥ.* (It is called *samvṛti* because it envelopes the real knowledge and also because it helps to uncover that which is, as a matter of course, enveloped. It is synonymous with ignorance, delusion, or misconception.) For *Paramārtha* being the same as *Nirvāṇa*, see *infra*.

3 *Bodhic.*, p. 352: *pratityasamutpannaṃ vasturūpam samvṛtir ucyate.*

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 374-5: *pratyakṣam api rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramāṇataḥ.*

to be really existing on account of their being directly perceived by all in the same way. Their existence is substantiated by proofs which are valid from the worldly, and not from the transcendental standpoint. If all that is perceived by the senses be true, then a fool knows the truth, and there is no need of exertion for the acquisition of Truth. In support of his statement, he cites the illustration that the body of a woman, though impure in the highest sense, is regarded as pure by a man whose mind is swayed by attachment, hence a fact cannot be established merely by experience.

It may be argued that as the expressions like *dhātu*, and *āyatana* occur in the scriptures, they are real, and besides had they been non-existent, the Teacher would not have referred to them as momentary, subject to decay, etc. Śāntideva explains this away by saying that the Teacher used them only as artifices to lead men, having minds engrossed in thinking of object as existent, to the conception of *śūnyatā*, i. e. things are really non-existent. Whatever Buddha said about *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana* or their transitoriness is conventional and not real; hence the existence of *dhātus* and *āyatanas* in reality is not established. If it be held that every object of experience is unreal, how can we account for the experience of *kṣāṇikatva* (transitoriness) of *pudgala* by the *yogins* (ascetics) who have perfected themselves in the meditation of *Pudgalanairātmya* (essencelessness of constituted things)? Śāntideva's answer is very simple. He says that even the experiences of *yogins* are not above *saṃvṛti*, for *saṃvṛti* included everything that falls within the scope of *buddhi* (intelligence), and the reality lies beyond it. The experience of the *yogins* that a woman's body is impure contradicts the experience of an ordinary man who considers it to be pure. Thus it is proved that the scriptural authority does not establish the reality of *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, etc.

All that has been said above applies to *loka-saṃvṛti* only, i. e. truths valid in the world of convention which are accepted as such by the generality of the people. There is,

Two kinds of *saṃvṛti-satyas*.

however, another kind of the so-called truth, which should be distinguished as *Aloka-saṃvṛti* i. e. truths not accepted by the generality of the people. The experiences of a man with diseased eyes or defective organs of sense are peculiar to the

man and are not true for all. Such experiences should be called *Aloka-samvṛti* (conventional truths but not general).

Śāntideva calls these two kinds of conventional truths *Tathya-samvṛti* and *Mithyā-samvṛti*, and distinguishes them thus:¹ The *Tathya-samvṛti* (phenomenal truth) refers to things which originate out of a cause (*kimcit pratītya jātam*) and are perceived in the same way by all persons with unimpaired organs of sense, e. g. the colour blue, etc. The *Mithyā-samvṛti* refers to those things or statements which are accepted only by individuals and not universally, though they may have originated through cause and condition, i. e. they are like things perceived by a person with a defective organ of sense.

The Truth of the *Āryas*, who see things as they really are, is

(b) *Paramārtha-satya*. quite different from the two so-called truths mentioned above. Nāgārjuna says that this truth, *Paramārthasatya*,

is identical with Nirvāṇa.² It does not admit of any distinction as subject and object.³ It is un-originating and undecaying, and as such it is not an object to be grasped by the mind. It is indeterminable by speech and unknowable by knowledge.⁴ Hence the highest truth is inexpressible and can be realised only within one's own self.⁵ It cannot form the subject matter of instruction, and hence it cannot be imparted by one to another. Śāntideva explains the truth (*tattva* or *paramārthasatya*) as beyond the range of *buddhi* (intellection or perception) while that which comes within the range of *buddhi* is conventional (*samvṛti*).⁶ According to him, the truth is attainable by giving up of all things which act as hindrances to knowledge, viz., impressions (*vāsanā*), connection (*anusaṃdhi*) and passion (*kleśa*) through comprehension of the real nature of things. It is therefore the same as the non-existence of all

1 *Bodhic.*, p. 353.

2. See ante, p. 108; *samvṛti* is identified with *avidyā* and *buddhi*. See *Bodhic.*, pp. 352, 366, also Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 164 n.

3. Cf. *Bodhic.*, p. 366 *Paramārthasatyam sarvavyavahārasamatikṛāntam nirviśeṣam Aśamutpannam aniruddham Abhūtheyābhidhānājñeyajñānavigatam.*

4 *M. Vr.*, pp. 364, 493.

5 *Bodhic.*, p. 367: *āryāṇām eva svasanūvidita-avabhāvatayā pratyātmavedyam.*

6 *Bodhic.*, p. 354.

*dharma*s and as such it may be taken as a synonym of *śūnyatā* (essencelessness), *tathatā* (thatness), *bhūlakoti* (true limit) and *dharmadhātu* (totality of things). What is caused and conditioned is not really existent, because some things undergo change with time, while in a really existent thing no change is possible; neither can the fact of coming and going be attributed to it. Things that are supposed to have existence are like an illusion or an echo, because they arise through cause and condition, and disappear when the cause and condition cease. So in reality, there can be no origination through cause and condition, because real origination does not depend upon and is not subject to something else. All things arise subject to some preceding causes and conditions; hence they are really non-existent. How, then, can an existent thing be expected to arise out of them? Can anybody ascertain whence the illusory things produced by causes come and where they go? In this connection Śāntideva comments elaborately on the famous stanza of Nāgārjuna :

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyaheturāḥ |
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ||¹

(Nowhere and never does a really existent thing originate out of a self or non-self or both self and non-self or without any cause).

The aim of Śāntideva and of the other Mahāyāna writers also is to assert that the real truth (*paramārthasatyā*) is that things of this world have no more existence than the magic figures created by a magician. As these figures and their movements are taken as real by the ordinary people while the magician himself does not concern himself about their reality, so also in this world, the *viparyastā*s i. e. those whose vision is obscured and subject to error run after, or weave their thoughts around, the various phenomenal things, while the *yogī*, who knows the highest reality, does not pay heed to them. In short, the *Paramārthasatyā* is nothing but the realisation of the dreamlike or echolike nature of the *Samvṛtisatyas*.²

1 *Bodhic.*, p. 357; *M. Vr.*, p. 12.

2 *Bodhic.*, pp. 368, 379. The Satyasiddhi school introduced the two kinds of truth, *Vyavahārasatyā* and *Paramārthasatyā* into the Buddhist metaphysics. In the *Aksayamatīnirdeśasūtra* these two truths form the principal subject of discussion (Vaidya, *Catuhśatikā*, p. 19). In the Mahāyāna literature there are other expressions bearing the same sense as *Paramārtha* and *Samvṛti*, e. g. *Nitārtha* and *Neyyārtha*, see *M. Vr.*, § 41; V. Sastri, *I. H. Q.*, iv, 2 on *Samdhya-bhāṣā*, *M. Vr.* pp. 41 *Sūtrā*, p. 51

If *Paramārthasatya* be of an inexpressible nature and *Samvṛti satya* be non-existing like an illusion or echo as urged by Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, a Hinayanist may enquire about the necessity of preaching on the topics like *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *āryasatya*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, and, which are conventionally true but not true in the highest sense (*atattva*). The reply is

Vyavahāram anāśṛitya paramārtho na deśyate ।

Paramārtham anāgamya nirvānam nādhigamyate. ¹ ॥

(The highest truth cannot be imparted without having recourse to conventional truths; and *nirvāna* cannot be attained without the realisation of the highest truth). In other words, the highest truth cannot be brought home directly to a mind, which normally does not rise above the conventional distinction of subject and object, knower and known; hence it must be imparted through conventional truths, and unless it is so imparted one cannot be expected to extricate himself from worldly limitations and arrive at Nirvāna. It is for this reason that the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with *saṃvṛti* topics like *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *āryasatya* and *pratītyasamutpāda*; they are like vessels to the seeker of water.

The other reason² for which the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with *saṃvṛti* topics is that the *Paramārthasatya* cannot be explained to another by signs or predicate, but yet it has to be explained. So the only alternative is to explain it by the negation of *saṃvṛti* matters. So it is said to be,

(i) *agocara* i. e. beyond the cognizance of *buddhi* (intelligence):

(ii) *aviśaya* i. e. beyond the scope of knowledge:

(iii) *sarvaprapañcāvinimukta* i. e. beyond the possibility of detailed descriptions:

(iv) *Kalpanāsamatikrānta* i. e. beyond every possible form of imagination, e. g. existence or non-existence, true or

¹ For *Pāramārthika* and *Abhiprāyiki*, see *M. Vṛ.*, pp. 42 ff; *Sūtrā.* p. 138; Keith, *B. Phil.*, p. 235; *Journal Asiatique*, 1903, ii, p. 360 for reference and comments on *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*.

² *M. Vṛ.*, p. 494; *Bodhic.*, p. 365; cf. *Bodhic.*, p. 372: *Upāyabhūtam vyavahārasatyam upēyabhūtam paramārthasatyam* (also in the *Mādhyamakāvatāra*, vi, 80). Also *Pañcaviṃśati* (A.S.B. ms) leaf 56a Na ca Subhūte samakṛtavatirekeṇa asamskṛtam śakyam prajñāpayitum.

² *Bodhic.*, p. 363

untrue, eternal or non-eternal, permanent, or impermanent, happy or unhappy, pure or impure, and so forth.¹ This being so, the only way to explain *paramārthasatya* to the people is through common place terms and illustrations. A person with diseased eyes sees a net of hair: he is corrected by another whose eyes are healthy, who negates the afflicted man's statement that there (really) is a net of hair. The man with healthy eyes does not indicate by such a negation that he is either denying or affirming something. Similarly, persons whose right vision is obstructed by ignorance conceive of the existence of *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana* etc. which are in reality non-existent phenomenal forms. Buddhas like the persons with healthy eyes know this, and they cannot help saying that there are in reality no *skandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas*, but thereby they neither deny nor affirm their existence. Therefore the highest truth cannot be preached without the help of the conventional truths. So it is said.

Anaksarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā ।
śrūyate deśyate cārthaḥ samāropād anakṣaraḥ² ॥

[How can there be hearing and preaching of *Dharma* which is unutterable (lit. cannot be articulated); it is by the superimposition of ideas on the reality which is inexpressible that the latter can be preached or heard].

If it be established that all mundane things are really non-existent, there is a probability of the *Paramāriha* (the highest truth) being conceived as nihilism. Nāgārjuna sounds a note of warning against such a conception by saying that *śūnyatā* should not be identified with the extinction of a thing which existed before. The question of extinction or nihilism does not arise, because the existence of something preceding is not admitted. Neither should it be regarded as something existing by having recourse to superimpositions. Those, who do not realise the real distinction between these two kinds of truth, fall into the error of either conceiving *śūnyatā* as the non-existence of *samśkāras* (constituents of a being) or of assuming the existence of something as the basis of *śūnyatā*. Both are wrong views, and people of limited knowledge misunderstand *śūnyatā* as the one or the other. The distinction was, in fact,

1 *Bodhic.*, pp. 366-7 This list can be expanded to a great length. See *Bodhic.*, p. 367

2 *Bodhic.*, p. 365; *M. Vṛ.*, p. 264, XV. 2; cf. *Lankā.*, p. 194.

so very subtle that even Buddha hesitated to preach the truth at first.¹

In concluding his argument, Nāgārjuna says that the Hinayānists by attributing the sense

The Hinayānists do not understand the standpoint of the Mahāyānists because they take *śūnyatā* as *abhāva*.

of *abhāva* (absence or non-existence after assuming the existence of something) to *śūnyatā*, fall into the error and fail to understand the standpoint of the Mahāyānists. The Mahāyānic conceptions of *śūnyatā*, i. e., that everything is non-existent fits in correctly with all *dharma*s and all statements, it is when *śūnyatā* is seen in this light that one can perceive the reasonableness of the formulae of Causal Law and the Four Truths, the fruits of sanctification, *saṅgha*, *dharma*, *buddha*, things worldly and transcendental, deeds right and wrong, a good or bad condition and other conventional matters. Nāgārjuna, having stated his position, attacks the Hinayānists for their inability to comprehend the correct sense of the Causal Law. He says that just as a rider, while riding may forget his horse and revile another for stealing it, so also the Hinayānists, because of their distracted mind, fail to grasp the truth that *śūnyatā* is the true sense and the chief characteristic of the Causal Law; and attack the Mahāyānists, the Śūnyatāvādins, for misinterpreting the Causal Law.

Nāgārjuna now proceeds to assail the position of his opponents. He says that those, who admit the reality of unconstituted things cannot logically support the *Āryasa'nyas* and the *Pratītyasamutpāda*. It should be remembered that the Hinayānists apply the Causal Law to constituted things only. Nāgārjuna attempts to make the position of the Hinayānists untenable by asserting that the Causal Law should be universally applicable, and that there cannot be anything in the world which was excepted by Buddha as beyond its range of the Causal Law. Starting with this assumption, he argues that if things exist by themselves, they are not subject to causes and conditions, and such being the case there is no need to draw distinctions of external and internal, of causes and conditions, or the doer and

¹ Buddhaghosa also uses this argument, see *Vis*, p. 508.

the doing of an action. In short, the Hinayānic theory contradicts the origin and decay as well as the fruits of sanctification. Hence, the position of the Hinayānists that things exist by themselves is untenable. It also contradicts the words of Buddha who said on many occasions: *apratītyasamutpanno dharmah kaścīn na vidyate* (there never exists anything which originated without cause and condition). This statement of Buddha, however, fits in with the definition of *sūnyatā* as given by the Mahāyānists.

If all things be existent (*asūnya*) and if it originates without cause and condition, there cannot be anything impermanent and consequently no *duḥkha*.

Again, if *duḥkha* be taken as something existent then the truths of *samudaya* and *nirodha* (origin and decay) of misery, and *mārga* (the eight-fold path leading to the decay of misery) are meaningless. Nāgārjuna thus pays back the Hinayānists in their own coin.

Then, with reference to the *parijñāna* (detailed knowledge) of the Hinayānists, Nāgārjuna shows that it is not logical to maintain that *duḥkha*, assuming it to be an existent thing, was unknown before, and that it is known subsequently because existent things remain always in the same condition (*svabhāva-samavasthataḥ*) and never undergo any change. If an existent thing be not subject to change, it cannot be maintained that *duḥkha*, which was unknowable at first, was known later on. From this it follows that there is no *duḥkha-parijñāna* (knowledge of suffering). Consequently, *prahāṇa* (abandonment), *sākṣātkaraṇa* (realisation), and *bhāvanā* (meditation) are meaningless.

As it is unreasonable to claim knowledge of *duḥkha*, which was formerly by nature unknowable, so it is wrong to assume the existence of the fruit of *Srotāpatti*, which did not exist before but was realised later on; and so with the other fruits of sanctification. The same reasoning—that which was by nature unattainable cannot be attained later on—is applied to show that there can be no one who enjoys these fruits, and consequently no *Saṅgha*. If there be not the *Āryasatyas*, there cannot be *Dharma*, and in the absence of *Dharma* and *Saṅgha* there cannot be a *Buddha*. If it be assumed that *Buddha* and *Bodhi* exist by themselves, then one remains without any

reference to the other. If *Buddhahood* be taken as already existing, a person, who by nature is a non-Buddha, can never attain *Bodhi*, however much he may practise the *Bodhisattva* duties, because a non-Buddha cannot be expected to change.

Nāgārjuna's point is that if a thing exists by itself then it is absurd to speak of it as created, having a creator, and so forth. Just as nobody speaks of uncovering the sky because the open sky exists by itself, so also nobody should say that a thing, existing by itself, has been performed or attained. In fact, the theory of *pratītyasamutpanna* (one existing with reference to another i. e. relatively) must be admitted, as otherwise even the expressions of every-day usage such as 'go', 'do', 'cook', 'read', etc., become meaningless. If the world is supposed to exist by itself, the world would be unoriginating, undecaying and unchangeable as the self-existent is changeless. The world, according to the *Aśūnyavādins* (those who do not admit *śūnyatā*) would have no concern with the Causal Law and be beyond the possibility of diversity. Had the world been so, says the *Puṣṭaputrasamāgama-sūtra*, it would not have been dealt with by Buddha, and the Teacher would have, as the *Hastikakṣya-sūtra* says, gone there with all his disciples.

Nāgārjuna concludes by saying that he who realises *Pratītyasamutpāda* can rightly know the four truths and quotes a passage from the *Mahāvastu* dealing with the Mahāyānic view of the four truths. It runs as follows:—he who realises that no *dharmas* have originated, has known *duḥkha*; he who realises the non-existence of all *dharmas*, has suppressed the source (*samudaya*) of misery; he, who realises that all *dharmas* are completely extinct (*parinirvṛta*), has comprehended the truth of *nirōdha* (cessation), and he, who realises the means by which the absence of all things is known is said to have practised the path (*mārga*). This has been developed thus in the *Dhyāyitamustisūtra*. Unable to comprehend the four truths properly on account of being troubled by the four *viçaryāsa*s (misconceptions), sentient beings cannot go beyond the world of transmigration. They conceive of *ātmā* (self) and *ātmiya* (things relating to a self) and thus have *karmābhisaṃ-*

skāra (actions).¹ Not knowing that all things are completely extinct (*pariniṣṭu*) they imagine the existence of themselves and others, and become engrossed therein to the extent of having affection, infatuation and ultimately delusion. They now perform actions, physically, verbally, and mentally, and after making some superimpositions of existing on non-existing things, they think that they are subject to affection, infatuation, and delusion. In order to get rid of them, they take ordination in the doctrines of Buddha, observe the precepts and hope to pass beyond the world and attain Nirvāṇa. They imagine that some things are good, some bad; some are to be rejected, some to be realised; that *duḥkha* is to be known, the *samudaya* of *duḥkha* to be given up; the *nirodha* of *duḥkha* to be realised; and the *mārga* to be practised. They also imagine that all constituted things are impermanent and endeavour to pass beyond them. Thus imagining, they attain a mental state full of disgust (or contempt) for constituted things, having *animitta* (absence of sign or cause) as its preceding condition. They think that they have thus known *duḥkha*, i. e. the transitoriness of constituted things, become terrified by them, and shun their causes. Having imagined something as source (*samudaya*) of *duḥkha* they conceive of a cessation (*nirodha*) of *duḥkha* and decide to follow the path (*mārga*) to attain it. They retire to a secluded place with the mind full of disgust and attain quietude (*śamatha*). Their minds are no longer moved by worldly things and they think that they have done all that is to be done, they are freed from all sufferings and have become *arhats*. But after death they find themselves reborn among the gods and in their minds exist doubts about Buddha and his knowledge. When they die again, they pass to hell because they doubt the existence of the Tathāgata after forming some misconceptions about all *dharma*s which are unoriginated. The four truths are therefore to be seen in the light of the *Mañjuśrīsūtra* as pointed out above.

The new point of view from which the *Āryasatya*s are looked at by Nāgārjuna appears in the *Prajñāpāramitā*s in connection with the attempt to establish the conception of *śūnyatā*. The *Pañcaviṃśati* thus defines the *Āryasatya*s:²

1 Cf. *Bodhic.*, p. 350 : Viparyāśasamjñāno' satsattivasamāropābhini-
veśavaśād ātmātinīyagrahapravṛtter yoniso manasikāraprasūto rāgādī-
kleśagaṇaḥ samupajāyate. Tasmāt karma. Tato janma, etc.

2 *Pañcaviṃśati* *Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 43 f.

What is *duḥkhasatyāvavāda*? A *Bodhisattva* while practising the *prajñāpāramitā* should not consider himself as attached or unattached (*yukta* or *ayukta*) to any one of the five *skandhas*, or to any organ of sense, or to their objects, or to the consciousness produced by the contact of the organs of sense with their respective objects, or to any of the four truths, twelve links of the chain of causation, eighteen kinds of *śūnyatā*, and so forth. He should not look upon anything as *rūpa*, *vedanā* etc., as connected or unconnected. This is called, according to the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the sermon on the first truth *Duḥkha*. The underlying idea is that if a *Bodhisattva* thinks of himself as connected or unconnected with anything, which according to the *Prajñāpāramitā*, is non-existent or has only a conventional existence, then the *Bodhisattva* is subject to *duḥkha* (suffering); even if a *Bodhisattva* considers himself as having realised the truths or the causal law or *śūnyatā*, he would be subject to *duḥkha*, though, according to the Hīnayānists, the *Bodhisattva* is to attain thereby *sukha* or *nirvāṇa*.

What is *samudayasatyāvavāda*? A *Bodhisattva* while practising *prajñāpāramitā* does not consider whether *rūpa* or any other *skandha* is subject to origination or destruction (*utpādadharmi* or *nirōdhadharmi*), or to contamination or purification (*samkleśadharmi* or *vyavadānadharmi*). He knows that *rūpa* does not convert (*samavasarati*) into *vedanā*, or *vedanā* into *saṃjñā*, and so forth; a *dharma*, in fact, on account of its nature being unreal (*prākṛti-śūnyatā*) cannot be converted into another *dharma*. Neither that which is *śūnyatā* (non-existence) of *rūpa*, is *rūpa* nor does the *śūnyatā* of *rūpa* take a *rūpa* (form); therefore *śūnyatā* is neither different from, nor identical with, *rūpa*, and in this way the other *skandhas* are treated. This is called the sermon on *samudaya*. The object of this discourse is to establish that the so-called things of the world have really no existence and hence there can be no origination, transformation or destruction, and so a *Bodhisattva* should remain unconcerned with the conception of *samudaya* of things.

What is *nirōdhasatyāvavāda*? A *Bodhisattva* is to know that *śūnyatā* has no origin, decay, contamination, purification, decrease, increase, past, present, or future. In it, therefore, there can be no *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc., no *duḥkha*, *samudaya*, etc. not even *srotāpanna*, *śaṅkṣāgāmi* or *Buddha*. This is called *nirōdhasatyāvavāda*. This statement is meant to convey that *nirōdha* is nothing but the realisation of the real nature of *śūnyatā*.

Arguing in this way *Prajñāpāramitā* shows that the truth is *śūnyatā*, i. e. the non-existence of the so-called things of the world, and this may be called the third truth, *nirodha*, while *duḥkha* consists in thinking of oneself as related in some way or other to the conventional things, and *samudaya* in believing that the origination of things does really happen. As the *mārga* has no place in this interpretation of the *āryasatyas*, the *Prajñāpāramitā* safely omits it.

Nāgārjuna, as we have seen, establishes by quotations from the Mahāyānic texts that Hīnayānic Arhats labour under misconceptions. Of the four common misconceptions (*viparyāsa*), they are not free from the fourth, viz., seeing ego in egoless things, thinking non-existent things as existent.¹ But this statement of Nāgārjuna or of the Mahāyānic texts with reference to the Hīnayānists has in view the egolessness of things generally (*dharmasūnyatā*) and not merely of constituted things, with which the Hīnayānists are concerned. Nāgārjuna ends his discourse by asserting that the truth is that all things are like echo, mirage, or images in dreams. When one realises this, he has neither love nor hatred for any being and with a mind like the sky, he does not know of any distinctions as Buddha, Dharma or Saṅgha and does not have doubts regarding anything. Being without doubt and without attachment, he attains *parinirvāṇa* without *upādāna*.

Śāntideva² also reasons in this way and says that a person's *avidyā*, the source of delusion, which comes about on account of the attribution of existence (*sat*) to non-existent things (*asat*) or ego (*ātmā*) to egoless things (*anātmā*), ceases to exist when he realises truly (*paramārthataḥ*) that things have only a dream-like or echo-like existence. On the cessation of *avidyā*, the other links of the chain of causation³ get no opportunity to arise, and hence the person obtains Nirodha.

1 Cf. *Bodhic.*, p. 350.

2 Cf. *Bodhic.*, pp. 350-1.

3 Śāntideva speaks of the chain of causation as consisting of three parts :

- (i) *Kleśakāṇḍa-avidyā*, *trṣṇā* and *upādāna* ;
- (ii) *karmakāṇḍa-saṃskāra* and *bhava* ; and
- (iii) *duḥkhakāṇḍa*-all the remaining links of the chain.

The Mahāyānists, thus relegate the four Truths and the Causal Law to the domain of matters, conventional and not real, and assert that they are necessary in the doctrines of Mahāyāna inasmuch as they serve as a means for the guidance of living beings, who as individuals in this world, cannot but have their vision distorted or screened by ignorance.¹

Nāgārjuna, followed by Śāntideva, explains the position of the Mādhyamikas with regard to the

The *Yogācāra* treatment of the *Āryasatyas* and the *Pratītyasamūtpāda*

Four Truths and the Causal Law. Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and other writers on the *Yogācāra* system deal with this topic incidentally. Asaṅga, for instance,

refers to the Four Truths,² saying that the first two relate to the origin of the world or the happening of repeated births and the cause thereof, while the second two relate to the disappearance of things and the causes thereof. The first two need suppression while the second two need realisation. In connection with the fourteen ways of practising the *smṛtyupasthānas* (power of recollection) by Bodhisattvas, it is pointed out that one can enter, and also make others enter, into the four truths by means of the *smṛtyupasthānas*. Other *Yogācāra* writings, viz., the *Siddhi* and the *Laṅkāvatāra* do not specifically refer to the four truths but they deal with the doctrines of the Hinayānists for the sake of comparison and contrast. For instance, they speak of the Hinayānists as those who maintain the overt sense of Buddha's teachings and not their deeper meanings;³ being satisfied only by ascertaining the generic characteristics of things but never questioning about their

1 The commentator of *Bodhic*, (p. 362) in order to show that the four *Āryasatyas* are really two, says that *duḥkha*, *samudaya* and *mārga* should be classified under *saṃvṛti* and *nirodha* under *paramārtha*.

2 *Sūtrā*., pp. 137-8, 140-1.

3 *Laṅkā*., p. 14: yathārutarthabhiniṣṭa. For a description of the *rutārthagrāhi*, see *Laṅkā*., pp. 151 f. 160 f. 197. 227. *Laṅkā*., p. 77 says "sūtrāntaḥ sarvasattvasāyadeśanārtihavyabhicālini na sūtatvapratyavas thānakathā (the discourses are not faithful expositions of the truth because they were preached according to the mental tendencies of beings.) For a remark like this, see *M. Vr.*, *Sūtrā*., p. 51: alpaśrutatvam nīrtha sūtrāntasāvaṇat.

essential unreality.¹ They labour under the misconception (*parikalpanā*) of taking the three worlds as real, of postulating distinctions as subject and object, of assuming the existence of *skandhas* (constituents of beings), *dṛṣṭu* (organs of sense), *āyatana* (spheres of the organs of sense), *citta* (mind), *hetu-pratyaya* (cause and condition), *krīyāyoga* (action), *utpāda* (origin), *sthiti* (continuance), *bhaṅga* (dissolution), etc.² The *Lankāvatāra*³ speaking of *Pratītyasamutpāda*, says that it is by comprehending that things originate through cause and condition that one can get rid of the misconception of taking non-existent things as existent, and of assuming gradual or simultaneous origin of things. Then it explains as usual that the dependent origination happens in two ways, externally and internally, e.g. an earthen pot, butter, sprout etc. originate through an external cause (*hetu*)⁴ and condition (*pratyaya*), while ignorance (*avidyā*), desire (*tṛṣṇā*), action (*karma*), etc. originate through an internal cause and condition. The remarks of the *Yogācāra* writers indicate that the four truths and the causal law of the Hīnayānists belong to the domain of imagination (*parikalpanā*) and not to that of reality.

It should be remembered that though the *Yogācārins* are

The *Samvrtti* and *Parāmartha* of the *Mādhyamikas* replaced by *Parikalpanā*; *Paratantra* and *Parinispāna* of the *Yogācāras*.

sharply criticised by the *Mādhyamikas*⁵ for their conception of the eighth consciousness called *Ālaya-vijñāna* (or store-consciousness), both these schools of thought agree in holding that all things (*dharma*s) are non-existent, and

are without origin and decay,⁶ and that the highest truth is unutterable (*anākṣara*),⁷ is identical with Thatness and Uncha-

1 *Lankā.*, pp. 51, 63, 71, *Yah skandhadhātvaṣyatana-svasmṛṇyālakṣaṇaparipñānādhiḡgame deśyamāno romāñcītanur bhavati. Lakṣanaparicayaḥ* āne cāsyā buddhiḥ praskandati na pratītyasamutpādavīnirbhāga-lakṣanaparicaye.

2 *Lankā.*, pp. 42, 43, 225.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 82-3, 84, 140.

4 For six kinds of *hetu*, see *Lankā.*, p. 83.

5 *M. Vṛ.* p. 523;

6 *Triṃśikā*, p. 41: sarvadharmaṃ nihsvabhavaṃ anutpannaṃ aniruddhaṃ iti nirdeśyante.

7 Buddhas are silent (*mauna*) and never preach a word. *Lankā.*, 16, 17, 144, 194.

ngeableness, possesses the signs of *anāyūha* and *niryūha* (non-taking and non-rejection) and is beyond every possible means of determination.¹ Passages like this can be multiplied from the Yogācāra works to show that their conception of the Reality apart from *Ālayavijñāna* is the same as that of the *Mādhyamikas*. They also hold with the *Mādhyamikas*² that from time immemorial, the mind has been under the delusion of imputing existence (*sat*) to non-existent things (*asat*), and that the Hīnayānists were not able to rid their minds completely of the four *viparyāsas* (misconceptions)³ inasmuch as they meditated on *Pudgalanimitta* (individuality as basis) only and not on *Sarvadharmanimitta* (all things whatsoever as basis) and conceived of Nirvāṇa as something existent,⁴ full of peace and beyond misery. Their conception is that the highest truth, which they usually call *Pariniṣpanna* for the *Paramārtha* of the *Mādhyamikas* is the realisation of the fact that all dharmas perceptible to our mind have no more existence than the images in a dream or the reflection of the moon in water. But from time immemorial, our minds are so deluded that we cannot help perceiving in the images or reflection something existent, or in other words, with our common knowledge, we cannot rise above *parikalpanā* (imaginary existence), the *saṃvṛti* of the *Mādhyamikas* and others. The Yogācāras add a rider to the *Parikalpanā*, saying that it depends for origination on something else, and hence it is always *paratantra*, the *pratītyasamutpanna* of the *Mādhyamikas* and others. It is not necessary that the basis of a *parikalpanā* need be anything existent or real, e.g. a person may be frightened by an echo. In short, *Parikalpita* and *Paratantra* relate to phenomenal matters only, to the *anīya*, *anātma*, and *duḥkha* of the Hīnayānists, while, *pariniṣpanna* relates to Nirvāṇa, the *Śānta*⁵ i.e. where all *kleśas* and *vikalpas* cease.

Asaṅga brings out the relation of the three forms of truth thus: The highest truth (*paramārtha* or *pariniṣpanna*) is non-

1 *Lankā*, p. 196: Tathātvam ananyathātvam anāyūhanīryūhalaṅkāraṇaṃ sarvaprapañcōpaśamaṃ; p. 73; śūnyatānutpādādvaya nīḥśva-bhūvalakṣaṇaṃ.

2 *M. Vṛ.*, ch. xxiv quoting Āryadhyāyita-muṣṭisūtra.

3 *Sūtrā*, p. 169: Tatra catur viparyāsānugatam pudgalanimittam vibhāvayan yogi śrāvakabodhiṃ pratyakabodhiṃ vā labhate. Sarva-dharmānimittam vibhāvayan mahābodhiṃ.

4 *Lankā*, p. 72.

5 *Sūtrā*, p. 149, cf. *M. Vṛ.*, chap. on Ātmā.

duality, which is shown in five ways. Two of these are that it is non-existing under the aspect of *parikalpita* and *paratantra* and not non-existing under the aspect of *pariniṣpanna*. It is not the same because the *parikalpita* and *paratantra* are not the same as *Pariniṣpanna*. It is not different, because the former two are not different from the latter.¹ In another connection Asaṅga says that a *Bodhisattva* can be truly called a *śūnyajña* (one who knows the real nature of non-existence) when he understands it under three aspects, viz., first, that the non-existence means the absence of signs which are commonly attributed to an imaginary object (*parikalpita*), second, that the non-existence is the absence of any particular form of existence that one imagines it to be (*paratantra*), and third, that which is by nature non-existent (*pariniṣpanna*).² The *Vijñaptimātrāsiddhi*³ elucidates this point by saying that the nature of non-existence is of three kinds⁴ viz., (i) *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* (non-existence of the signs commonly attributed to a thing, and hence of the thing itself, (i.e. *parikalpita*), (ii) *utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā* non-existence of a thing when considered from the standpoint of its origin, i.e. *paratantra*); and (iii) *paramārthanirniḥsvabhāvatā* (non-existence of a thing in the highest sense, i.e. *pariniṣpanna*).

Sthiramati, in commenting on it, says that the first

category *parikalpita* refers to the non-existence of things by its characteristics or signs. A thing cannot be conceived to exist unless it is accompanied by some characteristics, thus the sign of form is attributed to an object, or the sign of pain, pleasure etc. is attributed to a feeling. Endless things which people imagine, not excluding the *dharma*s attributed to a Buddha, have existence only in one's imagination, hence they are *parikalpita* i.e. have nothing corresponding to them in reality. The *Lankāvatāra* says that the *parikalpita* existence is inferred from signs⁵ (*nimitta*) and explains it thus: All dependently originating things are known by their *nimitta* (impressions)

1 *Ibid.*, p. 22: na san na cūsan na tathā na cānyathā, etc

2 *Sūtrā.*, pp. 94-5.

3 *Siddhi*, pp. 39-42.

4 *Lankā*, p. 67.

5 Prof. Lévi translates *nimitta* by 'signs of connotation'.

and *lakṣaṇa* (characteristics)¹. Now, things, having *nimitta* and *lakṣaṇa* are of two kinds. Things known by *nimitta* only refer to things generally, internal and external, while things known by *nimittalakṣaṇa* refer to the knowledge of generic characteristics of things both internal and external.² Asaṅga³ distinguishes *parikalpita* into three kinds. They take as real (i) the basis (*nimitta* or *ālambanā*) of one's thought constructions, (ii) the unconscious impressions (*vāsanā*) left by them upon one's mind, and (iii) the denominations (*artha*, *khyāti*) following the impressions.

The second category, *paratantra* refers to the imaginary existence pointed out above regarded from the aspect of its origin, i. e. all objects of feelings, which have existence only in imagination, and depend for origination on something else. Things as they appear are not the same as their origin or source⁴; so it is said that the unreality of things is perceptible when they are viewed from the standpoint of their origin. Though the things, good, bad and indeterminate, or the three worlds (*dhātu*) or the mind and its various functions, have only imaginary existence, they arise, however, from causes and conditions, i. e. they depend for origin on others, and hence they cannot be said to exist really, because a real thing remains always the same and does not depend on cause and condition. The *Laṅkāvatāra* puts it very briefly: *yadūśrayālambanāt pravartate tat paratantra* (that which, proceeds from a basis is dependently originated or *paratantra*). Asaṅga analyses the *paratantra* in this way; the mark of being *paratantra* is the false thought-construction (*abhūtoparikalpa*). The thought-constructions create a subject (*grāhaka*) and an object (*gāhya*).

1 *Laṅkā*., pp. 224-6: five natures of existent things, (i) *nāma*, (ii) *nimitta*, (iii) *vikalpa*, (iv) *samyakjñāna*, and (v) *tathatā*. *Nāma* = *saṃjñā*, *saṃketa*. Ignorant persons, deluded by various signs (*lakṣaṇa*) become attached to things as self or mine, and thus weave a net of thought-constructions around themselves.

Nimitta = The reflection (*ābhāsa*) of eye-consciousness known as form; so also the reflections of ear-consciousness, nose-c., tongue-c., body-c., mind-c., known as sound, smell, taste, touch and things are called *nimitta*. *Nimitta* is more or less a sign, impressed upon consciousness and *lakṣaṇa* is definition, or feature constituting a definition.

2 *Laṅkā*., p. 67; also pp. 150, 163.

3 *Sūtrā*., p. 64.

The third category, *pariniṣpanna*, refers to the *Paramārtha* ¹ (the highest truth) or *Tathatā* (Thatness). Like *ākāśa* (space) it is of uniform nature (lit. has one taste-*ekarasa*), pure, and changeless. The *Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva* (absolute reality) is called *paramārtha* because it is the highest aspect in which all dependently originated things are to be looked upon.

C. *Pariniṣpanna*

In this sense, it can be called also *dharmatā* (the nature of things), or in other words, it is the Absolute, immanent in the phenomenal world. The *Siddhi* points out that the *pariniṣpanna* (the Absolute) is so called because it is absolutely changeless. If it be compared with the *paratantra*, it may be said to be that *paratantra* which is always and ever completely devoid of the differentiations as subject and object, which are, in fact, the mere play of imagination, and hence absolutely non-existing. Thus, it follows that the *pariniṣpanna* is the same as the *paratantra* minus the *parikalpita*. ²

It is clear from the discussions summarised above that the expressions *Paramārtha* and *Samvṛti* of the *Mādhyamikas*, and *Pariniṣpanna*, *Paratantra* and *Parikalpita* of the *Yogācāras* are relative. The *paramārtha* of the one and the *pariniṣpanna* of the other indicate the Truth as conceived by them. Accepting that Truth is the only reality, they relegate everything else to the domain of unreality calling them conventional, *saṃvṛti* or *parikalpita*, with the reservation that the conventional things happen subject to causes and conditions, or in other words they conform to the law of causation, the *Pratītyasamutpāda* of the Buddhists in general, and the *Paratantra* of the *Yogācāras*. The *Hinayānists* too utilise these expressions just as much as the *Mahāyānists* and they also call their Truth the only reality, *Paramattha*, everything else being conventional, *sammuti*. Their Truth, in one word, is *anatta*, non-existence of any sub-

1 For seven different kinds of *Paramārtha*, see *Lankā*., p. 39.

2 This exposition is based on the *Siddhi*, pp. 39-42. Masuda has utilised the Chinese version of this treatise, for which see his *Der individualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra-schula*, pp. 40-43. For general discussion, see La Vallée Poussin, *E.R.E.* sv. philosophy (Buddhist); L.D. Barnett, *The Path of Light* (Wisdom of the East Series), p. 102; Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 235-236; Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 145, 146; Stcherbatsky, *Conception of Nirvāṇa*, p. 33.

stantiality in the so-called things of the world, with the corollary that everything being *anatta* is impermanent (*anicca*) and misery (*dukkha*). Buddhaghosa¹ draws the distinction, saying that Buddhas use two kinds of speech, conventional and real. The expressions, *satta* (being), *puggalo* (person), *deva* (god), etc. are 'conventional, while those like *anicca* (impermanence), *dukkha* (misery), *anatta* (essencelessness), *khandha* (aggregates), *dhātu* (organs of sense), *āyatana* (objects of senses), *satipatthāna* (practices of self-possession), *sammappadhāna* (right exertion), etc. were used in their true sense. Nāgasena explains that when Buddha said "I shall lead the *Saṅgha* or the *Saṅgha* is dependent on me"², he used the expressions "I" and "me" in the conventional and not in the real sense. Ledi Sadaw³, explains *sammuti-sacca* as those statements which are true by popular usage and are opposed to "inconsistency, and untruthfulness in speech" while *paramattha-sacca* are those which are established by the nature of the things and do not depend on opinion or usage. As an example he points out that when it is said "there is a soul", it is conventionally true but ultimately false,⁴ for the real ultimate truth is "there is no personal entity". The latter is true in all circumstances and conditions, and does not depend for its validity on usage or popular opinion.⁵ The contention of the Hinayānists is that a name is usually given to constituted things; that name is conventional e.g. when the wheels, frame, and other parts of a chariot are fitted up in a particular order, all the things taken together go by the name of a chariot. The term 'chariot' therefore depends on convention. If the constituted things, e.g. the chariot is divisible into various parts, it is no longer called a chariot when it is so divided. From this, it follows that the things, at which one ultimately arrives after repeated analysis, are the only real entities. They never undergo changes and they bear the same name at all times and places and under all conditions.

1 *Kvu. Atthakathā* pp. 33. 34.

2 *Milindapañha*, pp. 28, 60.

3 *J. P. T. S.*, 1914, pp. 129 f.

4 Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*; "Buddhism never denied the existence of a personality, or a soul, in the empirical sense; it only maintained that it was no ultimate reality."

5 See also Prof. Poussin's article in the *Journal Asiatique*, 1902, p. 250; *Points of the Controversy*, pp. 63 fn. 180.

So, according to the Hinayānists, all the various ultimate elements, which constitute a being or thing, are real, and when reference is made to them they may be called ultimate truths or *paramattha sacca*; hence the *dhātus* or *āyatanas*, *satipaṭṭhanas* or *sammāppadhanas* are expressions used in the ultimate sense.

The *Kośa*¹ explains also the 'two truths in a slightly different way. It says that the things like jug and clothes, after they are destroyed, do no longer bear the same name, so also things like water and fire, when examined analytically, dissolve into some elements and are no longer called water or fire. Hence the things, which on analysis are found to be changing, are given names by convention. Such expressions, which convey ideas temporarily and not permanently, are called *Samvṛtisatyas*. The *Paramārthasatyas* are those expressions, which convey ideas, which remain unchanged whether the things are dissolved, analysed or not, e. g. *rūpa*; although one may reduce the *rūpa* into atoms, or withdraw from it taste and other qualities, the idea of the real nature of *rūpa* persists. In the same way one can speak of feeling (*vedanā*), therefore such expressions are *Paramārthasatyas* (ultimate truths).

But these ultimate truths of the Hinayānists, we have seen, are relegated by the Mahāyānists to the domain of convention. Hence, what are real according to the Hinayānists, namely the *Āryasatyas* and the *Pratītyasamutpāda* are unreal and matters of convention according to the Mahāyānists.

¹ *Kośa*., VI. 4.

INDIAN STUDIES

No. 1.

SLOW PROGRESS OF ISLAM POWER IN ANCIENT INDIA

BY

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Part II.



Soon after the middle of the tenth century, the fabric of the Gurjara empire showed signs of disintegration and began to develop ominous cracks and crevices threatening a complete collapse. Rājputānā and East Panjab declared independence under the Cāhamānas, Bombay Gurjarāt and Kāthiāwār under the Caulukyās or Solāṅkis, Mālwā under the Paramārs, and Gwālior and Bundelkhand under the Candellas. Mathurā and the country east of the Jumna alone remained with the Pratihāras of Kanauj. Just at this time a Moslem power sprung up at Ghazna and was waxing mightily and quickly. The impending dissolution of the Gurjara empire offered a good opportunity for the renewal of Muhammadan aggression and aggrandisement. And Amir Sabuk-Tigin, founder of the Ghazna dynasty, undertook expeditions into India in the prosecution of holy wars. In the first expedition he found Jaipāl, the Hindu Śāhiya king, advanced as far as Lamghan and ready to fight. Their armies met and fought several days successively against each other, but without any decisive result. Thereupon the Amir ordered filth to be thrown into a clear fountain of water which was in a ravine close to where the infidels were encamped. The effect of it was that black clouds collected, whirlwinds arose, hailstones fell from heaven accompanied by loud claps of thunder; a blast, calculated to shake trees from their roots, blew upon them, and thick black vapours formed around them so that they could not see the road by which they could fly.¹ It is rather difficult to perceive the significance of this extraordinary story about a supernatural phenomenon. But it has been shrewdly surmised by Sir H. Elliot that a snowstorm suddenly burst out, and not only harassed but totally paralysed the 'Hindus

1. H. M. Elliot, *History of India*, Vol. II. p. 20.

who were unaccustomed to the cold and who consequently felt it as grievously as the Indian and British troops combined did, nine centuries afterwards, during the first Afghan War.'¹ It is therefore no wonder if the forces of Jaipāl sustained a grievous disaster. In his second expedition into India, however, Sabuk-Tigin had a well-pitched battle with Jaipāl and defeated him. This victory alone is worthy of mention. On the death of Amir Sabuk-Tigin, the throne of Ghazna was occupied after a short interval by his son Maḥmūd whose fighting qualities were doubtless of a superior order and who resumed the prosecution of the holy wars to gratify the ruling passion of his life, namely, avarice. He undertook several plundering raids, regarding the exact number and dates of which there is yet no consensus of opinion among historians. Maḥmūd, it appears, undertook an expedition generally once every year, leaving Ghazna and carrying on his raiding operations in the cold season. But our purpose here is to see what impression Maḥmūd's raids produced on India and what Indian provinces they ended in annexing to his dominion. It is not therefore necessary to take into our consideration here, every one of the expeditions ascribed to him. We shall confine our attention just to those two or three which were the most important.

The sixth expedition of Maḥmūd came off in H. 399 (=1009 A. D.), the account of which as given in the *Tawārikh-i-Firishtāh* is the one that is generally followed by historians. But it is forgotten that this account not only is an exaggeration but contains misstatements. This is the case not only in regard to this account but also others. The author wrote his account centuries after the events recorded by him took place. Tradition, which in India is another name for fiction, was much at work and fabricated many new but unfounded incidents which got mixed up with real facts; and it is this amalgam of truth and fiction that passes for history in the *Tawārikh-i-Firishtāh*, at any rate so far as the earlier period is concerned. The events relating to this expedition fall under two main heads. We are told that in H. 399 Maḥmūd collected his forces and determined to invade Hindustan and punish Ānandpāl, son of 'Jaipāl for the insolence he had shown in his previous raid of Multān.

1. *Ibid* p. 436.

Anandpāl, hearing of his intentions, sent ambassadors on all sides, inviting the assistance of the other princes of Hindustan, who now considered the expulsion of the Muhammadans from India as a sacred duty. Accordingly, the Rājās of Ujjain, Gwālīor, Kālīñjar, Kanauj, Delhi and Ajmēr¹ entered into a confederacy, and, collecting forces, advanced towards the Panjāb with a greater army than had ever taken the field against Amir Sabuk-Tigin. The *Tawārikh-i-Firishtāh* no doubt gives this glowing description of the Hindu confederacy against Maḥmūd just to show against what fearful odds the latter had to fight. But this confederacy seems to be nothing but a myth. There is not even an oblique reference to it in the contemporary Muhammadan accounts and is not alluded to at all, for instance, by Al-'Utbi in his *Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī*, which contains a contemporary description of Maḥmūd's expedition. If Maḥmūd of Ghazna had really confronted and vanquished such a powerful confederacy, there would surely have been a long glowing description of his prowess in this contemporary history which was written by a secretary to the emperor himself. As it is, there is not even a remote reference to it, in the *Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī*. It thus seems that the confederacy is a mere figment of imagination. Again, if the Hindu chiefs had really wanted to form a confederacy to expel the *mlecchas*, as the *Tawārikh-i-Firishtāh* leads us to suppose, they would have united under the leadership, not of a feudatory chieftain such as the Hindu Śāhiya was, but certainly of the king of Kanauj who was still the acknowledged suzerain, though he was no longer the power that he was originally. Besides, some of the Rājās who are reported to have formed the confederacy did not exist. Thus there was no Rājā of Gwālīor, separate from the Rājā of Kālīñjar, about 1009 A. D., who could come with his contingent independently of the latter. Besides, there is no epigraphic or numismatic evidence to show that any royal family at this time ruled at Delhi. It is true that the Tomaras are connected with this place, but that statement is based upon a mere vague tradition. But perhaps the strangest constituent of this confederacy is the Rājā of Ajmēr. It is well-known that Ajmēr, or Ajayamēru as it is fully called,

1. John Briggs' Trans. of *Tawārikh-i-Firishtāh* (published by Cambray & Co.), Vol. I. p. 46.

was founded by the Cahamāna king, Ajayadēva,¹ who, however, flourished between 1105 and 1139 A. D., that is, at least a century after this raid of Maḥmūd came off. Ajmēr² could not thus possibly have been in existence about 1009 A.D. when Maḥmūd attacked Ānandpāl. The story of the confederacy formed by the Hindu Rājās to expel Maḥmūd from India as a sacred duty thus seems to be nothing but a myth which was concocted later to impart a sacred character to his intentions and glorify his valorous deeds. And even supposing for the moment that this confederacy was a historical fact, what sort of triumph did Maḥmūd gain over it? The Indians and Muhammadans, we are told, arrived in sight of each other on the plain of Peshāwar, where they remained encamped for forty days. The Indians were further joined by the Gakkhars in great strength. The Sultan perceived that on this occasion the idolators behaved most devotedly, and that it was necessary to be circumspect in striking the first blow. He therefore entrenched his camp in order that the infidels might not be able to penetrate therein. Maḥmūd, having thus secured himself, ordered six thousand archers to the front to attack, and endeavour to draw, the enemy near to his entrenchments, where the Muhammadans were prepared to receive them. In spite of the Sultan's precautions, during the heat of the battle, 30,000 Gakkhars, with their heads and feet bare and armed with spears and other weapons, penetrated on the two sides into the Muhammadan lines, and forcing their way into the midst of the cavalry, they slaughtered in a few minutes three or four thousand Muhammadans. They carried their success so far that the Sultan, observing the fury of

1. *Jour. R. As. Soc.* 1913, p. 272.

2. It is possible, by a little overstraining, to say here that by 'Rājās of Ajmēr' the author of the *Tawārīkh-i-Firishīāh* meant the Cohān princes, who in the time of Maḥmūd, no doubt, were Rājās of Sāmbhar but were in the time of the author known as Rājās of Ajmēr. When the Cohān princes were thus called Rājās of Ajmēr, he did not mean, it may be contended, that Ajmēr was in existence in the time of Maḥmūd. All that he wanted to do was to refer to the Cohāns, and he did so by referring to them by the title current in the author's time. This defence of the *Tawārīkh-i-Firishīāh*, if any such is at all adduced, is far-fetched. Besides, that its author really believed that Ajmēr was in existence in the time of Maḥmūd will be clear to anybody from his account of Maḥmūd's expedition against Somnāth (Vol. I. p. 69), where the town by its name has actually been mentioned as having been reduced.

these Gakkhar footmen, withdrew himself from the thick of the fight, that he might stop the battle for that day. But it so happened, says the *Tawārīkh-i-Fīrishtāh*, that the elephant upon which Ānandpāl rode, becoming unruly from the effects of the naphtha-balls and the flights of arrows, turned and fled. The Hindus, adds the author of the *Tawārīkh*, deeming this to be the signal for flight on the part of their general, all gave way, and fled.¹ So Maḥmūd achieved a victory over the Hindus, not in a fair open fight but rather through an accident, the accident of Ānandpāl's elephant taking fright and causing the belief in the minds of his people that that was the signal for a flight. Maḥmūd perhaps was not very proud of this victory, but he was certainly shrewd enough to take the fullest advantage of this favourable situation. His cavalry pursued the enemy for two days and nights, killing 8,000 Indians in the retreat, till he reached the fort of Bhimnagar or Nagarkot which has been indentified with Kot Kangra. He attacked the garrison, reduced the fort, and carried off enormous booty. It is, however, worthy of note that the fort was defended by its garrison only and that no extraneous forces are reported to have come for its help.

It has been stated above that the account of the *Tawārīkh-i-Fīrishtāh* has to be accepted with caution. Reasons have been pointed out to show why the mention of the formation of the Hindu confederacy was a fiction. If further proof is needed it is furnished, I think, by other details specified in the *Tawārīkh*, which do not tally with those given by earlier accounts. The *Tawārīkh-i-Fīrishtāh* says that the battle was fought between Maḥmūd and Ānandpāl and on the plains of Peshāwar. The *Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī* of Al-'Utbi, however, which is an account contemporaneous with Maḥmūd, says that the battle came off at Wahind and was fought not between Maḥmūd and Ānandpāl but between Maḥmūd and Brahmapāl son of Ānandpāl. As Sir H. Elliot has pointed out, the river of Wahind, or the Indus was a more probable place of action than Peshāwar, as the latter was then within the Muhammadan border. This shows that we have to carefully scrutinize the account of the *Tawārīkh-i-Fīrishtāh* for this early period, before we accept it as history.

We shall now consider Maḥmūd's last raid, namely, that against Somnāth. It was the unparalleled success he achiev-

1. Elliot, Vol. II., p. 447.

ed in this expedition which is said to have raised him to the highest pinnacle of glory and fame. The account of this raid has been given by four or five Muhammadan historians. But even here we must remember that we have to be careful in giving credence to every one of their statements. The motive that prompted the author of *Tawārīkh-i-Firishṭāh* was by no means absent in the case of these Muhammadan historians also. There was every desire to exaggerate the importance of the victory of Maḥmūd and belittle the bravery of his Indian adversaries. We will now give a short description of this expedition based on, first, the account of Ibn Asir¹ (A.D. 1060-1229). It begins with the description of the idol called Somnāth and the wealth, pomp and religious importance of his temple. We will pass it over as it is of no consequence to us for our present purpose. When Maḥmūd, we are told, was gaining victories and demolishing idols in North India, the Hindus said Somnāth was displeased with them, otherwise no one could have destroyed or injured them. When Maḥmūd heard this, he resolved on making a campaign to destroy Somnāth, believing that when the Hindus saw their prayers and imprecations to be false and futile, they would embrace his faith. So he prayed to the Almighty for aid, and with thirty thousand horses, besides volunteers left Ghazna in H. 414 = A.D. 1024. He took the road to Multān, from whence the road to India was through a barren desert. So he collected provisions for the passage, and he started for Anhilvādā. After he had crossed the desert he came to a fort which he invested and brought under the sway of Islam. His men carried away water with them from there and marched for Anhilvādā whose chief called Bhīma fled hastily to a certain fort for safety in order to prepare himself for war. Maḥmūd pushed on for Somnāth through a desert where there was little water. From the desert he marched to Dabalwarah apparently Delvādā near Ūṇā, two days journey from Somnāth. Maḥmūd took and plundered the place, and marched to Somnāth. The story of the pillage and desecration is too well known to require any repetition here. No Musalman account, however, tells us what kind of soldiers and how many of them defended the place. In the absence of these important details it is impossible to form an estimate of the bravery of Maḥmūd and his troops. It is true that his arrival at Anhilvādā frightened

1. Ibid., p. 468 & ff.

the Solankī chief Bhīma who forthwith abandoned his city. What appears to have happened is that Maḥmūd's march from Ghazna to Multān and from Multān to Anhilvādā was so sudden and was of such lightning speed that Bhīma was completely taken by surprise. The Muhammadan account tells us distinctly that Bhīma fled hastily, not to save himself in an imbecile manner from the onslaught of Maḥmūd, but certainly to prepare himself for war. It is true that the very fact that Maḥmūd marched with the speed of lightning bespeaks highly of his generalship and proficiency in military tactics. And it is no doubt equally true that it is this unique trait of generalship that gave him victory after victory. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Maḥmūd never had an open fight with the Rājput̃s of Rājputānā and Gujarāt when he passed through these territories; possibly he never wanted to measure his strength against any one of them. This appears to be clear from the fact notified in *Tabakāt-i-Akbarī* that when Maḥmūd resolved upon returning home from Somnāth, he learnt that Parama Deva, one of the greatest Rājās of Hindustan, was preparing to intercept him, but that the Sultan, not deeming it advisable to contend with this chief, went towards Multān through Sind.¹ This Parama Deva seems in all likelihood to have been the Paramāra king of Ābū who could effectively block the Ajmer-Gujarāt route. The prospect of confronting and receiving an almost sure and crushing defeat from this Paramāra chief most probably impelled him to face what he thought to be the lesser danger of passing through the Sind desert. We know what happened to his army during his march through Sind. His men suffered miserably in some places from scarcity of water and in others for want of forage. And Firishtāh tells us that many of his troops died raging mad from the intolerable heat and thirst. After enduring these extreme hardships Maḥmūd at last arrived at Ghazna in H. 417 = A.D. 1026.

It has been remarked above that the accounts given by the Muhammadan historians of Maḥmūd's expedition are not sober history from beginning to end, but contain in not a few

1. Ibid., pp. 473-4. The *Tawārikh-i-Firishtāh*, however, says: "Intelligence being now received, that Brahma Dew and the Raja of Ajmeer, with others, had collected a great army in the desert to oppose his return, Mahmood determined to march direct by the route of Sind to Mooltan" (Vol. I. p 78.).

places exaggerated descriptions of his bravery and glory. If any instance of such fiction intermixed with history is required in the case of the raid on Somnāth, we have only to refer to and examine the various accounts given, for instance, of Somnāth. Thus the *Kāmilu-t-Tawārikh* of Ibn Asir speaks of Somnāth as an idol. Maḥmūd, we are told, seized it, part of which he burned and part he carried away with him to Ghazna, where he used it as a step at the entrance of the Jāmi Masjid. Firishtāh also gives us to understand that Somnāth was an idol. The *Tārīkh-i Alfī* also says the same thing namely, that Somnāth was an idol cut out of solid stone and that Maḥmūd broke it into pieces with his battle axe. When he was about to destroy the idol, Brāhman represented that if he desisted from the mutilation, they would pay several crores. But Maḥmūd replied: "I know this, but I desire that on the day of resurrection I should be summoned with the words, 'Where is that Maḥmūd who broke the greatest of the heathen idols?' rather than by these; 'Where is that Maḥmūd who sold the greatest of the idols to the infidels?'" When Maḥmūd demolished the image, he found in it so many superb jewels and rubies that they amounted to and even exceeded a hundred times the value of the ransom offered by the Brāhman. These are the embellishments of the story which are fiction and not history, and have already been commented upon by some English historians. In the first place, was Somnāth an idol at all as described by these Musalman writers? In all Hindu accounts it has been called a Līṅga, and not an idol; and even Al Bērūnī, a contemporary of Maḥmūd, knew it to be such. Similarly, Al Bērūnī tells us that the top of the Līṅga was garnished with precious stones and with gold. The mention of rubies and pearls hidden in the Līṅga is thus nothing but a pure invention, as was first pointed out by Wilson, "The earlier Muhammadan writers" remarks Wilson "say nothing of the mutilation of its features, for, in fact, it had none; nothing of the treasures it contained which, as it was solid, could not have been within it."

That the Muhammadan accounts of Maḥmūd's raids are confusing and unreliable may also be shown in another way. Kalhana in his *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* has given a vivid description of the campaign which Maḥmūd waged against Trilocanapāla and which ended in the total destruc-

tion of the Hindu Śāhiya dynasty. Kalhana's narrative is supported by Al Bērūnī who tells us that it was under Trilocanapāla that the Śāhiya kingdom succumbed to the Muhammadans under Maḥmūd. But curiously enough, no lucid account has been given by any Muhammadan historian of this campaign, though it was of such momentous importance from the Muslim point of view. In annotating this passage from the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, Sir Aurel Stein,¹ its editor and translator, is therefore compelled to admit that the discrepancy which the Muhammadan accounts show as to the chronology and the topographical details of Maḥmūd's expeditions does not permit us to identify with certainty the campaign to which Kalhana's narrative relates.

It will be seen that the accounts we possess of Maḥmūd's expeditions are inaccurate and confusing. It is, indeed, strange, very strange, that the Muhammadan authorities consider them to be twelve in number, but that when they actually record them *seriatim*, they enumerate not twelve, but fifteen or sixteen. The European historians, too, following them, curiously mention them as twelve, but record fifteen or sixteen. Sir H. Elliot, who first went deeper into the subject, computed them to be seventeen. But even this computation does not help us to identify as we have just seen the campaign of Maḥmūd which has been described by Kalhana as completely subversive of the Hindu Śāhiya power and which was thus of paramount importance to the history of Islam. Most of these accounts, again, contain an admixture of fiction or exaggeration which is not found in the contemporary histories and which is evidently concocted to unduly glorify his exploits. In these circumstances it is very difficult to frame an accurate estimate of Maḥmūd as a conqueror. It is true that he undertook a good many expeditions of conquest against India, though their exact number cannot be determined, and that every time except perhaps once his march was triumphant and unimpeded. But then we have to note that the Pratihāra supremacy which had made the guarding of the frontiers an imperial concern was at this time being shattered to pieces and that there was thus a complete lack of organisation. This was a supreme opportunity for Maḥmūd who seized it with alacrity and utilised it to his fullest advantage. If the Pratihāra imper-

1. *Kalhana's Chronicle of the kings of Kāśmīr*, Vol. I. p. 271, n.

ialism had continued what it was half a century ago, it is very doubtful whether he would have been able to penetrate into India even once. It cannot, however, be denied that Mahmūd was a first-rate general. Most of his victories were due to the lightning speed with which he marched against his adversaries before they had time to prepare themselves. This was no doubt a special feature of his tactics which was rendered possible by his nimble cavalry and for which he deserves every credit. He was also a great fighter. He defeated princes of the Hindu Sāhiya and Candella families. But it should not be forgotten that he avoided meeting in an open and fair battle the Paramāra king of Ābū when the latter was prepared to confront him, but went back to Ghazna from Somnāth by the Sind route, whereby he and his army suffered the worst miseries. Even here Mahmūd, it may be said, deserves some praise, because he undertook nothing that was impossible and never struck an enemy unless he was sure of overpowering him. He was thus a wonderful blending of daring and caution. Such a man could certainly flourish in environments where there was a complete lack of organisation if not an organised anarchy, and he was lucky that when he lived, the fabric of Pratihāra imperialism was being snapped to pieces. But if we want to gauge his work as a conqueror, we must ask what permanent result was produced by his expeditions so far as India was concerned. So far as we can see, they ended only in overthrowing the Hindu Sāhiya power and annexing merely Western Panjab to the Muhammadan dominions. A very poor result indeed! To Mahmūd of Ghazna, they say, belongs the credit of his being the first Muslim Emperor, and to him more than to any one else the rise of 'monarchy' among the Mussalmans is due. If this is really the case, it is a pity that he let a golden opportunity slip for carving an empire out of India. From the popular Muslim point of view, the subjugation of the infidel's territory was more pious than the conquest of a Muhammadan country. And here was a splendid opportunity presented to Mahmūd, as the edifice of the Pratihāra empire was at that time collapsing. And the wonder of it is that he did not, perhaps could not, conquer the greater portion of Northern India and make himself master of at least the Pratihāra dominions, if he had in him the vision of an empire with which he is credited. As it was, his invasions were not real expeditions of conquest, but ended in being mere raids of sack and pillage.

Things settled down rapidly after 1024 A. D. It has been mentioned above that the mighty Gurjara empire about the close of the tenth century was split up into a number of kingdoms. That consisting of East Panjab and Rājputānā was seized by the Cāhamānas with their capitals at Sāmbhar and Ajmer. That part of the Middle Country which corresponds to the United Provinces was ruled over by the Gāhadavāla family under Candradeva from Kanauj or Benares. It was these two kingdoms which were now exposed to the depredations of the neighbouring Muhammadan states. It is true that we hear so little of them from the Muhammadan authorities, but the inscriptions of these dynasties leave no doubt on this point. If we take first the records of the Gāhadavāla family, we find a distinct mention of Gōvindacandra having defeated Hammira when he was Yuvarāja,¹ that is, certainly before A. D. 1114. Nay, there seems to have been another Muhammadan incursion in his time, that is, when he was king. The Moslem invaders this time came as far east as Benares, his capital, but were effectively repulsed by him.² What is, however, specially noteworthy in connection with the copper-plate charters of the Gāhadavāla princes is that among the taxes which they levied is included one called *Turushka-dāṇḍa* which seems to have been a tax on the Muhammadans. The exact nature of this tax cannot be determined, but it seems to be a sort of land-tax imposed by the Gāhadavāla kings on the Muhammadan settlers in their dominions.³ There can be no doubt that some Muhammadans had been settled in the Gāhadavāla kingdom. Thus the *Kāmilu-t-Tawārīkh* of Ibn Asir⁴ informs us that there were many Musalmans settled in that country since the days of Maḥmūd of Ghazna. It is possible that these Hindu rulers levied this *Turushka-*

1. *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XVIII. p. 16, 1, 9.

2. *Ep. Ind.* Vol. IX. p. 321.

3. Dr. Hiranand Sastri combats this view (*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XIII. p. 296), but I agree with Prof. Sten Konow (*Ibid.*, Vol. IX. p. 321) because if it was something like the Danegeld of England levied for raising what was a price for the cessation of the Muslim ravages, it is inexplicable why it was discontinued by Jayacandra. Secondly, it was the Cāhamāna dominions which actually touched the Muhammadan territory and which consequently were more exposed to their inroads than the Gāhadavāla kingdom, but we do not find this tax levied in the Cāhamāna dominions where its necessity was greater.

4. *Elliot*, Vol. II. p. 251.

daṇḍa from the Moslems by way of retaliation for the *Jizya* which the latter must have exacted from the Hindus of that part of the Punjab that was now subject to their rule. The point that specially deserves to be noticed here is that this poll-tax seems to have been abolished by Jayacandra, the last Gāhādvāla prince, because there is no mention of *Turuṣka-daṇḍa* in any one of his copper-plate grants. The reason of this abolition it is not difficult to surmise. There was a great misunderstanding in his time between the Cāhamāna, and the Gāhādvāla House, on account of Rai Pithorā's daring abduction of Jayacandra's daughter. Hostilities between the Cāhamānas and the Moslem rulers had also increased about this time. And Jayacandra must therefore have tried to make friends with the latter in order to encompass the ruin of the former. And, as a matter of fact, we know that when Shihāb-ud-Dīn Ghur threatened India with an invasion, all the kings of North India joined Pṛthvirāja III., but Jayacandra held himself aloof. He had a definite purpose in view, which was ultimately served by the destruction of the Cāhamāna supremacy by the Muhammadans.

We may now direct our attention to the Cāhamāna records and try to find out what light they throw upon the fights of this Rajput family with the frontier Muhammadan rulers. Of these records perhaps the most valuable is the *Pṛthvirāja-vijaya*,¹ which describes the exploits of the Cāhamāna princes of Sāmbhar in general and of the last Pṛthvirāja in particular. The last portion of this work is unfortunately missing, but what has been preserved is enough for our purpose. So far as we can see, it was Durlabharāja II. of this dynasty who first came into conflict with these foreigners. He lived about 1075 A. D., and is represented to have been killed in a battle with the Mātāngas or Musalmans. Things were, however, better when one of his descendants, Arnōrāja, was on the throne in the second quarter of the twelfth century. For he is credited with having destroyed a Muhammadan army and constructed a lake on the scene of this action to purify the place polluted by the shedding of the Mleccha blood. This lake is undoubtedly the Ānāsāgar called after him, and is still a

1. Two fasciculi of the poem have been printed by the Beng. As. Society. A summary of it was published, first by Mr. J. Morrison in the *Vienna Ori. Jour.*, Vol. VII. pp. 188-92 and afterwards by Mr. Harvilas Sarda in *Jour. R. As. Soc.*, 1913, p. 262 & ff.

beautiful site of Ajmēr. Arnōrāja was followed by his son Vighraharāja (IV.), *alias* Visaladēva who is represented in a Delhi pillar inscription of A.D. 1164 to have brought the whole of North India under his sway and to have made it an Āryāvarta or Abode of Āryans again, by exterminating the Mlecchas or the Muhammadans¹. Further information on this point is furnished by a drama called *Lalita-Vighraharāja* by his court poet Sōmēśvara.² It was originally engraved on a series of slate stone slabs, and was put up for exhibition and study in the college and shrine of Sarasvatī which he had erected at Ajmēr but which was afterwards converted into a mosque known as *Dhāi dīn-kā jhūmpḍā*. This drama describes one of the defeats he inflicted on a Muhammadan ruler called Hammīra or Turuskeśvara. Only a few fragments of this play have been preserved, but they are enough to show under what adverse circumstances, Vighraharāja had to give battle to this enemy. The Cāhamāna king was then encamped at Vavvēraka, the same as Vavēra, by which Rūpnagar in the Kishangarh State was known before it was so named after Rūpsimha of the Kishangarh House³. One fragment of the drama introduces us to a scene where the king sees a spy sent to procure details of the Muhammadan force that was advancing. The spy informs him that the horses, elephants and soldiers which comprised the enemy's army were so many that it was impossible to frame even an approximate estimate and that they were then stationed just one *yojana* or perhaps nine miles from Vavvēraka. Consternation seizes the mind of the Cāhamāna king, who at once calls his maternal uncle Rāja Simhabala and his Brāhmaṇ prime-minister Śrīdhara. The whole information given by the spy is placed before them, and they are asked to give advice as to the course of action that was best in the circumstances. Simhabala advises him to give battle, but Śrīdhara tries to dissuade him from this decision as the Cāhamāna forces would be hopelessly outnumbered by those of the enemy. The king, however, decides in favour of the line of action suggested by Simhabala. No fragment of this play has been preserved which tells us what the issue of this battle actually was. But there can be no doubt on this question. The Cāhamāna king must have vanquished the

1. *Ind. Ant.* Vol. XIX, p. 219.

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. XX, p. 207 & ff.

3. *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 182.

enemy completely. Otherwise, there would not have been even a remote allusion to this incident, which on the contrary has been mentioned most prominently here. What we have to note is that the Cāhamāna ruler gave fight to the Muhammadan forces though he was fully conscious of the fact that they were more than a match to his army, so far, of course, as the numbers were concerned and that it is utter recklessness of life and superior fighting qualities that must have won him the day.

Vigraharāja was succeeded by his nephew, Prthvirāja II., one of whose records was originally found at Hānsī in the Hissar District, Panjāb. It says that he had a maternal uncle, called Kilhana, a Guhilōt by clan, who had been put in command of the fort of Asī or Hānsī, to arrest the advance of Hammīra or the Muhammadan emperor, who had become a thorn to the world.¹ We are also informed that Kilhana had seized and burned Pañcapura, the same as the modern 'Pachapattan' on the Sutlej which, as Tod tells us, was on the route from Kabul to Hānsī. The strategic importance of Pañcapura and also Hānsī can scarcely be over rated so far as the Cāhamāna kingdom was concerned. And it seems that the Cāhamāna monarchy was effectively fortifying the north-west frontiers of its territory against Muhammadan aggression which had been on the increase since the time of Durlabharāja. These precautions produced some salutary effect for some time. For certainly we do not hear of any Muhammadan expedition during the reign of this king or even of his successor Sōmēśvara.

Things were, however, different in the time of Prthvirāja III., who succeeded his father Sōmēśvara to the Cāhamāna throne. When Sōmēśvara died, Prthvirāja was a child. And his mother had been appointed regent to look after the affairs of the state. This was a fresh opportunity to the Muhammadans to renew their policy of aggression. Reference has already been made to a work called the *Prthvirāja-vijaya*, which contains a full account of the life and career of Prthvirāja. But only a page or two of it have survived, and that gives us the information that the beef-eating Mleccha called Ghorī, who captured Garjanī (Ghazni), had dispatched an envoy to the Cāhamāna court. It further informs

1. *Ibid.*, 1912, pp. 17-8.

us that it was this Ghorī whose soldiers had occupied Nadūla- (Nāḍōl), but that they had been put to a rout by the Gujarāt king without the Cāhamāna ruler having to take any action in the matter. This is a clear reference to the expedition of Shihābu-d-Dīn Muhammad Ghūr in 1178 A. D. when, after marching to Uchhā and Multān and crossing the desert of Mārwar, he invaded Gujarāt without entering the Cāhamāna territory. The king of Gujarāt at this time was the Solanki prince Bhīmadēva II., who defeated the Muhammadans with great slaughter at Kāsahrada (Kāyadrā) at the foot of Mount Abū, being aided by the Nāḍōl chief Kēlhaṇa and his brother Kīrtipāla and also by the Paramāra chief Dhārāvarsa of Candrāvati.¹ The Muhammadan defeat was so crushing that Shihābu-d-Dīn was himself badly wounded in this fight and had to beat a hasty retreat. This is another clear instance, if any further instance is needed, of the frontier Muhammadan rulers sustaining a heavy defeat at the hands of the Rajpūt princes, when the latter were prepared for a battle.

The ignominious defeat made such a deep impression on the mind of Shihābu-d-Dīn that it was not till 1191 A. D. that he again thought of invading India. About this time a sad misunderstanding had arisen between the Cāhamāna and Gāhaḍavāla families. This presented a good opportunity to the Moslem ruler to undertake another expedition. Prthvirāja was not dead to the danger that now threatened India. He solicited the kings of North India to join his confederacy, and they all did except, of course, Jayacandra. Shihābū-d-Dīn encountered Prthvirāja and his allies at Tarain or Talawari between Karnal and Thanēsar. The battle ended in a brilliant victory for Prthvirāja, and a complete rout of the Moslem army. The enemy was severely wounded, and had to run again for his life. Then followed a state of inaction and inertness on the part of the Rajpūts which is astounding to a degree. Instead of following up their victory by mercilessly pursuing and driving the foreigners out of India, they were self-complacent and remained where they were. Shihābu-d-Dīn retired quietly to Ghor, and after thirteen months returned with a mighty force to the former scene of action. Putting the Hindu army off their guard with a false pretence, the foreign invader fell upon them under cover of night. The Rajpūts, unprepared though they were, fought with great valour, and

1. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XI. pp. 71-3.

towards sunset seemed to be even on the point of gaining the day, when Shihābu-d-Dīn charged them at the head of a chosen body of horsemen which had been purposely left behind and which at once turned the tide of the battle. Pṛthvirāja was taken alive and murdered in cold blood. Thus was laid down the foundation stone of the fabric of Muhammadan supremacy in India. If Jayacandra of Kanauj and Benaras really played the traitor to his country, he soon atoned for it, for in 1194 Shihābu-d-Dīn defeated and killed him also and annexed his kingdom. India was divided into numerous independent states at this time and hence within six years of the second battle of Tarain, the whole of Northern India was conquered by Shihābu-d-Dīn.

When the power of the Imperial Gurjaras had been established over Northern India, the north-west boundary of the empire, we have seen, was the natural frontier of India formed by the Safed Koh and Sulaiman ranges. One of the feudatory families of the Gurjara period was the Hindu Śāhiyas who occupied the frontier province and whose territory, we know, included the Kābul Valley. The guarding of the north-west frontier was thus an imperial problem, and it was solved by the Hindu Śāhiyas effectively barring for centuries the advance of the Islam Powers. And it is when the Gurjara empire breaks up that Sabuk-Tigīn and Maḥmūd of Ghazna make their appearance in the political horizon of India, and undertake several expeditions which end in the destruction of the Hindu Śāhiya rule and the annexation of the greater portion of the Pānjāb. By this time the commotion and confusion caused by the downfall of the Gurjara supremacy settled down into some order, and two Rājput dynasties rose to prominence with conterminous territories. It was, however, the Cāhamāna territory which touched the Muslim dominions and was more constantly exposed to their raids and depredations. The problem of arresting the Muhammadan aggression had thus become very acute, for the Pānjāb which consists mostly of plains could not possibly form the the natural boundary to any Rājput State and offer any barrier to the foreign incursions. Besides, these were two different Rājput States, and they had naturally different aspirations and different policies to carry out. They could not bear any comparison to the Imperial Gurjara rule which had only one object in view and only one foreign policy to maintain. In

spite of this disadvantage the two Rajpūt dynasties succeeded in repelling the attacks of the Muhammadans for more than a century and a half. And the question arises what could be the cause of this strange phenomenon? The only answer is: Rajpūt bravery, which is, as a rule, notoriously reckless—reckless of life and reckless of any plan of action. We have seen from the *Lalita Vigharāja* how the Cāhamāna king Vigharāja *alias* Viśaladēva was impatient to fall upon a Muhammadan army although it was much larger than his and although he was being dissuaded by his Brāhman prime-minister from embarking upon such a fool-hardy project. But no amount of persuasion could produce any effect on him. He pounced upon the Muhammadan forces, and it was by good luck, no doubt aided by Rajpūt bravery, that he was successful in his venture. It is this reckless Rajpūt bravery that explains why, in almost all battles which were well-pitched and fought to the end, the Rajpūts, as a rule, triumphed over the Muhammadan foreigners; and if the latter at any time triumphed, the victory was due generally to an accident. Thus when Amir Sabuk-Tigīn gained a victory over Jaipāl, it was in consequence of the snow-storm which burst out all of a sudden and paralysed the Hindus who were unaccustomed to rigorous cold. Similarly, when Sabuk-Tigīn's son, Maḥmūd of Ghazna achieves a victory over Ānandpāl son of Jaipāl, it was due to the mere accident of Ānandpāl's elephant running away through fright and creating the belief in the minds of his soldiers that that was a signal to them for flight. But when Maḥmūd attacked and pillaged Somnāth and learnt that the route by which he came was being guarded by certain Rajpūt chiefs who wanted to give him battle, he returned to Ghazna, not by this route, but *via* Sind, although his army thereby suffered from the worst of privations and hardships. Likewise, in 1178 A.D. when Shihābu-d-Dīn Ghūr invaded Gujarāt, the Solanki king Bhīmadēva, aided by the Sonigarā and Paramāra chiefs, inflicted a crushing defeat on him at the foot of Mount Ābū and made him flee for life. Thirteen years later, that is, 1191 in A.D., the Muhammadan emperor returned with a larger army; and this time he met the Rajpūts under Pṛthvirāja at Tarain, and we know, with what result. This time too when the Rajpūts were face to face with the Muhammadan foreigners, the latter sustained an ignominious defeat and their leader Shihāb-ud-Dīn had again to fly for his life. This defeat of the enemy was no doubt caused by the

bravery of the Rajpūts, who in fighting were reckless of their life and therefore almost always vanquished their Muhammadan opponents in open well-pitched battles. But the battle of Tarain gives us an insight into another trait of Rajpūt character. The Rajpūts were not only indifferent to their life but also indifferent to improving and strengthening any position of advantage they might have gained through their bravery. Perhaps they did not possess the same amount of brain-power in the art of warfare that their Muhammadan rivals were endowed with. When Shihābu-d-Dīn's army was routed and he himself was running for his life, why did not Prthvirāja track his enemy and drive him out of India which he could easily have done? Would Mahmūd of Ghazna, for instance, have failed to take full advantage of such a unique opportunity? But the Rajpūt mentality was of a different mould. It was not only reckless of life but also indifferent to pursuing a victory to its fullest advantage. This was a weakness which emanated from an overweening confidence in their bravery, or perhaps from mental apathy caused by opium eating. Instances of this indifference are not wanting from later Rajpūt history, and this alone can satisfactorily explain why they were inactive and indifferent to pursuing their enemy after the first battle of Tarain and reaping the fullest advantage of their victory. And we know what disastrous consequence this indifference produced. It laid the foundation stone of the Islam power in India and changed the whole history of the country. Nevertheless, be it noted that Shihābu-d-Dīn Mu'izzu-d-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sām, who laid this foundation stone, allowed himself to be guided by the exigencies of the state only, not by the policy of iconomachy but of iconolatry, because we know he struck gold, silver and copper coins where not only his name appears in Nāgarī character alone but above all we find actual representations of the Hindu deities, either a seated figure of Lakṣmī or the Bull of Śiva.¹

It will thus be seen that the Muhammadan first began to penetrate into and overrun India under the Arabs in 712 A. D. But they did not obtain any firm footing till 1191 A. D. when Shihābu-d Dīn defeated and killed Prthvirāja in the second

1. *Catalogue of the coins in the Indian Museum Calcutta* by H. Nelson Wright, Vol. II, p. 5.

battle of Tarain. For four centuries and a half the Rajpūts held the Muhammadans at bay. The Muhammadans were all along making incursions into India and trying to establish an Islam empire over the country. They allowed no opportunity to slip unutilised when there was a political upheaval in Northern India. Nevertheless, the Rajpūts proved a most effective barrier to Muhammadan aggrandisement for upwards of four centuries and a half. In fact, such a thing is unprecedented in the history of early Islam, where we notice the Muhammadans carrying everything before them and making themselves masters of the whole globe between Sind and Southern Spain within eighty years of their Prophet's death. No impartial historian will therefore refrain from holding that it was probably the most glorious period of the Rajpūt history in India. To say, therefore, as V. A. Smith has done, that the Muhammadan invaders were doubtless superior to their Hindu opponents in fighting power, because they came from a cool climate in hilly regions and were heavier and physically stronger and also because they were flesh-eaters whereas the Hindus were mostly vegetarians and that their fierce fanaticism helped them immensely as it developed into all kinds of frightfulness is something which is altogether inexplicable in the light of the facts of history such as we have passed under review. If there was anything that offered a successful resistance to the Muhammadan aggression, it was Rajpūt bravery against which the cool climate of the hilly regions, the physical strength and flesh-eating propensities of the Muhammadans were of no avail. Even their fanaticism which undoubtedly showed its frightfulness all over Western Asia, North Africa and South Europe did not help the Muhammadans at all for four centuries and a half to penetrate into India and gain a stable footing. And very often this fanaticism had to yield to diplomacy such as we see when Shihābu-d-Dīn issued coins with Nāgarī legends and with Hindu icons to stabilise his rule in India or when the Arabs of Multān preserved the idol of Sūrya which was an object of veneration to the Hindus of the surrounding regions not only to make it a fertile source of revenue but also to use it as a weapon by threatening to destroy it whenever they were being overpowered and vanquished by their Hindu neighbours. Nor is there much force in the third cause of Moslem success on which V. A. Smith has laid stress. Hindu strategy and tactics, says he, were old-fashioned. They placed excessive

reliance on their elephants which, however, proved useless against well-equipped active cavalry of the Muhammadans. At the close of the last part, it was pointed out that the Gurjara cavalry was by no means inferior and that it elicited admiration even from the Muhammadan travellers who came into Northern India. And from the fact that the Cāṣamāna and the Solāṅki kings from time to time repulsed the Moslem attacks most successfully, it must follow that they too had by no means failed to maintain the efficiency of their cavalry. Again, it is not quite clear why Smith makes light of elephants as an instrument of warfare at that period. Even Maḥmūd of Ghazna, whose generalship was of an unquestionable character did not fail to make use of elephants whenever a suitable occasion called for it. Thus when he gave battle to the Tartar chief Ilaq Khān, near Balkh, he is reported to have purposely brought 500 elephants into the field, whose huge bulk and strange appearance produced their full effect on the horses of the enemy and checked the impetuosity of the Tartar charge. The elephants then advanced and pushed into the midst of the enemy, dispersing, overthrowing and trampling under foot whatever was opposed to them. It is said that Maḥmūd's own elephant caught up the standard bearer of Ilaq Khān with his trunk, "Before this disorder could be recovered, the armies closed; and so rapid and courageous was the onset of the Ghaznevites, that the Tartars gave way on all sides and were driven with a prodigious slaughter from the field of battle."

[Just a note of warning here, to prevent any misunderstanding that is likely to arise in this connection. When the various instances of Muhammadan iconoclasm and Muhammadan 'fanaticism' have been pointed out here, it is by no means to be understood even by implication that they were prompted by any teaching of the Quran. What almost invariably happened was that the passion for plunder was already present in the mind of the Muhammadan invader and that he was helped by the theologian so to interpret, that is, misinterpret, the sacred text as not only to justify his wanton spoliation of the non-Moslem populations and destruction of their places of worship but deem such vicious courses as a distinct service to Islam. Intolerance and violence, it is rightly contended, are nowhere preached by the *Shariat*. Similarly, wherever it is contended in this article that the Rājputs

successfully held at bay the Muhammadan invaders for three centuries and a half, it is by no means implied thereby that Hinduism was in any way superior to Muhammadanism. The question discussed above has nothing to do with the evaluation of any religion. And the word 'Muhammadan' is used simply to denote a non-Indian who not only refused to embrace any Hindu faith as his predecessors of the pre-Moslem period did in India but on the contrary carried on virulent and obtrusive proselytising propaganda.]

ON THE DATE OF SAMANTABHADRA

BY

DR. K. B. PATHAK, B. A., Ph. D.

—:०:०:—

It is easy to fix the date of Samantabhadra if we carefully study his Yuktyanuśāsana and his Āptamīmāṃsā. In the former work he attacks the well-known definition of perception given by Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu :—

प्रत्यक्षनिर्देशवदप्यसिद्ध—

मकल्पकं ज्ञापयितुं शक्यम् ।

विना च सिद्धेर्न च लक्षणार्थो

न तावकद्वेषिणि वीर ! सत्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

Yuktyanuśāsana

Translation

A principle, that is not proved, is impossible to be pointed out with certainty as free from imagination. When there is no proof, the definition loses its meaning. O Mahāvīra, truth is not found in thy foe Sugata.

Pātrakesari thus comments on the passage—निश्चयस्वरूपा-
निश्चये ततो कल्पकप्रत्यक्षव्यवस्थानाहुपपत्तेः सर्वथा तस्य ज्ञापयितुमशक्तेः कुतः सिद्धिः
स्यात्? विना च सिद्धेर्न च लक्षणार्थः संभवति “कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्ष” मिति लक्षणस्यार्थः
प्रत्यक्षप्रत्यायनं, न च प्रत्यक्षस्य सिद्धेर्विना तत्प्रत्यायनं कर्तुं शक्यमिति नैव लक्षणार्थः कवि-
त्संगच्छते.

In the Āptamīmāṃsā, verse 80, Samantabhadra says that Dharmakīrti contradicts himself when he says.

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्विशेषोः (प्रमाणविनिश्चय)

And in the same work, verse 106, the Jaina author attacks the ‘त्रिलक्षण द्वेतु’ of the Buddhist writer. Hence it is clear that Samantabhadra comes after Dharmakīrti.

I shall now proceed to prove that Samantabhadra refutes the views of Bhartṛhari. One of the peculiarities of our mediaeval authors is that they quote as nearly as possible the very words of those writers whose opinions they wish to refute. This will be evident from the following examples, Vidyānanda-
pātrakesari says :—

तदुक्तम्

सुगतो यदि सर्वज्ञो कपिलो नेति का प्रमा¹ ।

तावुमौ यदि सर्वज्ञौ मतभेदः कथं द्वयोरिति ॥

1 This is Kumārila's verse refuted in the following two verses.

तदेवं वक्तव्यम्

भावना यदि वाक्यार्थो नियोगो नेति का प्रमा ।
तावुभौ यदि वाक्यार्थौ हतौ भट्टप्रभाकराविति ॥
कार्येयं चोदना ज्ञानं स्वरूपे किन्न तत्प्रमा ।
द्वयोश्चेद्वन्त तौ नष्टौ भट्टेदान्तवादिनाविति ॥

Aṣṭasahasrī Nir. Sāg ed., p, 5.

Sāntaraksita quotes and refutes Kumārila:

सुगतो यदि सर्वज्ञः कपिलो नेति का प्रमा ।
अथोभावपि सर्वज्ञौ मतभेदस्तयोः कथम् ॥ ३१४९ ॥
सुगतस्तेन सर्वज्ञः कपिलो नेति तु प्रमा ।
अनन्तरोदिता व्यक्ताऽप्येषा मूढैर्न लक्षिता ॥ ३३४७ ॥

Tattvasaṁgraha, pp. 822 and 878

सर्वप्रमातृसंबद्धप्रत्यक्षादि निवारणात् ।
केवलागमगम्यत्वं लप्स्यते पुण्यपापयोः ॥ ३१४२ ॥
एतावतैव मीमांसापक्षे सिद्धेऽपि यः पुनः ।
सर्वज्ञवारणे यत्नस्तत्कृतं मृतमारणम् ॥ ३१४३ ॥

This is the statement of Kumārila refuted in the following two verses:—

सर्वप्रमातृसंबद्धप्रत्यक्षाद्यनिवारणात् ।
केवलागमगम्यत्वं नाप्यते पुण्यपापयोः ॥ ३३१५ ॥
एतावता च मीमांसापक्षेऽसिद्धेऽपि यः पुनः ।
सर्वज्ञवारणे यत्नः सोऽति सौख्या(मौख्या?)त्परैः कृतः ॥ ३३१६ ॥

Tattvasaṁgraha, pp. 820, and 864.

यत्नेनानुमितोप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्तैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ १४६२ ॥
यत्नेनानुमितोप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
नान्यथा साध्यते सोऽन्यैरभियुक्तैरपि ॥ १४७७ ॥

Tattvasaṁgraha, pp. 426 and 430

The first verse belongs to Bhartṛhari and is refuted by Sāntaraksita in the second verse.

Let us now turn to the following passage,

“ सर्वप्रमातृसंबन्धि प्रत्यक्षादि निवारणात् ।
केवलागमगम्यं च ” कथं मीमांसकस्य तत् ॥ १८ ॥
कार्येयं चोदनाज्ञानं प्रमाणं यस्य संमतम् ।
तस्य स्वरूपसत्तायां तन्नैवातिप्रसङ्गतः ॥ १९ ॥
तद् ज्ञापकोपलम्भस्याभावोऽभावप्रमाणतः ।
साध्यते चेन्न तस्यापि सर्वत्राप्यप्रवृत्तितः ॥ २० ॥
“ गृहीत्वा वस्तु सद्भावं स्मृत्वा तत्प्रतियोगिनम्
मानसं नास्ति ताज्ञानं येषामक्षानपेक्षया ” ॥ २१ ॥

तेषामशेषनृज्ञाते स्मृते तद् ज्ञापकेक्षणे ।

जायते नास्ति ताज्ञानं मानसं तत्र नान्यथा ॥ २२ ॥

Tattvārthaślokavārtika

Nirnaya S. ed. p. 14.

In this passage Vidyānandapātrakesari quotes Kumārila's definition of अभावप्रमाण from his Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika (Benares edn., p. 482.) and says that this very definition pre-supposes the existence of an omniscient being. He repeats this argument in his Āptaparīkṣā p. 56, Benares edn. thus:—

अभावोपि प्रमाणं ते निषेध्याधारवेदने ।

निषेध्यस्मरणे च स्यान्नास्ति ताज्ञानमञ्जसा ॥ १०५ ॥

Vidyānanda (Tattvārthas'lokavārtika, p. 121) cites from Dharmakīrti's प्रमाणविनिश्चयः—

नान्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्याऽस्ति तस्य नानुभवाऽपरः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात्स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ॥

In refuting the opinion of this Buddhist author, Vidyānanda remarks अत्रोच्यते,

नाग्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवापरः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात्स्वयं सा न प्रकाशते ॥

The Buddhist author criticised above is no other than धर्मे-
कीर्ति himself whose well-known verse, अविभागोपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्ययित-
रहेनैः । ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते has been explained in a previ-
ous paper. The doctrine of शब्दाद्वैत is thus propounded by
Bhartṛhari.

न सोस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमाद्वे ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥

वाग्प्रपता चेदुक्तामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमार्शिनी ॥

In the following passage Vidyānandapātrakesari ~~says~~
that this doctrine is refuted by Akalaṅkadeva.

न सोस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमाद्वे ।

इत्येकान्तं निराकर्तुं तथोक्तं तैरिहेति वा ॥

ज्ञानमाद्यं स्मृतिः संज्ञा चिन्ता चाभिनिबोधिकं ।

प्राप्तामसंसृतं शेषं श्रुतं शब्दानुयोजनाद् ॥

Tattvārthaślokavārtika, p. 230.

Now this very doctrine of Bhartṛhari is severely criticis-
ed by Haribhadrāsūri in his Anekāntajayapatakā (p. 43 a) in
the following passage in which the Śvetāmbara author¹
quotes Samantabhadra, whom he calls वादिमुख्य. एतेन यदुक्तमाह च

शब्दार्थवित्, बाग्रूपता चेदुक्तमेव इत्यादि कारिकाद्वयं तदपि प्रत्युक्तम् । तुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वादिति आह च वादिमुख्यः

बोधात्मा चेच्छब्दस्य न स्यादन्यत्र तच्छ्रुतिः ।
यद् बोद्धारं परित्यज्य न बोधोऽन्यत्र गच्छति ॥
न च स्यात्प्रत्ययो लोके यः श्रोत्रा न प्रतीयते ।
शब्दाभेदेन सत्येवं सर्वः स्यात्पराचितवत् ॥ इत्यादि ।

Translation.

If a word is of the nature of knowledge it will never be heard apart from the knower in whom knowledge resides, since knowledge never goes away from the knower. Nor is there any knowledge in the world which is not understood by a hearer. Thus a word being identical with knowledge, the knower and the hearer, every thing will be like the mind of other people.

It is thus clear that the doctrine of शब्दद्वैत is positively wrong in the opinion of Samantabhadra. We may compare Samantabhadra's words न च स्यात्प्रत्ययो लोके यः श्रोत्रा न प्रतीयते । with Bhartṛhari's words न सोस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमाद्वेत् । Samantabhadra refutes Bhartṛhari's opinion as nearly as possible in the latter's own words.

Lakṣmidhara, the pupil of Samantabhadra, in his *Ekāntakhaṇḍana*,¹ says.

अनेकान्तलक्ष्मीविलासाऽऽवासाः सिद्धसेनार्याः असिद्धिं प्रति (त्य) पादयन् । षड्दर्शन-
रहस्यसंवेदनसंपादितनिस्सीमपाण्डित्यमण्डिताः पूज्यपादस्वामिनस्तु विरोधं साधयति स्म ।
सकलतार्किकचक्रचूडामणिमरोचिमेचकितचरणनखमयूखा भगवन्तः श्रीस्वामिसमन्तभद्राचार्या
असिद्धिविरोधावब्रुवन् । तदुक्तं ।

असिद्धं सिद्धसेनस्य विरुद्धं देवनन्दिनः ।
द्वयं समन्तभद्रस्य सर्वथैकान्तसाधनमिति ॥
नित्याद्येकान्तहेतोर्बुधतातिमहितः सिद्धसेनो ह्यसिद्धं ।
ब्रूते श्रीदेवनन्दी विदितजिनमतः सन् विरोधं व्यनक्ति ।

In the *Ekāntakhaṇḍana*, from the opening part of which the above extracts are taken, Lakṣmidhara quotes Bhartṛcārya's disapproval of the Jaina doctrine that sounds are substances and not qualities.

वर्णीत्मकाश्च ये शब्दाः नित्याः सर्वगतास्तथा ।
पृथक् इव्यतयां ते तु न गुणः कस्यचिन्मताः ॥

इति भंदाचार्याः

Ekāntakhaṇḍana, palm-leaf ms p. 29 (a)

1. A palm-leaf ms belonging to Lakṣmīśaṇa maṭha, Kōlhapur.

Bhaṭṭācārya quoted by Laksmīdhara is Kumārila himself who is frequently referred to by this title,

तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैर्ममांसाश्लोकवार्तिके ।

यस्यानवयवः स्फोटो ।

व्यज्यते वर्णबुद्धिभिः ।

सोऽपि पर्यवृत्त्येव नैकेनापि विमुच्यते ॥ इति ।

तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ।

जगच्च सृजतस्तस्य किं नाम न कृतं भवेत् ॥ इति

Sarvadarśanasamgraha

Ānandāśrama ed, pp. 115 and 98.

In my paper entitled the position of Kumārila in Digambara-Jaina literature ¹ I have proved that the Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra and its first commentary called Aṣṭaśaṭi by Akalankadeva are severely criticised by Kumārila and defended by Akalankadeva's two Junior contemporaries Vidyānandapātrakesari and Prabhācandra. Akalankadeva flourished during the reign of the Rāstrakūṭa king Sāhasatūṅga-dantidurga; and Prabhācandra lived on into the reign of Amoghavarṣa I, as he quotes Guṇabhadra's Ātmānuśāsana. The literary activities of Akalankadeva and his critic Kumārila must be placed in the latter half of the eighth century. And since Samantabhadra refutes the opinions of Dhāramakīrti and Bhārtrhari, and his pupil Lashmīdhara quotes Kumārila, we are forced to assign Samantabhadra to the first half of the eighth century.

From the passages cited above from the Ekāntakhaṇḍana, it is clear that Pūjyapāda lived prior to Samantabhadra. How then can we account for the last sūtra in the Jainendra vyākaraṇa, चतुष्टयं समन्तभद्रस्य V, 4, 168?

Let us compare the last four sūtras of Pūjyapāda with the corresponding sūtras of Pāṇini and Jaina Śākaṭāyana.

Pūjyapāda	Pāṇini	Jaina Śākaṭāyana
{ झयो हः (V, 4, 164)	{ झयो होन्तव्यम् (VIII, 4, 62)	{ जशो हो जश्वा (I, 1, 143)
{ शब्दोऽमि (V, 4, 165)	{ शब्दो णि (VIII, 4, 63) { छत्वममीति वक्तव्यम्	{ शब्दोऽमि (I, 4, 144)

{ हलो यमो यमि खं { (V, 4, 166)	{ हलो यमां यमि लोपः { (VIII, 4, 64)	{ हलो यमि यमो वा { (I, 1, 132)
{ झरो झरि स्वे { (V, 4, 167)	{ झरो झरि सवर्णे { (VIII, 4, 65)	{ जरि जर स्वे वा { (I, 1, 133)
{ चतुष्टयं समन्त— { भद्रस्य (V, 4, 168)		

I have shown that Jaina Śākaṭāyana has copied many sūtras from Jainendra-vyākaraṇa. And yet, instead of citing Samantabhadra as an authority on grammar, Jaina Śākaṭāyana is content to use the word वा in his sūtras. As regards the optional forms to be obtained from the four concluding sūtras of Pūjyapāda, this can be easily done, by reading into each of these sūtras by अनुवृत्ति the word वा occurring in the Jainendra sūtra वा नुक्पदान्तस्य V, 4, 160. It is thus evident that the sūtra mentioning समन्तभद्र is an interpolation. Similar remarks may be made about the names भूतबलि (III, 4, 102), श्रीदत्त (1, 4, 39), प्रमाचन्द्र (IV, 3, 240), and सिद्धसेन (V, 1, 7), since Jaina Śākaṭāyana employs the word वा in his corresponding sūtras (III, 2, 106; I, 3, 154; II, 2, 72; I, 4, 42). Nor are we inclined to attach any value to the names occurring in the following sūtras of Jaina Śākaṭāyana himself,

ततः प्रागार्यवज्रस्य I, 2, 13.

जराया ढसिन्द्रस्याचि I, 2, 37.

शेषाद् सिद्धनन्दिनः II, 1, 229.

as we find that in the corresponding sūtras Pūjyapāda uses वा

प्राग्वास्तः V, 1, 55.

जराया ढस् (वा) V, 1, 175.

शेषाद्वा IV, 2, 194.

The mention of इन्द्र in one of the above sūtras of Jaina Śākaṭāyana has misled some scholars into the belief that Indra was a real grammarian. But this is contradicted by Pūjyapāda V, 1, 175, and Hemacandra (II, 1, 3). Besides the sūtra in question is entirely based on Pāṇini VII, 2. 101 जराया ढस् अन्यतर-स्याम्. Thus the difficulty caused by the interpolated names being removed, Samantabhadra may be assigned to the eighth century.

ŚĀNTARAKṢITA'S REFERENCE TO KUMĀRILA'S
ATTACKS ON SAMANTABHADRA AND
AKALĀṆKADEVA

BY

DR. K. B. PATHAK, B. A., Ph. D.

An excellent edition of an interesting Buddhist work called *Tattvasaṃgraha* by Śāntarakṣita with a commentary by Kamalaśīla has lately been published in the Gaekwad's Oriental series. This work should be read along with the writings of the famous Jaina authors Samantabhadra, Akalaṅkadeva, Māṇikyanandi, Pātrakesari and Prabhācandra. As regards the age of this Buddhist writer Śāntarakṣita it is enough to state that he quotes Pātrakesari and is himself quoted by the latter's Junior contemporary Prabhācandra. What is still more important is that Śāntarakṣita knows the fact that Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva, a contemporary of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Śāhasatunga Dantidurga (Śaka 675, A. D. 753) are attacked by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila.

Before beginning to deal with the subject of my paper, it is necessary to give my opinion about the merits of this edition. The editor Embar Krishnamacharya Shastri deserves to be highly praised for his great industry and accuracy. His method of filling up the lacunae in the author's verses is excellent. His emendations are enclosed in brackets; where no emendations can be proposed the lacunae are allowed to remain as in the original ms. The student of Digambara Jaina literature will be struck with the सर्वज्ञवाद in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* which resembles the सर्वज्ञवाद in the *Aṣṭasahasrī* and the *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*. Kumārila, who figures prominently in these three works, says,

एवं शास्त्रविचारेषु दृश्यतेऽतिशयो महान् ।

न तु शास्त्रान्तरज्ञानं त(स्मा)न्मात्रेणैव लभ्यते ॥ ३१६४ ॥

Tattvasaṃgraha vol. II p 826.

ज्योतिर्विच्च प्रकृष्टोऽपि चन्द्रार्कग्रहणादिकम् (वित्?)

न भवत्यादिशब्दानां साधुत्वं ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥ ३१६६ ॥

Let us read the correct text of these verses in the Jaina¹ works :—

1 { *Aṣṭasahasrī*, Nirṇayasa. ed., p. 47.
 Aptaparīkṣā, Benares, ed. p. 54.
 Prameyakamalamārtanda, Nirṇayasa. ed, p. 69 (b)

एकशास्त्रविचारेषु दृश्यतेतिशयो महान् ।
 न तु शास्त्रान्तरज्ञानं तन्मात्रेणैव लभ्यते ॥
 ज्यातिर्पिच प्रकृष्टेपि चन्द्रार्कग्रहणादिषु ।
 न भवत्यादिशब्दानां साधुत्वं ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥

The Shastri reads :—

तस्मात्सर्वेषु यद्रूपं प्रत्येकं परिनिष्ठितम् ।
 गोबुद्धिस्तन्निमित्ता स्या... ..स्ति तत् ॥ ९१८ ॥
 सामान्यं (वस्तुरूपं हि बुद्ध्या)कारो भविष्यति ।
 शब्दार्थ.....प्रकल्पितः ॥ ९२१ ॥

But we know that the above verses are found in the *Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārtika* ¹ thus

तस्मात्सर्वेषु यद्रूपं प्रत्येकं परिनिष्ठितम् ।
 गोबुद्धिस्तन्निमित्ता स्याद्गोत्वादन्यच्च नास्ति तत् ॥ १० ॥
 सामान्यं वस्तुरूपं हि बुद्ध्याकारो भविष्यति ।
 शब्दार्थोऽर्थानपेक्षो हि वृथाऽप्राहः प्रकल्पितः ॥ ३८ ॥

I give these two verses only in this paper, as Kumārila's verses in the सर्वज्ञवाद in the *Astasahasrī*, the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* will form the subject of a separate paper. I shall now give two verses more from the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. ²

आचार्यैरपि निर्दिष्टमाद्वैतसंक्षेपलक्षणम् ।
 “ग्राह्यधर्मस्तदशेन व्याप्तो हेतुरि”तीदृशम् ॥ १३८५ ॥

This is a well-known definition of हेतु given by Dignāga, as we learn from Udyotakara ³ and Vācaspatimīśra.

As regards the second verse

अर्थापत्तेश्च शाबर्या भैक्षवाश्चानुमानतः ।
 अन्यदेवानुमानं नो नरसिंहवदिष्यते ॥

I must first point out that भैक्षवाश्चानुमानतः is obviously a mis'ake for भैक्षवाच्चाडमानतः the two expressions शाबरी अर्थापत्ति and भैक्षव अनुमान are in the ablative case and joined by the particle च. The ablative is required by the following word अन्यत् according to Pāṇini अन्यात् II, 3, 29. Now भैक्षव अनुमान is the अनुमान of भिक्षु; who is this भिक्षु? Pārthasārathi commenting upon Kumārila's verse 94 अनुमान परिच्छेद, ⁴ says.

1 *Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārtika*, Benares ed. pp. 568, 576.

2 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, vol. I p. 409.

3 } *Nyāyavārtika*, Calcutta ed. p. 134.

3 } *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā*, Benares ed. p. 199.

4 *Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārtika*, Benares ed. p. 377.

यत्तु मिथुणा “ पक्षधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुरिति एकस्यैव हेतुत्वविवक्षयाऽनेकयो-
र्विरुद्धाऽव्यभिचारिणोराभासत्वं दर्शितं, तन्निराकरोति कचिदिति । The words पक्षधर्म-
स्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुः is part of the verse ascribed to Dharmakīrti by
Ānandajñāna who says

यथाऽऽह कीर्तिः—

पक्षधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुस्त्रिवैव सः ।
अविनाभावनियमाद्धेतुभासस्ततोऽपरः ॥

भैक्षव अनुमान therefore refers to the three kinds of हेतु which
are described in the Nyāyabindu.¹

The Shastri doubts whether the quotation नामजात्यादि
belongs to Dignāga who is called लक्षणकार. But this doubt
will be removed by Akalankadeva who says

तथा चोक्तं ।

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं नामजात्यादियोजना ।
असाधारणहेतुत्वादक्षैस्तद्व्यपदिश्यते ॥

Tattvārtharājavārtika, p. 38.

The Shastri reads जातिः पदार्थ इति वाजा (का ?) त्यायनः, द्रव्यमिति व्याडिः
उभयं पाणिनिः । Here the correct form is वाजप्यायनः according to
Vārtika 35 on Pāṇini 1, 2, 64. Kielhorn's ed. Mahābhāṣya
vol. I, p. 242.

On p. 817, Tattvasaṃgraha Vol. II the Shastri has
व्याकरणेऽभिर्देगित्यादिना लक्षणेन प्रत्ययागमादिकार्यं विधयिमानमर्थे न संभवतीति सामर्थ्या-
दर्थवान्निनि शब्देऽवगम्यत इति वैयाकरणैर्वर्ण्यते. The student of Pāṇini-
Mahābhāṣya will at once be reminded of the following passage.
इह व्याकरणेऽर्थे कार्यस्यासंभवः । अभिर्देक् (पाणिनि 4. 2. 33) इति न शक्यतेऽङ्गारेभ्यः
परो ढकर्तुम् । शब्देनार्थगतैरर्थस्यासंभवात् ।

Kielhorn's ed. Mahābhāṣya.

Vol. I, pp. 175, 176.

अभिर्देक् is thus a mistake for अभिर्देक्. On p. 768, Tattva-
saṃgraha Vol. II. we read यथोक्तमप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिध्यति ।
This is a quotation attributed to Dharmakīrti in Sarvadarśana-
saṃgraha (chap. on Buddhism). It also occurs on p. 578 of
Tattvasaṃgraha Vol. II. This should have been pointed out in
the Appendix.

On p. 72 Tattvasaṃgraha Vol. I. Kamalaśīla quotes 2
verses of Suresvara from Brhadāraṇyakavārtika.

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः ।

संकीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरुपलक्षयेत् ॥

1 Peterson's ed. p. 104.

तथेदममलं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया ।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥

Anandāśrama ed.
बृहदारण्यकवार्तिक III.
p. 1246.

Sureśvara's critic is Pātrakesari.. His well-known verse

अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ।
नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ॥ १७८ ॥

is found in his *Tattvārthaślokaavārtikālaṃkāra* p. 203. This is quoted by Śāntaraksita (*Tattvasaṃgraha* Vol. I, p. 406). Both the text and the commentary of *Tattvārthaślokaavārtika* were composed by Pātrakesariśvāmi himself, as the commentary is cited in the *Aṣṭasahasrī* p. 92 thus तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवार्तिकाङ्कारे व्यासतः समर्थितं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । we are told in the commentary that this verse was composed by the Vārtikakāra Pātrakesari himself. This finally settles the date of Śāntaraksita.

A most interesting feature of the edition is the Appendix containing quotations found in the text and the commentary with an attempt to identify them. Most of the quotations found in this Buddhist work are also met with in the Jaina authors mentioned above. Some of the verses which are attributed to Kumārila by Kamalaśīla but are not found in the Benares edition of Kumārila's works, are not indicated in a separate index. Some verses quoted in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, though not found in the Benares edition, are nevertheless pointed out in a separate index. The author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is referred to as Vidyāranya or simply Mādhavācārya. This is a mistake as is evident from the following introductory verses in that work.

श्रीमत्सायणदुग्धादिभिरुतुभेन महौजसा ।
क्रियते माधवायेण सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः ॥ ३ ॥
पूर्वेषामतिदुस्तराणि सुतरामालोच्य शास्त्राण्यसौ
श्रीमत्सायणमाधवः प्रभुरुपन्यास्यत्सतां प्रीतये ।
दूरेत्सारितमत्सेरेण मनसा श्रद्धाः तु तत्संजना
मार्थं कस्य विचित्रपुष्परचितं प्रीत्यै न संजायते ॥ ४ ॥

In the first verse quoted above Mādhavārya is compared to the कौस्तुभरत्न sprung from the milk-ocean which was सायण; that is to say, just as the jewel was the off-spring of the ocean, so was Mādhavārya born from Sāyana; the author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* was thus the son of Sāyana and the nephew of Vidyāranya. This is confirmed by the expression

सायण माधव used in the second verse which means सायण पुत्र माधव where the word पुत्र is omitted. The first chapter of this work ends :—

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे चार्वाकदर्शनम् where we are to understand that this work was composed by Mādhava son of Sāyana.

In the Mādhaviya Dhātuvṛtti we are told

अस्ति श्रीसंगमक्षत्रपः पृथ्वीवल्लभुरन्दरः ।

यत्क्रीर्तिमोक्तिकादर्शे प्रिलङ्कया प्रतिविम्ब्यते ॥

तस्य मन्त्रिशिखारत्नमस्ति मायणसायणः

Here the expression मायणसायण means सायणपुत्रसायण as we learn further on,

तेन मायणपुत्रेन सायणेन मनीषिणा ।

आख्यया माधवीयेयं धातुवृत्तिर्विरच्यते ॥

This subject has been fully dealt with by Raya Bahadur R. Narasimhachar in the Indian Antiquary (1916) pp. 12-17. The practice of prefixing the father's name to a person's name once prevailed in Western India. I have proved in my paper in the Epigraphia Indica vol. X p. 15., that Niravadya-Śrīmad-Anivārīta-Puṇyavallabha means Niravadya-putra-Śrīmad-Anivārīta-Puṇyavallabha or the illustrious Anivārīta-Puṇyavallabha, the son of Niravadya. Similarly Śrīmad-Anivārīta-Dhanamjaya-Puṇyavallabha means Śrīmad-Anivārīta-putra-Dhanamjaya-Puṇyavallabha or Dhanamjaya-Puṇyavallabha son of the illustrious Anivārīta. Here Puṇyavallabha is the family name. These facts lead to the conclusion that the author of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha was a different person from his more celebrated uncle Vidyāranya-Mādhavācārya and should be spoken of as Sāyana-Mādhava to distinguish him from the latter. It is needless to state that the composition of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha must be placed one generation later than that of the Mādhaviya Dhātuvṛtti.

It may be remarked that the present practice of prefixing one's name to the father's name, which is in vogue in Western India, dates only from the Mahomedan conquest of the Deccan.

Let us now turn to the subject of the present paper.

In the first passage quoted below Kumārila discusses the argument advanced in support of the claim of Arhan and Sugata to be considered omniscient. In the second, Śāntarakṣita replies to these arguments and maintains that Sugata

alone is omniscient. The third passage is most important and interesting. It is quoted both by the Jaina author *Pātrakesari* in the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, and by the Buddhist writer *Śāntarakṣita* in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. The latter's commentator *Kamalaśīla* assures us that this passage of *Kumārila* is directly aimed at the Jainas, while *Pātrakesari* says that here his senior contemporary *Akalanka* and his predecessor *Samantabhadra* are assailed by *Kumārila*.

First passage

गणिताद्येकदेशे तु सर्वेषां सत्यवादिता ।
जिनबुद्धादिसत्त्वानां विशेषो नावधार्यते ॥ ३१५० ॥
येनैव हेतुनैकस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसाध्यते ।
स्वपक्षप्रीतिमात्रेण सोऽन्यस्याप्युपतिष्ठते ॥ ३१५१ ॥
दूषणानि संसरम्भाः सर्वज्ञजिनसाधने ।
शाक्या यान्येव जल्पान्ति जैनास्तान्येव युञ्जते ॥ ३१५२ ॥
तत्रानवास्थितैस्तेषां भिन्नैः साधनदूषणैः ।
प्रतिबिम्बोदयग्रस्तौर्निर्णयः क्रियते कथम् ॥ ३१५३ ॥

Tattvasaṃgraha Vol. II p. 822.

In these verses *Kumārila* says that there is little to choose between the arguments advanced by the Bauddhas and the Jainas against each other. For this reason it is hard to decide which side has the advantage. *Śāntarakṣita* replies that the Buddhist view alone is correct.

Second passage

यथोदितान्तरादेव विशेषोऽप्यवधार्यते ।
ऋषभादिभूतार्थेभ्यः स्मरभङ्गविधायिनः ॥ ३३४८ ॥
कोहि निःशेषशाल्वार्थतत्त्वज्ञं मन्यते जडः ।
समानभोजनज्ञानान्मातृकामात्रवेदनात् ॥ ३३४९ ॥
तद्येन हेतुनैकस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसाध्यते ।
तद्धेतुवस्तुतोऽसत्त्वान्न सोऽन्यस्योपतिष्ठते ॥ ३३५० ॥
तदूषणान्यसंरम्भाः सर्वज्ञजिनशासने
शाक्या यानि वदन्येवं तान्यशक्ता दिगम्बराः ॥ ३३५१ ॥

Tattvasaṃgraha, vol. II, p. 879.

Śāntarakṣita says that he knows the arguments of the Digambara Jaina authors [*Samantabhadra* and *Akalankadeva*] alluded to by *Kumārila* in the third passage given below. The first five verses are also quoted and refuted by *Pātrakesari*,

Kamalaśīla introduces this passage thus :—

येऽपि मन्यन्ते—नास्माभिः शृङ्गग्राहिकया सर्वज्ञः प्रसाध्यते. किंतीहि? सामान्येन संभवमात्रं प्रसाध्यते—अस्ति कोऽपि सर्वज्ञः, क्वचिद्वा सर्वज्ञत्वमस्ति, प्रज्ञादीनां प्रकर्षदर्शनादिति, तान्त्रतीदमाह—नर इत्यादि ।

The third passage.

नरः कोऽप्यस्ति सर्वज्ञस्तत्सर्वज्ञत्वमित्यपि ।
 साधनं यत्प्रयुज्येत प्रतिज्ञान्यूनमेव तत् ॥ ३२३० ॥
 सिसाधयिषितो योऽर्थः सोऽनया नाभिधीयते ।
 यस्तूच्यते न तात्सिद्धौ किञ्चिदस्ति प्रयोजनम् ॥ ३२३१ ॥
 यदीयागमसत्यत्वसिद्धयै^१ सर्वज्ञतोच्यते ।
 न सा सर्वज्ञसामान्यसिद्धिमात्रेण लभ्यते ॥ ३२३२ ॥
 यावद्बुद्धो न सर्वज्ञस्तावत्तद्वचनं मृषा ।
 यत्र कचन सर्वज्ञे सिद्धे तत्सत्यता कुतः ॥ ३२३३ ॥
 अन्यस्मिन्न हि सर्वज्ञे वचसोऽन्यस्य सत्यता ।
 सामानाधिकरण्ये हि तयोरङ्गाङ्गिता भवेत् ॥ ३२३४ ॥

Tattvasaṃgraha vol. II, p. 841.

The word साधन in the first verse of Kumārila means, according to Laghusamantabhadra, ⁴ सुनिश्चितासंभवद्वाधकप्रमाणत्वादिति. This is the reason given by Akalankadeva who says,

“तदेवं तत् सुनिश्चितासंभवद्वाधकप्रमाणत्वमर्हत्येव सकलज्ञत्वं साधयति नान्यत्रेत्यविरोध इत्यादिना स्पष्टयति” स्वामीति शेषः Svāmi=Samantabhadra.

Astasahasrī, p. 72.

The next three verses of Kumārila quoted by Śāntaraksita are thus introduced by Kamalaśīla यदप्यम(प!)रेः^५ सर्वज्ञसिद्धये साधनमुपरचितं तदप्येतेनैव प्रतिव्यूढमिति दर्शयितुमाह यत्सर्वमित्यादि ।

यत्सर्वं नाम लोकेऽस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षं तद्धि कस्यचिद् ।
 प्रमेयज्ञेयवस्तुत्वैर्दधिरूपरसादिवत् ॥ ३२३५ ॥
 ज्ञानमात्रेऽपि निर्दिष्टे पक्षन्यूनत्वमापतेत् ।
 सर्वज्ञ इति योऽभीष्टो नेत्यं स प्रतिपादितः ॥ ३२३६ ॥
 यदि बुद्धातिरिक्तोऽन्यः कश्चित्सर्वज्ञतां गतः ।
 बुद्धवाक्यप्रमाणत्वे तज्ज्ञानं कोपयुज्यते ॥ ३२३७ ॥

Kamalaśīla explains :—

यत्प्रमेयत्ववस्तुत्वादियोगि तत्कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षं, यथा दधिरूपरसादिकं, सर्वं च पदार्थजातं प्रमेयत्वादि स्वभावमिति स्वभावहेतुः ।

The first of the three verses of Kumārila contains a direct attack on Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva.

1 *Aṣṭasahasrī*, Nirṇaya sūg. ed, p. 75. reads स तु सर्वज्ञ इत्यपि । for the translation of this passage, see my previous paper, “Position of Kumārila in Digambara Jaina literature.

2 *Aṣṭasahasrī*, प्रतिज्ञामात्रमेव.

3 *Aṣṭasahasrī*, सिद्धौ

4 *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 75, foot-note 20. See also other foot-notes given by Laghusamantabhadra here.

5 अपरेः refers to Samantabhadra, Akalankadeva and Patrakesari as will be shown further on.

Samantabhadra says.

तीर्थकृतसमयानां च परस्परविरोधतः ।

सर्वेषामाप्ताः । अस्ति कश्चिदेव भवेद्गुरुः ॥ ३ ॥

सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्याचिद्यथा ।

अनुमेयत्वतोऽग्न्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञसंस्थितिः ॥ ५ ॥

Āptamīmāṃsā.

Pātrakesari says, this is the view of Kumārila स्यान्मतं, बाधित-विषयोऽयं हेतुरनुमानेन पक्षस्य बाधनात् । तथा हि । न कश्चित् सूक्ष्माद्यर्थसाक्षात्कारी, प्रमेयत्वात्सत्त्वाद्भुत्वाद्भ्रमद दिशत् । न चेद् सावनमसिद्धं व्यभिचारि वा प्रत्यक्षाद्यविसंबादिस्वात् तदुक्तं

“प्रत्यक्षाद्यविसंबादि प्रमेयत्वादि यस्य तु ।

सद्भाववारणे शक्तं को नु तं कल्पयिष्यति ” इति ।¹

तदप्यसम्यक्, तत एव कस्यचित्सूक्ष्माद्यर्थसाक्षात्कारित्वसिद्धेः । सूक्ष्माद्यर्थः कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाः प्रमेयत्वत्सत्त्वाद्भुत्वाद्भा स्पष्टिकादिवत् । अनुमेयनात्यन्तपरोक्षेण चार्थेन व्यभिचार इति चेन्न, तस्य पक्षीकरणत्वात् । “तदेवं प्रमेयत्वसत्त्वादित्यत्र हेतुलक्षणं पुष्पाति तं कथं चेतनः प्रतिषेद्धमर्हति संशयितुं वा ” सूक्ष्माद्यर्थसाक्षात्कारिणस्तस्यैव सुनिश्चितासंभव-द्वाधकत्वादस्ति त्वसिद्धेरबाधितविषयत्वस्यापि परोपगतहेतुलक्षणस्य प्रकृतहेतुः पोषणात् ।

Aṣṭasahasrī, p. 58.

In one of the two verses of Samantabhadra quoted above the reason given to prove the existence of सर्वज्ञ is अनुमेयत्वतः । This word is explained by the commentator Vasunandī² thus :—

अनुमेयाः अनुमानगम्याः । अथवा अनुगतं मेयं मानं येषां ते अनुमेयाः प्रमेया इत्यर्थः । तेषां भावस्तस्मादनुमेयत्वतः ।..... ये ये प्रमेयास्ते ते प्रत्यक्षाः । यथा अग्न्यादयः । प्रमेयाश्च स्वभावकालदेहाविप्रकृष्टा अर्थाः कस्यचित्पुरुषविशेषस्य तस्मात्तेऽपि प्रत्यक्षाः । It is thus evident that the words अनुमेय and प्रमेय are synonymous. Akalaṅkādeva uses the word प्रमेयत्व in the above extract. And Kumārila copies this word and says :—

प्रत्यक्षाद्यविसंबादि प्रमेयत्वादि यस्य च ।

सद्भाववारणे शक्तं को नु तं कल्पयिष्यति ॥ १३२ ॥

Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika Benares ed. p. 85.

The Commentator Pārthasārathimīśra is older than Mādhavācārya who mentions him in his Jaiminiya-nyāyamālāvistara. Pārthasārathi explains the above verse thus —

अतितुच्छश्चायं सर्वज्ञवादो यस्य सर्वं साधारणैरपि प्रमेयत्वादिभिः प्रमाणान्तराद्विरोधेनैव निराकरणं संभवतीत्याह प्रत्यक्षादीति ।

1 *Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika*, verse, 132, Benares ed., p. 82.

2 *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Benares ed. p. 4.

This explanation is most absurd. Pātrakesari first makes explanatory remarks and then by way of confirmation introduces this verse. He says "Kumāṛila's¹ view may be thus stated:—

Here the subject of the reason is contradicted, since the minor term (पक्ष) is contradicted by the inference. This can be shown thus :—There is no body who can perceive things that are minute past and distant because they are demonstrable just as we are unable to perceive such things. Nor can it be urged that the reason (प्रमेयत्वादि) is here unproven or fallacious, since it is in agreement with perception. Therefore it is said by Kumāṛila :—

Who will believe in an omniscient being whose existence can be disproved by the reason (प्रमेयत्वादि) which agrees with perception ?

Pātrakasari replies :—

This is also wrong because from that very reason (प्रमेयत्वादि) we can prove the existence of some being able to perceive things which are minute &c. Things minute &c. can be perceived by some body by reason of प्रमेयत्व, सत्त्व, वस्तुत्व, just as स्फटिक &c. If it is objected that our view is fallacious on account of extremely invisible things, this objection is easily met by making them the subject of the minor premiss. It is said by Akalaṅka "Therefore in this way how can any person endowed with sense deny or doubt the existence of an omniscient being whose position is strengthened by such reasons प्रमेयत्व, सत्त्व, &c. ". The existence of an omniscient being who can perceive things minute &c. being proved by the removal of all possible objections, the reason under consideration [advanced by Akalaṅka] lends corroboration to the reason (प्रमेयत्वादि) admitted by Kumāṛila (परोपगत) though the latter reason remains incontrovertible".

The word प्रमेयत्व is most interesting and important. Pṛabhācandra who defends Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva against the attacks of Kumāṛila makes the illustrious Mīmāṃsaka state his पूर्वपक्ष thus :— यदप्युच्यते

सूक्ष्मान्तरितद्वयार्थः कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाः प्रमेयत्वात्पावकादिबन् तदप्युक्तिमात्रे ।

From this discussion there emerges the interesting fact that Samantabhadra who lived in the first half of the 8th century and his first commentator Akalaṅkadeva who was

1 This is a translation of the whole passage quoted from the *Aṣṭasahasī*, p. 56

contemporary with Sāhasatunga-dantitdurga (Śaka 675) were attacked by Kumārila and defended by Pātrakesari; and this fact was known to Śāntaraksita and Kamalasila. This subject is also fully discussed in my paper entitled the position of Kumārila in Digambara Jaina literature published in the transactions of the Ninth Oriental Congress (1892).

In my second paper I have proved that Dharmakīrti, the predecessor of Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva, is attacked by Pātrakesari and defended by Śāntaraksita. In my third paper I have shown that Śāntaraksita is frequently quoted by Brāhmacandra: while in my fourth paper I have critically examined the text of Kumārila's verses which are cited by Pātrakesari. Śāntaraksita and Prabhācandra but which are not found in the Benares edition of the Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārtika and the Tantravārtika. These papers will be shortly published.

EPIC STUDIES
BY
V. S. SUKTHANKAR



II. FURTHER TEXT-CRITICAL NOTES.

The organizers of the new Indian project of preparing a critical edition of the Mahābhārata are deeply indebted to both Geheimrat Lüders and Professor Winternitz not merely for their taking personally a keen interest in the scheme, but for their bringing the project formally to the notice of the savants assembled at the historic XVIIth International Congress of Orientalists held at Oxford in August 1928, and moving resolutions conveying messages of appreciation and congratulation.¹ A singularly happy feature of this event was that this gesture of cordial sympathy and willing co-operation should have proceeded spontaneously from just those two veteran scholars who not merely enjoy the greatest amount of respect and confidence in the world of Indologists but whose names are most intimately connected with the earlier scheme of the International Association of Academies of publishing a critical edition of our Great Epic. It is a matter of high gratification to the members of the Mahābhārata Editorial Board that their modest efforts in the cause of Mahābhārata studies are being so keenly appreciated by their fellow workers in Europe, just as it is a matter of relief to the responsible editors that the general method and principles underlying the preparation of this edition have won the warm approval of the two eminent European critics² who have themselves made the closest study of the central textual problem and enriched the literature on the subject by the contribution of several valuable papers and monographs.

At the said session of the Congress of Orientalists, Winternitz read a paper entitled "The Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata", dealing with the history of the project from its early beginnings. Much of what Winternitz says in this

1. The text of the resolutions moved by Geheimrat Lüders and adopted unanimously by the Indian Section of the Congress has been published by Winternitz in *Indologica Pragensia*, 1. 63.

2. Cf. Winternitz, *ABL*. 5. 24, 30, and *Ind. Prag.* 1. 62, 67; Lüders, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1929 (Heft 24), Sp. 1137-1146.

memorable address of his bears the unmistakable stamp of being personal reminiscences, because he was the first scholar who more than thirty years ago, at the XIth International Congress of Orientalists held in Paris (1897), emphasized the superlative importance of a critical edition of the Mahābhārata and proposed measures for its preparation.¹

After nearly thirty years of restless endeavour, he is again one of the small group of the first collaborators of the great and ambitious project. During 1922-3 he used his opportunities as a Guest Professor at the University of the poet philosopher Rabindranath Tagore to train some of his advanced pupils at the Viśvabhārati to do collation work, thus helping to establish there a centre for the collation of Bangālī MSS. of the Mahābhārata,² a centre which is still doing excellent work under the supervision of the Principal, Pandit Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. Finally, Winternitz has taken over some of the editorial burden on his own shoulders by kindly agreeing to edit for the Institute one Parvan, the Sabhāparvan. This is indeed a very happy augury for the continued success of our cherished project.

To the text of his Congress address, which he has published in the first issue of his Journal, *Indologica Pragensia*, Vol. 1 (1929), pp. 58-63, Winternitz has appended (pp. 64-68) some critical remarks on my edition of the Ādiparvan. While expressing his whole-hearted agreement with the general principles underlying my reconstruction of the text, he has given a long list of passages in which he differs from me with respect to the readings of the constituted text. With unerring judgement he has picked out those passages in the first two adhyāyas that had given me most trouble, and he has criticized the readings of the constituted text, weighing the pros and cons with great acumen, and pointing out the errors and imperfections with much delicacy and courtesy. While tendering him my cordial thanks for the honour he has done me by making so close and penetrating a study of my critical work, I shall endeavour here briefly to answer his queries and criticism. I write these notes not so much to justify my selection and establish the readings of the critical edition as

1. Cf. also *ABR.* 4. 145 ff.

2. Annual Report of the B. O. R. I. for 1922-23, p. 11 f.

to set forth the reasons that have guided me in the choice of the readings in question and that may not have occurred to my critic—remarks which will not fail to throw some fitful light on the obscure and complicated processes which go to make up Mahābhārata textual criticism.

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MINOR QUESTIONS.

1. 1. 30: Winternitz observes that “in the notes the interesting remark of Arjunamīśra is given: *parameṣṭhy atha iti prāyaśaḥ pāṭhaḥ*, but the actual reading of the Da MSS. is not given”. The reading of the Da MSS. not being *specifically* mentioned, it must, in conformity with a tacitly assumed Paribhāṣā, be taken to be the same as the text reading, namely, *parameṣṭhy atha*. In that sense the reading of the Da MSS. (i.e. of Arjunamīśra) has been given, and my note is both complete and correct, because both the Da MSS. collated for the passage do, in point of fact, read *parameṣṭhy atha*¹ Nevertheless, as I discovered on referring to the commentary once more, the note does not represent the facts fully and correctly, because the MSS. which are corrupt, being contaminated from the vulgate, had succeeded, for the time being, in completely misleading me.

That the true Arjunamīśra reading must, against the testimony of MSS., be assumed to be *parameśvaraḥ* (agreeing then with B2 D6-8 Cd) follows, with certainty, from the commentary itself, a fact I had overlooked when I wrote the note. The commentary runs thus:

मनुः प्रसिद्धः । कः वसिष्ठः । तस्य विशेषणं परमेश्वरः प्रजापतित्वात् । परमेष्ठयथ इति प्रायशः पाठः । परमेष्ठी कश्यपः ।

In the Foreword to Fascicule 1 (p. v), I have already drawn attention to the fact that “the (epic) text in the Arjunamīśra codices is frequently contaminated from the “vulgate” and has to be corrected with the help of Arjunamīśra’s commentary.” The examples cited there are 1. 1. 17b and 22b. In the former case, the Da MSS. read *puṇyān* (like the vulgate, with which the constituted text here agrees); the true Arjunamīśra

1. A reference to Prof. Lüders’ *Druckprobe* (p. 6) will show that the (Devanāgarī) MSS. of Arjunamīśra’s commentary collated by him for his Specimen edition read likewise *parameṣṭhy atha*; only in one instance has the reading been corrected (by a later hand) to *parameśvaraḥ*. Accordingly Prof. Lüders has also taken *parameṣṭhy atha* as the reading of the version of Arjunamīśra.

reading is, however, *punya-*, as follows clearly from Arjunamiśra's own observation :

पुण्यग्रन्थार्थसंयुताम् । पुण्यौ ग्रन्थार्थौ श्रुतमात्रस्य ज्ञातमात्रस्य च पुण्यहेतुत्वात् ।
ग्रन्थो ग्रन्थमानः शब्दसमूहः । अर्थो वाच्यादिरेव ।

In the latter case (1. 1. 22 b), likewise, the Da MSS. read *śivam*, agreeing with many K and D MSS.; but the commentary shows (as I have pointed out in the notes) that the true Arjunamiśra reading is *śucim*, agreeing with the constituted text, *śivam* being only a variant mentioned by the scholiast:

अनघं निष्पापमनवद्यं वा । अनुपाधि विश्वोपकारकत्वात् । अत एव शुचिम् । शिवमिति पाठे शिवं कल्याणं महेश्वरं वा ।

I must here add, therefore, a word of caution. In the critical notes published with the text, the readings as actually found in the (epic) text (in contradistinction to the commentary) of the Arjunamiśra codices have, as a rule, been taken to represent the readings of Arjunamiśra; the commentary was consulted by me only occasionally, in case of doubt or difficulty, or when a *pāṭhāntara* was noticed. It is, therefore, more than likely that, owing to the fact that our Da MSS. are conflated by contamination with various types of MSS., in particular with the Nilakanṭha type, a few errors of the kind pointed out by Winternitz may have inadvertently crept in. Such errors can be rectified only by working through the whole commentary, word for word, and comparing the lemmata with the (epic) text of the MSS.; even then one can of course be sure only of the words and passages actually cited and explained by the scholiast.

The version of Arjunamiśra, as I pointed out in the Foreword to Fascicule 1 (p. v), is closely allied to the Bangālī version. The reason for this affinity (as I have stated elsewhere) appears to be that Arjunamiśra was a native of Bengal.¹ Following the example of my predecessors, I have utilized, for the critical edition of the Ādiparvan, Devanāgarī MSS. of Arjunamiśra's commentary. The two MSS. I am using are extremely corrupt. In fact, all the MSS. of Arjunamiśra's commentary I have seen—and they are all Devanāgarī MSS.—have been remarkably corrupt. Not only that, the text they offer is, as already remarked, obviously contaminated from the

1. See my note on Arjunamiśra in the *Dr. Modi Memorial Volume*, pp. 565 ff.

vulgate. This corruption of the Devanāgarī MSS. I could not account for at first; but it must be due, I cannot but think now, to their being copies of Bangālī or Maithilī originals. It would, therefore, be expedient to procure and use, whenever possible, Bangālī¹ or Maithilī MSS. of Arjunamīśra's commentary, treating his version as an offshoot of the Bangālī (respectively Maithilī) version.²

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1. 1. 62 : Winternitz points out that the lengthy interpolation App. I, No. 1 = (B.) 1. 1. 55^{cd} - 93 is inserted in the R. A. S. Whish MS. No. 65 after 62^{ab}, and not after 62, as in most of the Southern MSS. used by me. But two of my MSS. (T1 G7) also insert the passage in question after 62^{ab}, like the Whish MS.; only between 62^{ab} and the Appendix passage, my MSS. further interpolate 29*, 64 and 30*, as stated in the very note cited by Winternitz. The point of insertion of this interpolation varied in the different MSS. Thus of the MSS. collated by Prof. Lüders for his *Druckprobe*, two (G2 [read G3] T2) read it after 62^{ab}, while two others (G2 T1) read it after 62; moreover, in T2 (of the *Druckprobe*) the inserted passage is preceded by 29*, 64 and 65 (somewhat like our T1 G7).³

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1. 1. 131 : The printer's devil, I regret to say, is responsible for the erroneous spelling *Samsaptaka*- (with dental s) in this stanza; the correct spelling *Samsāptaka*- (with palatal ś) is given at 1. 2. 56 and 160. Moreover, the various readings have been given only at 1. 2. 56, and, through some unfortunate oversight, omitted at 1. 1. 131 and 1. 2. 160. I make good the omission here. At 1. 1. 131 the various readings are as follows: K0. 2-4. 6 B4 Da Dn1. n3 Dr1. r3. r4 D1-4. 6. 7. 10. 14 T1 *Samsapta*°; K1 B1-3 Dn2 Dr2 D5. 8. 9. 11. 12 T2 G (G1. 2 om.) M *Samsāpta*°; V1 *Samsāpta*°; K5 D13 missing. At 1. 2. 160 they are: K0. 2-4. 6 V1 Da2 Dn Dr1. r4 D2-4. 7. 10-

1. The Asiatic Society of Bengal does contain some Bangālī MSS. (Descriptive Catalogue, vol. 5, Nos. 3371-3374, 3422), but it is very difficult to move the Society to send out its MSS. on loan.

2. That would also account for the frequent divergence of Da from the D class.

3. The passage is found inserted not only after 62^{ab} and 62, but also after 26, 53^{ab}, 59 ^{ab} (according to the *Druckprobe*), and 60.

14 T1 G7 *Samsapta*°; K1 B Da1 Dr2. r3 D1. 5. 6. 8. 9 T2 G1.
3-6 *Samsapta*°; G2 *Samsapta*°; K5 missing; M om.

From the readings of the three passages in question, it should seem that, anomalies apart, K1 (or the India Office Codex), Bangālī and Southern MSS. read it correctly (that is, with the palatal *ś*), while the rest of K agrees with the commentators in reading it with the dental *s*. The balance of probability inclines to the side of the palatal, I think, even if we restrict ourselves to the MS. evidence. C. V. Vaidya (*The Mahābhārata : A Criticism*, p. 159) speaks of them as the "7 clans who came probably from the Afagan (*sic*) borders," but it seems to me more likely that they got their nickname from the fact that they had bound themselves by an oath to kill Arjuna or die in the great Bhārata battle (Dronap. 17).

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1. 2. 85 : The spurious line (102*) *kūṭasya Dhārtarāṣṭreṇa preṣaṇam Pāṇḍavān prati* stands in the MSS. not before 97* (as Winternitz imagines and very naturally), but after 101*, as correctly stated in the critical notes. I have re-examined the MSS. concerned on the point and find that my note is perfectly correct. One cannot be dogmatic about the Mahābhārata MSS.; there is no knowing what they may or may not contain. The line was found only in six Nilakantha MSS. in Devanāgarī or Bangālī characters, collated for the first two adhyāyas. In all these six MSS. the line is found interpolated at the same place, the place mentioned in the critical apparatus (namely, after 101*), although all printed editions without exception place it elsewhere (namely, before 97*), which is no doubt the reason of Winternitz's remark. A note drawing attention to this patent discrepancy might have been usefully added in the critical notes. But I have found the printed editions so arbitrary and unreliable¹ that I have almost

1. The Kumbhakonam edition contains a misleading colophon after its adhyāya 100, which is not found in any MS. and is, moreover, unnecessary.—All printed editions contain the line (B.1.28.4cd=K. 1.28. 5cd)

gurur hi sarvabhūtānām brāhmaṇaḥ parikṛtitaḥ ।

which is not found even in Nilakanṭha MSS. The note on 1. 74. 12 mentions a line (B. 1. 79. 13ef =K. 1. 73. 23 ab)

maraṇam śobhanam tasya iti vidvajanā viduḥ ।

which was not found in any of the 60 MSS. collated for that adhyāya !

completely ignored them in the foot-notes, which have necessarily to be rather brief and to the point. The meaning of this enigmatic line found in Nilakanṭha MSS. is as obscure to me as the cause of its transposition in the first printed edition. We need not inquire why the line occurs in the wrong place in the other editions as well, since the subsequent editors appear to have studiously and uniformly avoided consulting MSS. Winternitz could easily convince himself of the correctness of my statement regarding the point of insertion of this line in the MSS. by referring to the superb complete copy of the Mahābhārata in Śāradā characters, with Nilakanṭha's scholium, he purchased in Kāśmīr during his stay there.

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1. 2. 102: Da Dn Dr do have *magnām* and *Draupadīm*, as found in the printed editions and as rightly surmised by Winternitz. This group has, through oversight, completely dropped out of the long list of MSS. that read *Draupadīm*, and I am thankful to Winternitz for drawing my attention to it. The correction will be duly notified in the list of Errata, which will be added at the end of the volume. In passing I may draw attention to the superiority of the K MSS., the only group which, as Winternitz rightly remarks, gives the undoubtedly correct rendering of the whole stanza; all other MSS.—even such as do not contain the interpolated line 112*—are in utter confusion.

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MAJOR QUESTIONS.

1. 1. 129 : *yadāśrauṣaṁ Śukrasūryau ca yuktau*
Kaunteyānām anulomau jayāya ।
nityaṁ cāsmāñ śvāpadā vyābhaṣantas
tadā nāśaṁse vijayāya Saṁjaya ॥

This is indeed a difficult case, and I for my part doubt whether any definite decision can be reached as to how the stanza originally read. I must say, I cannot share the confidence with which Winternitz decides for the reading :

yadā Vāyuḥ Śakrasūryau ca yuktau,

which is mentioned as a pāṭha by Nilakanṭha and was adopted in the *editio princeps*. It is one of the eight rival readings and is found chiefly in the Bangālī version, and in MSS. and editions allied to or influenced by it. The combinations found

in the different MSS. may be arranged schematically as follows :

	<i>Vāyu</i>	<i>Śakra</i>	<i>Sūrya</i> :	Majority of N
	<i>Vāyu</i>	<i>Śukra</i>	<i>Sūrya</i> :	K1 + some D
	<i>Vāyu</i>		<i>Sūrya</i> :	Dn
(a)śrausam		<i>Śukra</i>	<i>Sūrya</i> :	Text (T G1.5.6)
(a)śrauṣam		<i>Śakra</i>	<i>Sūrya</i> :	Majority of M
(a)śrauṣam			<i>Sūrya</i> :	A few G
(a)śrauṣam	<i>Vāyu</i>		<i>Sūrya</i> :	D5(inferior MS.)
(a)śrausam	<i>Vāyu</i>	<i>Śakra</i>	<i>Sūrya</i> :	M1 (conflated)

According to Winternitz, the stanza refers to (B.) 7. 7. 34 ff. "where the line *vātoddhūtaṁ rajas tivrām* etc., also testifies to the reading *vāyuh*, while *śakra* (= Indra) probably refers to the rain of pieces of flesh, bones, and blood." To start with I doubt whether *Śakra* could be held responsible for the "rain" of flesh, bones, and sundry other articles; but that is a minor point, immaterial to the present discussion. In believing, however, that our stanza refers to (B.) 7. 7. 34 ff., Winternitz is partly mistaken, as will presently appear. The important point is that in the opinion of Winternitz the stanza alludes to certain forces of Nature, certain elements, such as wind, rain and so on, which were favourable to the Pāṇḍavas and unfavourable to the Kauravas. The commentators Nilakanṭha, Arjunamīśra and Devabodha (with the readings which they had adopted or which were before them) have explained the stanza in a similar way. I hold a different view, however. When I selected the reading of the constituted text, I thought—and I still think—that in this stanza there is allusion not to the elements, but to some *astrological* factor or constellation—an allusion which was not understood by commentators and which I could not then fully explain. On reading the criticism of Prof. Winternitz, I therefore made a reference to my friend Prof. Jyotish Chandra Ghatak M.A., of Calcutta University, who has made a special study of Indian Astrology and allied sciences and is rightly regarded as an authority on these topics ; and I was not disappointed. Having already worked through the whole of the Mahābhārata in special search of references which have a bearing on Astrology, Augury and kindred subjects, he could at once lay his fingers on the right passage, the prototype of our stanza, which throws a flood of light on the question, without however fully solving the riddle of the stanza, so far as I can judge. The said stanza, (B.) 6. 20. 2, reads :

[Dhṛtarāṣṭra to Saṁjaya]

केषां जघन्यौ सोमसूर्यौ सवायू
 केषां सेनां श्वापदा व्याभषन्त ।
 केषां यूनां मुखवर्णाः प्रसन्नाः
 सर्वे ह्येतद् ब्रूहि तत्त्वं यथावत् ॥

While the connection between the two stanzas is patent and indeed unquestionable, the discovery of the prototype leaves, unfortunately, most of our real difficulties unsolved. The reading which agrees closest with that of the Bhīṣmaparvan stanza is that of the vulgate text and is found *only* in the MSS. of Nilakanṭha. These latter have Vāyu-Candra-Sūrya (lacking Śakra or Śukra altogether) like Soma-Sūrya-Vāyu of the Bhīṣmaparvan. Is the Nilakanṭha reading then the *original* reading? As I have pointed out elsewhere, we are apt to prefer, at first sight, the readings of the vulgate, which appear to be better than those of the critical text; but that is only because the text of the vulgate has been arrived at by the purging of the original by the continuous emendations of scholars for centuries.¹ It seems to me that there is a long history behind the reading of the vulgate in the present case also. Nilakanṭha had evidently arrived at it by an emendation, by collation with the prototype, because there is no indication of there being any MSS. before him which could have contained that particular combination. This fact may, perhaps, supply us with a clue to the labyrinth of the readings recorded in the critical notes for the line in question. An important factor is that Śukra (or Śakra), which persistently occurs in all the various categories of our MSS. and which must, therefore, be regarded as an essential feature of our stanza, is entirely lacking in the later stanza. This proves irrefutably that the combination of the former was not *identical*, in every respect, with that of the latter originally. That is an important point to remember. Winternitz is emphatic in asserting that *yadā Vāyuh* of the original was changed in S into the usual *yadā-śrauṣam*. This assumption does not seem to me to be at all well founded, because the very next stanza (130) begins *yadā Droṇo vividhān aśtramārgān*, and here no attempt has been made in S (or anywhere else) to change the beginning into *yadāśrauṣam*. There are a few more stanzas (133, 140, 145) in

1. See my Epic Studies (I), JBBRAS. (NS.) 4 (1928). 157. A patent example of correction is *gṛhīteḥ haranam prāpte* (in Devanāgarī MSS.) for *haranam gṛhya samprāpte* (1. 2. 93).

this series which do not begin with the oft-repeated formula. It seems to me much more likely, therefore, that Vāyu was introduced into our passage, secondarily, by some early Northern redactor who knew the prototype and had noticed the omission of one of the elements in the prior stanza; precisely as Nilakanṭha, much later, appears to have further altered the line by changing the difficult Śakra (or Śukra) to Candra, thus equating the combination to that of the prototype. I therefore adhere to my original choice, explaining the genesis of the variants as follows. The stanza in question, which was suggested to the author of the *yadāśrausam* section by the Bhismaparvan stanza but was composed from a vague recollection of the original, began like the other stanzas of the series, and contained, moreover, an allusion to an *astrological* situation. Some Northern redactor (who had known the Bhismaparvan stanza and noticed that the first stanza did not contain Vāyu) then deleted (a) *śrausam* and substituted for it the missing Vāyu, retaining, however, the original feature Śukra. The corruption of Śukra into Śakra must be judged as easy and even natural (in juxtaposition with Sūrya), in view of the famous episode of the Mahābhārata which narrates how Indra, disguised as a mendicant Brahman, begs for the miraculous ear-rings and the armour which had been Karna's from his birth and which had made him invincible. The emendatory activity of the early Northern redactor was continued by Nilakantha, who expunged the Śakra (or Śukra) which he found in his MSS. (and perhaps did not fully understand) and substituted for it Candra, thus equating the two combinations.

I am confirmed in the supposition that the original line contained only two agencies instead of three by the fact that no MSS. hitherto collated show *yuktāh* (plu.) for *yuktau* (dual) in the first line, as they certainly would have done, had there been three names in the original instead of two, as I have given.¹

The question then arises whether Śukra and Sūrya, as *grahas*, were at that time favourable to the Pāṇḍavas or, what comes to the same thing, adverse to the Kauravas. About

1. It should be noted that even in the explanation of Winternitz, Śakra and Sūrya do not make any *combined* effort. If the three elements wind, rain and sun operate all together for the success of the Pāṇḍavas, then *yuktāh* is indeed the correct word. What is the point of the dual, when the plural form would be even metrically equally suitable?

Sūrya I cannot say. But as far as Śukra is concerned, we may safely answer the question in the affirmative. My friend Prof. Ghatak has kindly drawn my attention to a stanza in Varāhamihira's Brhatsamhitā which, if *dyūtajivin* may be taken to apply to the Kauravas, would indicate that at the time of the Bhārata battle the planet Śukra, which was then in the Pūrvābhādrapadā (cf. 6. 3 15), was in a position which augured disaster to the Kauravas and was therefore favourable (*anuloma*) to the Pāṇḍavas. The Brhatsamhitā reference (9. 34) supplied to me by my friend runs:

शतमिषजि शौण्डिकानामजैकपे द्यूतजीविनां पीडा ।

कुरुपाञ्चालानामपि करोति चास्मिन्सितः सलिलम् ॥

As Vāyu is missing in the whole of S except M1 (which latter is a conflated MS.), it can never be established that Vāyu is an *essential* element of the original stanza; on the other hand, (*a*)*śrausam*, though of course no less doubtful because it is documented also by only half of the entire evidence, is rendered probable, if not required, by the context. But I am prepared to leave the line as "less than certain," as indicated by the wavy line below the words in question.

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1. 1. 180 : *tava putrair mahattamāḥ*.

Winternitz complains that the sentence is "very awkward grammatically". To have called forth no less than nine attempts at emendation, the original must indeed have been most awkward. Winternitz prefers to read *tava putrair mahattarāḥ*, pointing out that there is not much evidence for the text reading. It is quite true that the text is weakly supported; but so are almost all the readings except that of the vulgate, which certainly cannot be considered the original reading, as it is palpably an emendation. The text is based on K1. 5 G5. 6 only. But Winternitz's reading is not much better supported; in its entirety it is found only in K3 M; because, of the MSS. which do contain the questionable *mahattarāḥ*, K0 begins the pāda with *tvatputrair ye* and K4 with *tvatsutebhyo*. I submit, therefore, that the reading preferred by Winternitz is not better documented than mine. That is the first point. Winternitz then seeks to explain the variation on the ground that the scribes must have found difficulties with the

instr. putraih. Now the so-called *instr. comparisonis* is very common in both epics and, I submit, that alone would not account for this plethora of readings in the case of a simple line with a perfectly obvious meaning. I know instances in the Mahābhārata text where this *instr. comparisonis* has called forth no variants at all in the MSS., no doubt because it was felt to be quite normal by the copyists, editors and readers alike. The cause of disturbance in this case must, therefore, be looked for elsewhere, and that was principally, I think, the use of the superlative joined to the instrumental.

In settling the original reading, the question is primarily one of fact, of the actual MS. evidence, not of grammar. The Shakespearean "This was the most unkindest out of all" cannot be judged and emended by modern standards of grammar. It sounds harsh to our ears; but there is, I suppose, sufficient documentary evidence to prove or make it probable that the line as I have quoted it was in point of fact written by the author of *Julius Caesar* (who knew his English quite as well as, if indeed not better than, we do), consciously or unconsciously using what our purists stigmatize as vulgarism. The argument that a dramatist like Shakespeare could not commit such a blunder (if blunder it be) would be without cogency, when the MS. evidence supports the questionable reading.

The Mahābhārata, I may point out here, has suffered from the great misfortune of being always edited by learned Pandits, who were concerned more about the purity of diction than with the determination and preservation of the words of the author or the authors of the epic. One of the very worst offenders in this way was Pandit Böhlingk, who in the passages edited by him in his *Sanskrit-Chrestomathie* has "corrected" away the few oddities of idiom and style of the original which had escaped the vigilance of mediaeval Indian scholiasts and editors and found their way stealthily into our printed editions!¹

1. In the *Paugyaparvan* (Adip. 3) especially, his editorial activities are very much in evidence. He has not only introduced, with scrupulous care, the correct Sandhi wherever it was at all possible, he has substituted the correct *banddhum* for the (irregular) *baddhum* (1. 3. 21), found even in the printed editions and made many similar "corrections" independently of the MS. evidence. Most amusing, however, is his regular and systematic substitution of the correct form, as required by the Sūtra of Pāṇini, out of *etad* and *enad*, a rule probably unknown at any time to anybody outside a select coterie of Ācāryas of Vyākaraṇa.

The nine variants mentioned in the critical notes may be classified as follows. Readings

- (1) in which the comparison is emphasized
 - (a) by change of the superl. to the comp. :
 त्वत्पुत्रैर्ये महत्तराः । K0
 तव पुत्रैर्महत्तराः । K3 D14 M
 - (b) by a double change of superl. to comp. and of instr. to abl. (the "correct" construction) :
 त्वत्पुत्रेभ्यो महत्तराः । K4 (inferior MS.);
 - (2) in which the awkward instr. is done away with
 - (a) by changing the instr. into abl. :
 त्वत्पुत्रेभ्यो महत्तमाः । K2
 तव पुत्रान्महत्तमाः । V1
 - (b) by using the adj. predicatively (mostly in G) :
 तत्पुत्राश्च महत्तमाः । T2 G1-3, 4m. 7
 तव पुत्रा महत्तमाः । G4;
 - (3) in which the line has been recast (the vulgate) :
 तव पुत्रा इव प्रभो । K6 B D (mostly) T1;
- and (4) corrupt:
 तव पुत्रैर्महात्मनोः । D10.

It is an admittedly sound principle of textual criticism to give preference to a reading which best suggests how the other readings may have arisen, and it would be hard, I think, to find another reading which could explain all these nine variants more satisfactorily. Winternitz's choice, for instance, does not at all explain the origin of any of the readings which contain *mahattamāḥ* (superl.) such as 2 (a) and (b) and the text reading ; because there is in that case nothing to be gained by changing the (supposed) original comparative into superlative.¹

En passant it may be pointed out that the so-called *instr-comparisonis* is not a distinct category of the comparative at all ; it is only a special case of the (Prakritic) coalescence of the instr. and abl. pl. (*metri causa*), an equivalence which comes out very clearly in such parallel phrases as :

नरः पापात्प्रमुच्यते । 1. 1. 198

1. Unless it be a scribe's error perpetuated through centuries or repeated independently in different places and times.

and

सर्वपापैः प्रमुच्यते ।¹ 1. 1. 209 and 494*.

The latter does not mean "he is *left by* all sins" but "he is *freed from* all sins."

That the superlative is used in the epic in the sense of the comparative² may be seen from :

तेषां के योगवित्तमाः । Gita 12. 1

न च तस्मान्मदुष्येषु कश्चिन्मे प्रियकृत्तमः । *ibid.* 18. 69

"Of these which are *more versed* in Yoga?" "Nor among men shall there be any whose service is *dearer* to me than his."

The superlative is normally construed with the gen. or loc.; but that it is construed sometimes also with the abl. may be seen not merely from the example last cited but also from :

अपि चेदसि पापेभ्यः सर्वेभ्यः पापकृत्तमः । *ibid.* 4. 36

"Though thou art of all sinners the most sinful."

Then the above-mentioned equivalence of the instr. and abl. pl. ushers in finally the construction of the superlative with the instr., which we find in the passage in question.

Formally the two constructions *tava putrair mahattarāḥ* and *tava putrair mahattamāḥ* are almost equivalent; but there may be just a slight difference of meaning between the two locutions. While *tava putrair mahattarāḥ* (comp.) evidently means only "greater than thy sons", the other clause (*tava putrair mahattamāḥ*) may have been intended to convey some such sense as "*far, very much, greater than thy sons.*"

It may be finally observed that in dealing with the first two adhyāyas of the Ādiparvan (as in fact with the whole of the earlier portion of this Parvan) the critic should never forget that he has before him what Hopkins has justly called the "pseudo-epic": the poetasters responsible for the compilation of these passages are capable of the worst blunders of every description.

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1. This pāda recurs frequently in the Rāmāyana also.

2. These derivative forms have probably a merely intensive value, and do not necessarily and invariably connote comparison. The Prakrits frequently confuse the *tara* and the *tama* endings. It is further worth noting that a separate formation of the comparative and superlative is unknown to the Modern Indian dialects. The epics also sporadically furnish instances of the use of the *positive* in the sense of the comparative.

1. 1. 209 : *mahattvād bhāravattvāc ca.*

As Winternitz rightly observes, here the MS. evidence is almost evenly balanced. Moreover, graphically there is so little difference between the rival readings that we cannot expect much help from the side of the MSS., though it may be pointed out that their evidence inclines, if at all, just a trifle to the side of the text reading. Winternitz (*Ind. Ant.* 27. 93) admits that the lines (69*) *caturbhyah* etc. and *tadā prabhrti* etc. are " quite superfluous." When these lines are expunged from the text, as has been done by me, the line *mahattve ca gurutve ca* (of 208e) stands adjacent to *mahattvād bhāra°* (of 209a). The idea of 208e is evidently reflected and repeated in 209a. Just as *mahattvāt* corresponds to *mahattve*, so *bhāra°* should correspond to *gurutve*. This clearly shows, as far as I can judge, that the doubtful word (*bhāra°*), which should be a paraphrase of *gurutve*, must be *bhāravattvāt* and not *bhāratatvāt*. The latter seems to be an emendation made by some revisor who wanted to squeeze in somehow the significant word *Bhārata* into the context ; and, it must truthfully be confessed, it is a very ingenious emendation indeed. But as to which is the original reading there cannot be much doubt. The importance that Winternitz (like Buhler, *Ind. Stud.* 2. 9 f., before him) attaches to the circumstance that the verse is quoted in (our editions of) Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* with the reading *bhāratatvāt* is wholly unjustifiable, and that for two reasons: firstly, because we have no critical edition of the *Tantravārttika*, and so we cannot be wholly sure of what the MSS. actually read at that place ; and secondly, because, even if Kumārila should, in point of fact, have quoted the verse with *bhāratatvāt*, it does not at all follow that this is *ipso facto* the original reading, notwithstanding that Kumārila's work is far older than the extant *Mahābhārata* MSS ; because Kumārila may have cited the stanza from one or the other of the versions which contained (and still contain) that reading. Or again he may have known both variants and preferred, for reasons similar to those adduced by Buhler and Winternitz, the variant rejected by me.

The situation is somewhat clearer and the facts better capable of demonstration in the case of the other great mediæval commentator Śaṅkarācārya. In many cases when the readings of the *Mahābhārata* verses and stanzas cited by him

differ from those of the Bombay and Calcutta editions, I was able to identify Śaṅkarācārya's readings in the Southern MSS. Being a Southerner, he had naturally studied and cited from the Southern recension of the Mahābhārata. It is quite clear that he was not going to work through all available MSS. and establish the original reading of the numerous Mahābhārata stanzas cited by him in the course of his voluminous commentaries. Therefore his citations, although of far greater antiquity than the oldest of our extant Mahābhārata MSS., do not necessarily give us in every case the "original" readings. Śaṅkara's testimony applies to and affects mainly the version or the recension used or cited by him; and that was probably the Southern recension in its Malayālam version. Even in the time of the Ācārya the Northern MSS. must have read differently in places, as they do now, because the divagation of the recensions must be assumed to be far older than the epoch of the great Vedantist.

I shall give only one example in order to clarify my meaning. 1. 1. 37 of the critical edition reads *yathartāv ṛtulingām*, agreeing with other printed editions and with the majority of the MSS. of the Northern recension. Śaṅkarācārya in his Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra (1. 3. 30; Ānandāśrama ed., p. 313) cites, however, the verse with the reading *yathartuṣv ṛtulingāni*.¹ Now this reading is found only in Southern MSS. and in such of the Northern MSS. as can be shown to be contaminated from the Southern source, but not in any Kāśmīrī or Bangālī MSS. collated so far. Here it would be clearly wrong to cite the Bhāṣya as an authority older than our MSS. to establish the text reading as *yathartuṣv ṛtulingāni*. The Bhāṣya citation affects directly the Southern version only, documenting that the divergent reading of our Southern MSS. is as old as (or rather older than) the time of Śaṅkarācārya; and that is all. It does not take us beyond the Southern recension, much less beyond the two rival recensions to the archetype.

When Winternitz further observes that "from the etymologizer's point of view" *bhārataivāt* is a "better" etymology, since with the other reading the *ta* of the Bhārata remains unexplained, he is bringing into the discussion an element of finesse that is quite foreign to the view-point of

1. Only one of the Bhāṣya MSS. has our text reading.

the Purāṇic writers, as will be evident from the following specimens of "etymologische Spielerei" culled from the earlier adhyāyas of the Ādiparvan :

(B.) 1. 30. 7 = line 3 of 343* (Garuda):

गुरुं भारं समासाद्योद्धीन एष विहंगमः ।

1. 36. 3 (Jaratkāru):

जरेति क्षयमाहुर्वै दारुणं कारुसंज्ञितम् ।

1. 56. 31 (Mahābhārata):

भारतानां महज्जन्म महाभारतमुच्यते ।

1. 69. 33 (Bharata):

भर्तव्योऽयं त्वया यस्मादस्माकं वचनादपि ।

तस्माद्भवत्वयं नाम्ना भरतो नाम ते सुतः ॥

In view of these bizarre specimens, it would be extremely strange should a Purāṇic "etymologizer" fight shy of sacrificing a *ta*, if he, for the moment, could not think of anything better.

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1. 2. 2 : *śuśrūṣā yadi vo viprā bruvataś ca kathāḥ śubhāḥ*.

I admit that my reconstruction of the line is not wholly satisfactory. The reading preferred by Winternitz may also not appeal to other scholars, as it does not wholly appeal to me. I therefore cite here the 15 different readings found in the 48 MSS. collated for this passage, of which one (D3), unluckily or luckily, omits the line altogether. The lines containing *ca* (to which Winternitz takes exception in particular) have been underlined for the sake of ready identification.

1. शुश्रूषध्वमथो विप्रा ब्रूवतो मे शुभाः कथाः । K1
2. शुश्रूषध्वं वचो विप्रा ब्रुवतो मे कथाः शुभाः । K2. 3
3. शुश्रूषध्वं मम वो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथां शुभां । K4
4. शुश्रूषो माम वो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । K5 (corrupt)
5. शुश्रूषध्वं मम भो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । K6 V1 Dn D1.5. 8-11
6. शुश्रूषा मम वो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । B Da(Da1 corrupt) D13
7. शुश्रूषध्वं मम वो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । Dr D4
8. शुश्रूषध्वं मम वै विप्रा ब्रुवतः सत्कथां शुभां । D2
9. शुश्रूषध्वं मम भो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । D6
10. शुश्रूषाम वचो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । D7. 12
11. शुश्रूषा यदि वो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च शुभाः कथाः । T G6
12. शुश्रूषा यदि वो विप्राः प्रवक्ष्ये निखिलाः कथाः । G2. 3. 7
13. शुश्रूषा यदि वो विप्रा ब्रुवतो मे कथाः शुभाः । M2. 4
14. शुश्रूषा यदि वो विप्रा ब्रुवतो मे कथाः शुभाः । M3
15. शुश्रूषा यदि वो विप्रा ब्रुवतश्च कथाः शुभाः । Text (K0 D14 G 1. 4.5 M1),

As for the doubtful *ca*, I may remark that, besides its normal use as a conjunction meaning "and", *ca* is very frequently used in the Mahābhārata (and the Rāmāyana) as an expletive, a pure and simple verse-filler (*pādapūraṇa*), without restriction of position, like *ha* and *vai*. It may occasionally have served as a particle of emphasis, stressing the previous word like *eva*. The second use is somewhat doubtful; but of the first, one can find scores of perfectly clear and certain instances in any portion of the epic, even in the printed editions. In the line in question, I consider, *ca* has been used in the first sense, as a mere verse-filler. Sporadically *me*, which improves this awkward line ever so slightly, appears to have been substituted for it, independently in both recensions. The first half of the line was so uncouth that it was recast in the vulgate. There are numerous instances of lines being recast in the vulgate, as a careful study of the critical apparatus will show.

* * *

1. 2. 29: *yat tu Śaunakasatre te Bhāratākhyānavistaram |*
ākhyāsyē tatra Paulomam ākhyānam cāditaḥ param ||

This is again a most difficult case, and, as Winternitz rightly remarks, "full of almost hopeless editorial cruces". The reconstruction would be, therefore, almost entirely a matter of speculation. Winternitz has rightly surmised that I regard the Parvasaṅgraha as an accretion later than this stanza, which, in my opinion, belongs to a much earlier stratum of the text of the Mahābhārata. That *Śaunakasatre* in line 1 is a regular trap for the unwary. Misled by the printed editions, I had myself treated the words as separate at first, realizing only much later that in this adhyāya the Sūta is addressing not Śaunaka but the Ṛsis, among whom Śaunaka is not yet present. Śaunaka is not mentioned in the foregoing portion of the text except once, in connection with his twelve-year sacrifice in 1. 1. 1. In adhyāya 4, moreover, it is plainly stated that the Sūta first approaches the Ṛsis assemb'ed in the Naimisa forest and asks them what he should narrate. The Ṛsis request him to await the arrival of Śaunaka. The latter, *as soon as he arrives*, asks the Sūta to relate the history of the Bhārgavas (adhy. 5). If Śaunaka was not among the audience in adhyāya 4, I do not see how he could have been there in adhyāya 2. Moreover, in the latter adhyāya the interlocutors are throughout stated as being the Ṛsis, while it is only from adhyāya 5 onwards that Śaunaka appears in this

rôle. It should, therefore, seem that the reading *Śaunaka satire* is not easy to understand or explain by any means. Or does Winternitz mean that it should be adopted as the *lectio difficilior*? It would be admissible, in my opinion, only on the supposition (which is not as improbable as it may at first sight appear) that the compiler of adhyāya 2, when he wrote stanza 29, had overlooked the fact that Śaunaka was not then among the audience. I have preferred to give the "poet" the benefit of the doubt and assume that the remark is addressed to one of the Rsis present.

Winternitz has misunderstood my reconstruction in some other particulars as well. *yat*, at the beginning of the stanza, is not a neuter pronoun but an adverb = *yadā*. The words *āditaḥ param* offer no difficulties at all for interpretation; *āditaḥ* does not mean "from the beginning," but "at the beginning" (= *ādau*); *param* = "excellent." *ākhyāsyē* must of course be supplied in the first line; but that is not difficult as it is the very first word of the second line. Therefore I translate :

"But when, during Śaunaka's (sacrificial) session, I (shall narrate) to thee the very extensive Bhārata Story, then shall I narrate, to begin with, the excellent Story of Pauloma."

Even a cursory examination of the variants given in the critical notes is sufficient to convince anybody that the stanza has been recast over and over again. With its history is bound up the history of the successive additions of the three episodes Āstika, Pauloma and Pausya, which appear to have been appended successively to the main text in this order. The stanza in question seems to have been written at the time of or soon after the addition of the Pauloma, but before the addition of the Pausya. The purpose of the line was originally not—as Winternitz imagines—to state all the episodes with which the Mahābhārata begins, but to *authenticate the latest interpolation then made*, namely, the Pauloma, by making the Sūta declare beforehand his intention of narrating that ākhyāna at the beginning of the Mahābhārata. The Āstika must have formed at that time the recognized beginning of the epic (cf. *Manvādī Bhārataṁ kecid Āstikādi tathā pare* l. 1. 50), and the Pausya had not yet been added. This is the state of things the constituted text envisages.

A study of the critical apparatus of this adhyāya shows that the adhyāya is best preserved in the Southern recension;

in the MSS. group on which the vulgate is mainly based (namely, BD) numerous additional stanzas are found which are missing in S and K0. 1. 2; but even the three latter MSS. occasionally include some of such additional stanzas, which also nevertheless, since they are missing in S, may safely be regarded as interpolations. Of this character is interpolation 74*, which is found in almost the whole of N and which must have been made with a view to documenting the fact—or rather the fiction—that the Mahābhārata as narrated by the Sūta to Śaunaka was *identical* with that narrated by Vaiśampāyana to Janamejaya (cf. Nilakanṭha *ad loc.*). K0. 1 agree with S on the reading of this stanza except for the inclusion of 74* in the one and the addition of the name of the Āstika to the other. The text is formed by collating S with the inferable version of K before the addition in the latter of 74*. The subsequent steps leading towards the reading of the vulgate consisted in the addition of the name of the Āstika episode (which intervenes between the Pauloma and the beginning proper of the Mahābhārata), of a statement of the identity of the Sūta-version and the Vaiśampāyana-version, and finally of the name of the Pauṣya interlude, all these changes being made in our stanza with a view to setting the seal of authenticity on the three spurious additions. That adhyāya 3 must be an interpolation follows from the fact that it is wholly unconnected with the previous adhyāya and only loosely connected with what follows. Note-worthy is also the fact that adhyāyas 1 and 4 have the same beginning: *Lomahaṣṇaputra Ugraśravāḥ sūtaḥ paurāṇiko Naimiṣāranye dvādaśavārṣike satre!* And in the text itself there is no explanation why after the Sūta has finished his narration of the Pauṣya episode, it is necessary to reintroduce the Sūta in the same words as approaching the same Rsis assembled at the same twelve-year sacrificial session of Śaunaka in the Naimiṣa forest. There is clearly a *new* beginning made in one of the two adhyāyas.

Since many of the intermediate links are missing in the MS. evidence, it is not possible to reconstruct the history of this portion of the text fully and satisfactorily; but that it must be reconstructed on the lines sketched above, I have no doubt. Accordingly the successive stages in the development of the reading of the vulgate (which is the reading preferred by Winternitz) I would arrange in a scheme like the following, in which the innovations have been printed in black type.

It will show among other things that the *vistaram* of the text and of the Southern recension is not "a remnant of *vistarārtham*" of the vulgate; on the contrary, in the latter the first line was filled up with *uttamam* when the original *vistara* was used in the interpolated stanza. The view of Winternitz that at least *Āstikam* must remain in the text is quite untenable; because if the stanza had *Āstikam* there is no reason why it should not have *Pauṣyam* as well. On the other hand, if *Pauṣyam* is not indispensable, then *Āstikam* could go with it as well.

Stage 1 (Constituted Text)

यत्तु शौनकसत्रे ते भारताख्यानविस्तरम् ।
आख्यास्ये तत्र पौलोममाख्यानं चादितः परम् ॥

Northern recension.

Stage 2 (K1): by addition of 2 lines to the original.

यत्तु शौनकसत्रे ते भारताख्यानमुत्तमम् ।
जनमेजयस्य तत्सत्रे व्यासशिष्येण धीमता ॥
कथितं विस्तरार्थं च यशो वीर्यं महीक्षिताम् ।
आख्यास्ये तत्र पौलोममाख्यानं चादितः परम् ॥

Stage 3 (Da D2-4. 13): by addition of *आस्तीकं* to stage 2.

यत्र शौनकसत्रे तु भारताख्यानमुत्तमम् ।
जनमेजयस्य तत्सत्रे व्यासशिष्येण धीमता ॥
कथितं विस्तरार्थं च यशो वीर्यं महीक्षिताम् ।
आख्यानं तत्र पौलोममास्तीकं चादितः स्मृतम् ॥

Stage 4 (Dn Dr D1. 5-12): by addition of *पौष्यं* to stage 3.

यत्तु शौनकसत्रे ते भारताख्यानमुत्तमम् ।
जनमेजयस्य तत्सत्रे व्यासशिष्येण धीमता ॥
कथितं विस्तरार्थं च यशो वीर्यं महीक्षिताम् ।
पौष्यं तत्र च पौलोममास्तीकं चादितः स्मृतम् ॥

Stage 5 (B): by addition of 1 line to stage 4.

यत्र शौनकसत्रे तु भारताख्यानमुत्तमम् ।
जनमेजयस्य तत्सत्रे व्यासशिष्येण धीमता ।
आख्यानं कथितं कृत्स्नं महाभारतमुत्तमम् ॥

कथितं विस्तरार्थं च यशो वीर्यं महीक्षिताम् ।
पौष्यं तत्र च पौलोममास्तीकं चादितः स्मृतम् ॥

Southern recension.

Stage 2 (S) : by addition of आस्तीक to the original.

यत्तु शौनकसूत्रे ते भारताख्यानविस्तरम् ।

आख्यास्ये तत्र पौलोममास्तीकं च ततः परम् ॥

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1. 2. 46 : *mṛgasvapnabhayaṃ tataḥ*

Here again Winternitz prefers the reading of the vulgate (*mṛgasvapnodbhayaṃ*). It is clearer but, I must say, I am very doubtful about its originality. The MS. support for this variant is only slightly stronger than that for the reading of the constituted text. It is worthy of note that B, which generally sides with the vulgate, has here a third and entirely different reading : *mṛgasvapno 'bhavat tataḥ* ! How would Winternitz account for that ? I explain the compound of the constituted text as an irregular compound with inverted sequence, common in Prakrit (Pischel, *Gramm. der Prakrit-Sprachen*, § 603) and not unknown to the Low Sanskrit of the epics. Hopkins, *JAO S.* 20 (1899). 223, has cited two instances from the *Rāmāyana* : 7. 22. 36 *dṛṣtvā daṇḍodyatām Yamam* (for *udyatadaṇḍam*) "like Yama with upraised staff"; and *ibid.* 7. 26. 2 *tulyaparvatavarcaṣi* (for *parvatatulyavarcaṣi*) "glorious like the mountain (Kailāsa)." I accordingly take the compound in question as equivalent to *svapna(dṛṣṭa)mṛgabhayam* "(Parvan) in which there is the fright of the deer (seen) in a dream" (cf. the compound *Svapnavāsavadattam*). Yudhiṣṭhira, in any case, was not frightened : that is certain ; but that the deer were, follows from (K.) 3. 259. 8, which Winternitz himself cites :

तान्वेपमानान्वित्रस्तान्बीजमात्रावशेषितान् ।

मृगान्दृष्ट्वा सुदुःखार्तो धर्मराजो युधिष्ठिरः ॥

The readings of the vulgate and the Bangālī version seem to represent different attempts at emendation of the irregular compound which stood originally in the Northern recension and which was perhaps misunderstood, if it was not totally unintelligible. The wavy line below the pāda was called for also by the variant reading of S, which has *parva* (or *tataḥ*) *prāyopaveśanam*. This refers to an entirely different section of

the narrative, the name being derived from the vow of fasting taken by Duryodhana.

* * *

1. 2. 89 : *tathā rājyārdhasāsanam.*

The variants are °śāsanam, °lambhanam, °sarjanam' (vulgate), °mārganam, °pādanam, °dāpanam ! If rājyārdhasarjanam corresponds better to one portion of the contents of Ādip. 207, °śāsanam may be said to correspond better to a subsequent portion of the same adhyāya : °sarjanam was followed by °śāsanam. Intrinsically there is not much to choose between the two. The sub-parvan name is really something quite different : rājya-lambha or °lābha, which has given rise to the reading of K3 rājyārdhalambhanam. The reading preferred by Winternitz is found only in the vulgate group supported by four Southern MSS. G4. 5 M1. 3. The text reading was adopted on the direct testimony of K0. 6 D2 G1. 6, but it has the partial support of T2 and of two K MSS. (K1. 2), one of which is the important India Office codex (K1). These MSS. (K1. 2) read as a matter of fact rājyānuśāsanam, but the nu of these MSS. is obviously wrong (perhaps representing a mislection of the ligature rdha), being opposed by the remainder of the MS. material collated and conveying no satisfactory sense. There appears to be an agreement between independent versions on the reading °sarjanam, but the concord, I believe, is only apparent, being due to the conflation of MSS. That G4. 5 are contaminated from some late Northern source, I think, I have established with tolerable certainty in the note on 1. 20. 1; the conclusion is corroborated by many less certain instances where these MSS. (along with G1. 2) agree with Northern MSS. against other Southern MSS., and the agreement cannot be regarded as one derived from their connection through the archetype.¹ That further G7 and M1 are not reliable representatives of the Grantha and the Malayālam versions respectively, I have already pointed out in the Foreword to Fascicule 1 (p. v). There remains only one other MS. (M3), which represents a moderately pure (Malayālam) tradition and must have acquired its °sarjanam, secondarily, through some complicated infiltration of the reading of the vulgate.

1. For instance, cf. v. 1. 1. 5. 26 (220°); 13. 34 (255*); 20. 15.

In this instance, we have, moreover, a complex cross-agreement between the different versions.

°śāsanam: K0. 1. 2 D2 + T2 G1. 6

°sarjanam: Vulgate (B D) + G4. 5 M1. 3

Graphically there is no connection between the conflicting readings. The reading of the vulgate is found in only one MS. of the K group (K4), an inferior conflated MS. It will thus be seen that the MS. evidence is utterly confused. That being so, I have adopted the reading °śāsanam, giving preference to the side on which the majority of K stand, according to a principle enunciated in the Foreword to Fascicule 1 (p. vii).

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1. 2. 96: In the Editorial Note appended to Fascicule 3, I have given my reasons for selecting 7984 as the figure representing the number of ślokas in the Ādiparvan. That is the figure given by the India Office MS. (K1) and corroborated by the Śāradā codex (Ś1). It may, therefore, be regarded as the extent of the Śāradā version at any rate. I consider, as I have frequently stated, the Śāradā (Kāśmīrī) version the best version now preserved, and my edition of the Ādiparvan is based mainly (though not wholly) on this version.

I fully agree with Winternitz (*op. cit.* p. 61) that the Parvasaṃgraha argument is necessarily of secondary importance and should not be pressed too far.¹ Be that as it may, it is extremely problematic whether we could make any use whatsoever of the Parvasaṃgraha enumeration in the case of the Ādiparvan at least, because it will be difficult to compute the *exact* extent of this Parvan, and that for two reasons. Firstly, because this Parvan, as is well known, contains two lengthy prose adhyāyas (3 and 90); and it is difficult to say

1. The exaggerated importance Utgikar attached to the data of the Parvasaṃgraha was, I believe, mainly due to his erroneous belief (induced probably by the misleading character of the text of the Kumbhakonam edition) that the Northern and Southern MSS. agreed completely with each other in all material particulars for this adhyāya. The Kumbhakonam edition, which claims to be an edition "mainly based on the South Indian texts", presents a text of this adhyāya which is almost identical with that of the Calcutta and Bombay editions, taking no notice of the Southern divergences, while in other sections of the epic it introduces numerous innovations which are based on the Southern tradition.

now how the extent of the prose sections was computed by the compilers of the *Parvasaṅgraha*; our section-numbers certainly can give no indication of the extent in "Ślokas."¹ Secondly, this *Parvan* also contains a large number of *Tristubh-Jagatī* stanzas, which again introduce an element of uncertainty in the computation. Was each *Tristubh-Jagatī* stanza counted as one "Śloka" or did the *Bhārata* compute the exact equivalent of these long-metre stanzas in "Ślokas"? No definite answer is possible as yet. The difference in the reckoning will be, however, between 40 and 50 per cent of the total. As a very rough estimate, the *Ādiparvan* may contain something like 500 long-metre stanzas. This factor alone would then introduce a difference of a little less than 250 "Ślokas" in the total!

We must, moreover, not lose sight of the fact that the reading of the number itself is never entirely free from doubt, since the MSS., as Winternitz remarks, differ sometimes quite essentially in the *Parvasaṅgraha* itself; the figures differ not by units or tens, but by hundreds, and even thousands in extreme cases.² There can be no doubt, as I have pointed out elsewhere, that the text of the *Parvasaṅgraha* has been tampered with and designedly altered, in various ways, in order to make it harmonize with the inflated versions of a later epoch.³

These are some of the difficulties in the way of making any practical use of the figures recorded in the *Parvasaṅgrahaparvan* for fixing the text of the *Mahābhārata*. The computations may have some value for a *Parvan* in which there is no prose at all, which is almost wholly in *Anuṣṭubh* metre, and for which finally the *Parvasaṅgraha* figure is tolerably certain.

It is quite within the range of probability, as far as I can judge now, that the extent of the critical text of a *parvan* may

1. The lengths of the prose sections must have been computed on the basis of 32 akṣaras to a śloka, but such a computation in the case of long prose sections can be only approximate.

2. Thus for the *Virāṭaparvan*, the Northern figure is 2050, the Southern 3500; the difference therefore is 1450 ślokas.

3. Cf. the Editorial Note (2) appended to Fascicule 3 (p. iii).

fall appreciably below or rise appreciably above the figure recorded in the second adhyāya, as is actually the case with about half the number of Parvans in the Calcutta, Bombay and Kumbhakonam editions when checked up with the figures given in their respective Parvasaṅgraha.¹ Moreover, unless it can be made probable that the compilation of this "Table of Contents" is nearly synchronous with the final redaction of the Great Epic, this discrepancy will be without any cogency in questions relating to the constitution of the text. The value of a MS. or a version cannot be said to depend exclusively or even mainly upon its agreement with or discrepancy from the data of the Parvasaṅgraha. It must, in the last analysis, be regarded as depending upon some intrinsic criteria, upon the place it occupies in a logical and convincing scheme formulated to explain satisfactorily the evolution of the different extant versions and types of Mahābhārata MSS.

It should further be carefully borne in mind that even if there is an exact agreement as to extent between a constituted text and the Parvasaṅgraha, this fact alone is no guarantee of the originality and the absolute correctness of the entire text, line for line; because the same number of stanzas could be made up in innumerable different ways by accepting or rejecting, hesitatingly, stanzas of doubtful authenticity and uncertain documentation, of which there will always be a plentiful supply in every Parvan.² The difficulty will finally not be solved even if we happen to light upon a unique MS. which agrees with the Parvasaṅgraha exactly and we should adopt its text verbatim; because there is every probability that while it satisfies the one criterion of extent given by the Parvasaṅgraha, it may not satisfy, in every respect, other and more exacting critical tests when compared, line by line and word by word, with other extant MSS.

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1. The actual number of ślokaś falls *below* the Parvasaṅgraha figure in the following 10 Parvans: *Adi*, *Udyoga*, *Bhīṣma*, *Sauptika*, *Śānti*, *Anuśāsana*, *Aśvamedhika*, *Āśramavāśika*, *Mausala* and *Mahāprasthānika*; while it rises *above* the other figure in the following 8 Parvans: *Sabha*, *Aranya*, *Virāṭa*, *Drona*, *Karna*, *Śalya*, *Strī*, and *Svargarohana*.

2. See Winternitz, *ABI*. 5. 25.

1. 2. 105 : *paurānugamanam caiva dharmaputrasya dhīmataḥ*.

Winternitz is mistaken in thinking that the line is missing in the *whole* of K : it is missing in only two MSS. of the group, albeit the best MSS. These MSS. (K0. 1) are, however, by no means infallible, as a careful study of the apparatus will show. Their evidence is, therefore, rebuttable and not conclusive. In this instance, not only does the line occur in the rest of N, but there is a corresponding line in S. I cannot think that the two lines :—

Text : *paurānugamanam caiva dharmaputrasya dhīmataḥ*
 S(except M1): *paurānukampā nirvedo dharmarājasya dhīmataḥ*
 could have arisen *wholly* independently of each other. Even though the purport of the lines is different, the *construction* is identical, which is a very important point in its favour. Either these lines are connected through the archetype, or else there is wholesale contamination between S and N except K0. 1. The latter contingency being improbable in the extreme, we are led to conclude that there must have been a line of that description in the original; only its precise reading is doubtful; the doubtful words have accordingly been indicated in the usual manner.

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The problem of the 'Mahābhārata textual criticism, as I have pointed out already, is a problem *sui generis*. Here the principles of textual reconstruction, which must first be evolved from a study of the MS. material and the MS. tradition, can be considered as finally settled only after considerable discussion and exchange of ideas on the subject. I would, therefore, earnestly request Prof. Winternitz to continue his searching and exhaustive examination of the fascicules as they are issued and publish periodically the results of his scrutiny, a proceeding which cannot but throw much-needed light on at least some of the difficult problems the editors have to face, and thus advance the cause of Mahābhārata studies.

MISCELLANEA

MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATĪ: HIS LIFE AND WORKS: A REJØINDER

A note of mine on a paper of Mr. P. C. Divanji on the life and works of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Annals*, Vol. IX, pp.309-12) has evoked a reply from him (*Op. cit.* pp. 313 ff.) in which he has questioned the accuracy of some of the statements contained in my note. The questions raised by Mr. Divanji broadly resolve themselves into three (*Op. cit.* pp. 318-9):— (1) the authorship and age of the *Vaidikavāda-mīmāṃsā*, (2) the exact location of Kotālīpādā and, (3) the proper name of Avilamba Sarasvatī.

Some minor points raised by Mr. Divanji, *e. g.* the correct form of the name *Koṭālīpādā* and the authority for the statement that *Koṭālīpādā* was an ancient site, would not have arisen at all were Mr. Divanji been supplied with a corrected proof of my note and not merely with a typed copy of it.

Koṭālīpādā is the correct Bengali form, the Bengali pronunciation of *Kotwāl* being *Koṭāla*. But Kotwālīpārā is the form adopted by the local Post-Office. The reference to recent researches by virtue of which the place is regarded as an ancient site has been quoted in the footnote of p. 311.

I should now give my remarks on the three points raised by Mr. Divanji one after another.

The statement that the *Vaidika-vāda-mīmāṃsā* is a modern work composed by a well-known Pandit Haridāsa Siddhānta-vāgīśa (and not Vidyāvāgīśa as Mr. Divanji puts it) of Haricarana Catuspāthī (P. O. Nakipur, Dt. Khulna) is made by me on the strength, not only, of what I heard from the Pandit but also of a letter that he wrote to me several years back. The work has not yet been published and is therefore to be found in a manuscript which unfortunately is in a worm-eaten condition as the author informs me.

The authenticity of the statement may as well be verified by a reference to the said Pandit, who is now settled in Calcutta.

Koṭālīpādā is still a Paraganā with a Police station and a Sub-Registrar's office and though, at present, included in the district of Faridpur lies on the border of the two adjacent

districts of Faridpur and Barisal. It is fairly distant from the district town of Faridpur to be called its suburb. It was originally included within Candradvīpa and even fifty years back formed part of the district of Barisal. The statements of old school scholars who care more for poetic cadence than anything else should be taken with proper caution in these matters.

The third point raised by Mr. Divanji is, of course, the most important. I do not know the nature and weight of the authority on which the editor of the *Vedāntakalpalatīkā* (Saraswati Bhavan Series, Benares) depended in associating the title Avilamba Sarasvatī with Yādavānanda, who had the title *Nyāyācārya*. But that he has made a confusion is clear from his hopeless combination of Yādavānanda and Mādhava. It is inconceivable how the same man came to be known both as Yādava and Mādhava.

On the other hand, Mādhavānanda Avilamba Sarasvatī is the full name of the son of Yādavānanda Nyāyācārya given in the *Vaṅger Jātīya Itihāsa*¹ (History of the Castes and Creeds of Bengal) of Mr. Nagendranath Vasu, who compiled the work after consulting all available materials.

Further, the descendants of Yādavānanda Nyāyācārya have three well-known sub-divisions tracing their lineage from three sons of Yādavānanda *viz.* Mādhava Avilamba, Viśvanātha and Raghunātha.

This is a fact known almost to every member of the line.²

This clearly goes against the identification of Avilamba with Yādavānanda. I do not know from what source the editor of the *Vedānta-kalpalatīkā* drew his information which takes no heed of a well-known fact.

CHINTAHARAN CHAKRAVARTI

1. *Varṇika Kānda*, p. 139.

2. I myself belong to the line of Mādhava Avilamba.

On p. 156 of the *Annals*, Vol. X (i-ii), Mr. P. V. Kane pointed out that the English expression, 'man in the street' has a counterpart in the Sanskrit word, *rathyāpuruṣa*,—a striking instance of idiomatic similarity. I would now give several other cases where *rathyāpuruṣa* has been used, besides those mentioned by Mr. Kane and A. B. G. (Prof. Gajendragadkar).

(1) *Nyāyabindu* (Bib. Buddhica), p. 88

तथा संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मादयश्च । यथा रागादिमानयं वचनाद्रथ्यापुरुषवत् । मरणधर्मायं पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वाद्रथ्यापुरुषवत् । असर्वज्ञोऽयं रागादिमत्त्वाद्रथ्यापुरुषवदिति । III. 126.

Also in the *Nyāyabindutīkā* (B. B.), p. 88., V. 9, 11 and 13 in the above connection—

(2) *Hetutattvopadeśa* (in Tibetan translation).¹

(a) एवं संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मो । दृष्टान्ताभासो यथा धर्मापुरुषः कश्चिद्रागादिमान् वचनाद्रथ्यापुरुषवदिति । रथ्यापुरुषे दृष्टान्ते रागादिमत्त्वं सांदिग्धम् परिचित्तस्य दुरधिगमत्वात् ।

संदिग्धसाधनधर्मो यथा मरणधर्मापुरुष इति साध्ये रागादिमत्त्वादिति हेतु रथ्यापुरुषे दृष्टान्ते संदिग्धः ... संदिग्धोभयधर्मो दृष्टान्ताभासो यथा धर्मा कश्चित् पुरुषोऽसर्वज्ञ इति साध्ये रागादिमत्त्वादिति हेतु , रथ्यापुरुषदृष्टान्ते साध्यं साधनं च संदिग्धम् ।

(b) तत्र अनन्वयो यथा यो वक्ता स रागादिमान् रथ्यापुरुषवत् ।

(3) *Parīkṣāmukhalaghuvṛtti*, Commentary on the *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* (Bib. Ind.), p. 19.

अथेदमस्त्येव विवादापन्नः पुरुषो नाशेषज्ञः वक्तृत्वात् पुरुषत्वात् पाप्यादिमत्त्वाच्च रथ्यापुरुषवदिति ।

(4) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (*Māṇikacand--Digambara-Jaina-Granthamālā*, No. 10), p. 63.

रागादिमान् सुगतो वक्तृत्वादित्यत्र रथ्यापुरुषवदिति संदिग्धसाध्यं रथ्यापुरुषे साध्यस्य प्रत्यक्षेणान्वियात्, etc .

1. The work is lost in its original Sanskrit form, but is extant in Tibetan translation. (Tanjur, Mdo, Ce, fols. 344b.6 -354a.3, Narthang edition). The Sanskrit passages are taken from my restoration of the Sanskrit text from its Tibetan translation. It may be noted that *rathyāpuruṣa* has been translated into Tibetan as *Lam-po-shāpi shye-bu* (man of a great road).

(5) *Nyāyatīpākā* (*Śaṅkarācārya-Granthaṇṭā*, No. 10) p. 14— ... अहं सर्वज्ञो भवितुं उद्यतं निर्दोषत्वात् । यस्तु न सर्वज्ञो नासौ निर्दोषो यथा रथ्यापुरुषः । इति केदलव्यतिरेकिलिङ्गानुमानम् ।

(6) *Pramāṇasamūhā*. (*Ārhatasāhityaprabhākara Series*, No. 1,) p. 83 Sūtra ? 1. 25—

वचनाद्वागे रागाभरणवर्मेकत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वयोः । संदिग्धसाध्यान्वयव्यतिरेका
रथ्यापुरुषादयः ॥

Rathyāpuruṣa occurs several times also in the *Vṛtti* on the above Sūtra.

(7) *Nyāyasāra* (Bib. Ind.), p. 14 -

संदिग्धसाधनो यथा नाथं सर्वज्ञो रागादिमत्त्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् ।

See also *Nyāyatīparyāṭikā*, pp. 142-143, where the word is used more than once.

From the above it appears that there were some stereotyped illustrations of fallacies current among the Buddhist, Jaina and Brahmanic logicians and philosophers. *Rathyāpuruṣa* was similarly a stock example, a *drṣṭānta* which, as Aksapāda has it in the *Nyāyasūtra*, must be familiar to both the expert and the average man (लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः, NS 1. 1. 25). *Rathyāpuruṣa* may perhaps be also found in other treatises of Brahmanic, Jaina and Buddhist philosophers.

(ii)

A NOTE ON THE PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYA

It is a matter of great regret that the writings of Dinnāga, one of the greatest of the philosophers that India has ever produced, are all lost in their original Sanskrit form. But it is mostly the views of Dinnāga (as well as of Dharmakīrti) that have been cited, though hardly with the mention of his name and treatise, by the Brahmanic and the Jaina philosophers in course of their repudiating the Buddhist standpoints. The extant Tibetan translations of his treatises as well as those of other Buddhist philosophers, apart from the fact of their being accessible to a few specialists, are so very terse and mechanically literal that they at times baffle all attempts at understanding. So the identification of any Sanskrit fragment with its Tibetan counterpart must always be of very great

value. It is therefore hoped that the following identification of two Kārikās in Dīnnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (lost in Sanskrit but preserved in Tibetan translation in the Tanjur, Mdo, Ce, fols. 1-13, Narthang edition) will not be without some interest to the students of Buddhism and Indian philosophy.

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) gan tshe snañ ba de gz'al bya
tshad ma dan dehi hbras bu ni;
hdzin rnam rig pañi de yi phyir
de gsum tha dad du ma byas. | yadābhāsam prameyam
tat pramāṇaphalate
punah grāhakākāra-
samvittyostrayam nātañ
prthak-kṛtam. |
|---|--|

(*Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Tib.
tshad ma kun las btus pa, Tanjur,
Mdo, Ce, fol. 2b.4).

Quoted as a
Yogācāra view in the
Nyāyaratnākara on the
Ślokavārttika the Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Series;
p. 159, also in the *Nyāya
mañjarī* of Jayanta
Bhaṭṭa, p. 540.

- | | |
|---|--|
| (2) byas phyir sgra ni rtag pa dan
lus can phyir dan gz'al ¹ min
phyir lus min phyir dan mñan
bya las mi rtag mig gis gzun
byañi phyir (<i>ibid</i> , fol. 5a. 5). | kṛtakatvād dhvanirnityo
mūrttatvād aprameyatañ
Amūrtaśrāvaṇatvābhyām
anityaś cākṣusatvatañ.
Quoted in the <i>Tattva-
saṃgraha</i> , (Gaekwad
Oriental Series), p. 404. |
|---|--|

(iii)

TWO QUOTATIONS IN TATTVASAMGRAHA-PAÑJIKĀ

Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* is an elaborate commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita² (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXX, 2 vols.) which is an encyclopaedic work undertaking to refute the doctrines of almost all the rival philosophical schools from the standpoint of a Vijñānavādin Buddhist. The *Pañjikā* abounds in quotations from several Buddhist and Brahmanical authors but for which no trace of the works and personalities of some of them would have been left to us. The Tibetan and the Chinese translations have.

1. Xylograph reads *gz an*.

2. Śāntirakṣita is to be preferred. cf. JRAS, 1927, p. 862. *Erkenntnistheorie und Logik*, p. 33 Cordier, Vol III., p. 456.

however, saved from utter oblivion the writings of many reputed Buddhist teachers. But these translations are sealed books to all but a few specialists and, therefore, their contents remain unknown and their value unappraised, until they are translated into some of our modern languages or hypothetically restored into their original Sanskrit form.

There are several quotations from Dinnāga in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā** and of these two (p. 582, ll. 10-12, 12-14) I have been able to identify with their Tibetan counterparts in the Tibetan translations of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (*dmigs pa brtag pa*) and the *Ālambanapurīkṣāvṛtti* (*dmigs pa brtag pa hgral pa*) of Dinnāga both of which are apparently lost in their original form. I also looked into the Tibetan translation of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* and found the Tibetan versions of these two passages identical with those in the Tibetan translations of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* thereon.

The Tibetan versions of the two passages side by side with their Sanskrit originals are given below—

1. yad antar jñeyarūpaṃ tu
bahirvad avabhāṣate ।
so'rtho vijñānarūpatvāt
tatpratyaayatayāpi ca ॥
Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā,
p. 582, ll. 11-12.

It is to be noted that Śaṅkara has quoted the first half of the above *kārikā* in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*, 2.12.11 28, without mentioning the name of the author or the treatise wherefrom he quotes. The current editions of the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* read *tad* instead of *tu*. But the latter is in agreement with the Tibetan version and also

nan gi śes byaḥi ṇo bo ni
phyi rol ltar snan gan yin te
don yin rnam śes ni boḥi phyir
de rkyen ṇid kyan yin phyir ro.
Ālambanaparīkṣā, Tib. *dmigs pa
brtag pa*, Tanjur (*bstan-hgyur*)
Mdo, Ce, fol 180^a6.

The reading it gives in (d) is *deḥi
rkyen ṇid kyan yin paḥi phyir ro*. This is evidently wrong; it contains 8 syllables while other *pādas* contain 7 syllables each. We have therefore accepted the reading of the *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*, Tib. *dmigs pa brtag paḥi hgral pa*, Tanjur Mdo, Ce, fol. 181^b1 and this has been supported by the reading of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, Tib. *de kho na ṇid bsdus paḥi dkaḥ hgral*, Tanjur, Mdo, Ye, fol. 161^a 4.

* Prof. Tucci ; J. R. A. S., 1928, pp. 389-397.

seems to be a better reading, as the first *yad* is to be connected with *saḥ* of the third *pāda* which otherwise will remain unconnected. The Ānandāśram edition of the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, (p. 553, f. n. 3), however, notes a variant with *tu*. The first half of the *Kārikā* has also been quoted without any reference by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (*Vijānāgram Sanskrit Series* p. 178, ll. 14–15.) Jayanta reads it thus—

yad antarjñeyarūpam *hu*
bahirvadavabhāṣate.¹

2. athavā śaktyarpanāt krame-
nāpi so'rthāvablāsāḥ svanu-
rūpakāryotpattaye śaktim
vijñānādhārām karotityaviro-
dhah. *Tattvasaṃgrahapañ-
jikā*, p. 583, ll. 13–15.

yan na nus² pa hjoḡ phyir
rim gyis yin rim³ gyis kyan
yin te don du snan ba de ni
ran⁴ snan ba dan mthun paḥi
hbras bu skyed par byed
paḥi nus par nam par śes paḥi
rten can byed pas mi hgal lo.
Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti, Tib,
dmigs pa brtag paḥi hḡrel pa,
Tanjur, Mdo. Ce, fol. 181b 3, 4

The Tibetan translation of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* reads the passage somewhat differently from the above, but agreeably to the Sanskrit, thus: *yañ na nus pa hjoḡ phyir rim gyis kyan don du snan ba de ni ran dan mthun paḥi hbras bu...etc. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, Tib, *de kho na nid bsdus paḥi dkah hḡel*, *ibid.* fol. 161a 5.

Professor Randle in his 'Fragments from *Dinwāga* (Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1926), p. 53, has suggested that the passage *sarvo*⁵ *yam anumānānumeya-*

1. Almost a similar line (*yadantarjñeyatattvam taiḥ bahirvadavabhāṣate*) occurs in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, (Government Oriental Series), p. 35.

2. *nus pa hjoḡ phyir rim gyis yin* (= *śaktyarpanāt krameṇāpi*) is the second *pāda* of the seventh *kārikā* of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, which consists of eight *kārikās* only.

3. This portion is probably explanatory.

4. *ran snan ba dan mthun* is literally *svābhāsanurūpa*. So the reading of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Tibetan), *ran dan mthun* which agrees with the Sanskrit, is preferable.

vyavahāro buddhy-ārūhḍeṇ-aiva dharma-dharmī-bhāvena na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate,¹ attributed to Dinnāga by both Vācaspati (Nyāyabīja, p. 39 and p. 100) and Nyāyaratnākara (Nyāyaratnākara on Śloka-vārtika, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 258) "may be found in Dinnāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, or in his *Vṛtti* thereon". Although it is a digression, it may be worth while to observe that the passage, being in prose, cannot *a priori* belong to the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* which is written in verse (*kārikā*), and also I have so far failed to find out its Tibetan counterpart in the Tibetan translation of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti*. It being taken for granted that the passage is quoted from Dinnāga's writings on the authority of both Vācaspati and Pārthasārathimīśra, our search may be fruitful, if we have a look into the *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti*, because the rest of his treatises extant in Tibetan translations cannot contain the passage in question, some being metrical in composition and some dealing with topics incongruous with the tenor of the above passage.

It is interesting to note that the passage has been quoted in the *Syādvādamañjarī* (*Arhatamaṭaprabhāka-akāryālaya* Poona City), p. 145, as the opinion of a Sūnyavādin. But apart from the weight of the definite ascription by both Vācaspati and Pārthasārathi to Dinnāga, who was, as is well known, a Vijñānavādin, the sense of the passage being incompatible with the position of a Sūnyavādin, it cannot in any case be fathered upon any teacher of that school. Śaṅkara also notes a similar opinion of Vijñānavādin: *tasmimśca vijñānavāde budhyārūhḍhena rūpeṇāntahstha eva pramāṇa prameya-phala-vyavahārah sarva upapadyate* (*Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* 2. 2. 28.)

Professor Stoherbatsky in his *Epistemology and Logic of the Later Buddhist Schools* (in German) has discussed the above unidentified passage. He, too has not as yet been able, to locate it in the works (in Tibetan translation) of Dinnāga, and remarks that it is possibly a misquotation. (*Erkenntnis-theorie und Logik* p. 28 and p. 270, note 46). So far as the philosophical position is concerned, there is no difficulty in connecting the passage with Dinnāga, but it is to be ascertained in what treatise of his and in what form the passage exists.*

DURGACHARAN CHATTERJI.

1. The passage has been read a bit differently in different works.

* N. B.—After the above note had been sent for publication in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* I received the *Journal Asiatique*, Tome CCXIV, No 1-1929, containing the edition of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and its *vṛtti* by Dinnāga in their Tibetan Chinese versions supplemented by a French translation, copious notes and index. I have used the Narthang edition of the *Tanjur* (Viśvabhāṭi and the Asiatic Society of Bengal Libraries) for the two Tibetan passages discussed above, but they are almost similar to those of the printed text in the *Journal Asiatique*.

EXACT DATE OF DINAKARA'S COMMENTARY
GŪDHAPRAKĀS'IKĀ ON THE
UPACĀRASĀRA OF
MUKUNDADAIVAJŊA

The *Upacārasāra* is a work on medicine in five chapters (adhikāras) composed by *Mukundadaivajña*, son of Raṅga-nātha Ganaka. Aufrecht makes no mention of this work in his *Catalogus Catalogorum*. The following MSS. of the work are in the Government MSS. Library at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute :—

(1) No. 86 of 1907-15 (text only) dated Śaka 1736.

(2) No. 587 of 1899-1915 (text with commentary *Gūḍhaprakāśikā* of *Dinakara*).

A third MS. of the work is in the Library of the Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay. It has been described by Prof. H. D. Velankar in his *Descriptive Catalogue of the MSS. of that Society*.¹ It is dated Śaka 1756 and contains the text of *Mukundadaivajña* with the commentary of *Dinakara*. As regards the date of *Dinakara's Commentary*, with which I am concerned here at present, Prof. Velankar remarks: "The Commentary was composed by *Dinakara* at Poona in the 18th Century."

This remark is evidently based on the incorrect chronogram contained in the following verses quoted by Prof. Velankar :—

“ रवमुद्राश्वभूषाके बहुधान्याख्यवत्सरे ।

कार्तिके पूर्वपक्षे च चतुर्थ्यामिन्दुवासरे ॥ २ ॥

दिनकरोकरोद्दीकां नाम्ना गृहप्रकाशिकाम् ।

पुण्यग्रामे यथामत्या स्वीकुर्वन्तु मिषग्वराः ॥ ३ ॥

The chronogram “रवमुद्राश्वभूषाके” in the above stanza is incorrect as the letters “मुद्रा” make no meaning whatsoever. The correct chronogram is “खसमुद्राश्वभूषाके” as is given in the B. O. R. Institute MS. No. 587 of 1899-1915 mentioned above. This gives us Śaka 1740, i. e. A. D. 1818 as the exact date of *Dinakara's commentary*. The B. O. R. Institute MS. (No. 86 of 1907-15) which is dated Śaka 1736 and which contains the text only is a copy written three years earlier than the composition of *Dinakara's commentary*.

P. K. GODE

1. *Descriptive Catalogue*, Vol. I (1925), pp. 55-56.

Vol. XI]

[Part III

**Annals of the
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
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CONTENTS

VOL. XI, PART III

(24-7-30)

ARTICLES :	Pages
1 Peep into Ancient Indian Sociology, by Dr. R. Shamshastri, B. A., Ph. D.	... 201-234
2 Bengal's Contribution to Sanskrit Literature, by Chintaharan Chakra- varti, M. A.	... 235-258
3 Epic Studies : III, Dr. Ruben on the Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata, by Dr. V. S. Sukthankar, M. A., Ph. D.	... 259-283
4 The Grammar of the Gītā: A Vindica- tion, by B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma.	... 284-299
REVIEWS	
5 Karma Yoga, reviewed by Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, M. A., Ph. D.	... 300

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona

Vol. XI]

April 1930

[Part III

A PEEP INTO ANCIENT INDIAN SOCIOLOGY

By

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India has no history of its own. What is now taught as its history in schools and colleges is a recent compilation based upon modern archaeological research. It gives a bare outline of the vicissitudes of a number of successive ruling dynasties that ruled over different parts of India. As it is based upon epigraphical records and biographical and literary works, the information it supplies does not go far beyond an account of the personal achievements of a few famous kings. Little or nothing is known of the evolution of India's social, religious, economical and political institutions. The field of India's sociological activity, however, is no less extensive than that of any other nation on the globe. Compared with the extensiveness of the field, our knowledge of the harvest it has yielded is very scanty. There is, however, no dearth of materials for the formation of such a history. What thwarts our attempts in this direction is the difficulty in putting the scattered materials so as to take that shape which they once had. It is quite possible that old and worn out materials may be so adjusted and fitted together as to form a new shape altogether. Fragments of old texts found here and there may be brought together and made to convey ideas never dreamt of by their framers. On the strength of a passage or verse an historian may come to the conclusion that a representative or republican form of government was a thing unknown in India and that despotism, sometimes benevolent, sometimes tyrannical has ever been its course. On the other hand, on the basis of the Atharvavedic passage (2-27) containing a prayer for power to refute an adversary's speech in an assembly, a contradictory

conclusion may also be arrived at that Ancient India had a Parliamentary form of government. Again in consideration of A. V. 6-73-1, 2, 3, calling for the unanimity of kinsmen in supporting a Rāja as their mighty guardian, it may also be thought that the people were real governors, and that the Rāja was no more than a commander of the army. Such are the difficulties experienced in the collection of scattered materials and their correct interpretation.

The best way to avoid such unfounded conclusions and hasty generalisations is to test their accuracy from various stand-points. Before accepting a solitary statement found in the literary remains of a people and passing it on as an historical fact, it is possible to examine its reliability in the light furnished by philology, ethnology, anthropomorphology, contemporary history, Indo-European antiquities, and lastly additional literary records of the people themselves. With such means of verification of the results, of study and investigation, I propose to make a survey of ancient Indian Sociology and ascertain the views of the ancients on ethics, economics and politics.

It may be taken as a truism that a people's social and religious institutions correspond to its political institutions. No people that have either voluntarily or by force yielded themselves to be slaves to time-honoured social and religious customs can be believed to be capable of exercising their right to political freedom to any appreciable degree. Nor can political despotism find a place among people habituated to freedom of thought and action in social and religious matters. For it is an historical fact that before the advent of the Mohamedans and the British into India, the above three aspects of social activity were inseparably connected with and acting and reacting upon each other. In the early stages of social life in India as elsewhere supervision over the three kinds of activity, social, religious and political, was entrusted to a single tribunal, be it an assembly or a king.

In the patriarchal stage it was the father that is believed to have exercised his authority over and guided the activities of the members of his family. In the tribal stage it was the tribal chief whose voice was supreme on questions concerning these matters. In the sweet home love seems to have softened the iron-rule of the father, while in the tribal state decision over controversial questions seems to have been arrived at on

the consensus of the tribe. A nation or a state is more or less an enlargement of the tribe by conquest and addition to itself of other tribes in adjacent tracts of land. A nation claiming and practising freedom of thought and action in social and religious matters cannot be believed to have been submissive to political tyranny. So long as India was under its own rulers, it rested with the ruler of each of its several states to give a rule or decision, in consultation with his assembly, on questions connected with any of the three kinds of activity.

But no sooner had India passed under Mohamedan rule, it had to bow down before two tribunals, one exercising its authority on social and religious questions and the other on political questions.

It is admitted that during the Vedic period rules to regulate social customs and religious worship were still in a state of formation. There was no caste. The words, *Brahma*, *Kṣatra* *Viś*, and *Śūdra* met in the Vedas are names of classes rather than of castes. Those who qualified themselves for priest-craft were called *Brāhmins*. Those who were fit or trained for military profession were termed *Kṣatriyas*. The trading and agricultural people were known as *Viś* or *Vaiśyas*. The servile class recruited from the conquered people received the designation, *Śūdra*. Function rather than birth determined the class to which an individual belonged. This is proved by what *Lāṭyāyana*, the author of a *Śrautasūtra* belonging to the *Sāma* Veda, says (X-II.-45-5-6) in connection with the *Daśapeya*, a sacrifice in which ten priests have to drink a cup of *Soma* juice after enumerating the names of their ten ancestral fathers and mothers. The *Brāhmaṇa* lays down, says *Lāṭyāyana*, that the priests should proceed to drink their respective *Soma* cups after enumerating the names of ten ancestral fathers and mothers; if however they come across the names of one or two non-*Brāhman* women, they should begin with the next *Brāhman* woman and complete the number ten by repetition. Those who do not remember the names may begin with the name they remember. From this it is clear that during the Vedic period the *Brāhmins* used to marry wives from non-*Brāhman* classes, and sons begotten on such wives were free to follow the profession of their fathers, whatever might be the class to which their mother, belonged by birth. In his *Dharma-Sūtra* (IV-22-23-24) *Gautama* says : ‘ ‘ In the seventh generation men obtain a change of caste (rather class)

either by being raised to a higher one or being degraded to a lower one. The venerable teacher says that this happens in the fifth generation." Commenting on the above Sūtras Haradatta says as follows "If a *Savarna* female, born of a Ksatriya wife of a Brāhman, is married to a Brāhman, and her female descendants down to the seventh likewise, then the offspring which that seventh female descendant bears to her Brāhman husband is equal in caste to that of a Brāhman. In like manner if a *Savarna* male, the son of a Brāhman, and of a Ksatriya wife, marries a Ksatriya wife and his male descendants down to the seventh generation likewise, then the offspring of that seventh male descendant is equal in caste to that of a Ksatriya."

According to Gautama's teachers this kind of elevation to, or degradation from, a class is permitted even in the fifth generation. According to Lātyāna's statement quoted above, however, change of class was permitted even in the second, if not in the first, generation. That choice of a profession depended not upon birth but upon individual taste and capacity is also corroborated by the *Visnu-Purāṇa*. "The sons of Dhṛṣṭa," says the *Visnu-Purāṇa*, "though Ksatriyas by birth, became Brāhmins; the Rathītaras are termed Brāhmins following the profession of Kṣatriyas; the sons of Agniveśya, a king of the Solar line, became Agniveśyāyana Brāhmins; likewise the sons of Hārīta, the son of Yauvanāśva, are termed Brāhmins with the profession of Ksatriyas. Similarly the Gārgyas, the sons of Garga, though Ksatriyas by birth, became Brāhmins; Kapi, the son of Uruksaya, became Brāhman; from Mudgala, the son of Haryaśva, descended the Maudgalya Brāhmins. The story narrated in the *Mahābhārata* (*Ādiparvan*, chap. 128) of Śvetaketu's protest against the custom of an honoured guest being allowed to lie down with the host's wife for a night or two, goes to show the looseness of marriage-tie. The story of the birth of Satyakāmaśrībālā before his mother*Jabālā was duly married, and of his initiation as a Brāhman student by Gautama Hārīdrumata (*Chāndogya* IV.-00) is another striking instance of the absence of hard and fast rules regulating social conduct. Also such of the customs as are prohibited for the Kali age go to show that man was at liberty to do whatever his taste and pleasure dictated and the ethical notions of his time permitted. They also go to show that there was no restriction whatever to

connubium and *commensalism* and that it was left to the option of women either to marry or live a spiritual life as *Brahma vādinis*. The customs prohibited for the Kali age are :—

Admission of sea-farers back into the society; embracing asceticism and holding a water-vessel made of dry bitter gourd; marriage with girls other than of their own class by men of the three upper classes; the custom of deputing a brother to beget a son on the wife of his dead brother; the slaughter of a cow on the occasion of entertaining a guest; use of flesh in ancestral ceremonies; embracing the *Vānaprastha* order or living like a hermit in forests; the remarriage of virgin widows; the observance of bachelorhood for a long time; performance of human and horse sacrifices; the custom of making a long and difficult journey with a view to end one's life, and the slaughter of a cow in sacrifice; sojournment of *Brāhmans*; snoking; admission to society of women outraged by force; begging his food from people of all the four classes by an ascetic; and employment of *Sūdras* as cook in the houses of *Brāhmana*.¹

No less striking is the degree of freedom of thought and action enjoyed by ancient Indians in religious matters during the Vedic and Paurānic periods. It was during what may be called the Hindu period, extending from the Vedic period down to the tenth century A. D., that India witnessed the rise and growth of different schools of thought on subjects such as grammar, logic, medicine, metaphysics, ethics, theology, and the like. There are three stages clearly discernible in the Hindu religious thought. The first is the stage of Polytheism along with Fetishism and Animism coeval with the Vedic period extending, according to the opinion of Western scholars, from B. C. 1500 to B. C. 1000. The second is that of Pantheism of the *Upaniṣads* extending from B. C. 1000 to about B. C. 300. The third is the stage of Monotheism coeval with the *Āgamic* and Paurānic periods, extending from B. C. 300 to A. D. 900, when systematization of Indian religion and philosophy was begun in right earnest by reformers and commentators like *Samkarācārya* and other philosophers.

The Vedic Polytheism consists in the worship of a number of gods, all being of an equal status. They are either personi-

1 *Nirṇayasindhu* IV.

fifications of natural phenomena, or deifications of animals and natural objects. Besides these, the spirits of the dead are also worshipped as gods. The worship is called Yāga or Yajña, which consists in making an animal or vegetable offering into the sacred fire for transmission to the gods invoked. These gods are so anthropomorphic in conception that they are easily mistaken for departed heroes of the Vedic people. In fact some of the Western scholars went so far as to identify them with departed heroes of the same names, and rejected the theory of the personification of natural phenomena. The individual and social life of the gods may accordingly be said to be a duplicate copy of the life of the Āryans of the period. It is usual with the Vedic poets to raise to the rank of a supreme deity any of the gods they specially worshipped for the attainment of a particular object. This tendency of the poets is called Henotheism or Kathenotheism by Max Müller. Powerful as are the gods they are never worshipped in any slavish spirit. Offerings are made to them in exchange for the boons and blessings they are believed to confer upon the worshippers. Like the worshipping Āryans the gods are also divided into three classes, Brahma, Kṣatra, and Viś. They are as warlike as the Āryans. The classification of the gods according to their imagined rank is a characteristic of later Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism and is unknown to the Vedas. At the close of the Vedic period the poets rise to the conception of one god in whom all other gods are merged, or who is called by various names. "The one Being they call variously." This conception of unity has not however resulted in the conception of a single personal god like Śiva or Viṣṇu. It took the form of the Pantheism of the Upanisads. It is conceived as an universal spirit identical with the soul or self in man, as explained by some philosophers.

With the Upanisads there have arisen in Ancient India a number of philosophic schools. Not satisfied with the cult of animal sacrifice elaborated in the Vedas and the Brāhmanas, there arise several schools of theologians and metaphysicians. With a view to conceal their apostacy from the Vedic sacrificial cult, they interpret the Vedas in metaphysical light. They teach that knowledge of the self is the sacred fire; the mind and the senses are the victims to be immolated; the end to be attained is Mokṣa or emancipation from the bondage of the world. Conquest of passions by controlling senses is the main theme

common to all the schools. The Sāṅkhyas, the Yogins the Kānādas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Buddhists, the Jains, and the Vedāntins come before our view vying with each other in expounding their own views on the nature of matter, spirit and emancipation. They are all atheistic inasmuch as they admit no personal god or an intelligent Being endowed with supreme power. It is on the other hand Brahman the Universal Saccidānanda, i. e. sat, eternal, cit, consciousness, and ānanda, perfect bliss. It is Pūrṇa, complete and is wanting in nothing for completion. This universal consciousness or caitanya is identical with individual self, Jīvātman. Opposed to caitanya there is matter *rūpa* of various forms and names. What is called matter is mere appearance of the universal caitanya which underlies it. Just as man regards the colourless sky as blue and the moon as being one foot (*prādesa*) in diameter, and just as he mistakes a rope for a snake and mirage for water, so he mistakes caitanya for matter such as stone, tree, pot, mat, and the like. The whole of the universe is nothing but a conscious-stuff and appears variously. Appearance is the nature of caitanya. It is unknowable in its real form, for it has no form. Māyā is the name given to appearance. Not knowing or realising the distinction between caitanya and its appearance, man mistakes appearance for reality and is thereby involved in what is called endless *samsāra* and its miseries.

In order to get rid of this misery of life, he has to realise the real nature of his self and its identity with the universal self. One who realises this can very easily get rid of the idea of "the other." Since all individual selves are identical with the universal self, there can be no other self. The distinction of "mine and thine" vanishes to him. Since self is wanting in nothing, and is *pūrṇa* or complete in itself, a wise man has nothing to achieve. All that he is obliged to do is preservation of the body with a view to attain the right knowledge of caitanya. The action which he is thus required to undertake is to be rather of an involuntary than of voluntary nature. This necessitates on his part the conquest of the senses, the will and the mind. Man's nature is to be active. Usually human activity is after external or objective pleasure as contrasted with subjective pleasure. It is objective pleasure which impels him to have his mouth wide open to swallow the whole world and to achieve what he considers his pleasure. He is not in need of liberty or freedom of the will of which nature has

endowed him with more than he requires. But he has no restraints provided for against his reckless dissipations. The one restraint devised in the Vedānta śāstra is Nivṛtti or withdrawal from all kinds of objective pursuits except those which natural and involuntary animal appetite demands from him. These animal cravings are, in the words of the Upanisads, thirteen in number. They are (1) seeing (2) hearing (3) touching (4) smelling (5) eating (6) walking (7) sleeping (8) breathing (9) talking (10) excretion (11) catching hold of any support and (12 & 13) winking i. e., closing and opening the eye-lids. These are all nature's own activities or involuntary actions. Such acts as are voluntary are regarded as temptations leading man astray unless his activity is made with no motive or desire for any result thereof.

"By the body," says the Bhagavadgītā, "by the mind, by the intellect and by mere senses also, Yogins perform actions without attachment, for the purification of the self."

Thus exclusive attachment to the fruits of bodily actions or intellectual and sensual activities is condemned in clear terms. Is then, it may be questioned, life worth living? Will any one engage himself in agriculture, trade or other occupations with no desire for the profits accruing from them? Why should a man marry a wife, if it were not for domestic pleasure? It must be noted in reply that action is not prohibited in its entirety. All kinds of activities, physical, mental and spiritual, are undertaken for pleasure and pleasure alone. It is pleasure that impels man to be active. Even Yogic practice or mysticism is learnt for pleasure in this or the other world. The Vedāntic Brahmadyāna or constant contemplation on Brahman, the Universal self, is for Mokṣa which is eternal bliss. "Rāgādeva pravṛtṭih" "pleasure alone is the motive of action" is the saying of the Mīmāṃsakas. But what is meant by non-attachment to fruits of action is this :—

There are two kinds of pleasure, subjective and objective. Subjective pleasure is the nature of the self itself and cannot be avoided. But objective pleasure is neither permanent nor unavoidable. In his Vivekasāra (Mss. p. 72), Śaṅkarānanda says that pleasure is innate, and that objects appearing to give pleasure are only stimulants. His reasons for arriving at this conclusion are marshalled as follows :—

"Is pleasure a quality of the objects enjoyed? or is it a mental phenomenon? or is it a characteristic of

place or time ? or is it a product or result of action ? or is it a quality of the senses ? or is it the nature of self itself ? It is not a quality of the objects perceived ; for, the feeling of pleasure experienced at the moment of perceiving an object disappears the next moment, though there is the object still under the act of perception ? If it were a property of the object perceived, the feeling of pleasure would have continued, just as a fragrant smell is continued to be experienced as long as the flower giving rise to the sensation of fragrance remains close by. Hence it follows that it is not a property of the object perceived or enjoyed.

Nor is it a function of the mind, for in the absence of objects of enjoyment the mind does not experience the feeling of pleasure, as it would have done if it were its own function.

Nor is it the function of the association of mind with objects for even though there is such association, the feeling of pleasure experienced in the first moment of contact disappears the next moment.

Nor is it a property of the enjoyer, for, the feeling of pleasure is not constantly experienced. If it were the property of the enjoyer, there would have been no break in experiencing the enjoyer's own property by the enjoyer. Nor is it a characteristic of activity, for activity is invariably painful. Nor is it a result of past deeds, for, the body which is believed to be the result of past deeds is a victim of misery and pain. Nor is it due to place and environments, for in the same place and under the same environments experience of pleasure and pain varies with different men. If it were due to place and environments, all men in the same place and under the same environments would have felt pleasure or pain equally. Nor is it a property of time, for if it were so, all men would have experienced pleasure equally like heat and cold. Nor is it a property of senses, for the dumb, the deaf, the blind, and the like experience pleasure notwithstanding the deformity of their senses. Then the only remaining alternative is whether it is a property of the self. Here there are two issues to be considered : (1) is it a property of the self or (2) is it

the nature of the self. It cannot be said that it is a quality of the self, for, the disappearance of property causes the disappearance of that which possesses that property or quality as its constituent. But in the case of the self even in the absence of the feeling of pleasure, there is the consciousness of self's existence. Hence it cannot be said to be a quality of the self. It follows that it is the nature of the self itself. But it may be questioned that if pleasure is the nature of Caitanya itself why it is not always felt. "

The answer in Śamkarānanda's own words is as follows :—

"There are two forms of pleasure, subjective and objective, The former is the nature of the self and is eternal, the latter is momentary and is due to external objects which are only stimulants. He who has realised self-pleasure does not stand in need of stimulants to experience his own self pleasure. "

This is demonstrated even in the life of animals, as stated by Śamkarācārya in his Śataśloki :

With the instinctive belief that pleasure is caused by external objects, the eagle flies high up in the sky in search of its prey on the surface of the earth. In vain it flies far and wide until at last feeling quite fatigued it perches itself on the branch of a tree, falls asleep and enjoys its own pleasure."

Whatever may be the difference in other philosophical matters, there is agreement among all schools of Indian philosophical systems in the theory of pleasure explained above. The Vedāntists, the Buddhists, the Jainas, the Kāṇādas, the Viśeṣikas, the Śaivites and the Vaiṣṇavites have all accepted the Upanisadic theory of pleasure and preached renunciation of the world and worldly activity for the sake of momentary pleasure as the best means of realising eternal pleasure. On this theory of pleasure are based their theory of ethics, economics and politics. Reserving economics and politics for consideration in the third and fourth Lectures, I proceed to explain their theory of ethics as briefly as possible.

In the Vedic period their ethical theory was based upon pleasure and pain. Whatever was considered to be productive of pleasure in this or the other world was regarded

as Dharma, good and righteous, and the reverse as bad and vicious. Telling the truth, charity and sacrificial acts are good on account of their leading the true, the charitable and the sacrificing to the Svarga, the abode of pleasure, after death. Lie, theft and impiety lead the guilty to hell to suffer for their wickedness. Varuna with his spies is considered to watch over the good and bad deeds of men.

This theory of good as pleasure-giving and bad as pain-giving promoted the habit of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.

Since there is no action which is absolutely productive of unmixed pleasure or pain, the Mimāṃsakas or the Exegetists of the Vedas expounded a new theory of Dharma and Adharma, good and bad. Jaimini in his *Mimāṃsā-sūtras* defines Dharma as follows:—

“Codanālakṣano'rtho Dharmah.”

The meaning of this aphorism according to authoritative commentators is this:—Whatever is enjoined by a verb in imperative mood in a sentence in the Vedas, or in the common parlance, and is at the same time beneficial, but not harmful, is Dharma. In this definition is included both religious and secular Dharmas. In the Vedic sentence, “Whoever is desirous of attaining to Svarga, the abode of pleasure, after death, shall perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice,” the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is Dharma, since it is believed to enable the performer to attain to Heaven after death. This act is also beneficial. In the sentence “Whoever is desirous of causing the death of an enemy, shall perform Śyena sacrifice, the sacrificial act is harmful, inasmuch as it causes the death of a person and thereby involves the performer in sin. Likewise in the sentences commonly used in conversation:—“Whoever is desirous of long life shall drink milk,” and “whoever is desirous of long life shall not drink liquor,” milk-drinking is good and liquor-drinking is bad. In the case of Vedic sacrificial acts the result is invisible, while in worldly acts the result is realised sooner or later.

The theory propounded in the Sūtra is that the conception of good and bad, and virtue and vice is not an innate idea of man. It is acquired through language in social intercourse; the language which supplies information as to what is good or bad or what is virtuous and vicious may be a religious text

traditionally handed down from generation to generation, or a secular sentence now and then heard in common parlance. Language is a social product, and whatever is known through language is social experience, acquired, tested and proved by a number of generations. It follows therefore that the conception of good and bad and virtue and vice is the result of social evolution. Whatever act receives social approbation is regarded as *Dharma* and whatever act meets with social condemnation is *Adharma*. The Western expounders of the evolutionary hypothesis of ethics are of the same opinion: according to Mr. Stephen "the normal sense is a product of the social factor." (*Science of Ethics* p. 372). Again on pages 350 and 351 he says that "the conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to obey the primary conditions of its welfare." Mr. Laird in his "Study in Moral Theory" says, agreeing with Kant's theory of categorical imperative, that "Duties are unconditional demands, categorical imperatives, self-justifying injunctions. The "ought" of morality may very well justify itself." (page 20). Again on page 40 he says that "A categorical proposition is a statement asserted directly and without conditions or governing conjunctions, while a hypothetical proposition is one in which the apodosis is expressly contingent upon and governed by, a ruling protasis (or assumption or hypothesis). Extending this usage by analogy, Kant meant by a Categorical Imperative one that is not subject to conditions or qualifications, but on the contrary "shines like a jewel by its own light," while a Hypothetical Imperative is borrowed and contingent. The latter class Kant subdivided into rules of skill and counsels of prudence remarking that the precepts for the physician to cure his patient and for a prisoner to kill him" are equally matters of skill, and that prudence can never yield us certainty. A command of morality is subject to no governing clause. Counsels inform us that we must employ certain means if we desire certain ends."

The obligatory and optional rules enjoined in the Vedas are quite similar to the duties commanded by categorical and hypothetical imperatives referred to by Mr. Laird. "Tell the truth; do not steal," "Thou shalt have no intercourse with others' wives" are assertions containing categorical imperatives enjoining, under all conditions and circumstances, the duty of telling the truth and of committing no theft or adultery. The

duty of performing a Jyotistoma sacrifice with the desire of getting into heaven is enjoined by a hypothetical imperative such as "Svargakāmo Jyotiṣṭomena Yajeta," whoever is desirous of Svarga, pleasure, shall perform Jyotistoma sacrifice. Lekewise in all worldly and other-worldly acts it is these two kinds of imperatives that inspire the sense of obligatory or optional duties in man. There are two schools of thinkers regarding the origin of these imperatives. One school ascribes the origin to *Pratibhā*, intuition, and the other to sacred or secular sentences. We shall see more of these theories in the second lecture.

Since social experience is ever growing and therefore varying from time to time, the conception of good and bad must also necessarily vary with time. This is confirmed by the history of morals, of all nations and admits of no doubt. The conception of good and bad, right and wrong and virtue and vice varies not only with time but also with the place and environment. In case of doubt, it is only social approbation and condemnation of a course of action that is regarded as a determinant of its goodness and badness at the time and place. This is clearly stated in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa: "if the student has doubt concerning an act or conduct, then recourse should be had to the attitude of Brāhmins, competent to judge, apt, devoted, not harsh, lovers of virtue; as they behave themselves in such a case so should the student behave himself." Śvetaketu's protest against his father's attempt to allow an honoured guest to lie down with his mother is an instance of customs changing according to change in sentiment due to time.

In the polytheistic stage of the Vedic period, the ethical views of the invading Aryans were such as were quite suited to the time and place. Probably no other people would behave better than they did under the circumstances. Judged by their myths and anthropomorphic views about their gods, they do appear to be as indifferent to the moral qualities of their acts as the Greeks and the Romans. But it is wrong to base our judgment about the morality of a people on their myths. Jealousy, malice, treachery, gambling, plunder, and capture of women are sins and crimes from which no warlike people of ancient time were free. But we are not justified in coming to the conclusion that the atrocities committed by a people in war form the true moral code of their conduct in peace. Nor

are we right in basing the moral code of a people on the anthropomorphic features and conduct of their gods, inasmuch as we do not know exactly what sort of natural phenomena the poets were obliged to describe in terms of their gods' immoral demeanour, which they were not slow to condemn outright. For violating the chastity of Ahalyā, Indra is cursed to possess a body of thousand bhagas (uvulas). Such abnormal traits of character and conduct are termed sāhasa, indiscreet acts, and are expressly condemned as bad examples never to be imitated. Hence I presume that the remarks made by Dr. A. B. Keith on the ethics of the Brāhmanas are far from being deserved. In his religion and philosophy of the Vedas (vol II, p. 470) he says that "these texts (the Brāhmanas) do not develop any theory of morality. Indeed they do not normally inculcate morality even on merely empiric grounds. The myths which they recount and invent have this characteristic about them, that they are indifferent to the moral qualities of the acts; the gods are willing to commit sins freely for their own gain." As I have already stated, it is quite unreasonable to base the moral code of a people on their myths. If we were to do so, there would be no nation on earth free from the charge of immorality. Regarding the insolence and insult shown in asking the wife of the sacrificer, as pointed out by Dr. Keith, whether she has consorted with any other than her husband, I presume that what is emphasized here in putting such a question to the wife is the maintenance of her fidelity to her husband, but not her faithlessness and her hesitation or readiness to confess it. The insistence on the confession about the perpetration of guilt, if any, is a preventive, and not an inducement to commit crime for the sake of confessing it. The Subrahmanya litany sung at the outset of a sacrifice, declaring that the priests engaged for the sacrifice are legitimate children of Brāhman couples, faithful to each other (Subrahmanya), equally shows the paramount importance which the ancient Indians attached to the maintenance of chastity on the part of both man and woman. It is wrong to interpret this litany as indicating promiscuity in ancient Indian society. The marriage of Draupadī to the five sons of Pāṇḍu is explained by Kumārila, the celebrated commentator on Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā sūtras, as a mythological story metaphorically describing the exercise of sovereign power by the five brothers together. In answer to the question put to her whether she has consorted with any other than her five husbands, she stated that she had

a liking for a sixth husband also. This is commonly interpreted as a reference to Karna, the eldest son of Pāṇḍu, who would have also married Draupadī or had a share in sovereign power, if he had not been deserted or abandoned by Kuntī, his mother. Again it is obligatory on the part of every man of the twice-born castes, the Brāhmanas, the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas, to sip water by saying in the Vedic words of the morning or evening prayer, that he may be absolved of such unconscious transgressions as he might have committed in mind, or speech, with hands or feet or in eating or in sexual intercourse, or any other sin committed during the day or night. In this connection it is wrong to represent the Hindus as being ever ready to pray for redemption from sins which they have no scruples in committing. As a matter of fact this prayer is intended to remind every twice-born individual twice a day of his sacred duty to guard himself against the usual human tendency of unconsciously going astray. The authors of the Dharma-sūtras all are unanimous in saying that there can be no redemption from sins which are deliberately committed, though there is permission in the Śāstras to absolve a man of his unconscious transgressions and grant him admission into society. "Those who unconsciously fall into error and confess it, taking care not to repeat such errors again for a second time are termed sensible (ātmaavat): those that wilfully commit sins in spite of warning are habitual criminals (durātmans); and those who conceal the crimes they commit are the worst sinners. The teacher can bring round and set right the conduct of the sensible; the king will chastise the criminals, while Yama, the god of death alone is the chastiser of the worst sinners.

As regards the absence of development of any theory of morality in the Brāhmanas, I have not clearly understood what Dr. Keith has meant thereby. I do not know whether he refers to the Hedonistic, Intuitive, and Utilitarian theories of morality which have made so much noise in books and papers without any benefit to society and to its moral improvement. It is not that the ancients were not aware of the Hedonistic theory of morality. It is implied in the very example quoted in illustrating the definition of Dharma, good, by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsā sūtras. The illustrative sentence is "whoever is desirous of attaining to Svarga, the abode of

pleasure shall perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice". Pleasure as motive for action is made clear here. Utility as a motive for action is clearly stated in the oft quoted verse meaning "with no end in view not even an idiot sets to work". The intuitive theory is given expression to by Kālidāsa in his Śakuntala: "Pramānamantaḥ-karanapravṛttayaḥ", authoritative are automatic or instinctive movements. Besides, the age of the Brāhmaṇas is too early a period in the evolution of the Āryan to expect him to theorise on social, moral or political principles. In the age of the Upaniṣads, we have a grand theory of morality which will be dealt with presently. The Purāṇic and Āgamic age is noted for the elaboration of theories of morality based upon divine inspiration social consciousness, and intuitive suggestions or commands. The treatment of this subject will be taken up again along with the development of the Āgamic and the Dravidian culture. But none of these theories can be demonstrated and proved. After all, whatever obtains social approbation is good, and whatever is socially condemned is bad, as implied in Jaimini's famous definition of Dharma. I presume that our scientific age has made no improvement on this definition; nor are we in a better position to give decisive answers to questions on the morality of a nation or of an individual. we only appeal to public opinion.

Again taking the Brāhmaṇic sentence that "gods are true," Dr. Keith remarks on it by saying that "the nature of the truth is not vitally moral: it is strictly confined to the precise carrying out of the rites and utterance of the formulae of the sacrificial ritual. Just as man's faith is not in the goodness of the gods, but in the efficacy of the sacrifice, if duly performed, so truth has no real moral content and in intellectual outlook is limited to the sacrifice which, it must be admitted, is for the Brāhmaṇas, the reality *par excellence*." Here also I presume that Dr. Keith is not right in his interpretation. By the Brāhmaṇa saying that "gods are true" is meant the regularity and the precise periodicity of their heavenly movements. In the statement made in the Brāhmaṇas that corresponding to the precision of the movements of the gods, the sacrificial performance must also be precise and exact in all its details the Brāhmaṇas do not refer to any moral truth here. Like the word good, the word true means many things. A true picture means a picture exactly corresponding to its original. A true answer means a correct answer. A true man means a

man stating facts as they are seen, heard or known to him or keeping his word. So in the context referred to by Dr. Keith, the word true (*satya*) is used to mean precision and not moral truth, and it is not fair to condemn the authors of the *Brāhmaṇas* because they do not use the word "true" in its moral sense when precision is meant by them to be conveyed by the word. When however the *Brāhmaṇa* means moral truth, as in the sentence "*satyam vada*" it certainly means moral truth, but not precision or exactitude there.

But generally speaking the question arises what is truth after all? The ultimate truth is really unknown and the *Upanisads* speak volumes in favour of the sincere and commendable attempts made by the ancient Indians to ascertain the nature of the ultimate truth and deduce therefrom the nature of the relative truth also. *Vyāvaharika-satya* is the name given to relative truth. They profess that they have succeeded in their attempt and found out that the absolute ultimate truth is *Caitanya*, *Saccidānanda*, and nothing else. Self is true and matter is mere appearance and so false. The physical body is material and is transient as contrasted with the eternity of the spirit, the *Saccidānanda*. Since the spirit is complete in itself and is wanting in nothing, no action good or bad is needed for the sake of the spirit. It is the physical body that needs constant action to repair its wear and tear. It is this action that is susceptible of being looked upon either as good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust according as it is done with attention to spiritual, or physical well-being. On the spiritual plane there is needed no such distinction as good or bad, for there is no action whatever. On the material side this distinction is needed more than we have actually allowed. The ideal ever kept before the view by the *Vedāntins* and even by the *Jainas* is what is termed *Naiskarmyasiddhi*, realisation of the state of inaction, and annihilation of the will. When the will is subdued and the state of inaction is attained in *Samādhi* or concentration of the mind on *Caitanya*, there is no occasion for such a *Yogi* to think of good or bad, right or wrong, and just or unjust. He has nothing to do with such distinctions for he has abandoned all actions. No such thoughts as those of slaying an embryo, the murder of a father or a mother will ever dawn in his mind, for the realisation of the true nature of *Caitanya* or self has once for all raised him to the spiritual sphere which is beyond the world's moral sphere.

Speaking of Carlyle's views on morality; Martineau says in his *Types of ethical theory*, P. 35, that "according to the latter (Carlyle) there is something higher than moral life; a region in which the authority of the right and the good vanishes and ceases to be supreme: as soon as we meet the divine, we leave moral distinctions behind. It is regrettable that such a great Sanskrit scholar as Dr. A. B. Keith has misunderstood the spirit of the philosophy of the Upanisads and found no ground of morality in it. He says in his *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas* (vol 2, p. 584-5) "There is made no attempt to make the theoretical philosophy a ground of morality of any sort." The possession of knowledge makes a man independent of all morality, the slaying of an embryo, the murder of a father or a mother." They have completely failed to see that morality is the most objective and essential part of philosophy. "Knowledge in the Upanisads is essentially profitable and by no means for spiritual ends alone. He who knows the world as five-fold obtains it, he who knows Indra as without a rival has no rival; the possessor of knowledge cannot be injured by an enemy. Knowledge obliterates evil; one who knows may consort with even the murderer without being contaminated." (p. 586). Also he terms the philosophy of the Upanisads as "intellectual gymnastics" and Yogic practice as "wild fantasies."

The principal aim of the Upanisads is the realisation of the state of inaction. How can it then afford a ground for morality which is entirely objective? As it has no concern with the world of action, good or bad, it is above the moral or immoral world, where there can be no talk of the slaying of an embryo, the murder of a father or of the mother, Prof. Keith says that "Knowledge in the Upanisads is for profitable and by no means for spiritual ends alone." Knowledge taught in the Upanisads is self-knowledge and self-knowledge alone. Except spiritual ends what other ends, it may be questioned, do the Upanisads promise? It cannot be children, or money; for renunciation of wife, children, wealth in short, of the world itself, is the first and most sacred and indispensable duty of a Self-seeker. Is it empire-making or exploiting of other nations? According to Dr. Keith himself there is no political theory taught or expounded in the Upanisads. The Upanisadic sentence "whoever knows the world five-fold obtains it" refers to the Pañcikarāṇa process of the origin of the world and its

obtainment means the knowledge of its nature. It does not mean that the knower of the world becomes a lord or an emperor of it. The knowledge of Indra as without a rival means the knowledge of Brahman without a second entity either similar or dissimilar to Brahman, the individual self also being the same as Brahman according to the Upaniṣads. Hence it follows that the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman and will have no rival and will be free from all sorts of fear, sorrow and the like. Hence there will be no evil to the knower of Brahman. As to Dr. Keith's characterisation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads as intellectual gymnastics, I may say that there are now many politically minded or worldly minded Hindus who, inebriated with a strong dose of modern material sciences, have formed the same opinion not merely of the Upaniṣads, but also of the Buddhistic and Jaina philosophies. But it must be noted that what appears to us as fantasies and intellectual gymnastics have come out from a mind which transformed itself into what it thought of, and which lived in it. We study that life and pass remarks and judgments upon it from the standpoint of our own life. We cannot make those thoughts our own, for we cannot live the life of those thoughts. But the authors of the Upaniṣads could not have given expression to those sublime thoughts unless they experienced them and lived in them. They were neither spectators nor actors of their spiritual drama, but its actual or real characters or the spiritual dramatic personae whom we can neither see nor imitate.

"The true ideal therefore", says Dr. Keith, (p. 587) "of the seeker for truth is embodied in the practice of asceticism and the adoption of renunciation: by turning away from the things of the world and by concentrating unnaturally the mind upon the object, the vision beatific was to be obtained: the utter incompatibility of this with the purely intellectual view, that the recognition of the Brahman as the self was emancipation, is obvious, but contradictions *in adjecto* are the normal characteristics of the Upaniṣads. Hence was developed the scheme by which the old rule of life was complicated and a series of four Āśramas, places of asceticism, was devised, through which man should pass on his way to his home in the heaven."

Like so many philosophic theories, the theory or theories of philosophy expounded in the Upaniṣads may be purely

intellectual and the means devised for the attainment of the end may or may not be compatible with the view. None of us is prepared to test the truth of this or that philosophy or religion and establish it as a world religion or philosophy to the exclusion of other faiths or systems. All that I am prepared to say here is that like other philosophical systems, the Indian systems have their moral and political corollaries which seem to have proved more beneficial to the world than the maxims and principals deduced from other philosophical systems of the western world. Whatever might be the other kinds of differences between the East and the West, the one that appears to me most conspicuous is that while the East is bent on translating into action as far as possible its religious and philosophical lessons, neglecting at the same time almost all the practical principles of material sciences, the West is ever keen in shaping its life to the tune of the objective sciences with only an academic interest in metaphysics and religion. This is a trait of hereditary difference between them. Consequently the West is materially rich and politically supreme while the East is proud of its philosophical contentment amidst the miseries of poverty and servility.

With a view to act up to its philosophical lessons, the life of a Hindu is divided into four stages or *Āśramas* as they are called. They are (1) the stage of student life, (2) of householder (3) of a hermit residing in a forest, and (4) that of renunciation (*saṁnyāsa*). While describing the characteristic features of the life of the members of the Raghu dynasty in his *Raghuvamśa* (canto 1), Kālidāsa speaks of the purposes of the four stages of life as follows :—

“Kings who spent their early age in learning, their youth enjoying their objective pleasure, their old age in living like forest hermits, and who breathed their last following the precepts of the Yoga system.”

We learn that most of the young boys of the twice-born class in ancient India spent their first stage of life in learning in the *Āśramas* from their respective *gurus*. After going through the course of their learning in the forest Universities, they returned to their native places,—either cities or villages—to live as house-holders. However severe might be the rules of discipline laid down in the *sūtras* and *Dharmśāstra* texts

for the guidance of house-holders, it is probable that under the temptations of city life they did not follow the ideal set for them in the Śāstra texts. I presume that a majority of the Brāhman house-holders deserved the censure passed on their life by the Buddha, in the dialogue between him and a Brāhman named Vasettha in the *Tevigga Sutta* (II, 3).

“ Now what think you, Vasettha,” asks the Buddha, “ are the Brāhmins versed in the Vedas in the possession of wives and wealth, or are they not ? ”

“ They are, Gotama. ”

“ Have they anger in their hearts, or have they not ? ”

“ They have, Gotama, ”

“ Do they bear malice, or do they not ? ”

“ They do, Gotama. ”

“ Are they pure in heart, or are they not ? ”

“ They are not, Gotama. ”

“ Have they self-mastery, or have they not ? ”

“ They have not, Gotama. ”

“ Very good, Vasettha, that the Brāhmins versed in the Vedas, yet bearing anger and malice in their hearts, sinful and uncontrolled, should, after death when the body is dissolved, become united to Brahman who is free from anger and malice, sinless and has self-mastery such a condition of things has no existence. ”

This censure seems to refer to the plurality of wives they married, and to the variety of occupations in which they engaged themselves for the sake of earning wealth. Their professions also are thus enumerated in the same work as follows :—

“ By predicting that there will be abundant rainfall, abundant harvest, famine disturbances, sickness or health, or by drawing deeds, making up accounts, giving pills, making verses, or arguing points or casuistry, or by giving advice touching the taking in marriage, or giving in marriage, the forming of alliances, or dissolutions of connections; by teaching spells to procure prosperity or to cause adversity to others; or by worshipping the sun, or by worshipping Brahma, by spitting fire out of their mouth,— this, too, is the kind of goodness that he (the Brahman) has. ”

Though this seems to be a true account of the life of house-holders among the Brahmans and others, yet it cannot be denied that there were a few who by the exemplary life they lived according to the rules of the Dharmśāstra texts earned and deserved the honour and respect shown to them by kings and wealthy men. There are records to show that there were Brāhmans of the type of the celebrated scholar Vedāntadeśika who despising even the voluntary gift of honour and wealth offered by kings and emperors and content with a handful of rice collected from house to house by way of begging alms, devoted their life to study, teaching, and writing on all the subjects then known. Vedāntadeśika sincerely believed in the teachings of the śāstras and declined to accept an honourable and economically comfortable position offered by the then emperor of Vijayanagara. The large number of works written and left by him on almost all branches of Sanskrit learning, speak volumes in favour of the vast learning he had and of the use he made of it for the good of posterity. Appaya Dāksita is another luminary of learning with whose scholarly work almost all sanskrit scholars are quite familiar. Śivānanda has given us a short sketch of his exemplary life. He is said to have made an offering into the sacred sacrificial fire of the costly presentations sent to him by the king of Tanjore. Halāyudha in his Brāhmanasarasva says or implies to say that amidst the luxurious favour shown to him by the king of the Kākatiya dynasty he lived a life to the very letter of the śāstras. Such examples are numerous, and are not given here for want of space. But for their selfless life and true devotion to learning, there would have been no literary monuments to speak of India's ancient civilization. What would have been the verdict of the western critics on India's ancient civilization, if there had been no Pāṇini, Patañjali, Jaimini, Bādarāyaṇa, Śabara, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Śaṅkara, Rāmaṇuja, Halāyudha, Yādavaprakāśa, Vāgbhaṭa, Vedāntadeśika, Mādhva, Vidyāranya, Appaya Dikṣita, and a host of other true Brāhman scholars. Had they but exhibited any inclination for the acquisition of wealth and a taste for pompous life of power, they would have succeeded in it and passed away, not merely themselves unknown, but making it possible and plausible for critics to say that India is a country of savages given to sensual and immoral life. It cannot be denied that the Buddhists and the Jainas, have also made a large contribution

to the glory of India in intellectual and spiritual fields. They are no other than Brāhmins that embraced Buddhism and Jainism. As most of them lived the life of monks not dissimilar to that of Brāhmin Vānaprasthas or forest hermits, they can better be classed with the latter. As the influence which the Vānaprasthas and the Saṃnyāsins, with their experience of life acquired during the two previous stages of life and with their independent thought, had exerted not only on the social and political life of the people in cities and villages, but also on the life of kings, was most salutary and disciplinary, it is necessary that some notice of their life should be taken here.

Self-abnegation, living by sweat or by begging, and original thinking seem to have been the characteristic feature and guiding principle of their life. According to the Purāṇas, the founders of Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and other systems of philosophy were men of the Vānaprastha order, living upon fruits, roots and other forest produce in forests. Regarding the dietary of the hermits, the Baudhāyana Smṛti (IV. 3) says as follows ;—

“ Then there are two kinds of hermits ; those that cook their food and those that do not cook their food. Those that cook their food are of five kinds : (1) Sarvāranyaka, (2) Vaitusika, (3) Kādamūlaphalbhakṣa, (4) Phalabhakṣa and (5) Śākābhakṣa. The Sarvāranyakas are of two kinds : (1) Indrāvasikta and (2) Retovasikta, as they live upon two different kinds of forest produce. The Indrāvasiktas are those who bring edible stuffs produced by creepers, plants, shrubs, and trees and cook them ; and having offered oblations thereof into the fire both morning and evening and having fed ascetics, guests and other persons engaged in penance, live upon what remains thereof. The Retovasiktas are those who gather the flesh of wild animals killed by a tiger, wolf, hawk, or any other beast of prey and cook it ; and having offered oblations thereof into the fire both morning and evening, and having fed ascetics, guests and other persons engaged in penance therewith, live upon what remains thereof. The Vaitusikas are those who collect grains without chaff and especially rice, cook them and having offered oblations into the fire both morning and even-

ing and having fed ascetics, guests and other persons engaged in penance therewith, live upon what remains thereof. Those who live upon turnips, roots and fruits or upon fruits only or upon herbs only do also likewise.

Those that do not cook their food are of five kinds: (1) Mumajjakas, (2) Pravṛttāsins, (3) Mukhādāyins, (4) Toyāhāras and (5) Vāyubhaksas. The Mumajjakas are those who prepare their food without making use of metallic or stone vessels. The Pravṛttāsins are those that live upon morsels that can be held in their hands. Mukhādāyins are those who catch hold of their food by their mouth without using their hand. The Toyāhāras are those who live merely upon water and the Vāyubhaksas only upon air.

Living in company with the antelopes and imitating their life in all respects: this is the characteristic of heavenly life on earth."

Many are familiar with the story of Dilipa poetically described by Kālidāsa in his *Raghuvamśa*. The king is said to have followed the Nandini cow of Vasiṣṭha, his family priest, just like the cow's shadow. Moving when the cow moved, sitting when it sat, drinking when it drank and resting when it took rest. According to the Sūtra literature of the Jains there existed in ancient India a sect of people called Govratika who took delight in following the movements of cows tended by them and imitated their life in all respects.

It is clear from the above that a Brāhman's or Ksatriya's life was not as much stereotyped as it is found in the later Smṛti works. In the Vedic and the Sūtra periods man was free to act as he liked with necessary self-control and belief in the existence of the other world. He may follow an old sect with its ideal of life set before him or consistently with the principle of self-abnegation of the Vānaprasthas. He may expound a new philosophy of life and form a new sect. The hermitages of Rṣyaśṛṅga, Mārkaṇḍeya and Badarīnātha, described in the *Mahābhārata* (Vana 3: 130; and 147.) exemplify the freedom of thought and activity in social and religious spheres of the ancient Indians. The hermitage of Kaṇva described in the first and fourth acts of the *Śākuntala* and that of Vasiṣṭha in the first canto of the *Raghuvamśa* are also typical Vānaprastha institutions.

The Devibhāgavata (V. 32) gives a vivid description of the typical hermitage of a hermit called Sumedhas and of the self-denying life which he and other hermits in that hermitage lived :—

“ Having recognised the hermitage of the devoted sage, Sumedhas, at a distance of three yojanas, the king (Suratha by name) went to it. Full of a number of trees and situated in the sandy bank of river, full of tamed wild animals, pleasing with songs of cuckoo, resounding with the voice of students studying their lessons, full of hundreds of antelopes, with dishes of well-cooked wild rice, abounding in trees of sweet flowers and fruits, causing pleasant feelings to all with the sweat smelling smoke of oblations made into the fire, with the echoes of the sounds of Vedic hymns recited, and more charming than even the abode of the celestials, having come in view of such a hermitage, the king was pleased. Having renounced all fear, he made up his mind to take rest in the happy retreat of the Brāhman sage. Having tied his horse to a tree close by, and having seen the sage seated on a deer skin under the shadow of a sāla tree, with tranquil mind, with his body emaciated by the observance of penance, open-hearted, teaching the Vedas to a number of students, learned in the Vedas, Śāstras, and their secret meaning, devoid of anger, greed, and other passions, free from the trouble of mutually opposing pair of worldly affections such as heat and cold and the like, devoid of jealousy, ever bent on attaining the knowledge of the soul, speaking the truth, and having his mind under control, the king went to him with modesty and said :—

“ I am a king Suratha by name ; and having been defeated by my foes, I gave up my country house, and wife, and came here seeking your protection. ” The sage replied, “ Reside here, O king, with no fear. None of your mighty enemies will ever step here scared by the power of my penance. No animals should be slaughtered here. Following the customs of the hermits here, O best of the kings, life should be sustained with wild rice, fruits and roots. ”—*

* Compare Bhāgavata XI. 18.

According to the Śrīmadbhāgavata (XI, 18) it is the duty of a hermit to live upon the substance procured by him and to take nothing offered by others. The Rāmāyāna gives lucid descriptions of a number of hermitages visited by Rāma. A charming description of Kaṇva's hermitage is found in the Śākuntala of Kālidāsa. It follows therefore that hermitages played an important part in the life of ancient Indians, and had exercised considerable influence on the intellectual and spiritual life of the people.

It is also clear from the above passages that the hermitages of ancient Indians were invariably situated in an extensive forest tract on the bank of a perennial river, congenial to the growth of flowers, fruits, roots, and wild rice. They were a sort of a University full of professors ready to teach and students eager to learn. They were an asylum for the afflicted either in body or in mind or in both, who for the alleviation of their physical or mental infirmities, sought remedies at the hands of the sages in the hermitages. They were a safe retreat for kings defeated on the battle fields and chased by their blood-thirsty conquerors. Once within the boundary of a hermitage, the run-away kings were safe, as their terrible enemies dreaded the power of the penance of the hermits. The hermitages may be termed as cities without walls or police for protection. In fact they needed no such things ; for the hermits had neither gold nor granaries in their possession. They had no worldly things to lose and had therefore no fear from worldly enemies. Their food was simple and accessible to the needy, whether man or beast, and consisted of wild rice, fruits and roots.

All classes of ancient Āryans found the Āśramas a happy retreat for their old age. That people of the Vaiśya class also spent their old age in hermitages, is corroborated by the story of Suratha narrated in the Saptasatī.

Besides, as a rule, (hermits) and monks (śaṁnyāsins) Vānaprasthas have to cast away caste-distinctions and also to abandon the observance of religious rites and image worship. In his Vivekasāra, treatise on the Advaita philosophy, Śaṁkarānanda the teacher of Sāyaṇa Mādhava, writes, consistently with the principles of Advaita non-dualism and the teaching of the Upaniṣads as follows (p. 11, 12 and 24).

“ He who performs religious rites with a view to attain heavenly bliss cannot be credited even with a

trace of wisdom. He who looks upon images made of mud, stone or wood as gods cannot be credited even with a trace of wisdom.

The worship of gods is for no good; nor is pilgrimage to sacred places productive of any good..... "Religious rites do not deserve performance, because their results, if any, must necessarily be as perishable as the seeds of grains sown and harvested; nor can the performance of religious rites purge the mind of its impure thoughts, inasmuch as the performance itself is due to impure thought such as desire for some naturally perishable good." "Appearance is misleading and false. Idols are appearances like the objective world. Hence, like the world, idols are no reality. The various forms of worship are all likewise appearances and cannot therefore be reality. Hence the good expected to result from worship must necessarily be other than reality. No endeavour to obtain water from mirage can succeed. Similar is the endeavour to obtain good from idol-worship. Worship is an act. But no act is a means for liberation. Those who worship idols with immense faith for the attainment of liberation endeavour to do the impossible act of covering the sky [with a mat. A man becomes what he thinks. Hence he who worships can become the worshipped i. e. another limited being. But limitation is no emancipation." (pp. 53-54).

Regarding the absurdity of all caste distinctions in particular, he says.

"A wise man should withdraw from the world of name and form, 'the thou and I'. 'This is a Brāhman and that is a Sūdra.' For such differences are only real to a fool. But a wise man should not behave like a fool. Unity liberates man and duality involves him in bondage."

It follows therefore that the duty of the Vānaprasthas and Saṁnyāsins is to confine their attention to realisation of Self by constant meditation on Individual Self as Universal Self. With a view to achieve this end he has to follow the method taught in the Yoga philosophy. As a preliminary step in the

practice of Yoga, the beginner has to shun all desire and concentrate his mind on any single object and learn high thinking. As a rule abstinence from injury to animals and men, veracity, abstinence from theft, continence, and avoidance of avariciousness must be strictly observed. It is a mistake to call Yoga practice mysticism. He should not shun society. It is laid down in the Yoga sūtra I, 33: "The mind becomes pure by cultivating the habit of friendliness towards those who are fond of objective pleasure, compassion towards those who are suffering from pain and indifference towards those who are vicious."

Quite similar is the view of the Buddhists and the Jainas on the nature of the world and our life within it. None of the three schools of philosophers, the Advaitins, the Buddhists and the Jainas admit and own a personal god. Their ideal in life is to get rid of the six enemies, desire, anger, greed, delusion, pride and malice, and attain a state of inaction by shunning all action, except that which is unavoidable, to acquire as much food as may be necessary to keep the body and soul together with a view to attain perfection and liberation. With regard to the conception of emancipation and the means of attaining it, however, not only these three schools, but also the various hermitages differed from each other.

As already referred to, the conclusions of the Sāṃkhyas were quite different from those of other schools of thought which also differed from each other. In self denial, control over senses and contempt for worldly possessions, they were all alike. As stated by Cāṇakya in his *Arthaśāstra*, the one aim of all the śāstras is control of senses (*Indriyajaya*), without which man can aspire for no success in this or the other world. The same was the central theme of the Jainas and the Buddhists. In their view, for a selfish man this world is a hell and the other nil.

They do not deserve the charge of pessimism brought against them. In portraying life in this world as purely miserable and life in the other worlds unmixed pleasure, the aim of the ancient Indians was an indirect attack on selfishness and commendation of self-abnegation. It was not a disappointed man's despair of all hope and pleasure in life. As will be pointed out in a later lecture, *Ātmānanda*, pleasure internal, in Self, or subjective pleasure, was in their view better than ob-

jective pleasure or Visayasukha. Their constant experience of subjective pleasure banished from their mind all thoughts of suicide or of desire for early death. The experience of intellectual and spiritual pleasure coupled with a desire to do good to others and to reclaim the erring world from the path of sin, kindled in their breast a strong desire for long life. To this effect there is a verse attributed to the Buddha and quoted by Bhāskara in his commentary on the Vedānta sūtras of Bādarāyana :

Ākāśasya sthitir yāvat Yāvadapy avaneḥ sthitiḥ
Tavan mama sthitir bhūyāt Viśvapāpāni nighnataḥ ॥

As long as the sky lasts and as long as the globe of the earth lasts so long may my life last, desirous as I am to eradicate the world of its sins.

Equally interesting are the verses which convey the same idea and which are put in the mouth of Jimūtavāhana in the drama of Nāgānanda :—

Śayyā śādvalam, āsanam śuciśilā, sadma drumānām adhaḥ
Śītam nirjharavāri pānam āsanam kandāḥ sahāyā mṛgāḥ ।
Ity aprārthitalabhyasarvavibhave doṣo'yam eko vane
Dusprāpārthini yat parārthaghaṭanāvandhyair vṛthā sthīyate ॥

Bed is the green grass ; a clean seat is the stone ; home under the trees ; the water of water-falls is a cool drink ; roots are foodstuffs : companions are the deer ; in the forest with such flourish of supplies of necessities unsought for there is only one defect : namely, that man has to live in vain with no hope of benefiting the needy that are scarcely seen here.

With a desire to save the life of the Vāsuki snake by offering his own body to Garuḍa, Jimūtavāhana is made to say again as follows.

Samraksatā pannagam adya puṇyam
Mayārjitaṁ yat svaśarīradānāt ।
Bhave bhave tena mamaiva bhūyāt
Paropakārāya śarīralābhāḥ ॥

In virtue of the merit which I have earned just now by offering my own body in order to save the life of the Vāsuki snake, let me have in an endless series of births the profit of possession of a body for the sake of helping others.

It is this spirit of self-abnegation with a strong desire to preserve life both for experiencing spiritual pleasure and for the good of others that formed the predominant thought of all schools of Philosophic systems. It is this self-luminous ray of thought that renders life charming, alike for the poor and the rich, the educated and the uneducated. It is this inner contentment that made India both ancient and modern submissive to law and order.

It is incredible that a community of people divided into three classes on the basis of profession rather than birth, and proud of its intellectual and spiritual freedom, should be submissive to political slavery. There is ample evidence to prove that in their hermitages the ancient Āryans had a sort of politico-religious form of government independent of the king of the state in which the hermitages were situated. They had no material wealth enough to tempt either criminal tribes to plunder them at dark nights, or civilized robber-like kings to carry off their wealth by day light. They were remarkable for their moral and spiritual wealth. Nevertheless the hermitages were not free from temptations. In addition to the herds of cattle and deer, the hermits had their wives and daughters so charming as to tempt an Indra or a Duṣyanta, or some youthful students in the hermitages itself. Besides they had the necessity of guarding their gardens and fields from the ravage of wild beasts; the hermits had also the need to protect their hermitages from the molestation of aboriginal tribes. With a view to prevent their own people from falling a prey to temptations they devised a religious criminal code enumerating sins and Prāyaścittas or punishments for them. In order to protect the forest from wild beasts and men, they had to call in the aid, of their king. In return for the aid, they paid the king one sixth of the grains gleaned by them from harvested fields, or in the absence of such grains they made a gift of one sixth of the merit of their penance to the protective sovereign. In consideration of the prayer and penance made by the hermits for the prosperity of the king, he had to protect them from hunger, cold and heat also, besides granting them free of tax as much land as they needed.

Apart from civil and criminal laws administered in duly constituted courts, the Brāhmins had their own religious code of laws treating of crimes and of atonements for them. The

crimes coming under the cognisance of this code are all called *pātakas* or sins and classified according to the gravity of the offences. Most of the crimes coming under *pātakas* have been duly noticed and dealt with in the civil and criminal codes administered in the king's court. The *pātakas* are murder, adultery, theft, kidnapping of women, killing of animals and lying, defamation, and assault and hurt. Drinking of liquor, non-payment of debts, studying bad books, dancing, neglecting the daily study of the Vedas, eating forbidden food, casting off one's teacher, mother, father, and son, earning money or subsistence by forbidden professions, and the like, are regarded as religious crimes deserving of *prāyaścitta* or atonement.

The reason for the prescription of *prāyas'cittas* or penances for secular crimes seems to have been two-fold. First, the intention of the *Vānaprastha* seems to have been to have their own code of laws in virtue of their social, religious and political independence. Secondly they seem to have thought of making the hermitage a kind of reformatory school to reform or to reclaim juveniles from their evil courses. This view is corroborated by what *Vasiṣṭha* says (XXI. 3) regarding the classess of criminals and their chastisers. He says:—

“The teacher is the punisher of such sinners as are tractable; the king is the punisher of the wicked; and *Vaivasvata Yama*, the god of death, is the punisher of those who hide their evil deeds.”

Gautama lays down a peculiar form of punishment in order to reclaim juvenile offenders. In XII. 24, he says that whenever a man continues to abstain from doing what is enjoined or in pursuing what is forbidden, he is to be deprived of whatever he possesses over and above a piece of cloth and a few morsels of food necessary to sustain his life. This punishment is in addition to the *prāyaścitta* or atonement laid down for his sin. “If this is done,” says *Maskarīn*, the commentator, “he will abandon his wicked proceeding. According to the propensities and wicked habits of the individual either religious punishment alone or legal punishment alone or both have to be meted out.” With a view to facilitate the determination of equivalents of religious punishments or *prāyaścittas* in terms of money fines, the commentator quotes under *Gautama* XXI. 20 from *Lokāksi* who says that what is called a *Prājāpatya Prāyaścitta* is equivalent to a fine of thirty three *paṇas*; a *sāntapana* is equal to 100½ *paṇas*; and

Atikṛcchra is equal to 467 panas; a Kṛcchrātikṛcchra is equal to 500 panas. And a Parāka is also equivalent to a fine of 500 panas. As a general rule, the sūtras and smrtis exempt Brāhmins from corporal punishment and servitude. In serious crimes, they were branded with marks indicative of the crimes committed and excommunicated. Admonition and rebuke together with money-fines were all the punishment they received from the king's court. But the prāyaścitta or penances they had to go through were not less severe. Nor can it be denied that imprisonment is preferable to the observance of Kṛcchras and Cāndrāyaṇas. Hence there is no reason to believe that among the ancient Indians the Brāhmins formed a favoured class and that the rights and privileges they secured at the hands of ancient kings were more than they deserved. It is in honour of their highly intellectual and spiritual life that such rights and privileges were conferred upon them. The monumental, literary, religious and philosophical works which they have left behind are an unfailing testimony to their high intellect and spiritual earnestness. It is in those works that the glory of ancient Indian civilization is still alive. But for them, India would have been declared a country of savages. Considering their excellent literary, religious and philosophical works one would not hesitate to go so far as to say that the honour shown them by letting off their criminals without corporal punishment was a trifling reward for the lasting contribution they made to the glory of the country.

Whether there were so many criminals and hypocrites among ancient Brāhmins is another important question that deserves consideration. The ancient Brāhmins formed not a rigid or isolated caste of themselves. By the process of elevation and degradation their class was periodically increasing or decreasing in volume. So the privileges were rather functional than a birth-right. They were open to all people irrespective of their birth. By degrading their kinsman for their incapacity to exercise the duties of the class and by elevating people of other classes in virtue of their fitness to live the life of a true Brāhmin, the class seems to have been maintained in its ideal purity. As in other nations, so in ancient India, the penal code was very severe and was therefore deterrent of crimes. No less deterrent of pātakas was the code of religious punishments, and it is more

than probable that it gave no room for miscarriage of justice. What now appears as an undue partiality shown to the Brāhman caste was really a kind of premium paid for intellectual and spiritual life of a class which was recruiting its members from all classes. Thus the prerogative of the Brāhman class to have the law of punishing its criminals in its own hands points to its being a political institution independent of the king. This is corroborated by the following passage of the Yajurveda (1. 8, 10) in which the independence of the Brāhmins is clearly stated :—

“Eṣa vo Bharata rājā, somo' smākam rājā.”

“This is your king, O Bharatas; Soma is the king of us, the Brāhmins.” Dr. A. B. Keith remarks on the passage as follows :—

“The important feature of the whole is the fact that the king is sharply distinguished from the priests. The proclamation (the above passage) tells the people that so and so is their king; but the Brāhmins add that their king is Soma. This distinction shows that for Vedic India at least the connection of royalty with priestly rank, if it ever had been a motive of the growth of the kingship, had long disappeared before the time of the Samhitās.”

Whatever might be the duration of the independence of the priestly class and its motive, it is a fact that the ancient Brāhmins formed a class of people noted for its intellectual and spiritual life and that it enjoyed in full measure its freedom of thought, speech, and action in social, religious and political matters. This is confirmed by what Gautama says in his Dharma Sūtra (XI. 1) :—

The king is master of all except Brāhmins.

We shall see, in connection with Viśvajit sacrifice to be discussed in our third lecture on ancient Indian Economics, how the Mīmāṃsakas denied the king his right over any person whether a freeman or a slave.

Thus it is clear that from the Vedic down to the Sūtra period ancient Indian society was divided into two political units the Pauras (citizens), and the Vānaprasthas (the hermits). The latter was ever growing in its bulk by the arrival into the hermitage of old and young people from cities either for learn-

ing or for preparation for the journey to the next world. Its life was intellectual and spiritual and held gold and luxury in utter contempt. The charms of this world has no attraction for it. The dialogue of Pautrayana and Raikva narrated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad goes to show the utter contempt with which wealth was looked upon by the hermits. Corresponding to the Samiti or political assembly of the king the hermits had their own assembly called Parisad in which social, religious and political problems awaiting solution were discussed and decided.

BENGAL'S CONTRIBUTION TO SANSKRIT LITERATURE
(A chronological frame-work)

BY

CHINTAHARAN CHAKRAVARTI, M. A.



PREFACE

An investigation into the history of Sanskrit literature in a particular province will be of help not only to build up a connected literary history of the land but also in supplying important materials for the study of its cultural history. This purpose is not however served by any study of the history of Sanskrit literature as a whole, for necessarily in a general history of literature—works that have only a local interest cannot receive detailed treatment howsoever important those works may be in the literary history of a particular province. What is of little importance in Sanskrit literature taken as a whole may be of vital importance with respect to a particular province. But no comprehensive work dealing with the history of Sanskrit literature in any particular province has appeared as yet. Prof. K. R. Pisharoti delivered before the Madras University a course of lectures on the Kerala contribution to Sanskrit literature of which the first instalment only appeared in *Shama'a* (October 1928).

The study of the history of Sanskrit literature in Bengal and Bengal's contributions to it are specially interesting. Bengal has her peculiarities in her ways of life and thought which are reflected in her religious notions and ritualism. And she has her peculiarities in her literature too. Besides, the history of Sanskrit literature in Bengal does not seem to point to a progressive degeneration but apparently there are traces of growth along with the process of time. Fresh developments are noticed as the centuries roll on. Bengal, as we shall see in the following pages, had become an important centre of Sanskrit learning almost from the beginning of the Christian era and continued to be so all along. And from about the fifteenth century she came to be one of the most important—if not the most important—centres of Sanskrit culture, and produced a good many works of outstanding merit. It is to be noted that Bengal seems still to hold her position at least with regard to some particular branches of study.

A good many Sanskrit works of Bengal have no doubt been published either in Nāgari or in Bengali characters. But many more still are to be found only in Mss which supply us with important materials in our investigations. So the various Notices, Reports and Catalogues of Sanskrit Mss are of immense help in this matter. An attempt has been made to make the best use of them, especially those of Bengal as also the *Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss in the India Office Library, London*. Besides these, I had the opportunity of consulting two valuable manuscript collections, namely, (1) the collection of the Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat, Calcutta (2) the private collection of Kumar Sarat Kumar Ray, M. A. of Dighapatia which is called Savitā Memorial collection in memory of the eldest son of the Kumāra. No catalogue of any of these collections has as yet been published.

Some amount of useful and valuable work on this subject has already been done. But all this is with reference to particular periods or particular topics. Of these the papers of Mm. Dr. H. P. Shastri on *Contributions of Bengal to Hindu Civilisation and Literary History of the Pāla Period* (J. B. O. R. S. 1919), and of the late Manomohan Chakravarti on *Sanskrit literature in Bengal during the Sena Period* (J. A. S. B.-1906), *History of Navya Nyāya in Bengal and Mithilā* (J. A. S. B. 1915) deserve special mention. Much valuable and useful information on the subject is also found scattered in the Prefaces to Mm. H. P. Shastri's notices and catalogues as also, among others, in the *History of Indian Logic* of Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan, *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics* of Dr. S. K. De and *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar* of Dr. S. K. Belvalkar.

No attempt to write a systematic and complete history of Sanskrit literature in Bengal seems to have as yet been made by any scholar. Dr. Md. Shahidullah of the Dacca University, read a short paper on "Bengal's Contribution to Sanskrit learning", before the Oriental Conference held in Madras in 1924.¹ But he has not so far published it anywhere.

But there are some difficulties which one has to face in the study of the history of Sanskrit literature in Bengal, nay, any particular province. One of these is regarding chronology. Works of Bengal, like those of other parts of India, seldom

¹ *Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1925—*
p. XIX.

mention dates or localities pertaining to the authors. And hence the difficulty of settling the chronology is very great and this is quite well-known. But even more than this is the difficulty of determining the place of origin of most of the authors.

In very many cases one has no other way left for ascertaining the Bengal origin of a work than one or more of the following: (1) peculiarities of personal names, surnames or titles (2) provenance of the mss of the work (3) tradition. But it is seen that none of these can be taken to be decisive. It is, no doubt, true that the personal names, surnames and titles of Bengal, like those of other provinces developed some peculiarities from the mediaeval period. It is not, however, always, safe to rely on these peculiarities alone as they are not infrequently found to lead to wrong conclusions. And in earlier periods it is hard to find out these peculiarities if there were any. It is for this reason that we can definitely assign very few works of these periods to Bengal though there is no dearth of evidence testifying to the flourishing condition of Sanskrit literature at that time. The provenance and find-spots of manuscripts of a work cannot also, in every case, be supposed to be a sure guide for determining its place of origin. Not a single manuscript of the commentary on the *Amarakoṣa* by Sarvānanda, undoubtedly a Bengalee, has so far been found anywhere in Bengal¹ though several manuscripts of it are known to exist in South India and South Indian scripts. And it would not be right to regard this as only an exception. As regards tradition we can accept it only with some caution if it is not fairly old and is not supported by any other evidence. And I shall not be surprised if owing to these difficulties I have somewhere omitted some important names and added some wrong ones.

In many a branch of Sanskrit literature Bengal produced quite an unwieldy number of works, any treatment of each one of which would go to make up a fairly big volume. I have had therefore to remain satisfied with a reference only to the most important and representative of them; and have tried to point out the literary tendency of Bengal in every

1. It is true that sometime back Mr. N. K. Bhattasali announced the acquisition on behalf of the Dacca University, of a manuscript from the district of Faridpur of this work in Bengali characters (*Ind. Ant.* 1926 p. 122.) but, I had it from Dr. S. K. De, that on closer examination it was found to be the manuscript of a different work.

direction. On the whole I have, in the following pages, made an attempt to touch merely the outlines of the subject.

PRE-PĀLA PERIOD

Sanskrit language, the language of the Aryans, must have been first introduced into Bengal at the time of the Aryan conquest of the land, though it is now generally admitted that Bengal had a civilisation even before that time. We do not know, of course, the time when exactly that event took place. Neither is this the place to go into the conflicting views with regard to this vexed question and try to determine it with as much exactitude as it is possible for us to attain. It is however, fairly certain that Bengal was already Aryanised by the Mauryan period if not earlier. But we have no definite record of the literary activities of Bengal during the first few centuries of its Aryanisation. As a matter of fact we know little of her Sanskrit culture before as late as the time of the Imperial Guptas, though the evidence so far available would naturally lead one to suppose that Bengal had made her mark in Sanskrit literature much earlier.

Jacobi contends that the Vaidarbhi style of composition was a reaction against the older and more ornate style of Gauda (Bengal) and he is of opinion that the Vaidarbhi style came into existence as early as the third century A.D. (S. K. De *Studies in the Hist. of Sans. Poetics* -1920-II. 114. n. 20). Thus the line of argument as followed by Jacobi would point to the beginning of the Christian era when Bengal had as much literary progress as to be able to evolve a style of her own. But it must be admitted that the view of Jacobi has been questioned (loc. cit.).

And we cannot definitely assign any known Sanskrit work to a very early date. Pālakāpya, the author of the *Hastyaśyurveda* a work on the treatment of elephants seems to have lived in Bengal—in the easternmost part of it—more properly, in Assam—where flows the Brahma-putra and the Himālaya is in the North (*Hastyaśyurveda* I, 39, 101). Nothing definite is, of course, known of his date but it must be a very old work. And from the style of the work Mm. H. P. Shastri is inclined to assign it to a period even preceding the Christian Era (J. B. O. R. S.-1919-300 ff)

We may also refer to one more work here. This is the well-known philosophical work the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* the

Bengal origin of which is referred to by as early an author as Sureśvarācārya. In his Vedāntic work, the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* (IV. 41-44) he quotes two verses one from the Kārikā and the other from the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* of Śāṅkara and expressly refers to the former as embodying the views of the Gauḍas as contrasted with the latter which is stated to represent the views of the Drāviḍas. There can be very little doubt as regards the old age of these kārīkās as they are said to have, actually, been quoted by several early commentators of the Mādhyamika school (Belvalkar and Ranade-*Hist. of Ind. Philosophy*-Vol. II., pp. 96-7.).

From the Gupta period, we get not only definite references to the flourishing condition of Sanskrit literature in Bengal but also several works which can be assigned to fairly certain but approximate dates.

The earliest instance of any Sanskrit composition of Bengal of this period is a small lithic record of king Candravarman (Ep. Ind. vol. XIII p. 133) lord of Puṣkarapa which is now identified with a village Pokharpa in Bankura (*Origin and Development of Bengali language*- Dr. S. K. Chatterji, vol. II. p. 1061). Candravarman seems to have been a contemporary of king Samudragupta who defeated him as recorded in the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta.

To the Gupta period also belong the five Damodarpur copperplates (Ep. Ind. vol. XV. p 130 ff) which are of the time of Kumāragupta I, Budhagupta and Bhānugupta. These appear to have been issued by the Governors of Puṇḍravardhana in Bengal. The excavations at Paharpur in Rājshahi has brought to light another copperplate of this period. Dated in the year 158 of the Gupta era it records the donation of a plot of land by a Brahman couple for the maintenance of worship at the Vihāra of Jain ascetics at the village of Vata-Gohali, supposed to be identical with the village Goāl-bhītā in which the boundaries of the monument are partly located at present.

None of these records, already referred to, shows any degree of excellence of composition-any sign of the Gauḍa style which seems to have already come into vogue-and their only importance lies in the undeniable evidence which they supply of Sanskrit culture in Bengal at that time. The Tipperah

copperplates of Lokanātha (Ep. Ind. vol. XV. p. 301 ff), of 650 A.D. and the Nidhānpur copperplates of Bhāskara-Varman of Assam (7th century) (Ep. Ind. vol. XII. p. 65) are the only records of this period which are composed in a high-flown Kāvya style.

It is now generally supposed that Kālidāsa flourished in the Gupta period—some favouring an earlier date for him during the reign of the Imperial Guptas while others assigning him to the period following their fall. But a broad divergence of opinion is still found to exist among scholars as regards the home of the greatest poet of India. Mm. H. P. Shastri has shown that he hailed from Western Malwa (J. B. O. R. S.—1915—pp. 197 ff). Prof. Lachmi Kalla of the Delhi University has sought to prove a Kashmirian origin of him (*Birthplace of Kālidāsa*, Delhi University Publications No. I). Several scholars in Bengal have, also started a movement to establish the close connection of Kālidāsa with Bengal. But the evidences put forward so far cannot be taken to be conclusive to entitle the inclusion of his name herein.

The earliest known writer of Bengal of this period seems to have been Candragomin whose fame rests mainly on his *Candra Vyākaraṇa* though several other works of him are also referred to. Tibetan records like the *Dpag-bsam-ljon-lzan* represent him as having hailed from Varendri (Ind. Ant. 1930 p. 25.) Another scholar whose reputation had travelled beyond the limits of India was Śilabhadra, a scion of the Brahmanical royal family of Samatata (East Bengal) who rose to be the Head of the great monastery of Nālandā and became the teacher of the great Chinese pilgrim Ywan Chwang. He is spoken of in eloquent terms by the pilgrim and is stated to have been the author of several treatises widely known and highly valued by contemporaries. (*On Ywan Chwang—Watters.*—Vol. II, p. 109, 165).

It was probably in this period that the famous medical writer Mādhava Kara flourished. His surname *Kara* is believed to indicate his Bengal origin. His *Nidāna*, the best known of all his works is stated to have been translated into Persian as early as the 8th century during the reign of Harun-al-Rasid. And if the identification of *Pañcīkākāra* referred to by Varadarāja (11th century) in his *Kusumāñjali-Bodhinī* (Saraswati Bhawan Series, p. 123) as a *Gauḍa Mīmāṃsaka* with

Śalikanātha be correct then we get another name added to this period.

But besides these stray works there is ample evidence which testifies to the flourishing condition of Sanskrit literature in Bengal at this period. The first reference to any literary activity in Bengal is gathered from the account of the Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hien who visited India during the reign of Candragupta II of the Imperial Gupta dynasty. He paid a visit to Tāmralipti (Mod. Tamluk) in Bengal where he spent two years copying manuscripts and painting images. (Legge-*Record of Buddhist Kingdoms*, p. 100) From what is said by the Chinese pilgrim Tāmralipti seems to have been a seat of learning in this time and the manuscripts which he copied might in all probability have been of Buddhist Sanskrit works many of which had been taken to China by pilgrims from time to time.

Love of learning of the people of Bengal is referred to by Ywan Chwang, another Chinese pilgrim, who came to India during the reign of Harṣavardhana in the 7th century. He visited Puṇḍravardhana, Kāmarūpa, Samatāṭa, Tāmralipti and Karpasuvarna. And the love of learning of the people of all these places finds special mention in his account. Large Buddhist monasteries, which were all seats of learning, are also stated to have existed in each of these places (*On Ywan Chwang*-Watters.- vol. II, pp. 184-191).

Still another Chinese pilgrim I-tsing who almost immediately followed Ywan Chwang and came to India in 673 A. D. definitely states that he learnt the Brahma language (Sanskrit) and practised the science of words (grammar, *śabdavidyā*) (Takakusu - I - tsing, p. xxxi) in Tāmralipti. This shows that it continued to be a seat of learning even in his time.

And we get a confirmation of these reports of the Chinese pilgrims from what we read in Indian authors like Bāṇa (1st half of 7th century), Bhāmaha (end of 7th century) and Daṇḍin (beginning of 8th century). It is clear from what they say that Bengal had evolved (from what date it is not known) a high-flown ornate style of her own, presumably from a very early period. Thus Bāṇa in one of the introductory verses of his *Harṣacarita* characterises the style of composition as prevailing in Gauḍa (Bengal) to have

been a verbose one.¹ There can scarcely be any room for doubt that Gauda of Bāna has reference to Bengal; for in another place he has made use of the same term to denote Bengal as he styles king Śaśānka of Bengal as the vilest of Gaudas (*Gaudāpasadaḥ*). Bhāmaha too refers to the Gaudīya (of Gauda)² style of composition in his *Kāvya-lamkāra* (I. 31-32) where he definitely hints at the controversy raging in his time as regards the superiority of the two styles *Gaudī* and *Vaidarbhī*. From the way in which he introduces³ the Vaidarbhi style Bhāmaha seems to assign to it a position decidedly inferior to that of Gauda. It also does not seem that the Gauda style was a new thing in his time but it is only reasonable to suppose that it had a history behind it which had secured it a commendable position in the time of Bhāmaha.

Daṇḍin who probably came after Bhāmaha refers to Gaudī and Vaidarbhi as the two most important styles of composition of which he was decidedly in favour of the latter. (*Kāvya-darśa*—I. 40-42).

PĀLA PERIOD (OR PRE-SENA PERIOD)

<p>General remarks regarding the literary condition of the period</p>	<p>We are not in possession of enough materials that will throw sufficient light on the literary condition of period. The materials so far obtained are too scanty to justify any generalisation. But we are still in a position to state that Sanskrit literature in its different branches was assiduously studied at this period. The</p>
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1. “श्लेषप्रायमुदीच्येष्टु प्रतीच्येष्वर्थमात्रकम् । उत्प्रेक्षा दाक्षिणात्येष्टु गौडेष्वक्षरदम्बरः ॥ ”

It should be noted that of all places Bāna here refers to Gauda alone by name. This may be taken to be a covert indication of the prominent position held by the style of Gauda in the estimation of the people owing possibly to its obvious distinguishing feature viz. verbosity. And it is also to be noted that Bāna undoubtedly follows this style in most places of his works.

2. That the name has reference to its place of origin is clear from *Kāvya-lamkāra* of Vāmana (I. 2. 9. 10) where he definitely says that the names of the styles were derived from the places where they were found to have been prevalent.

3. वैदर्भमन्यदस्तीति मन्यन्ते सुषियोऽपरे (I. 31)

“There are other scholars who suppose that there is another style called Vaidarbha.” The words “another style” seem to show that the Gaudī style has been indicated in a previous verse which unfortunately is missing.

epigraphic records of the Pāla kings supply us with some light in this direction. One of these records viz. the Garuḍa pillar inscription of the time of Nārāyaṇapāla *Gauḍalekhamālā*, p. 71 ff.) gives a vivid picture of one of the ministerial families of the Pāla kings, in which their literary attainments find a prominent mention. Darbhapāni of this family, minister of Devapāla is here recorded to have mastered the four *Vidyās*. It is however not known what these four *Vidyās* were. Neither does it seem to be justified to take them as referring to the four Vedas. His grandson Kedāramiśra is also given the same credit. His son Guḍava Miśra seems to have been the greatest man of letters of the family. He is stated to have acquired proficiency in the *āgamas* (sacred lores), in *Jyotiṣa* (Astronomy and Astrology). The family comes in for special admiration for its exceptional knowledge of Vedic literature (ll. 20-21). Guḍava Miśra appears to have been a good writer as well. His compositions have been given high praise in the record in question. He seems to have composed a work on religious history where he gave elaborate exposition of the Vedas (ll. 25).¹ This record is thus of great importance from the standpoint of literary history. But there are two more noteworthy points here which are not less important and interesting in point of social and religious history of the period. It records how Vedic sacrifices were performed by Kedāramiśra (ll. 11 and 16). Vedic rites do not seem, therefore, to have gone out of use at that time. Book knowledge and physical culture also appear to have progressed hand in hand. Kedāramiśra was as much a warrior as a man-of- letters. (l. 23).

The question, however, may naturally arise as to whether the family of Kedāramiśra really hailed from Bengal. The wife of Kedāramiśra was a Bengalee of Devagrāma. It has been located by Mm. H. P. Shastri in the district of Nuddia (Bengal) (Introduction to *Rāmacarita*, A. S. B. - Memoirs Vol. III). It is not known if it has any connection with Deopara in Rajshahi, the find-spot of the only inscription of Vijayasena so far known (Ep. Ind. Vol. I). Further a man of the position of Guḍava could not be expected to have erected a pillar in his honour anywhere but in his native country. The Pillar exists

1 But the work is not known to have come down.

even to this day in the village of Bādāl in Dinajpur in Bengal, which therefore seems to have included his birthplace.

Mīmāṃsā (which possibly refers to the Karma-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini), grammar and Tarka (Logic) are known to have been studied in the time of Mahīpāladeva (Bānagaḍ Inscription (1. 48) - *Gauḍalekhamālā* - p. 97).

Śrīdhara, a Brahman of Pundra-varḍhana in Bengal, who was the recipient of a land-grant from Vaidyadeva of Kāmārūpa is stated to have been equally proficient in Śruti (Vedas) and Smṛti (Kamauli grant of Vaidyadeva - ll. 44-45- *Gauḍalekhamālā*, (p. 134).

Scholars of the Vedic lore to whom reference has been made above had, it seems, specialised in that subject and it is only probable that Vedic study was regularly carried on. This supposition gets support from the way in which the Vedic schools, to which the recipients of royal grants in the Pāla Period belonged are referred to. Thus Kṛṣṇāditya is represented as a student of Vājasaneyya school of White Yajurveda (*Yajurveda-sābrahmacāriṇe Vājasaneyya-Śākhādhyāyine*- Bānagar plates Lines 47-48). One Vātesvara is similarly represented as a student of Kauthuma school of the Sāmaveda (*Sāmavedāntargata-kauthuma-Śākhādhyāyine*-Manhali plates of Madanapāla, 1. 43 *Gauḍalekhamālā*, p. 154). The word 'student' seems to be significant in the above statements which do not appear to have degenerated into formal and unmeaning ones as yet.

Besides these epigraphic records there are some other sources also which throw light on the literary condition of the period. Rājasekhara (end of 10th century) in two places of his well-known work *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* (p. 33, 51) expressly testifies to the extreme love of Sanskrit of Bengal.¹

The two most important centres of learning during the Pāla period seem to have been Bhūriśreṣṭhī (mod. Bhursut near Howrah) (*Prabodhacandrodaya*-Act. II) and Jagaddala the locality of which as yet has not been identified.

Of works of this period we know a good deal more than of the preceding period of which we have already given an account. Besides the epigraphic literature, which has already

Works of Bengal
in the Pāla Period.

1. " गौडायाः संस्कृतस्थाः " - p. 51

पदन्ति संस्कृतं ब्रह्म कुण्डाः प्राकृतवाचिन्ते । वाराणासीतः पूर्वेण ये केचिन्मगधादयः ॥-p. 31.

been referred to incidentally, works in different branches of Sanskrit literature are known to have been composed by scholars of Bengal at this period. And many of them are well-known even now. We make only a passing reference to the most important of them.

The most important work of philosophy of this period is the
 Philosophy. *Nyāyakandalī* of Bhaṭṭa Śrīdhara of Bhūrī
 Śreṣṭhī (mod. Bhursut, near Howrah).

This is a commentary on the Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda on the Vaisesika sūtra, and was composed in 913 S. E. as the author himself states at the end of his work (Ed. by Vindhyeswari Prasad Dvivedī, Benares). This Śrīdhara was also the author of several other philosophical works, namely, *Advayasiddhi*, *Tattvabodha Saṁgrāha ṭīkā*. But none of these works is known to have come down and they are only known from the references made to them in the *Nyāyakandalī*. Udayana, the well-known author of philosophical works, is sought to be connected with Bengal by a tradition which associates him with the Bhāduti family. But this does not seem to be trustworthy as Udayana in his *Kusumāñjali* mentions the *Gauḍa mīmāṃsaka* probably Mīmāṃsaka of Bengal in a disparaging tone.

Bengal's contributions to Smṛti literature are enormous.

Smṛti. To the Pāla period, we can definitely assign
 at least two authors. The earlier of these is Nārāyaṇa—who is by the by, the earliest Smṛti writer of Bengal—flourished during the reign of king Devapāla. He wrote a commentary on the *Chandogapariśiṣṭa* (Bib. Ind.) in the introduction of which he gives an account of his family which was highly learned and well-known. We should also refer to Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa minister of king Harivarmadeva whose many-sided literary activities are referred to in his Praśasti (Ep. Ind. vol. vi, pp. 203-7). Two of his works the *Prāyaścitta-Prakarana* and *Karmānuṣṭhānapaddhati* have been published. The latter of this work is highly popular even to this day.

In Kāvya the only work the Bengal origin of which is definitely known is perhaps the *Rāmacarita*
 Kāvya. of Saṁdhyākara Nandin of Varendrī who composed the work probably during the reign of king Madanapāladeva of the Pāla dynasty (A. S. B. Memoirs III—pp. 1 ff.). The work gives an account of the reign of king

Rāmapāla of the Pāla dynasty and is thus very important from the standpoint of history.

The dramatic work *Caṇḍa-kaūsika* of Ārya Ksemīśvara also belongs to this period. It was composed in the reign of king Mahīpāla I. There are several other works also of about this period which are associated with Bengal by tradition of doubtful credibility in some cases. Thus the popular drama *Veṇīsamhāra* of Bhattanārāyaṇa is supposed to be the work of the Bhattanārāyaṇa one of the five Brahmans brought to Bengal by Ādiśūra.

It was also at this time that Bengal produced several Buddhist literature. scholars whose fame travelled beyond the limits of India and some of whom at least are still deified in far off lands. I refer to Buddhist scholars like Śāntaraksita and Dipamkara Śrījñāna.¹

The Pāla period also saw Tantracism flourishing in India. The Nāthas who are assigned to Tantras about 800 A. D. by Wasseljew are stated to have brought down the Tantras. And of these Matsyendra or Minanātha is definitely stated to have introduced Kaula rites in Kāmarūpa.²

We know of at least one scholar of this period whose Medical literature. works on Hindu medicine have got an All-India popularity and are still studied and held in high honour, I refer to the work of Cakra Datta or Cakrapāṇi Datta who was in charge of the kitchen of Nayapāla.

It was probably at this period—about the 9th century—that the great grammarian Jinendrabuddhi, the Grammar. famous author of *Kāśikā-vivaraṇa-pañcikā* (published by the Varendra Research society) flourished. Almost all the commentaries on this work are by Bengalees—a fact which has led Mr. D. C. Bhattacharya to suspect his Bengal origin (*Sir Asutosh Commemoration Volumes*—vol. III, Pt. I, pp. 189). But without further direct evidence he cannot be definitely taken to be a Bengalee.

1. For a detailed account of Buddhist Sanskrit works of Bengal see my paper in *Ind. Ant.* (February 1930)

2 C. Chakravarti—*Some new facts about Matsyendranātha* (*Indian Historical Quarterly* Vol. VI. p. 178 pp.),

SENA PERIOD¹

With the accession of the Senas the cultivation of Sanskrit literature in Bengal got a fresh impetus. This was primarily due to the persistent efforts of these Brahmanic rulers towards a revival of Brahmanism in all its phases in a Buddhist ridden land ruled ere-long by Buddhist kings—the Pālas. Thus some Brahman scholars attached in some way or other to the court of one Sena ruler or another composed, apparently at the desire, and with the patronage, of the king under whom they lived, works to regulate the religious rites a Hindu was required to perform. It is curious that even some of the kings—who were not Brahmans themselves—composed similar works to which was unreservedly accorded as much reception as to those by Brahmans. As a result, within the short duration of the Sena rule a fairly good amount of ritualistic literature was produced. Thus Aniruddha, the preceptor of Vallāla composed the *Pitrdayitā* which deals with *śrāddha* to be offered for the satisfaction of the dead forefathers, to Brahmans versed in the vedas and not on *kuśa* grass as later on when such Brahmans were not available in Bengal (S. S. P. series) and the *Hārālatā*—a work on *āśauca* (Bib. Ind.). Vallāla himself was the author of two big volumes—1. *Dānasāgara* dealing with various festivities to be gone through in connection with the *dāna* or gift of various objects. 2. *Adbhutasāgara* a work dealing with good and bad omens and also various astronomical phenomena. The three brothers Paśupati, Halāyudha and Īśāna each had some ritualistic works but unfortunately they are not all available now. Of these Halāyudha was a Judge in the court of king Lakṣmanasena.

But though this ritualistic literature may be regarded as the characteristic feature of the literary activities of this period of Brahmanic revival it should not be assumed that this was the only kind of literary production of the period. For besides this, we have some poetic compositions of this period which would shed lustre on the literary history of any age. One of these, namely the *Gītāgovinda* of Jayadeva has rightly earned the praise of

¹ An illuminating account of the literary activities of this period is to be found in an article by M. Chakravarti in J. A. S. B., 1906, pp. 157ff. Some facts unknown in his time are however to be found in the following pages.

the Sanskrit loving people of all countries.¹ Jayadeva was a poet at the court of Lakṣmaṇasena which was resorted to by other poets and scholars of no mean merit. As a matter of fact Govardhana, author of *Āryāsuptaśāṭī*—a collection of seven hundred verses, mostly on love matters, in Āryā metre—Śarana, Jayadeva, Umāpati, Dhoyī, author of the *Pavanadūta* written in imitation of the *Meghadūta* of Kālidāsa—these five poets are stated to have constituted the five jewels of the court of king Lakṣmaṇasena. Of course, we do not get the works of all these poets, only portions of which have been preserved in the form of stray verses in the *Saduktikarṇāmṛta*, an anthology compiled by Śrīdharadāsa. This anthology preserves stray verses of a good many other poets of Bengal, who are unknown from any other source, including Royal poets like, Vallāla, his son Lakṣmaṇa, his son Viśvarūpa and a good many poetesses, no complete work of any of whom has unfortunately come down.

Another field in which the literary activities of the period found expression is the field of Grammar. Grammatical studies. The most important grammatical work of this period is the *Bhāṣāvṛtti* of Purusottama (V. R. S. Series) of the court of king Lakṣmaṇasena. This is a gloss on Pāṇini's well-known grammar and deals with those rules alone which pertain to classical Sanskrit. It seems that Pāṇini was the only grammar studied at this time.

It looks strange that though this period is marked by a spirit of Brahmanic revival which is fully demonstrated by the ritualistic works, we get no work of Brahmanic Philosophy of the time, composed either to give an exposition of this philosophy as it is or to prove its superiority over that of the Buddhists and thus to undermine the latter. The reason might lie in the fact that Bengal at this period was too busy with rituals to devote any attention to deep philosophical thought.

But on the whole the literary output of the period is quite commendable as it practically covered the reigns of two

.1. A popular account of the popularity of the *Gitagovinda* has been given by the present writer in the Bengali monthly *Pañcapuṣpa* (1336 B. S. Kārtika) It will be seen that the work has about forty commentaries and a dozen imitations.

kings only, namely, Vallālasena and Lakṣmaṇasena. For we are aware of little activity before Vallāla and after Lakṣmaṇa. The period preceding the time of Vallāla seems to have been spent in the consolidation of the Sena rule and that following the age of Lakṣmaṇa was disturbed by Muhamudan incursion and hence both these periods were unfavourable to literary activities.

MUHAMUDAN PERIOD

Strange though it may seem this was undoubtedly the most glorious period in the history of Sanskrit literature in Bengal. The amount of literature both Sanskrit and Bengali that was produced in this period is simply amazing. Whether in the field of philosophy,¹ or in the domain of ritualistic literature, or in the province *belles lettres* the productions were equally voluminous. In fact Navya Nyāya (modern Logic), Navya smṛti and Tantra compilations that have been admitted to be the special features of the Sanskrit literature of Bengal and that are still the popular subjects of study here – attained their full development at this period. It was also during this period that the vast amount of Vaiṣṇava literature,² covering different branches of study was produced. It is not possible to give even a short account of the literary productions of this period within the space of a short chapter. The amount of literature produced in each branch was enormous. These commendable literary activities during the Muhamudan period cannot of course be stated to be due to ardent state patronage. The Muhamudan rulers, as is well-known, had with some honourable exceptions, scant sympathy for Brahmanic culture as a whole and consequently for Sanskrit literature which embodied and spread it. As a result scholars had to fight against great odds in order to preserve, in tact, Indian culture and tradition. But there was one great advantage which stood in their favour and helped them to achieve great things in the field of literature even in spite of royal discouragement in some cases or harmless neutrality in others.

The Muhamudan rulers did not interfere with the local Zamindars or chiefs who were the paramount lords over

1 *Bengal's Contributions to Philosophical Literature in Sanskrit*—C. Chakravarti—*Ind. Ant.* (1929—p. 206, 232 ff; 1930 p 23 ff.)

2 For a detailed account of this branch of literature see *Sanskrit Literature of the Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal*—C. Chakravarti (Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vol. X. 114 ff)

their own possessions so long as they were regular in sending the required revenue to their Muhamudan overlords. And therefore the Hindu chiefs had no difficulty in patronising Sanskrit culture. Besides education in India, as a careful study of its history shows, did not always look up to any state help. It thrived generally through spontaneous help received from the generous aristocracy who considered it their duty to help scholars and desired to earn religious merit in this way. Thus every aristocratic family had a *catuspāthī* (orthodox school) founded and maintained at its own expenses where students from far and near came, resided and had their education free of cost. And on all festive occasions (such as marriage, funeral ceremony and the like) the wealthy section of the people as a rule made valuable gifts to scholars which went a great way in encouraging them.

Of the local chiefs of this period who were great patrons of literature and through whose help and inspiration-direct and indirect-was produced a vast amount of valuable literature in different branches the House of Nadia deserves special mention. During the Muhamudan period - specially from about the 15th century, that is, from the time when the Great Caitanya flourished - Nadia became the most important cultural centre in Bengal - nay in the whole of Eastern India, so that it has quite rightly been described as the Oxford of Bengal. And the contributions of the worthy members of the Nadia House to raise the place to this enviable position must have been considerable.

The most famous of the scions of this House whose patronage to all cultural activities in Bengal has almost become proverbial was Mahārāja Kṛṣṇa Candra who ascended his *gādi* in 1728. He is also well-known in the history of India as one of the most important persons who helped the British to consolidate their power in India. From the keen interest exhibited by him in all literary activities of his time he has most deservedly been called the Mecaenas of his age (Calcutta Review—Vol. LIV, 1872, p. 174).

BRITISH PERIOD

In pre-British period, before the introduction of printing,

Conditions of Sanskrit Studies. Sanskrit studies in Bengal, as we have seen cannot be said to have been generally prevalent in all branches, there being some branches more

popular than others. Thus there were some subjects e. g. Nyāya and Smṛti which were specially 'Bengali' in the sense that they were cultivated in Bengal more than anywhere else. But contemporaneously with the advent of the Europeans and the introduction of printing and facilities of communication this state of things disappeared to a great extent. Though the subjects for which Bengal was reputed to have a special predilection still continued to be studied with as much assiduity as ever, other subjects which were known to be more or less neglected began to attract the attention. The immense popularity which the study of Vedānta has of late attained may be cited as an instance. This is one of the characteristic features of Sanskrit studies of this period.

The foundation of the Calcutta University and the Board of Sanskrit Studies (now, Calcutta Sanskrit Association) which made provision for examination in various branches of Sanskrit literature supplied additional impetus in this direction. Facilities of communication urged people—to a larger extent than before—to migrate to renowned centres of learning like Benares where they went not for pilgrimage alone, but for prosecuting studies in subjects not so much cultivated in Bengal. The founding of the Asiatic Society Bengal by Sir Williams Jones in 1784 also gave fresh inspiration for study of Indian literature in all its various branches and led to the rise of a new type of Anglo-Sanskrit scholars imbued with a scientific and critical spirit that has ever since been doing much valuable work in the field of Sanskrit studies. Further the need of successful administration in the country led British statesmen to encourage the study of Indian laws and customs and get Sanskrit books to be compiled on them mostly by Bengalee scholars.

Now let us turn to the works that were produced by scholars of Bengal at this period. We are not concerned here with all that was done by Anglo-Sanskrit scholars as most of their works are either in English or Bengali though almost all of them deal with important topics of Sanskrit literature. But it seems that we should not omit to mention, in this connection, the various Notices and Descriptions of Sanskrit Manuscripts compiled, among others, by those two veteran scholars namely the late

Rāja Rājendra Lāl Mitra and Mm. Dr. H. P. Śāstri.¹ The various critical editions of old Sanskrit texts published in the Bibliotheca Indica should also be noted here.

We should begin our survey of the literary output of this period by referring, first of all, to some works
Legal Digests.

in the production of which the Government took keen and active interest. When the British first came to power in India they felt the necessity of learning the laws and customs of the land they were going to rule. So at the instance of the Government several digests of Hindu law came to be compiled.² Of these the *Vivāda-bhaṅgārṇava* was compiled by Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana of Triveni who was one of the greatest scholars of his time. Unfortunately his work has not been published uptill now. The *Vivādārṇava-setu*³ was composed by eleven best scholars of Bengal called together by Warren Hastings. The work was translated into Persian and thence to English by Halhed, the English version being well-known as a 'Code of Gentoo Law' which was published in 1776. Both these works were composed in the old style of preparing digests. Frequent references were made to old texts and all attempts were made to reconcile conflicting statements. But we also know of two works prepared exactly in the style followed in modern legal texts. These are the *Vyavasthā-darpana* and *Vyavasthā-candrikā* of Śyāmācaraṇa Sarkār. The latter of these works with Urdu translation was published in 1935 V. S. (1879 A. D.).

We should now give a brief account of the work done by some of the greatest orthodox scholars of Bengal during this period in the various branches of study. The necessity of compressing the whole account in a short section of a

1. Twelve volumes of Notices were published by R. L. Mitra and H. P. Shastri. Descriptive Catalogues of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta have been published in 22 volumes. Three volumes of such catalogues of manuscripts in the Government collection of A. S. B. have also been published by H. P. Shastri. A catalogue of the grammatical Mss. of the A. S. B. was published long ago by R. L. Mitra.

2 It may be noted here that individual scholars like Jones and Colebrooke got similar works prepared by pandits of other provinces (I. O. III. 1505-1510).

3 It is curious that in the preface of the work published by the Venkateswar Press, Bombay it is stated to have been compiled at the instance of Ranjit Sing.

short chapter prevented us from attempting to refer to the very many poets of this period; for though stray verses of them are still sources of perennial enjoyment, very few of them are known to have composed any poetic work and the fame of most of them are due to works in other branches to most of which a reference has been made in the following pages.

Prānakṛṣṇa Bīśvāsa flourished almost immediately after the occupation of Bengal by the British. He was a big land-holder, a deep scholar and a great patron of Sanskrit learning. His ancestral home was at Khardaha, a few miles from Calcutta on the western bank of the Ganges. At his instance were composed several voluminous scholarly works some of which continue to enjoy a well-deserved popularity even to this day. The most famous of his works is a Tantra compilation called the *Prānatoṣiṇī* after his name and that of ‡Rāmatosaṇa Vidyālaṃkāra who compiled it. His other published works are :—

1. Prānakṛṣṇa-*ausadhāvalī*—a work on medicine. 2. Prānakṛṣṇa-*Vaiṣṇavāmṛta*. 3. Prānakṛṣṇa-*kriyāmbudhi*. 4. Prānakṛṣṇa-*śabdābdi* (composed in 1737 S. E. by Raghumaṇi elder brother of Rāmanandana Vidyālaṃkāra, son of Rāmananda Nyāyālaṃkāra preceptor of Mahārāja Kṛṣṇacandra of Nadia.)

Some of his works, namely *Bhasmakauṃudī* and *Viṣṇukaumudī* are stated to be still unpublished. (*Viśvakoṣa* under Prānakṛṣṇa Bīśvāsa).

It will be seen from the literary activities of Prānakṛṣṇa that chaos and disorder did not follow on the heels of the British conquest, as may naturally be expected for in that event such literary activities would in no way be possible. It should also be noted that though the works go by the name of Prānakṛṣṇa they were not composed by him but by scholars employed by him as is stated in the introductory portions of the works themselves.

The next name to be mentioned is that of Rājā Rādhākānta

Rājā Rādhākānta. Deva. He was a great patron of learning and Deva (1784—1868) took keen interest for all literary activities of his time. His greatest achievement was the compilation of a voluminous lexicography in Sanskrit of an encyclopædic character. The work was named *Śabdakalpādruma*. It was first published in eight parts, including a part containing a

supplement. The first part appeared in 1822 A. D. in Bengali Characters and the supplement was published in 1858. Thus altogether thirty six long years were required to complete the work. It should be noted here that such a big work which necessarily entailed enormous labour and huge expenditure was distributed free among the scholars of the day.¹

This work came to be highly appreciated by scholars, both Indian and foreign.² It has already undergone several editions, mostly in Bengali characters. It is a pity that no Devnagari edition of it is available, its utility being thereby curtailed to a great extent. It is a storehouse of much useful information which has been of invaluable help to all workers in the field of Indology. Professors Roth and Boethling utilised the book the only modern work of India-as being highly important and of great use in the compilation of their monumental Sanskrit Dictionary. Their *Sanskrit Worterbuch* is replete with references to the *Śabdakalpadruma*.

Gangādhara Kavirāja was born in 1798 A. D. in Jessore. He was a genius. His versatile scholarship (1798-1885) earned for him a name and fame that will not die out soon. He was a Vaidya by caste and was a physician by profession. Stories of his exceptional skill in diagnosis and treatment have almost become proverbial.

He composed about forty works in different branches of Sanskrit literature which give eloquent testimony to the depth of his scholarship. It is stated that he did not consider it worth while to bother about works that were not composed by ṛṣis (seers) as distinguished from ordinary men. He wrote commentaries only on two works that were not composed by a ṛṣi, namely a commentary on the *Mugdhabodha* of Bopadeva and a commentary on *Kusumāñjali* of Udayana. Other exegetical works of his are:—

1. Commentary on the *Carakasamhitā* called *Jalpakaḥparatu*. This is perhaps the most erudite of his works. But his

1. O. other instances of the distribution of valuable literary production mention may be made of the well-known Bengali translation of the *Mahābhārata* by Kaliprasanna Simha and the edition of the *Mahābhārata* published by the Rājā of Burdwan.

2. A very commendable review of the work was published by Dr. Lenz in J. R. A. S. 1835 pp. 188 ff. It was referred to in highly eulogistic terms by Wilson in the first edition of his Sanskrit Dictionary (1819).

occasional digressions into philosophical topics has made it very difficult for beginners to follow.

2. Commentary on *Upaniṣads* like *Taittirīya* etc.

3. *Śārīrakasūtra-Vyākhyāna*. 4. Commentary on *Īśvarīgītā* and *Bhagavadgītā*. 6-9 *Bhāṣya* on Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Pātañjalasūtras. 10. *Bhāṣya* on *Gobhīlagṛhyasūtra*. 11. *Bhāṣya* on the Āyurveda portion of *Agnipurāṇa*. 12. Commentary on *Kaumāra Vyākaraṇa*. 13. Gloss on the *Vārtikas* of Kātyāyana. 14. Commentary on Sāṅdilya Sūtras. 15. Commentary on *Manusamhitā*. 16-17. Notes on Parāśara and Yājñavalkya *Samhitā*. 18. Commentary on the *Mugdhabodha*.

His original works were :—

In Kāvya :—*Durgavadha Kāvya*, *Harsodaya (Citrakāvya)*, *Śikhandi-prādurbhāva* (Romance), *Lokālokapurusīya* etc. In Rhetoric-*Prācyā-prabhā* based on the *Alamkāra* chapters of *Agnipurāṇa*.

In Grammar-*Trikāṇḍaśabda Śāsana* and *Trisūtra Vyākaraṇa* both in verse.

In Purāṇa-*Bhāgavatavicāra* where proofs are adduced to show that the *Bhāgavata* cannot be regarded as a *mahāpurāṇa* (*ViśvaKoṣa*-under *Gaṅgādhara*).

The list is sufficient to show the enormous and abnormal range of study of *Gaṅgādhara*.

It is a pity that very few of the works of this great scholar who lived and wrote not long ago, have been published - far less studied. Nor have all his works been preserved; only some of them are found described in the notices of Mm. H.P. Shastri. No estimate of his literary achievements is thus possible.

Of his works the commentary on *Caraka-Samhitā* has undergone several editions both in Bengali and Nagari characters. An edition of it in Bengali characters was published by his son Dharanīdhara Rāy from Behampur in V. S. 1935. The *Taittirīyopaniṣad-vṛtti* was also published by his son from the same place in Nagari character (1291 B. S.). Fragments of some other works of his were also published in the periodical called *Gaṅgādhara manīṣā* which was being published from Calcutta by Kavirāja Jñānendra Nātha Sena in 1911 with a view to edit the works of *Gaṅgādhara*. But only a few issues of it are known to have been published.

Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati was a Professor in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. His greatest literary achievement was the single-handed compilation of the Sanskrit lexicography called *Vācaspatya* after his name and complete in six volumes (Calcutta 1873-1884). He had also composed other works too numerous to mention. A reference may only be made to his *Āsubodha Vyākaraṇa* an independent grammar based on the Pāṇini.

Mr. Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra was one of the greatest savants in ancient Sanskrit lore that Bengal produced in the last century. He belonged to Serpur in Mymensing. His scholarship was not narrow and confined to a particular branch of Sanskrit literature. He was Professor of Sanskrit in the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta. His literary productions are varied and many, which have received almost universal appreciation. Of his original works mention may be made of his *Smṛti-Candrāloka* in which the views of Raghunandana are occasionally discussed and refuted. Only parts of the work are known to have been published (*Śuddhi*-1903, *Aurdhvadehika*-1906). His *Kātantra-cchandaḥ. Prakriyā* is a supplement to the Kātantra grammar which supplies the want of a Vedic grammar of the Kātantra school. Besides these he composed several *kāvya*s and dramas as well.

We may close our survey by a reference to Kāśīcandra Vidyāratna who came of a Brahman family of Vikrampur. His special subject of study was *Smṛti* in which he had earned an enviable reputation all over India. He had not that unbending conservative spirit, invariably found to be associated with scholars of this type which revolts against everything new in the society. On the other hand he had the courage and generosity to welcome all salutary innovations which were required by the exigencies of the time, and find out scriptural sanction for them. It was with this spirit that he wrote a very learned and illuminating commentary on the twenty Dharma Saṃhitās which guide the religious life of the present day Hindus. His commentary on the *Manu* alone has been published. An original work of him was the *Uādhāra-Candrīkā* (Calcutta 1321 B. S.) in which he deals with the problem of taking back

into society those that have crossed the sea and have gone to western countries.

A class of work that was the special and entirely new characteristic of the period under review

Journalistic works.

was the journalistic literature of Sanskrit.

With the introduction of the Press, journals came to be published in the different vernaculars of India. A section of the people actuated by a desire for the diffusion and revival of Sanskrit brought out journals in Sanskrit which they hoped would fulfil the object they had in view. The journalistic literature in Sanskrit all over India has an undoubted philological interest. Sanskrit of the journals shows how it is influenced by the different vernaculars in the different provinces. This kind of intrusion of vernacular idioms into Sanskrit has been the order for a long time past in the history of Sanskrit literature and it is palpable now as we are able to compare Sanskrit and the vernaculars side by side. A good many such journals were published from time to time from different parts of the province only to last for a short period.

One thing that attracts the notice of one engaged in the investigation of the contribution of Bengal towards Sanskrit literature is that Bengal like other provinces has not ceased to contribute her quota even to the present day when very few persons care to read things in Sanskrit. Works both exegetical and independent are occasionally published even now. Of these we may mention first those of Kavirāja Gaṇanātha Sena, M. A., L. M. S. His *Pratyakṣa-Sārira* or a Text Book of Human Anatomy in Sanskrit (Calcutta, 1919) and *Siddhānta-Nidānam* or Text Book of a Etiology, Pathology, and Symptomatology of diseases in Sanskrit (Calcutta, 1922) are two very important contributions to the medical literature of Sanskrit. We may also refer to the *Rasa-Jalanidhi* a work in Sanskrit on Hind Chemistry by Bhudeva Mukherji, (Calcutta 1926). We should also mention two important exegetical works namely the commentary on *Caraka Saṃhitā* and *Suśruta Saṃhitā* respectively by Kavirāja Jogindra-nātha Sen, M. A. and Kavirāja Haranacandra Cakravarti, both of whom are well-known physicians of Bengal. The latter of the two is probably the only physician of the present time who practises surgery according to the *Āyurveda* and thus seems to be quite competent to write a commentary on the *Suśruta Saṃhitā* which deals with surgery.

Besides these a good many works on Kāvya have been produced in recent years. Some of these could have received sufficient appreciation had the authors flourished several centuries back when Sanskrit scholarship was held in esteem and Sanskrit works were read with interest and care. We should however be failing in our duty if we do not mention the names of Pandits Rāmanātha Tarkaratna, Haridāsa Siddhāntavāgīśa, Kālīpada Tarkācārya and Professor Hem Candra Ray Kavibhūṣana, M. A.¹ Of these Tarkācārya excels in writing short lyrics.

It is common knowledge that owing to the comparative neglect of orthodox scholarship quite a number of scholars are passing their days unnoticed and unrespected who could have made their contribution—not in all cases worthless—were they given sufficient opportunities.

CONCLUSION

Even in spite of brevity and consequent incompleteness the above account will be sufficient to drive away a good deal of misconception with regard to the subject. And one will be surprised at the extent of this misconception even in enlightened circles. In an article entitled '*Bengali Literature*' (Calcutta Review—1871—Vol. LII—p. 294) no less a scholar and intellectual giant than Bankim Chandra Chatterji.² 'The Scott of Bengal'—wrote:—"It is a Bengali writer, Babu Rajendralal Mitra who has said that in ancient times Bengal was the Boestia of India. And the observation is correct. The contributions of Bengal to that ancient Indian Literature which still commands the respect and attention of European scholars were few and insignificant." In the face of the facts put forward it now remains for the reader to judge the accuracy of the above statement.

1. Several works of each of these have been published and are well known at least among the orthodox Pandits.

2. Though the article does not bear the name of its author Mr. Manmathanath Ghosh M.A., B.L. who has published a Bengali translation of it (*Bāṅālā Sāhitya*—Gurudas Chatterji and Sons) attributes it to Bankim Chandra. Mr. Ghosh says that the name of the author is found in an advertisement of the *Selections from the Calcutta Review* undertaken by the publishers of the Review.

EPIC STUDIES¹

BY

V. S. SUKTHANKAR

III. DR. RUBEN ON THE CRITICAL EDITION OF THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

I am bound to form and express an opinion on the issues raised in the article "Schwierigkeiten der Textkritik des Mahābhārata" published in the current issue of the *Acta Orientalia* (vol. 8, pp. 240-256), in which the author, Dr. Walter Ruben of the University of Bonn, has reviewed Fascicules 1-3 of my edition of the Ādiparvan, criticizing at considerable length and in great detail the principles underlying the preparation of the edition and the constitution of the text.

From his discursive remarks it is indeed hazardous to say what precise opinion Ruben has formed of the critical edition. But it seems to me that his general verdict is anything but favourable.

It is not my intention to scrutinize every statement of the writer and answer all his queries and criticisms; nor is it incumbent on me to do so; nor even necessary, as will appear from the sequel. I shall confine my remarks to a few points of outstanding importance in Ruben's paper which might mislead the casual reader, creating an erroneous impression regarding the value of the results achieved by the critical edition.

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The Bogy of Classical Philology

At the beginning of his paper (p. 241), the learned reviewer from Bonn formally recites the canon of the *caturvarga* of the Classical Philologist. The Classical Philology, we are explained, distinguishes: 1. Heuristics, i. e. assembling and arranging the entire material consisting of MSS. and *testimonia* in the form of a genealogical tree; 2. *Recensio*, i. e. restoration of the text of the archetype; 3. *Emendatio*, i. e. restoration of the text of the author; 4. "Higher Criticism," i. e. separation of the sources utilized by the author.

¹ For the first instalment of the series, cf. *JBBRAS.* 4. 157 ff.; the second has appeared in these *Annals*, pp. 165-191 *supra*.

Tested on this touchstone of the classicist, the critical edition of the Mahābhārata is found wanting in no less than three items, namely, Nos. 1, 3 and 4. The third and the fourth items of the programme, R. points out, have been left wholly untouched; even the first has by a long way not been done full justice to by the hapless editor!¹ But as one reads on, one finds that the dereliction is after all not as serious as one might be led to suppose at first. For, as regards No. 1 (Heuristics), R. himself admits that it is not yet possible to concentrate the entire material, and that in all likelihood it will be for ever impossible to prepare a genealogical tree of the Mahābhārata MSS. — As for No. 3 (*Emendatio*), I must plead guilty to having perpetrated so far, perhaps somewhat unnecessarily, minor emendations in 13 instances² in about 3800 stanzas; that is, on an average 1 emendation in a little under 300 stanzas. R. has not taken any notice of my conjectural corrections; I take it that he approves of them. I feel greatly flattered, I must confess, by R.'s (implied) suggestion that I should have gone in more systematically and vigorously for emendation. Most scholars will, I fancy, be sincerely grateful that I have been so moderate and that I have declared it as my policy to give preference to interpretation over emendation.³ — In speaking at all of "Higher Criticism" (No. 4 on the programme) in this connection, R. seems to show a lamentable lack of understanding of the objective of the edition, having mistaken evidently the beginning for the end of the critical work on the Mahābhārata. Higher Criticism can begin only after Lower Criticism has done its work, and not until then. And our critical edition is just laying the foundation of the Lower Criticism of the Great Epic. But I imagine, R. does not want to say anything special at all, when he mentions his "Höhere Kritik". In the 1833 ślokas of the constituted text (=2161 of the Bombay edition and 2208 of the Calcutta edition) so closely investigated by R. in the preparation of his erudite paper, he does not mention even a single passage where the "Höhere Kritik" could have

¹ R. has inadvertently omitted the mention of the 23 Devanāgarī MSS. in the description of my critical apparatus; cf. *op. cit.* p. 241, lines 3-6 from the bottom.

² In the first 86 adhyāyas, the following stanzas contain conjectural readings: 1. 14. 15; 30. 7; 37. 10; 41. 5; 45. 15; 48. 9; 51. 8; 57. 20; 68. 25; 71. 36; 84. 3, 13; 86. 5.

³ Cf. Foreword to Fasc. 1, p. vi, column 2.

earnestly and usefully "functioned". The item is probably introduced here merely *pro forma*, as the fourth and last stage of the *ariya-magga*.

But R. might have mercifully spared us this learned *prooemium* on the aims and methods of the Classical Philology and their application to the problem of the Mahābhārata textual criticism. The same thing has been said by others before R., more simply but with ample clearness and emphasis. In the paper¹ he read at the XVIIth International Congress of Orientalists (Oxford 1928), Winternitz remarked: "The general principles followed in critical editions of classical texts, Greek or Latin or Sanskrit, can be applied to a critical edition of the Mahābhārata only with great limitations and modifications. It is simply impossible to trace a genealogical tree of all the MSS. of the Adiparvan, and only in some cases are we able to state how MSS. are related to one another. On the whole, we have to be satisfied with a classification of the MSS. according to script, and the provinces to which they belong. And we have more often to refer to classes of MSS., than to individual MSS."² I had myself pointed out in the Foreword (p. ii) to Fascicule I that "it is impossible to apply to the Mahābhārata the special canons of textual criticism which are derived from a study of classical (Greek and Latin) texts and which depend ultimately upon their being a more or less complete concatenation of copies and exemplars reaching finally back to a single authentic (written) archetype".

And how would it be possible to apply to the Mahābhārata the canons of the Classical Philology *in toto*? Where has the Classical Philology, I should like to know, the necessary experience of dealing with a text with about a dozen recensions whose extreme types differ in extent by something like 13,000 stanzas (or 26,000 lines); a work which for centuries has been growing not only upwards and downwards but also laterally, like the Nyagrodha tree, growing on all sides; a codex which has been written in seven or eight different scripts, assiduously and lovingly copied through a long vista of centuries by a legion of devout—and perhaps mostly ignorant

¹ *Indol. Prag.* vol. 1 (1929), pp. 58–68.

² See *op. cit.* p. 61.

and inefficient¹—copyists speaking different tongues; a traditional book of inspiration which, in various shapes and sizes, has been the cherished heritage of one people continuously for several millennia and which to the present day is interwoven with the thoughts and beliefs and moral ideas of a nation numbering over two hundred million? No, the Classical Philology has no experience in dealing with a text of this description, a work of such colossal dimensions and complex character, with such a long and intricate history behind it. That is why I have elsewhere also said that the problem of the Mahābhārata textual criticism is a problem *sui generis*.² The method of the Mahābhārata textual criticism must be evolved from a special study of the Mahābhārata manuscripts and of the Mahābhārata manuscript tradition. Its results and achievements can be judged only by a standard of its own.

Ruben's Exaggerations and Generalizations

In his endeavour to maintain consistently an attitude of dogmatic doubt, R. has been unconsciously led to make wild exaggerations and rash generalizations, which such a meticulous and captious critic as R. should have taken pains to avoid.

Thus in one place (p. 242), R. observes that the Śāradā MS., as a matter of fact, does not differ at all from other MSS. ! As a matter of fact, this statement of R. is demonstrably false. If a difference of something like 1000 stanzas (which is probably the difference between the Śāradā and the Grantha versions of the Ādiparvan), not to speak of innumerable minor variants, is no difference, I should like to know what, in the opinion of R., would constitute a difference. Did R. expect that the Kāśmīrī Mahābhārata would be a poem of 8800 ślokas in Old Prakrit in which Kṛṣṇa was still a tribal hero ?

On p. 253, R. remarks that *every* contextual criterion is problematic.³ This is a rash generalization. In the Editorial Note (3) appended to Fascicule 4, I have now pointed out (p. ii f.) three passages for which there is the strongest in-

¹ The critical note on l. 85. 20 mentions an instance where the scribe (of K1) has first copied the reverse of the folio of his exemplar and then the obverse !

² See my " Epic Studies I " (*JBBRAS.* vol. 4), p. 157.

³ Cf. also Ruben, *op. cit.* p. 244.

trinsic probability, amounting to certainty, that they are interpolations in the recension in which they are found. All three are instances in which according to the Northern recension the parties to be married were united only by a shadowy and clandestine form of marriage known as the *Gāndharva-vivāha*, which is no marriage at all, while according to the Southern recension (respectively, in one case, the Grantha version only) the same parties were married, so to say, in church, in due form, with great pomp and ceremony. I maintain that at least in these three instances the criterion of intrinsic probability is not at all problematic. I challenge R. to prove the contrary.

I shall mention only one other interesting instance of intrinsic probability. In the *Paulomaparvan*, Ruru, while praying for the life of his wife who has just died from the bite of a venomous serpent, says (1. 9. 4-5) :

“ If I have (practised) charity, (if I have) practised penance, if I have duly served (my) Gurus, then on account of that (merit of these virtuous acts) let my beloved be restored to life ! As from (the moment of) my birth I have restrained my self and maintained my vows, so let the beautiful *Pramadvarā* even now arise ! ”

The fulfilment of Ruru's fervent utterance is thought to be due merely to the efficacy of his pious acts in the past : they by themselves operate as a charm or spell to restore to life the dead *Pramadvarā*. This is a form of an “ impersonal ” prayer belonging to a comparatively older stratum of religious life and thought, which would never occur to an ordinary interpolator. At this place, G 1. 2. 4. 5 have some additional lines including the following prayer (233*)

“ Is my faith in *Kṛṣṇa*, *Viṣṇu*, *Hṛṣikeśa*, the Lord of the Worlds, the Foe of the *Asuras*, unshakable, then let this beloved of mine be restored to life ! ”

This belongs to a later stratum, the period of the *Bhakti* cult. This is just the thing that would be interpolated by a devout *Vaiṣṇava*, to whom the former prayer would be meaningless and unintelligible.

I maintain that here also the intrinsic probability as to what is original and what is interpolation is so strong as to be conclusive in favour of the text and against G 1. 2. 4. 5. No

one with a modicum of the historical sense can doubt it. Can R. adduce even a shadow of a reason to show that the intrinsic evidence in this instance is in any degree problematic? Scores of illustrations of this character may be produced where the contextual evidence is not problematic at all, but quite definite and conclusive.¹

R. (p. 254) has magnanimously set the seal of his approval on "Die Sage von R̥ṣyaśṛṅga" by Professor Lüd̥ers,² citing it approvingly as a piece of investigation that belongs to the coveted domain of *emendatio*. It is unquestionably that. Had R. now thought over the question a little more deeply than he appears to have done, he would have easily perceived that the whole thesis of "Die Sage von R̥ṣyaśṛṅga" rests on the exploitation of intrinsic probability. There was, in fact, nothing else except the vulgate text before Prof. Lüd̥ers when he framed his brilliant hypothesis about the different strata and the cross-currents in the Mahābhārata version of that legend. If now *every* contextual criterion is so very problematic, then what is the value, may I ask, of Prof. Lüd̥ers' monograph, which R. professes to admire so fervently? R. has been contradicting himself in one and the same paragraph (p. 253 f.).

Theoretically considered also, R.'s proposition is untenable. When a text has been tampered with *on a large scale*, however careful and however accomplished the interpolator may be, it is inconceivable that all the frills, patches and paddings added by the interpolator should remain for all time incapable of detection. It is inevitable that the interpolator should bungle something somewhere, produce a misfit, leave raw edges which do not meet. Therefore R.'s dictum (p. 253) "ebenso problematisch ist schliesslich jedes³ inhaltliche Kriterium" is, in the form in which he has put it, fundamentally wrong and is to be unhesitatingly rejected.

Here is another instance of R.'s misstatements. On p. 242 he observes that among the fifty MSS. collated for the Ādiparvan

¹ For instance, it is on grounds of intrinsic probability that Prof. Lüd̥ers (*DLZ*. Heft 24, Sp. 1142 f.) decides for and defends the reading *amṛtam* of the constituted text (1. 1. 201). Here the documentary evidence is inconclusive, but Prof. Lüd̥ers is on that account in no doubt as to which the true reading is.

² *Nachr. d. Ges. d. Wiss. z. Göttingen*, 1897, pp. 87ff.

Italics mine

there are not even *two* that may be directly connected with each other. This is of course a wild exaggeration. The two Arjunamīśra MSS. show *inter se* no more difference than any two (carelessly made) copies of an original would show; as a matter of fact — but this could not have been known to R. — they agree almost page for page. If they were not copied from the same original, their respective exemplars could not have differed from each other very considerably. The same is the case with the three Nilakantha MSS. The MSS. of the text as fixed by commentators (like Arjunamīśra and Nilakantha) are, in general, as like as two peas. The number of such replicas can be increased almost indefinitely. I have intentionally restricted their number to the minimum necessary for fixing the text of the respective versions, always giving preference to a divergent type. But even apart from such texts with commentaries, there is considerable similarity and kinship to be noticed among the different MSS. In the Editorial Note (2) appended to Fascicule 3 (p. ii), I have demonstrated the kinship between Ś₁ and K₁. I pointed out there that "the India Office codex must be a transcript not merely of a Śāradā codex, but, as a careful comparison with Ś₁ would show, of an exemplar very closely allied to *our* Śāradā codex". This conclusion is supported by numerous other agreements throughout the Adiparvan. That the three new Malayālam MSS. M6. 7. 8 again go back to the same original follows not merely from the numerous readings these MSS. have in common, but conspicuously from one particular mistake where they *repeat* inconsequentially, at the same point, a fragment of a stanza (1. 85. 25): *pūjayantiha loke nāsādhavaḥ*. Further the four Grantha MSS. G₁. 2. 4. 5. (which will come up for detailed discussion below) must go back to a not very distant common original. This group has not only numerous readings in common, but it contains quite a considerable number of interpolations peculiar to itself.¹ Their close affinity is, however, placed beyond the pale of reasonable doubt by the fact that they all contain a stanza (294*) interpolated at a place where it is, as will presently be shown, so thoroughly irrelevant that with it the passage does not construe even!

It will thus be seen that these generalizations of R. are absolutely unwarranted. They appear to have been introduced

¹ See *infra* p. 273

by R. merely for the satisfaction of having made some pointed and effective little statement.

The Four Types of Variants.

After pointing out that no pedigree of the Mahābhārata MSS. is possible, R. proceeds (p. 243) to consider the different types of characteristic combinations among the variants, whose consideration must take the place of the formation of the usual genealogical tree. He distinguishes four different types of constellations. They are as follows: 1. *Complete Agreement*, where the two recensions N and S register one concordant reading; 2. *No Agreement*, where N and S stand opposite to each other with two divergent readings; 3. *Cross-Agreement*, where a part of N agrees with a part of S against the rest of N, which latter agrees with the rest of S; 4. *Partial Agreement*, where a part of N stands against S and the rest of N (or *vice versa*).

Diagrammatically the four types of constellations may be represented thus.

Type No. 1: *Complete Agreement* : N = S

Type No. 2: *No Agreement* : N ≠ S

Type No. 3: *Cross-Agreement* : N1 N2
 S1 S2

Type No. 4: *Partial Agreement* : N1 N2 | N
 S S1 S2

Type No. 1 (N=S). In this case I have assumed that the concordant reading of N and S must be postulated as having already belonged to the archetype. To my proposition R. adds the rider that there is a possibility that even such a concordant reading (or feature) might have been an innovation made in one recension and then borrowed *in toto* by the other recension. He cites (p. 244) Rāmāyana, Ayodhyā 6 (Bombay ed.), which (according to R.) is an interpolation in one recension, which had been borrowed *en bloc* by the other (independent) recension. R.'s proposition would be a contradiction in terms; only he takes care not to put forward the proposition in this form.

If the two recensions N and S of the Mahābhārata should have an interpolation in common, they would not be (truly) independent. But these recensions must be assumed to be independent, and R. would not be able to prove any "second-

ary interrelationship" between N as a whole and S as a whole, at least for the Ādiparvan. Should there be found a passage which stands in such an apparent disagreement with the context that it may (*a priori*) be regarded as an interpolation, it would be no more difficult—in fact it would be, in my opinion, far easier and much more natural—to assume that the contradiction was already present in the "archetype," before the bifurcation of the recensions than to premise that one independent recension had borrowed it from another independent recension.

For example, adhyāyas 1 and 4 of the Ādiparvan begin with the identical sentence, depicting the identical situation, that the Sūta approaches the Rsis assembled in the Naimisa forest at the twelve-year sacrificial session of Śaunaka. This implies that a new beginning is made at adhyāya 4, totally ignoring whatever has gone before it in the text as it now stands. Both passages occur with minimal variations in both recensions. It is evident that this double beginning (adhy. 1 and 4), as we find it in our version of the Mahābhārata, was not conceived and depicted by one and the same poet. But it does not at all follow therefore that the interpolation was first made in one recension of our text and was subsequently borrowed by the other from this recension. There are various possibilities.¹ Perhaps both versions of the beginning lay before the diaskeuasts of the last redaction of the Mahābhārata: one giving the very useful table of contents, the other containing some interesting old tales of gods, ṛsis and serpents. They were not consistent in juxtaposition, but each was too good to lose. The redactors put both in, making but a poor compromise. This is one possibility. The other possibility is that one of these sections was composed and tacked on to an existing version of the beginning by the diaskeuasts of the last redaction themselves, using the same opening device. That would only show—as R. himself concedes in another connection (p. 254)—that though we might regard the original epic as a more or less homogeneous

1 Cf. Holtzmann, *Das Mahābhārata*, 2. 12.

work, the archetype of our MSS. already contained some inconsistencies and contradictions.¹

Type No. 2 (N ≠ S). I agree with R. that when there is a conflict between N and S and they stand opposite to each other with two divergent readings, no definite decision is, in general, possible as to which is the original; the versions should *a priori* be placed on an equal footing and treated with impartiality.² Accordingly, in such cases, I have adopted as stop-gap the reading of N, placing a wavy line below it, to show that the reading is uncertain. R. mentions an exception to this procedure of mine, but the exception is only apparent. R. has failed to understand my motives in departing from my usual practice in the solitary instance of the benedictory stanza with which the epic begins (*Nārāyaṇaṁ namaskṛtya* etc.). I have printed it above the line not because it is found in Ko or in K or even in N, but simply as a mangala. I am aware that the stanza is missing in S. There is, therefore, every probability that it did not belong to the archetype. I am also fully aware that the stanza is a characteristic mark of the works of the Bhāgavata sect and not peculiar to the Mahābhārata.³ There is, however, the fact that all our MSS. of the Ādiparvan begin with some benedictory stanza. These stanzas have probably usurped now the place of some simpler mangala with which the epic once began. No orthodox Hindu work can begin without a mangala; and this edition of the Mahābhārata, critical though it be, is and remains a Hindu work, which could not dispense with a mangala. My recognition of the unoriginal character of the stanza is, however, clearly implied by the fact that I have omitted to give the

¹ For instance, the story of the birth of Bhṛṣma contains a patent contradiction. The reason why the Vasus were cursed by Vasiṣṭha as given in adhy. 91 (= 96 of the Bombay text) is quite different from and inconsistent with that given in adhy. 93 (= 99 of the Bombay text). Both versions occur, in substantially identical form, in both recensions.— Cf. also the passage regarding the eight forms of marriage (1 67. 8-12) in the Śakuntala episode. The passage is made up of two different and mutually inconsistent systems of rules, taken from two different sources. 11cā and 12ab have been borrowed from a context which mentions only five forms of marriages; cf. (K.) 13. 79. 9 and Dahlmann, *Das Mahābhārata* pp. 203 ff. The same passage, with some variation, but with the same inconsistency, occurs in Manu (3. 21-26).

² See my "Epic Studies I" (*JBRAS.* vol. 4), p. 163.

³ Bühler, *Indian Studies*, 2. 4 (footnote 2).

stanza a number, differing in this respect conspicuously from the earlier editions, which treat it as the first stanza of the epic and an integral part of the text.

The Position of G1. 2. 4. 5.

One of the most perplexing forms of variation in the Mahābhārata text is Type No. 4, namely, Partial Agreement. The critical apparatus is a veritable labyrinth of complicated and intermingled versions, each with a long and intricate history of its own behind it. We have unfortunately no single thread to guide us out of the maze, but rather a multitude of strands intertwined and entangled and leading along divergent paths. How difficult it is to find one's way in this maze may be realized from the fact that so painstaking and able a critic as R., despite his close and conscientious study of the critical apparatus, could totally lose his bearings the moment the network gets a little more complicated than usual.

The really perplexing part of the whole tangle is that while the agreements of Ś1 K1 with S are mostly authentic and fundamental, those of G1. 2. 4. 5 with N are mostly secondary and spurious. Let us first consider the position of the group G1. 2. 4. 5, which appears to have caused R. most trouble. I shall state the case as it has been put forward by R. himself (p. 249 f.).

Suparnādhyaṃya 19 contains a conversation of Garuḍa with his father Kaśyapa. Garuḍa introduces himself as *patatām va-riṣṭha* and makes some polite inquiries regarding his father (*kaccid vas tāta kuśalam grheṣu*) and his mother (*kaccit . . . mātā na śocati*). The father replies that they are doing well at home (*vedāham etat kuśalam grheṣu*) and then pronounces a blessing on Garuḍa (*. . . tvā rakṣatu . . . ṛco yajūṃṣi*; then *svastyayanam*). This conversation assumes in the Mahābhārata (1. 25. 7-25) the following form. Garuḍa asks his father for some new and substantial food and the father recommends the mammoth elephant and tortoise (as in Suparn. 13. 1 f. Garuḍa's mother does) and proceeds to relate their history. In this scene the contents of the Suparn. are to be found in the "interpolated" verses (here adapted to the new contents). In the beginning (324*: Ko. 3. 4 Ñ V1 B D T1), the father asks Garuḍa if he is doing well "in respect of food" (*kaccid vaḥ kuśalam*

¹ This is R.'s rendering ("fragt nach seinem Wohlergehen 'in Bezug auf das Essen'"); but he has evidently misunderstood the line, which may be translated thus: "Have you (all) been doing well? (Have you had) always plenty of food?"

nityam bhojane); the three lines of this N interpolation (says R.) correspond to the equally long S interpolation (326*: G₁. 2. 4. 5), in which Garuḍa introduces himself as *patatām śrestha*. In both these N and S groups there follows a common interpolation (327*) in which Garuḍa says that his mother is well (*mātā me kuśalā*), etc. At the end of the scene follows in these MSS. (Ñ V₁ B D T₁ G₁. 2. 4. 5; in K₂. 4 only partly) the blessings of the father (335*: . . . *svastyayanam* . . . *ro yajūṁsi*).

Garuḍa has stolen the Amṛta; Indra hurls at him his Vajra; Garuḍa shows his strength and drops just one feather (Mbh. 1. 29. 19=Suparṇ. 27. 6). Mbh. 1. 29. 23 is similar to Suparṇ. 28. 2 (Indra then tries to make friends with Garuḍa); Suparṇ. 28. 3 is similar to Mbh. 1. 30. 4 ff. (Garuḍa boasts about his great strength).¹ In Suparṇ. 28. 1 it is narrated that out of Garuḍa's feather, which had split in three parts (*chinnam tridhā tat kuḷiśena patram*), there sprang the peacock, the "two-mouthed serpent-lords" and the mongoose. The last three pādas of this stanza are interpolated at this place in K_o. 4 (358*); the first finds an echo in 361*, an interpolation of T₂ G₁. 2. 4. 5 (*tridhā kṛtvā tadā vajram*). K_o. 4 has then further actually cited *verbatim* Suparṇ. 28. 3 in 365*.

R. admits that in the second scene K_o. 4 unquestionably cite Suparṇ. Further 361*, according to R. again, is to be judged similarly. That is an interpolation in the S MSS., the same stanza of the Suparṇ. (28. 1) having hovered before the eyes of the interpolators as in the case of those who interpolated 358* in K_o. 4. After pointing out all this R. asks: "Should one now regard the first scene also as an interpolation made independently in N and S? Consider that G₁. 2. 4. 5 agree quite frequently in this episode with N (1. 20. 15; 301*; 329*; 343*), that they alone have a remarkably large number of interpolations, and that 340* is found only G₁. 2. 4. 5 M and corresponds to Suparṇ. 13. 4. . . . Has the G group then

¹ It is by no means certain that (as R. says, p. 249) the stanzas which are common to the Mbh. and the Suparṇ. have been borrowed by the Suparṇ. from the Mbh. I believe, on the contrary, that the Suparṇ. has to be looked up on here as the source from which the stanzas in question have been taken over by the epic. Four of the stanzas are nearly identical in the two works, because they occur as ślokas in the Suparṇ. and could be utilized by the redactors of the epic version without change of metre and with some trifling change of language.

interpolated the passage under the influence of the Suparn. and in its turn influenced the N groups? Su[kthankar] gives in 1. 20. 1 the diametrically opposite answer with an assurance which is out of place in such difficult passages. It cannot even be strictly proved that these "interpolations" in the first scene, which are common to N and S, are not an old remnant of the archetype."

There are in the Ādiparvan far more complicated passages than this: this is one of the simpler complications. I shudder at the thought of what R. would have done if he had to handle one of the really difficult cases of conflation.² In the present case, it can, as it happens, be *strictly* proved that the doubtful passages of the first scene, which are common to certain N groups and S groups, are interpolations and no rest of the archetype. Also I may repeat here most emphatically what I have said in the note on 1. 20. 1 that the irrelevant insertion of 294* in Gr. 2. 4. 5 is *irrefutable* evidence of the contamination of these four Grantha MSS. from late Northern sources.

We shall consider the second point first. I imagine, R. has misunderstood or overlooked the little word "irrelevantly" in my note on 1. 20. 1. Otherwise he would have tried to visualize the passage, by reconstructing it carefully from the critical notes, and then he would have surely come to the same conclusion as I. All that is necessary in order to prove that 294* is an interpolation in the Grantha group is to cite the passage *in extenso*. Here is a transcript of the passage as it is found in G₂, the better preserved of the two Grantha MSS. belonging to the Bombay Government collection, collated for the Ādiparvan.

App. I, No. 13³: सूतः ।

नागास्तु सहिताः कृत्वा कर्तव्यमिति तद्वचः ।

¹ R. means the passages which have been regarded as interpolations by me and excluded from the text.

² That would happen when the interpolation may have filled out a factitive lacuna or what looks like a lacuna in the archetype. Cf. the case discussed by Belloni-Filippi in his paper cited in the next footnote.

³ In the stimulating article entitled "L'episodio di Kadrū e d Vinatā nell'edizione critica del Mahābhārata" (Traduzioni di epica indiana II), published in the Ascoli Memorial volume *Silloga Linguistica* (Torino 1930), F. Belloni-Filippi justifies the excision of passage No. 13 of App. I (Bombay text 1. 22. 1-3), showing that the lacuna is only apparent and the *textus simplicior* is quite in order.

विस्नेहा विदहेन्माता ह्यसंप्राप्तमनोरथा ।
 प्रसन्ना मोक्षयेदस्मान्तस्माच्छापाच्च भामिनी ।
 कृष्णं पुच्छ करिष्यामस्तुरगस्य महात्मनः ।
 तथेति तस्य ते तस्य कृष्णवाला इव स्थिताः । [5]
 एतस्मिन्नन्तरे ते तु पत्न्यौ वै पणिते तदा ।

294 * : महासत्त्वबलोपेतः शशिवत् द्योतयन्दिशः ।
 कामरूपः कामगमः कामरूपो वियत्तमः ।

1. 20. 1: तं समुद्रमतिक्रम्य कद्रूर्विनतया सह ।
 न्यपतत्तुरगाभ्याशो न चिरादिव शीघ्रगा । [10]
 2: निशाम्य च बहून्वालान्कृष्णान्पुच्छमुपाश्रितान् ।
 विनतां विषण्णवदनां कद्रूर्दास्ये न्ययोजयत् ।

Even a cursory reading of the passage will show that lines 7-8 of this passage (which constitute 294*) are *thoroughly* irrelevant here. The lines comprise merely a string of attributes of Garuḍa. There is no finite verb in the sentence and there is no reference to Garuḍa in the foregoing or following lines. The only *rational* explanation of this state of things is that the lines were interpolated in an ancestor of G₁. 2. 4. 5 by a clumsy copyist, who had missed the right place by four stanzas. Such mistakes occur frequently in Indian MSS. because the additional lines were, as a rule, first written in the narrow margin of the MS. and a small mark was made to indicate the point of insertion. Should the mark get obliterated, the lines would be inserted by the next copyist wherever he considered they belonged or fitted best. If those lines (294*) belonged to the archetype of our MSS. we should have to assume that they were accidentally misplaced in a sub-group of the Grantha version, omitted (for an unknown reason) in another group of MSS. K₁.3 D₂ T G₃.6 M and are found in their correct place only in K₀.2.4 Ñ V₁ B D (except D₂). Is this plausible? I can hardly think that R. would say so. I am inclined to believe that R. had failed to realize how the passage actually read in this particular sub-group of the Grantha version. Taking all things into consideration, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that an ancestor of the Grantha sub-group had been compared with some MS. or MSS. of the Northern recension which contained the spurious passage 294*. This is the first important fact to remember with regard to this interesting sub-group of the Grantha version. It is quite in harmony with

the other fact that this group contains 25 interpolated passages in 52 adhyāyas (24-75) or about 2000 stanzas, which have not been found so far anywhere else. They are: 320*, 322*, 326*, 330*, 337*, 345*, 351* (third line!), 357*, 363*, 364*, 368*, 371*, 373*, 382*, 386*, 387*, 388*, 406*, 519*, 584*, 636*, 705*, 706*, 741*, 755*. This group moreover contains in the same section the following 10 passages which it shares only with two or three other MSS. (in some written only on the margin): 312*, 348*, 353*, 399*, 404*, 421*, 423*, 442*, 469* (phalaśruti!), 831*. How these passages originate is somewhat of a mystery. But as no one would be so inane as to maintain that these are rests of the archetype preserved only in a sub-group of the Grantha version and lost without a trace elsewhere, not only in the remaining MSS. of the Grantha version but in all other versions of both recensions as well, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that this sub-group of the Grantha version must present a text exceptionally heavily padded with indiscriminate additions. *This noteworthy fact renders its agreements with N immediately suspect.* And *a priori* also it is more likely that, when there is agreement between a sub-group of one version and some entirely different version or versions, the sub-group is the borrower. It may further be pointed out that 294* is by a long way not the only passage which this sub-group of the Grantha version shares with the vulgate text, against the rest of the Grantha version together with the Śāradā-Kāśmīrī and the Malayālam versions. Here is a list of these passages (in adhyāyas 20-43), which must all be assumed to be interpolated in the sub-group in question under the influence of some MS. or MSS. on which the text of the vulgate is based, that is, of some late Northern sources: 294*, 301*, 307*, 327*, 329*, 335*, 341*, 343*, 355*, 385*, 392*, 393*, 396*, 402*, 411*, 419*, etc.

After this preamble we may proceed to consider the case of the Suparn. passage. Here the indebtedness of Gr. 2.4.5 to the Northern recension is equally clear and would have been manifest to R., had he but attempted to visualize the whole passage as it stands in the sub-group instead of contenting himself with merely counting the number of lines. R.'s initial mistake lies in thinking that 324* and 326* are equivalent passages, whereas the passages, although of the same length and inserted at the same point, are utterly different in contents and have an entirely different significance. The passage 324*

contains a kuśala-question and an inquiry as to whether Garuḍa gets enough to eat; 326*, on the other hand, contains a question as to where Garuḍa is going in such hurry! Remembering this and reading the various passages together, the relationship between the MSS. will be clear. It is again a case of *irrelevant* insertion in the conflated group. The passage in question reads in the different MS. groups as under.

Ko. 3. 4 N̄ V₁ B D T₁

(7ab and 324*)

ततोऽपश्यत्स पितरं पृष्ट्वा ख्यातवान्पितुः ।

यथान्यायममेयात्मा तं चोवाच महानृषिः ।

कश्यप उवाच ।

कञ्चिद् कुशलं नित्यं भोजने बहुलं सुत ।

कञ्चिच्च मानुषे लोके तवान्नं विद्यते बहु ।

G₁. 2. 4. 5

(7ab and 326*)

ततोऽपश्यत्स पितरं काश्यपं दीप्तितेजसम् ।

ववन्दे पततां श्रेष्ठो ब्रह्म ब्रह्मविदां प्रभुम् ।

पृष्ट्वा पित्रा बलवान्वैनतेयः प्रतापवान् ।

[काश्यप उवाच ।]

क गन्तासीति वेगेन मम त्वं वक्तुमर्हसि !

Ko. 3. 4 N̄ V₁ B D T₁ G₂. 4. 5

(327*)

गरुड उवाच ।

माता मे कुशला शश्वत्तथा भ्राता तथा ह्यहम् ।

न हि मे कुशलं तात भोजने बहुले सदा ।

Placed in this way, the reader will see at a glance that while 327* is a proper rejoinder to the query in 324,* it is totally irrelevant after 326*; because in G₂. 4. 5, in reply to Kāśyapa's question where Garuḍa is going, Garuḍa says "My mother is well, so is my brother, and so am I" etc. This clearly shows that in G₂. 4. 5, 327* is a *secondary* interpolation. Then the question arises whether 326* could be a rest of the archetype. The probability of this being so is reduced to nil not merely by the fact that the passage is found only in the highly inflated group G₁. 2. 4. 5, but also from the noteworthy circumstance (which I fear has escaped the vigilant R.) that in G₁. 2. 4. 5, 7ab has been altered from *prṣṭas cākhyātavān pituḥ* to *Kāśyapam dīptatejasam* in order to accommodate the additional lines. In any case these interpolations are *not* common to N and S, as erroneously believed by R.

The history of these interpolations must be something like the following. The question (which is missing in S except T₁) and the answer (which is found only in T₁ G₂. 4. 5 of the S MSS.) regarding Garuḍa's gastronomic requirements (324* and 327*) were interpolated in a part of N (namely, the base of the vul-

gate), inspired by Suparn. 19. 2. Independently there was inserted in Gr. 2. 4. 5 a question by Kāśyapa ("Where are you going with such speed?") in anticipation of the reply of Garuḍa in 1. 25. 7 *cd*, an interpolation which probably has nothing to do with the Suparn. Subsequently, after comparison with some MS. or MSS. of the N recension, the answer of Garuḍa 327* (which, as I have remarked above, fits only to the question in 324*) was irrelevantly added in an ancestor of Gr. 2. 4. 5 by an ignorant copyist after 326*, where it does not fit in the least! This *second* mistake of the copyist of an ancestor of Gr. 2. 4. 5 is another valuable piece of *irrefutable* evidence of the contamination of these four G MSS. from some late Northern source.

I have remarked above that the māṅgalya or svastyayana (335*) before 1. 25. 26 must also be regarded as an interpolation. This follows for one thing from the MS. evidence, and is corroborated by the fact that the words of the Sūta: *sa tac chrutvā pitur vākyaṃ* refer clearly to Kāśyapa's directions as to what Garuḍa should next do and ignore the intervening the long māṅgalya altogether. That is why the vulgate alters *śrutvā* to *smṛtvā*!

The reader need not be sceptical about the possibilities of such indiscriminate conflation and addition. The critical apparatus, if closely scrutinized and properly understood, will reveal numerous instances of a similar character. Even a close study of the Kumbhakonam edition, prepared in our own times by two excellent Southern Pandits, will throw some light on the mentality of the old redactors of the Mahābhārata: parallel and even contradictory versions are placed quite unconcernedly side by side, regardless of the effect on the reader, regardless of the fact that sentences are left hanging in the air, that passages do not construe. Here one notices above all the anxiety that nothing that was by any chance found in a Mahābhārata MS. should be lost. Everything was carefully preserved, assembled in a picturesque disarray. The guiding principle was to make the Mahābhārata a "thesaurus of all excellences," culled no matter from what source. At the beginning of his commentary on the Sanatsujātiya,¹ Nilakaṇṭha naively remarks:

¹ Cf. Udyoga 42. See also Telang, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. 8, p. 203 f.; and Winternitz, *Ind. Ant.* 27 (1898). 128.


उद्योगपर्वणि सनत्स्रुजातीये भाष्यकारादिभिर्व्याख्यातान्संप्रतितनपुस्तकेषु च
स्थितान्पाठान् श्लोकांश्च गुणोपसंहारन्यायेनैकीकृत्य व्याख्यायते ।

That is why it is safe to assume that far more stanzas must have been added to the Great Epic than omitted from it. It follows from this as a corollary that the archetype must almost completely—if not quite completely—be contained in the extant MSS.¹

It will thus be seen that the assurance with which I have spoken (in the note on 1. 20. 1) of the contamination of Gr. 2. 4. 5 from late Northern sources is amply justified; and that the passages common to this sub-group and the vulgate text (324*, 326*, 327*) mentioned by R. are in fact interpolations and no remnants of the archetype.

The Position of K .

If I understand R. (p. 248, lines 1-3) right—his remarks are somewhat confused—he questions the propriety of my treating the concordant readings of the Southern recension and the Kaśmīrī (Śāradā) version (against the rest of N) as original readings. But in the course of the same paragraph, he expresses his unqualified approval of the procedure of Prof. Lüders in accepting as original the consensus of G and B (against the rest of N). Now, as a matter of documentary probability, there is no difference whatsoever between the consensus of K and S against B D on the one hand and the consensus of B and G against D on the other ; because the relationship between the different versions must be one of the following type :



where **X** is the intermediate archetype of the vulgate, and ***K**, ***B**, etc. are the (uncontaminated) archetypes of **K**, **B**, etc.

¹ Cf. Ruben, *op. cit.* p. 245.

If Prof. Lüders gives preference to the consensus of B and G against the D MSS., it is to be presumed that he would likewise give preference to the consensus of K and S against B (with or without D). Let us see what Prof. Lüders himself has to say on the point:¹

"... Dagegen ist es sehr erfreulich zu hören, dass von Adhy. 26 an noch ein altes Śārada-Manuskript auf Birkenrinde zu Gebote steht, voraussichtlich der einzige vollkommen echte Vertreter der Kāśmīrī-Version.

"Das ist um so mehr zu begrüßen, als die Kāśmīrī-Version den relativ ältesten Text des Epos bietet. Mit keiner der übrigen nördlichen Versionen stimmen aber die südlichen Handschriften so genau überein wie mit der Kāśmīrī-Version. Andererseits zeigt diese keine der offenkundigen Zusätze der südlichen Rezension. Die räumlich weite Getrenntheit der beiden Handschriftengruppen schliesst die direkte Abhängigkeit der südlichen Rezension von der Kāśmīrī-Version nahezu aus. Es ist daher anzunehmen, dass da, wo die beiden in Lesarten zusammenstimmen, die Lesungen des ältesten Textes, der erreichbar ist, vorliegen. Zu dieser Beurteilung des Verhältnisses der Kāśmīrī und der südlichen Handschriften, die Sukthankar vertritt, war auch ich bereits bei der Herstellung der Druckprobe gelangt,² wenn mir auch von der Kāśmīrī-Version nur die ziemlich nachlässig geschriebene Handschrift der Bibliothek des India Office 2137 vorlag. ... Selbstverständlich kann auch die Kāśmīrī-Version Textänderungen enthalten, und der Herausgeber ist meines Erachtens im Rechte, wenn er gelegentlich der Bangālī-Version, mit der die Maithilī-Version und der Text des Arjunamīśra im allgemeinen zusammengehen, da wo sie mit den südlichen Handschriften übereinstimmt, den Vorzug gegeben hat."

Prof. Lüders, in other words, unhesitatingly endorses my procedure. Herr Dr. Ruben dissents! I am content to leave it at that.

The Extent of the Virāṭaparvan

When I adopted 2050 as the figure³ representing the extent of the Virāṭaparvan, I did not do so, as R. says (p. 251),

¹ *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1930, Heft 24, Sp. 1141.

² Italics mine!

³ See my remarks in "Epic Studies II", pp. 188 ff. *supra*, on the value of the figures in the Parvasaṃgraha.

under the influence of Utgikar or anybody else. My chief reason for adopting the figure was that it represents the reading of the *majority* of K supported by the Maithilī MS. (V₁) and the Nilakanṭha version (Dn). When Nilakanṭha adopts it, there is a certain amount of probability of its being well represented in the old Northern MSS. of his time. I cannot say whether R. knows that it is the reading of *all* printed editions as well ; it looks as though he does not.

Now let us consider the claims of the other variants. S has an obviously inflated text.¹ This inflated text appears to have been recounted in the South by the diaskeuasts and the Parvasaṁgraha figure altered accordingly to 3500.² So the reading of S may be left out of consideration altogether. The other Northern variants are as follows :

2015 :	श्लोकाः पंचदशैव तु	K ₃
2300 :	त्रीणि श्लोकशतानि च	K ₁ V ₁ m B ₂ . 3. 4m D ₇ . 12. 14
2500 :	पंच श्लोकशतानि च	B ₄ D ₂
	तथा पंच शतानि च	K ₀ B ₁ Da D ₁₃
	श्लोकाः पंच शतानि च	Dr D ₁

Only one thing that is plain in the midst of the prevailing confusion is that the text has been counted and the figure adjusted more than once. The *pañcadaśaiva* of K₃, however, is obviously only a corruption of *pañcāśad eva* of the text.³ Thus the text reading represents the reading of K except K₀.¹ There is no adequate reason for giving preference here to the readings of K₀ or K₁, because they not only disagree among themselves, but each finds only desultory support from other Northern MSS. What could the editor do under these circumstances but leave the reading of the vulgate (supported by the majority of K) in possession and mark it as doubtful ? The text figure appears, however, in a certain measure, to be supported and even made probable by the facts of the case ; because there are in existence, as a matter of fact, a few MSS. of the *textus simplicior* (F A M)⁴—and with the constantly operating

¹ See Lüders, " Ueber die Grantharecension des Mahābhārata ", *Abh. d. Ges. d. Wiss. z. Göttingen*, 1901, p. 52.

² See Editorial Note (2) to Fasc. 3, p. iii.

³ The only difference between K₃ and the text is that the former has °*cadaśa*° for °*cāśade*° of the latter.

⁴ Utgikar did not realize it, but I surmise that his F A M are also MSS. of the K version, that is, Devanāgarī transcripts of Śāradā originals.

urge towards inflation their number will be necessarily small —which are approximately of that length.

The figure 2500, I must confess, I cannot adequately explain.¹ But as regards 2300, which approximately represents the extent of the vulgate text and which is documented by Bz. 3. 4m among others, one may hazard the guess that it represents the measure of the text of that section of the Bangālī version in which the Kālī (or Durgā) hymn had been first interpolated along with some other accretions. All things considered, I think I was perfectly justified in adopting in the Parvasamgraha the reading which I did adopt.

What R. means by saying (p. 251) that the reading of the archetype might have been :

सहस्रमेकं श्लोकानां सप्त श्लोकशतानि च ।

is beyond my comprehension. Does he mean that I should have set this (imaginary) line in the constituted text in place of the one which I have, or does he only want to show that he can compose an Anuṣṭubh line? If it is the latter, I will readily admit that the line is metrically, grammatically and stylistically impeccable, and does him credit. As we do not, however, want to rewrite the Mahābhārata, such manufactured lines have no value for us. The only sound test of the correctness of a reading is the evidence of MSS. In overriding this evidence, R. is unguardedly opening wide the door to a subjective "Höhere Kritik", which is the only thing that we must rigorously avoid doing at this stage of the Mahābhārata studies and which R. would be the first to deprecate if any one else were to attempt it.

Ruben constitutes the Text

At the end of his paper R. has appended, as a specimen, the text of 3 stanzas (1. 26. 1-3), as it should be constituted. The reader who has waded through 15 pages of R.'s disquisition on the complications of the Mahābhārata textual criticism will be amazed to discover that notwithstanding the overwhelming mass of variants and "additional" lines which stand at the

¹ I surmise that it is the extent of some composite text (like that prepared by the scholiast Ratnagarbha), comprising the vulgate text plus some interesting additions gleaned from the Southern recension.

² A line made up by R. on the basis of Utgikar's statement that there are 1729 stanzas common to N and S.

disposal of the exacting critic and despite the alarming theoretical doubts and scruples expressed by R. in the earlier part of his paper, his constituted text differs from mine principally in the readings of two *akṣaras*, and the addition of a line which he himself subsequently (p. 256) admits to be a probable interpolation! The difference between our readings is as follows. In line 1 he *hesitatingly* sets °*mātre*¹ for my °*mātrā*, and in line 3 *bhaṅktvā* for my *bhagnām*. R. (doubtfully) decides in favour of °*mātre* on the ground that it is a *lectio difficilior* and according to R. himself—of course in another place (p. 253)—the criterion of the *lect. diff.* is problematic and proves nothing. Here is a neat little paradox: R. prefers the *lect. diff.* and sets it in the text, because the criterion of the *lect. diff.* is problematic and proves nothing!—As regards the second word, R. admits that though he prefers *bhaṅktvā*, the differentiation from (an original) *bhagnām* to *bhaṅktvā* may be an innovation (p. 256).

The other difference in the text as constituted by R. and by me lies in the underlining of the uncertain parts of the text. Let me at once admit that I have been rather remiss in showing the uncertain portions in this passage. The device is a practical makeshift and by its very nature hard to apply strictly and consistently. But the difficulty is not solved by R.'s marking below the text wavy and straight, single and double lines, in season and out of season, as soon as he spies a variant in the critical apparatus. An edition prepared on R.'s plan would be indeed not critical but hypercritical. Even a constituted text is after all a text, meant to be read like any other text, and not a chart of the aberrations of careless copyists of the last two millennia. While it would be foolish to underline *bhagnām* (line 2) merely on the ground that three (inferior) MSS. D₃.6.7 read for it *lagnām*, which is obviously a clerical error, it is fatuous to underline text-words merely because some MS.

¹ Even with his reading, R.'s translation is inaccurate. The translation should be: "Aber kaum hatte der übermächtige Garuḍa (den Baum) mit seinen Füssen berührt, als der Ast des Baumes abbrach", etc. and not "Nachdem (der Baum) von Garuḍa berührt war, brach von ihm ein Ast," etc. R.'s translation omits *tu*, *padbhyām* and *balīyasā* and ignores the force of °*mātra*—(ifc.)!—With R.'s reading °*mātre*, the word *sā* in line 1 (for which there is no variant even in TGM1) remains unclaimed and has to be forcibly connected with *śākhā* in the middle of the following line. Altogether the reading adopted by R. is unsatisfactory.

or other has a divergent reading, as R. does in the case of *balīyasū* (K₁ *mahātmanū*), *sa tad-* (G₃ *sarṣiḥ*), *teṣām evā* (Ñ₃ *teṣām caivā*), etc.

With regard to the short explanatory notes (p. 255 f.) added by R. below the specimen of the text, I have to make the following comments

The participle *smayamāna* is not "episch", but *smayan* (of the text) may be, since the root *smi* is commonly used with middle endings. — The line 340* being an interpolation (even R. admits, p. 256, the possibility of its being that), the *adhomukhān* of the text is opposed virtually only by the *avānmukhān* of the two Grantha MSS. G₃. 6, because the remaining adverse MSS. (G₁. 2. 4. 5 M), while trying to interpolate the Vaikhānasas (under the influence of Suparṇ. 13. 4), have obviously altered the last foot of the line (2d);¹ therefore the text reading *adhomukhān* is hundred per cent certain and in need of no underlining, straight or wavy. — In view of the fact that 340* is missing even in T G₃. 6 and in regard to the general character of G₁. 2. 4. 5 explained above, there cannot be the slightest doubt about the spuriousness of 340*; the line was probably first inserted in M and copied thence by the highly inflated group G₁. 2. 4. 5. — The form *jagṛhe* is found only in five Devanāgarī and two Southern MSS. (one Malayālam and one Grantha). In old Devanāgarī MSS. (written with prsthāmātrās), *jagṛhe* would be all but indistinguishable from *jagrāha* of the text. So the reading of these Devanāgarī MSS. may be ignored in this case. The Bangālī and the Southern MSS., which would carefully distinguish between the two words, have *jagrāha*, with two insignificant exceptions in the Southern recension. It is on that account that *jagrāha* was adopted in the text, and it is not doubtful. — 3ef is certainly a third line, but is in spite of that quite certain. The line is not missing in any MS., and as for its reading there is agreement on all material points between all versions of both recensions. Thus K and S agree completely with each other as far as *e* is concerned, which is a very significant fact in its favour and should not be lightly ignored. The variations concern mainly *f*. The difficult *praviśātayat*, a lect. diff., preserved only in K, was the cause of the remodelling of the pāda in S and the vulgate. Of

¹ G₁. 2. 4. 5 have used their *adhomukhān* in 340*. They therefore substitute *tapodhanān* in its place in the original line. M has worked out another combination (*tapodhanān-avānmukhān*).

course all guesses as to how the variants have actually arisen must be more or less problematic. I would, however, hazard the conjecture that the way to the variant *pravicālayan* was virtually paved by the southern tendency to confuse the palatal sibilant (ś) and fricative (ç) : the successive steps in the corruption would be *praviśātayan*, corrupted to **cālayan*, and then "corrected" to **cālayan*. The *vināśayan* of K₃ D₂ is perhaps an original gloss; or (more probably) a wrong correction of an original mislection, the successive steps being *viśātayan*, **viśānayan* (*ta* and *na* being written almost alike in old Devanāgarī MSS.), and *vināśayan*. The difficulty with the word *praviśātayan* may be realized when it is remembered that the Dhātupāṭha knows no root like *śat* or *śāt*; it cites only *śad*!

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Ruben's long disquisition on the difficulties of the Mahābhārata textual criticism boils down to this: only that portion of the text which is documented by both recensions, in identical terms, is *tolerably* certain; the rest is doubtful in varying degrees, there being no criterion whatsoever which can enable us to discriminate with complete confidence between the variants; even the concordance between K and S (against B D)¹ is not conclusive evidence of the originality of the common reading. This is a more or less obvious standpoint, though partly erroneous and distinctly timid and conservative. It was hardly necessary for the "Referent" to write so much in order to say so little. His attitude of dogmatic doubt has caused him to make unwittingly some wild exaggerations and unwarranted generalizations as I have shown above. His perfunctory study of the manuscript evidence has led him occasionally to make gross blunders in the estimation of the relationship of the different manuscript groups and versions, some of which have been pointed out above. Many of the difficulties of the Mahābhārata textual criticism of which he speaks in his paper are

¹ R. seems to have somehow a lurking partiality for the consensus of B and S (or even B and G). If he only knew, the agreements between K and S are likely to prove much sounder than those between B and S; for, while there are indications that there may be *sporadic* contamination between B and G (and perhaps even between B and S), the (genuine) Kāśmīrī version (Ś) and S as a whole have certainly the appearance of being almost wholly independent of each other throughout the *Ādiparvan*.

due to his failure to understand the *modus operandi* of the redactors and copyists of the epic and his lack of insight into the character of the different manuscripts—an insight which can be acquired only after a long familiarity with the manuscripts themselves and a close and patient study of their tendencies and idiosyncrasies. Ruben's paper is, in general, quite intelligent, but not at all important for the Mahābhārata textual criticism.

THE GRAMMAR OF THE GĪTĀ— A VINDICATION

BY

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI SARMA

In the course of an article contributed by him to the Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume 1917, Prof. V. K. Rajwade, a scholar of some repute, had unsparingly criticised the Bhagavad-Gītā, and opined that it could not be regarded as one of the best poems in the world. He also pointed it out to be full of grammatical absurdities and defects of diction and added that it "offends against the economy of words by most egregiously interspersing expletives like च, एव, अपि, तु, उत्, ह and other meaningless single words plentifully and by using expressions that in no way add to or emphasise the meaning." (p. 330.), that "tho' lavish of expletives the Gītā does not mind lacunae" (p. 332), and that "we should expect the Gītā to be honey-combed with purple passages if it were a poem and a poem worthy of being placed in the highest class of poetry." (p. 332).

The whole criticism is directed from two standpoints, the æsthetic and the grammatical. The critic at the outset begins with an elaborate citation of the definitions of poetry given by prominent literary critics Indian as well as European. Mammatta and Jagannātha are cited. A host of English poets and literary critics are approvingly quoted: Puttenham, Dryden, Wordsworth, Coleridge, De Quincey, Hudson, Herbert Spencer, —in the light of whose theories of poetry and its foundations the art and diction of the Gītā is pronounced to be poor and clumsy.

Taking his stand upon the Sūtras of Pāṇini and Classical Sanskrit, the critic proceeds to show that the Gītā "abounds in slovenly unclassical Sanskrit and mistakes of grammar."

The Gītā, as every body knows, is a part and an important part of the Mahābhārata. It shares the oddities of Epic style even as any other portion of the Epic. Indeed, the Epic period is recognised to be a distinctive epoch in the development of the Sanskrit language and the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata as works belonging to this period are far earlier in date of composition if not of final redaction than the Sūtra Period. Pāṇini's Sūtras do not affect the language of the Mahābhārata anymore than they do the language of the Vedas or Upaniṣads.

No one should therefore presume to judge either from the vantage of Pāṇinian grammar. The rules of Pāṇini do not and cannot apply to the Epic. It does not also apply to the Gītā which forms part of the Epic. I shall presently show that the Gītā does share the oddities of Epic style and that its language is closely akin to that of the Epic. It is even possible to point out parallel passages, lines and phrases, from all other portions of the Epic to those of the Gītā.

The entire criticism becomes groundless when it is remembered that no claim is or has ever been made on behalf of the Gītā that it is the *beau idéal* of Sanskrit poetry! Hindu tradition has not cared to attribute false perfection of any kind to it. The entire attitude which seeks to *make* it conform to classical definitions of Kāvya given from the latest works of Alaṅkāra and requires the author of the Gītā—whoever he be, to embellish his verses with all the niceties of literary fiat is wrong lock stock and barrel. The author of the Gītā is no laureate writing to win a smile from patronising lips or winks of approbation and nods of assent from gullible admirers. He is in a word not a dilettante of poetry and the fine arts, but a moralist and a philosopher. His words are addressed to the earnest seeker who asks for the redeeming truth and not to him who asks for purple patches of poetry wherewith to amuse his leisure hours.

Far from being claimed as one of the best *poems* of the world the Gītā is always claimed to be and spoken of as an *Upaniṣad*! It is what it claims to be—a Yoga Śāstra and an Upaniṣad. It is a gross perversion of facts and a misnomer to call it a Kāvya and then seriously proceed to adjudge its merits as one.

The critic picks out grammatical mistakes which range from indiscriminate use of Ātmanēpada and Parasmaipada in place of each other, absence of regular Saṁdhi and loose usage of case-endings to clumsy and intricate constructions and shifting of compounds.

These errors of commission and omission are too trivial to be taken into account. Everything is explained when we remember that we are dealing with Epic and not Classical Sanskrit. One feature of Epic and Purāṇic Sanskrit is that forms have not yet become stereotyped. Saṁdhi was a matter of convenience in poetry. Indiscriminate use of Parasmaipada

and Ātmanepada is very common. But still there are other cases in which the padas are used scrupulously. In these and in many other particulars the Gītā follows the Mahābhārata.

Let us see how. Here are some parallel passages and phrases.

संज्ञां नोपलभे सूत मनो विह्वलतीव मे । (Mahābhārata. I. 1. 243).

दिशो न जाने न लभे च शर्म । Gītā

कालमूलमिदं सर्वं । I. 1. 272-6.

कालोस्मि लोकक्षयकृत्प्रवृत्तः ।

रामः शस्त्रभृतां वरः । I. 2. 3.

देहभृतां वर । 8. 4.

अब्रवीद्वचनं । I. 9. 2.

तमुवाच हृषीकेशं विषीदन्तमिदं वचः ।

काश्यपो वचनमब्रवीत् ।

राजा वचनमब्रवीत् ।

सर्वथा वर्तमानस्य । I. 41. 22.

सर्वथा वर्तमानोपि ।

उत्सीदेयुरिमे लोकाः । I. 43. 5.

उत्सीदेयुरिमे लोकाः ।

भवन्तः सर्वे एवेह । I. 45. 11.

भवन्तः सर्वे एव हि ।

हन्त ते कथयिष्यामि । III. 116. 9.

हन्त ते कथयिष्यामि ।

उभे सुकृतदुष्कृते । I. 64. 40.

उभे सुकृतदुष्कृते ।

अकारणाच्च द्वेष्यन्ति पारिवादं वदन्ति हि । I. 73. 19.

अवाच्यवादांश्च बहून्वादिष्यन्ति ।

गन्तारो नरकं वयं । I. 87. 10.

तदा गन्तासि निर्वेदं ।

जन्म कर्म च शुश्रूषोः । I. 89. 1.

जन्म कर्म च मे दिव्यं ।

स्वकर्मनिरता विप्राः । I. 89. 10.

स्वकर्मनिरतः ।

विषादमेश्व बोद्धव्यमिति मां विदुरोऽब्रवीत् । I. 157. 31.

कर्मणो ह्यपि बोद्धव्यं बोद्धव्यं च विकर्मणः ।

भीम मा स्म स्त्रियं वधीः ।

हैव्यं मा स्म गमः पार्थ ।

इन्द्रियाणां विचरतां यन्मनोऽनुविधीयते ।

तदस्य हरते बुद्धिं नावं वायुरिवाम्भसि ॥ III. 215. 26.

इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां यन्मनोऽनुविधीयते ।

तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि ॥

उद्विजेत तदैवास्याः सर्पाद्वेस्मगतादिव ।
उद्विग्नस्य कुतः शान्तिरशान्तस्य कुतः सुखं ॥ III. 234. 13. 14.
नास्ति बुद्धिरयुक्तस्य न चायुक्तस्य भावना ।
न चाभावयतः शान्तिरशान्तस्य कुतः सुखं ॥

Other parallels in Purānic diction are :—

मा शुचः स्वतनयं देवगुप्तं विशांपते । Bhāgavata. IV. 7. 2
मा शुचः संपदं दैवीमभिजातोसि पाण्डव ।
अहो वत । IV. 9. 31. (भागवत)
वर्णये । IV. 25. 46. „
पश्ये । IV. 26. 24. „

An indiscriminate use of padas can be met with in plenty in the Bhārata as well as in the Gītā.

पश्यमानः (II. 14. 24), हन्म, अनुयामहे, करवामहे, शोचये, (III. 60. 11)
चिन्तयानाः, प्रक्रीडते, पश्ये.

An apparently scrupulous use of padas is seen in :—

कामये दर्शनं पित्रोः याहि सावित्रि । (III. 298. 102).
न चाहं कामये यक्ष । (III. 314-45).
यावदेतात्रिरीक्षेहं ॥
न योत्स्य इति मन्यसे ।
न काङ्क्षे विजयं कृष्ण ।

Odd usages are not uncommon :—

भार्गव meaning कुलाल (I. 2. 117)
कल्य „ समर्थ (I. 251. 23)
पाणिगृहीता „ पाणिगृहीती
वैद्य „ विद्वान्
अस्माकं रोचते । I. 257. 21.
रोचते यदि युष्माकं । I. 256. 24.
अहं त्राता हि खेदानां । I. 178. 27.
अवेदयच्च शक्रस्य ।
प्रतिजानीमि ते । III. 48. 36.
देवतानां प्रतिश्रुत्य । III. 53. 16.
ग्राहसन् स्म ।
विषादं कर्तुं अलं ते । (III. 251. 10)
निबोध मे ।
मे शृणु ।
प्रेक्षां स्म चक्रुः ।

Loose constructions are in evidence in :—

ते यज्ञसेनं द्रुपदं गृहीत्वा रणमूर्धनि ।
उपाजग्मुः सहामात्यं द्रोणाय भरतर्षभ ॥ (I. 148. 68)
एकदेव सदायुक्ता एकमन्त्रविधिक्रियाः ।

पृथग्धर्मास्त्वेकवेदाः धर्ममेकमनुव्रताः ॥ (भारत)
 आकर्ष्यात्मजमायान्तं संपरेत्य यथागतं ।
 राजा न श्रद्धे भद्रं अभद्रस्य कुतो मम ॥ (भागवत)
 अस्माकं तु विशिष्टा ये तान्निबोध द्विजोत्तम ।
 नायका मम सैन्यस्य संज्ञार्थं तान्ब्रवीमि ते ॥
 भयाद्रणादुपरतं मंस्यन्ते त्वां महारथाः ।
 येषां च त्वं बहुमतो भूत्वा यास्यसि लाघवम् ॥
 इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां यन्मनोनुविधीयते ।
 तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि ॥
 मणीव जात्यौ पश्यामि तव चैवात्मनश्च ह (भारत V. 112. 12)
 मणीवोष्टस्य लम्बेते प्रियौ वत्सरौ मम ॥

It will be readily seen from the foregoing parallelisms that the *Gītā* cannot possibly be isolated from the rest of the *Mahābhārata* and adjudged in any respect. It is part and parcel of the Epic. It errs with the Epic and rises with it.

The critic makes the greatest mistake when he utterly overlooks the indigenous commentaries on the *Gītā* which satisfactorily explain many of his 'puzzles.'

He thinks that the author of the *Gītā* has used मनीषिणां for मनुष्याणां (ch. 18. 5) अन्यथा for अन्यत् (13. 11).* But this is clearly a misapprehension. The term मनीषी has been actually used in the text twice as also its synonyms कवि and विचक्षण. Thus the author of the *Gītā* speaks throughout of "wise men" as opposed to mere "men." द्वारैर्विमुक्तः is said to be "careless Sanskrit." But a little consideration would show that it is not the mistake of the author of the *Gītā*. The prose-order and explanation as given by Rāghavendra Svāmin runs:—तमोद्वारैः नरकहेतुभिः एतैः कामक्रोधलोभैः मुक्तो नरः आत्मनः श्रेयः पुमर्थसाधनमाचरति. The critic has misread the words and played tricks with evidence.

The use of expletives is not always without reason. Nor are they mere "stop-gaps" and "fillers" as the critic thinks. Our commentators have always drawn attention to the expletives and explained their force. Students of Indian Philosophy are well aware of the value of such expletives in Indian polemical literature.

In the case of लोकसंग्रहमेवापि संपश्यन्कर्तुमर्हसि (3. 20) in which the critic wrongly renders लोकसंग्रह as "preservation of Society," both the expletives अपि and एव are necessary. In his own

* The critic's reference is incorrect for (13. 12). Elsewhere there are three more incorrect references.

masterly way Rāghavendra Svāmin explains them :—लोकानामज्ञ-
जनानां कर्मणि प्रवृत्तिरूपं संग्रहं एवापि । न केवलं ज्ञान्याचारमित्यपेक्ष्यः । एवकारस्तु निष्ठु
तावत्कर्मकरणे अन्यो हेतुरित्यर्थः ।

The critic patronisingly remarks, " It is doubtful if it has any meaning in उभयोरपि दृष्टोन्तस्त्वनयोः तत्त्वदर्शिभिः (2. 16) and in अविनाशि तु तद्विद्धि (2. 17)." The author of Bhāsyotkarṣa-Dīpikā and Rāghavendra agree that तु implies emphatic iteration : तुशब्दो दृष्टशब्देन संबद्धयमानः दृष्टमवधारयति । अविनाशि तु नित्यमेवेति ॥ The critic unnecessarily confuses the whole issue by introducing a fanciful distinction between a "popular and a philosophical notion." To say (as he does) that " in the popular view only one thing has an end while according to the philosophical view both have an end " and so on (p. 330) is fantastic nonsense.

The next complaint is that sometimes two words meaning the same thing are used to " fill up gaps. " It is a pity that he forgets that no two synonyms are ever exactly synonymous. There is bound to be some slight shade of difference between the two. He points out that सर्वं and अखिलं (4. 33), अचलं and ध्रुवं (12. 3), सुहृद् मित्र, अरि द्वेष्य, मध्यस्थ उदासीन (6-9) pairs meaning the same thing are used side by side " without any difference in sense being implied. " Here again his lack of acquaintance with Sanskrit commentaries is responsible for this hasty criticism. With regard to अखिलं Śaṅkara says अप्रतिबद्धं आविद्यमानं खिलं शेषोऽस्त्येति खिलं (Ānandagiri.) The Gītā-Vivṛti runs :—खिलं सशेषं न भवतीत्याखिलं यद्वा आखिलं इति विभागः आसमन्तादत्यल्पमपि सर्वं कर्म ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते ॥ The idea expressed is quite in line with Vedāntic tradition.

अचलं and ध्रुवं are explained by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja as static (stable) and eternal. The Vivṛti would have ध्रुवं as निर्विकारं. With regard to the three pairs ' सुहृद् मित्र etc. ' Rāghavendra Svāmin has a brilliant exposition which bears out the niceties of Sanskrit vocabulary :—प्रत्युपकारनिरपेक्षोपकारकृत् सुहृत् । क्लेशस्थानं विज्ञाप्य ततो रक्षाकृन्मित्रं । वधादिकर्ताऽरिः । अवाञ्छितकृद्द्वेष्यः । कर्तव्यापकारे अपकारे च य उदास्ते स उदासीनः । उपकारापकारोभयकृन्मध्यस्थः ॥

The critic writes :— " भूतमहेश्वरं is hard to construe and interpret. " The difficulty again is due to scrupulous non-cooperation with original texts and commentaries. Śaṅkara does not feel it hard to "construe and interpret" । सर्वभूतानां महान्तं ईश्वरं । Madhva finds it easier still :—भूतां महदीश्वरं चेति । भावं याथाभ्या-
मिति व्याख्यानपेक्षया नपुंसकं (Jayatīrtha.)

" Sometimes the stop-gaps and fillers spoil the sense as in आवृतं ज्ञानमेतेन ज्ञानिनो कामरूपेणानलेन च (3.39) as though Fire would envelop but not burn knowledge !" (p. 331). This is clearly disingenuous. In the first place the word अनल in the text does not mean Fire. It is too commonplace. As भाष्योत्कर्षदीपिका facetiously remarks: अनलेन वह्निनेवेति व्याख्यानं तु सुगमत्वादान्वायैरेपेक्षितं । Śaṅkara himself gives a different interpretation: नास्यालं पर्याप्तिर्विद्यत इत्यनलः तेन which gains ground under कामरूपेण. Vivṛti runs: कामेति रूपमाख्या यस्य तेन कामरूपेण कामाख्येन नित्यवैरिणा सदापकारिणा दुष्पूरेण । न केवलं दुष्पूरः किंतु अनलेन न विद्यतेऽलं तृप्तिः यस्य तेन । महतो भोग्यविषयस्य प्राप्तवपि अधिकेच्छयाऽलंबुद्धिरहितेनेत्यर्थः ॥

" Prepositions are promiscuously used without any apparent alteration in meaning." Then follows a list of such forms. But it has to be suggested in reply that prepositional forms besides usually indicating different and varying shades of meanings are also used for the sake of style and in other cases are to be attributed to the idiosyncrasies of authors. Here again the critic's list of forms is only partially correct.

Thus प्रदुष्यन्तु: indicates the buoyancy of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna as soon as they entered the field—a fact intended to be contrasted with the gloom of the opposite party. " In spite of the thundrous noise of the trumpets, blow of conches etc., from the enemy's ranks, Mādhava and Arjuna blew their conches louder still not in the least disheartened or perturbed by the clamour of the opposite rank." (Madhusūdana Sarasvatī).

प्रदुष्यन्ति expresses Arjuna's over-anxiety to preserve the chastity of the women-folk which he fears would be irredeemably jeopardised in the event of a national war and consequent carnage.

परिशुष्यति, परिदहते etc. bear witness to his burning state of emotions.

निवसिष्यसि conveys an assurance.

निबन्ध denotes eternal bondage. (Śaṅkara).

परिसमाप्यते has the force of प्रतिबन्धक्षयद्वारेण पर्यवस्यति or फलवद्भवति

नानुपश्यामि obviates any expectation on the part of the speaker: स्वजनं हत्वा अनु पश्चात् श्रेयः न पश्यामि (Bhāṣyōtkarṣa Dīpikā).

Nilakaṇṭha defines पशुपासते as सर्वप्रकारेणोपासते । उपासनमिह अनात्मनामदर्शनमेव ॥ Śaṅkara takes it to mean अनुतिष्ठन्ति. Another commentary remarks सर्वस्वतन्त्रत्वेन भगवदुपास्तिपूर्वकं तत्परिवारतया देव्यु- (अव्यक्तो) पासनमेव पशुपासनं ॥

“प्रत्यनीक is the oppoiste of and not the same as अनीक (11-32)” (p 332.) ! I wonder what is the point after all in this sapient comment. If the critic means that it is misused he is sadly mistaken. The reference here is not merely to one army but to both. अनीकं अनीकं प्रति प्रतिपक्षभूतेषु (Śaṅkara). Madhva writes —प्रत्यनीकत्वं तु परस्परतया । सेनाद्वयस्यापीतिशेषः । कुत एवं व्याख्यातमित्यन आह सर्वेति सेनाद्वयगताऽपि (Jayatirtha)

गृह्यते without a preposition tho' unusual is excusable on Epic grounds : स तं गृह्य नृपश्रेष्ठः I. 44. 32.

The omission of अपि after आततायिनः and विगुणः etc , of अनि before जाग्रतः can as well be supplied from the context and hence do not count as serious errors.

On p. 335 the critic remarks “ No one can trace the source of his (Kṛṣṇa's) statement that the द्वन्द्व is the *first* of compounds. ” Kṛṣṇa however does not say it is the *first* but “ *best* ” of compounds and the reason is not far to seek : द्वन्द्वसमास उभयपदप्रधानः (Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. cf. also Bhaṭṭoji)

केवलं in ‘ तत्रैवं सति कर्तारं..... ’ is deemed unnecessary because it would “ make the Ātman an agent in company with certain other factors. ” But there is no need for such nervousness if we understand केवलं as constituting the very reason of the soul's inactivity. केवलशब्दस्तु स्वाभाविकरूपमात्मनः असङ्गाद्वितीयरूपत्वमवबुद्धि (Śaṅkara.) But it remains to be seen whether the Gītā is pledged to this theory of the soul's inactivity. All that the verse means to tell us is that the individual is not an absolutely free and independent agent. The trend of the Gītā is far from supporting any theory of the inactivity of the soul. The verse in question simply warns us against arrogating to ourselves the initiative and conduct of affairs. Rāghavendra sums up the whole : तत्र कर्मणि ईश्वरादिपञ्चकस्यैवं करणत्वे सति जीवस्य स्वातन्त्र्याभावेन केवलं परप्रेरणां विना स्वतः क्रियाहीनमात्मानं कर्तारं स्वातन्त्र्येण कर्तारं यस्तु पश्यति मन्यते सोऽकृतबुद्धिः । In either case the word केवलं is not without a purpose and significance and we shall leave it at that.

Our critic is at a loss to understand how and why certain things mentioned in Chapter X as specially significant or best of their kind are really so ! But his ignorance only heightens his audacity and he burst forth into facetious humour : “Some no doubt are good and grand examples of divine greatness as the Himālayas, the ocean and the Ganges ; some splendid such as the Sun, the Moon; some powerful as the wind, the fire and the lion etc. But by which of these qualities shall we charac-

terise the Sāma Veda, Brhaspati, Bhrgu and Nārada? They are simply best of their kind!" (p. 334). A reference to the commentaries at once clarifies the issue! Just see:— गानेन रमणीयत्वाच्चतुर्णां वेदानां मध्ये गानमाधुर्येणातिरमणीयः सामवेदः (Nilakanṭha, Madhusūdana.)

बृहस्पतिः पुरोधसां मध्ये देवपुरोहितत्वान्मुख्यं (Śrīdhara.)

भृगुरतितेजास्वित्वात् (Madhusūdana.) The story of Bhrgu's mysterious third eye in virtue of which he roamed about the three worlds to decide who was the best of the gods is current in the Padma-Purāṇa.

नारदः The cause of his greatness is given in the text itself. देवा एव सन्तः मन्त्रदर्शनेन ऋषित्वं प्राप्तास्तेषां मध्ये नारदः (Śaṅkara, Śrīdhara, Madhusūdana.)

वाद and वृत् elude the critic. "What sort of greatness do these possess and what sort of pride or pleasure can Kṛṣṇa or for the matter of that any one feel in calling himself 'gambling' which is simply a civilised form of filching?" (p.335) वाद is not the dry disputation of two extinct volcanoes. Śaṅkara brings out the innate dignity of Vāda. वादोऽर्थनिर्णयहेतुत्वात्प्रधानं । वादो वीतरागं कथा । तत्त्वनिर्णयावसाना (Ānandagiri and Madhusūdana.)

The critic makes a colossal mistake when he thinks that the so many things referred to by Kṛṣṇa are in fact his own alter-egos or that any identification between them is meant! The aim of Kṛṣṇa's illustrations is to impress upon Arjuna the fact that He is the Ruler of All, who empowers the mightiest and sustains the weakest. His hand is felt not merely in things great and good but in things small or repellent (उच्चावचा येन समस्तचेष्टाः). But nothing is repellent to him. He is equally present in all: in the learned Brahman, the elephant, the cow, the dog and the Caṇḍāla. In fact he is in all—high and low, great and small, good and bad. The warrior's might is due to Him and the gambler's cunning is due to Him. Nothing exists then which is not ultimately derived from Him and which does not in ever so small or great a degree call up his prowess and presence. There is nothing inherently shocking if the Gītā fearlessly attributes gambling as an art to the divine presence. The Lord himself is going to speak of himself as the merciless slayer of all men. It is, however, a false notion that God resides only in good things. He lives in Heaven and Hell, suffers the play of good and evil but is not in turn affected by them. (निर्दोषं हि समं ब्रह्म।) In fact standards

of anthropomorphism do not apply to Him. In his lectures on the Gītā, Babu Aurobindo Ghose clearly brings out the thoroughness of the Hindu conception of God.

The critic further deplores that “कीर्ति श्री etc. are considered best among women because they happen to be feminine in speech. But the heroines and noble ladies of our Epics—a mere utterance of whose names soon after waking in the early morning is deemed auspicious (as if the critic does believe in such rank superstition.)—Sītā, Tārā, Anasūyā, Mandōdarī, Sāvitrī, Damayantī and Tārāmatī of blessed memory..... Sarasvatī the goddess of speech have all been forgotten” (p.334). A reference to the commentaries again clarifies the issue. Madhusūdana explains: कीर्तिर्विष्णु श्री च नारीणां स्मृतिर्मेधा धृतिः क्षमे-
यिता उत्तमस्त्रीणां.....यासां आभासमात्रसंबन्धेनापि लोकाः कृतार्थमात्मानं मन्यन्ते
The “noble ladies” are not forgotten. चकारान्मूर्त्याद्योपि धर्मपत्न्यो गृह्यन्ते। According to another view the seven terms respectively denote seven ladies each famous in a particular respect.

Elsewhere he remarks, “It is doubtful whether ब्राह्मणाः in ब्राह्मणास्तेन वेदाश्च (17. 23) refers to the caste or the Brāhmana portion of the Vedas. In the latter case it ought to be ब्राह्मणानि. If it were the caste there is no reason why it should precede the Vedas and sacrifices” (p. 327). But the commentators are sure that only the caste is meant. And the critic's puzzle why it should precede the Vedas and sacrifices is thus clearly explained by Madhusūdana. ब्राह्मणा इति त्रैवर्णिकोपलक्षणं। ब्राह्मणाद्याः कर्तारः वेदाः करणानि यज्ञाः कर्माणि।

मन्त्रकृतेष्वभिधास्यति is not wrong as is made out. Nor is it necessary to have it as भक्तानभिधास्यति। अभिधास्यति has the force of ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च स्थापयिष्यति (Śaṅkara.) Madhusūdana writes; अभितः ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च धास्यति स्थापयिष्यति।

अथर्द्धधाना धर्मस्य (9. 3) again is explained by Śrīdhara thus: अस्य भक्तिसाहितज्ञानलणस्य धर्मस्येति कर्मणि षष्ठी।

Some “clumsy and intricate constructions” are noticed:—

अस्माकं तु विशिष्टा ये तान्निबोध द्विजोत्तम।

नायका मम सैन्यस्य संहार्य तान्ब्रवीमि ते ॥

The critic asks “how are we to construe नायका मम सैन्यस्य?” The Vivṛti suggests a simple construction: अस्माकं संबन्धिनः विशिष्टा बलिष्ठाः मम सैन्यस्य ये नायका तान्निबोध। The genitive here is संबन्ध-सामान्ये। Evidently Duryodhana means to refer to his *proteges* as distinct from the mercenary soldiers and allies—(cf अन्ये च बहवः शूराः)

“ The queerest stanza is इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां (2. 67). For an intelligible construction we have to alter the forms of certain words as well as supply certain links ” (p. 328.) But the verse is sufficiently intelligible as it is. Nilakantha has a very simple and catching interpretation. हि यस्मादिन्द्रियाणां चरतां स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानानां यद्वागकलुषितं मनः तान्यनु लक्ष्यीकृत्य विधीयते प्रवर्त्यते तदिन्द्रियानुसारि मनः प्रज्ञां हरति । The Vivṛti suggests a more definite and direct construction. Some more verses are pronounced to be clumsy in a footnote. But a reference to any recognised commentary would set at nought all doubts and difficulties. Intricacy there is none to speak of. Mr. Gandhi once declared the language of the Gītā to be “ incredibly simple. ”

The critic declares that कर्मणो ह्यपि बोद्धव्यं (4. 17) really means कर्म हि बोद्धव्यं. But this is a needless emendation. He will do well to understand गतिः after every one of the three genitives. Śaṅkara actually adopts the same procedure. कर्मो कर्मविकर्मणां गतिः यायात्स्यं बोद्धव्यमित्यर्थः । Nilakantha and Śrīdhara suggest a similar procedure. Rāghavendra offers a different solution. (पूर्वस्मात् कर्मो कर्मपदयोरनुवृत्तिः)

Then comes a sententious remark. “ It is rather strange that Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna and Vyāsa so intimately connected with the story of the Mahābhārata and the Gītā should be mentioned as the best of their clans, family or class. Can they be so detached from self and so impartial as to look upon themselves in that light ? ” (p. 335) This is simply a mischievous stunt the only fitting answer to which is given by Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself in 7. 19, 24, 25.

“ Another source of filling out is a host of vocatives ” (p. 331.) In the first place it should be remembered that the use of vocatives is a very common feature of Epic style. The Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Purāṇās abound in vocatives. This should not be condemned as unnatural because primitive poetry has an irrepressible tendency toward vocative address. There is nothing incompatible therefore if the Gītā too is given to the use of vocatives in a large measure. It is a defect (if you please) which it shares in common with the rest of the Epic. But not all of them can be declared to be meaningless. Most of them are quite contestual and significant. They contain so many hidden allusions, and sly hits. The great commentators do not notice the vocatives. भाष्यकृद्भिस्तु सुगमत्वात् संबोधनाभिप्रायवर्णनं न सर्वत्र क्रियत इति बोद्धव्यं । The Bhāṣyotkaraṣa

-Dīpikā a commentary of the Advaita school makes a consistent and almost astonishing attempt to explain the import of everyone of the vocatives occurring throughout the Gītā. The success with which the feat is carried out is simply phenomenal. No other commentary so far as I am aware has attempted anything like it with such wonderful capacity and ingenuity. The critic's list of some twenty-four vocatives in all (said to be meaningless) vanishes into nothingness before the myriads of instances selected and commented upon by the author of the Bhāṣyotkarṣa-Dīpikā. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also notices some vocatives and explains their significance. I have taken great pains to determine the variety and frequency of such vocatives and trace out the explanations thereon offered by the author of Bhāṣyotkarṣa-Dīpikā¹ in particular and other commentators in general.

जनार्दन 1-36. A. B.* 3. 1-10-18.

केशव 1-31.

अनघ 3-3. A. B.

अर्जुन 2-45, 3-7, 4-5 A. B. 4-9 A. 4-37 A. 6-46, 8-27, 10-42, 18-34.

कौन्तेय 2-37, 60, 3-9, 39, 5-22, 6-35, 8-6. 9-23, 31. 18-60.

पार्थ 2-3, 42, 55, 72. 3-16, 22 A. B. 4-11, 8-8, 14, 22, 27. 16-4 A. B. 17-26.

भारत 2-14 A. 2-18, 28, 30. 3-25 A. B. 4-7 A. B. C. 4-42 A. 11-6, 14-10.

महाबाहो 2-26, 68. 3-28 A. B. 3-43 A. B. 5-3, 6. 6-35. 7-5. 18-1.

वाष्पेय 1-41 A. B. 3-36 A. B.

परंतप 4-2 A. B. 18-41.

कुरुसत्तम 4-31 A. B.

पाण्डव 4-35 A. 6-2, 16-5.

धर्मजय 2-48, 4-41. A. B. 7-7 A. B. 9-9. 18-29.

मधुसूदन 2-1. 6-33. 8-2.

कृष्ण 1-28. A. B. 6-34, 37, 39. 17-1.

कुस्मन्न्दन 2-41. 6-43 A. B. 14-13.

भरतर्षभ 7-11, 16, 23. 17-12.

पुरुषोत्तम 8-1.

कमलपत्राक्ष 11-2 A. B.

प्रभो 11-4.

केशिनिषूदन 18-1.

* A, B, and C refer respectively to the explanations of Madhusūdana, Bhāṣyotkarṣa-Dīpikā and Anandagiri. Blank references are always to Bhāṣyotkarṣa-Dīpikā.

कुरुश्रेष्ठ 10-19.

गुडाकेश 11-7.

माधव 1-37 AB.

The following are some of the typical explanations of vocatives :—

1. कौन्तेय (8-6) कौन्तेयेति संबोधयन् संबन्धप्रदर्शनेन स्वस्मिन्सर्वदा भावनाभ्यास-सौलभ्यं द्योतयति ।
2. अर्जुन (10-41) एतेन बहुना ज्ञातेन तव किं । चित्तशोधकस्यैतज्ज्ञानस्य शुचिचित्ते शक्ते त्वयि प्रयोजनाभावादिति ध्वनयन्संबोधयति ।
3. धनंजय (7-7) दिग्विजये उत्तरगोग्रहे च राज्ञो भीष्मादींश्च विजित्य धनमाहूतवतः त्वत्तः परतर एतादृशकर्मकर्ता यथा नास्ति तथा मत्तः परं जगत्कारणं नास्तीति ध्वनयन्संबोधयति ।
4. वार्ष्णेय (1-41) कुलमर्यादाभिज्ञस्त्वमेतत्कथं न जानासि ज्ञात्वा च किमेवमुपेक्षसे इति ध्वनिः ।
5. पार्थ (2-3) पृथाया देवप्रसादलब्धे तत्तनयमात्रे वीर्यीतिशयस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् पृथा-तनयत्वेन क्लैव्यायोगादित्यर्थः । Kṛṣṇa himself had commended Arjuna's spirited speech before the Rājāsūya in the following terms :

जातस्य भरते वंशे तथा कुन्त्या सुतस्य च ।
या वै युक्ता मतिः सेयं अर्जुनेन प्रदर्शिता ॥

(*Sabhā Parva. 17-1*)

Kunti's heroism was well known. The day preceding the great war she had sent a message to her sons reminding them of her slavery and encouraging them to fight to the death. The Lord reminds Arjuna of the same by this gentle humor.

6. प्रभो (11-4) न त्वाज्ञां करोमि किंतु प्रार्थयामि । ब्रह्मादिप्रभौ त्वय्याज्ञायोगादिति सूच-यन् आह प्रभो इति । मम दर्शनासामर्थ्येपि त्वं दर्शयितुं समर्थोसीति वा संबोधनाशयः ।

Besides, the Gītā is not so hopelessly vocative-ridden. There are a good number of passages wherein vocatives are not at all pressed into service—a fact which itself refutes the view that they are used merely as stop-gaps and fillers. Such of these are :—

II 22-25 ; 33-36 ; 50-53 ; 61-67.

III 17-20 ; 29-35 ; IV. 12-30. VI. 6-16 ; 17-31.

VII 17-25. X. 2-12. XIII. 3-30. XVIII. 7-28 ; 50-59.

Furthermore, the Gītā as a poem can boast of a number of verses which for brevity of style, chastity of expression and elevation of thought are unrivalled. Examples are, IV-18, V-8, 11, 14—29. VI-1, 2, 5, 6, 16, 19, 46. VII 14. 30. VIII. 5, 6.

There are some sublime stanzas: VIII-9, 13, 17, 18, 19,—22. IX. 27. X. 19-24.

An approach to rhyme is almost in evidence in the series यो मे भक्तः स मे प्रियः (XII-14-17), which recalls the famous तदा नाशंसे series in Ādiparva or the equally memorable योगिनस्तं प्रपश्यन्ति भगवन्तं सनातनं in which the same refrain is kept up throughout a whole chapter (Udyoga parva 46.)

An earnest scholar may as well collect together many stanzas with an aphoristic flavor. Sanskrit poetry can be rightly proud of crisp sententious and pregnant verses like:—

नास्ति बुद्धिरयुक्तस्य न चायुक्तस्य भावना ।
न चाभावयतः शान्तिः अशान्तस्य कुतः सुखं ॥
नासतो विद्यते भावः नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
उभयोरपि दृष्टोन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥
कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूः मा ते संगोस्त्वकर्मणि ॥
यो मां पश्यति सर्वत्र सर्वं च मयि पश्यति ।
तस्याहं न प्रणश्यामि स च मे न प्रणश्यति ॥
या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी ।
यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥
अशोच्यानन्वशोचस्त्वं प्रज्ञावादांश्च भाषसे ।
गतासूनगतासूश्च नानुशोचन्ति पण्डिताः ॥
न कर्मणामनारम्भान्नैष्कर्म्यं पुरुषोऽश्रुते ।
न च संन्यसनादेव सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति ॥
सर्वधर्मान्परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज ।
अहं त्वा सर्वपापेभ्यो मोचयिष्यामि मा शुचः ॥

and of many others besides, which want of space forbids citation.

“ A philosophical poem is a misnomer if the philosophy is not allegorised. The Gītā has not the slightest pretensions to allegory ” (p. 332). This is entirely wrong. Ignorance of the nature of the contents of the Gītā cannot go further. Our ancient commentators have clearly drawn attention to many allegories in the Gītā and even third rate modern writers and booksellers of the Gītā wax eloquent over the profound allegories of the Gītā and dwell upon the mysterious divisions of the Mahābhārata into eighteen books, the duration of the fight for eighteen days and of the division of

the Gītā into eighteen chapters. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī reads the concise phrase and Vedantic formula तत्त्वमसि (That Thou Art) into the scheme of the Gītā and holds that the division into three saktas (षट्क) corresponds to three periods of the great sentence तत्, त्वं, असि.

सच्चिदानन्दरूपं तत्पूर्णं विष्णोः परं पदं ।
 यत्प्राप्तये समारब्धाः वेदाः काण्डत्रयात्मकाः ॥ ३ ॥
 कर्मोपास्तिस्तथा ज्ञानमिति काण्डत्रयं क्रमात् ।
 तद्रूपाष्टादशाध्यायैः गीताकाण्डत्रयात्मिका ॥ ४ ॥
 तत्र तु प्रथमे काण्डे कर्म तत्स्यागवर्त्मना ।
 त्वंपदार्थो विशुद्धात्मा सोपपत्तिर्निरूप्यते ॥ ८ ॥
 द्वितीये भगवद्भक्तिनिष्ठावर्णनवर्त्मना ।
 भगवान्परमानन्दः तत्पदार्थोऽवधार्यते ॥ ९ ॥
 तृतीये तु तयोरैक्यं वाक्यार्थो वर्ण्यते स्फुटं ।
 एवमप्यत्र काण्डानां संबन्धोऽस्ति परस्परम् ॥ १० ॥

(Introd. to Gītā Vyākhyāna).

Mr. Vasant G. Rele F. C. P. S., L. M. & S. in his, "Bhagavad Gītā — A Psycho-Analysis" (Tarporewala & Sons, Hornby Road, Bombay), has endeavoured to show that the Gītā besides embodying the theory and practice of psychology indicates the method of analysing, synthesising and re-educating different phases of the mind of an individual on the border-land of mental derangement. Arjuna on the eve of the battle grew definitely psychotic. Kṛṣṇa was an expert psycho-analyst and he subjected him to a process of psycho-analysis and pointed out that his doubts and difficulties, moral misgivings and mental musings were all due to a proper lack of harmony. Kṛṣṇa sets to work to restore that harmony. Elsewhere Mr. Rele represents the human nervous system as the famous Aśvattha tree.

Whatever may be said of Rele's theories, XV Chapter. dealing with the Aśvattha tree turned topsy turvy is an allegory. Madhusūdana says : पूर्वोद्ध्यायोक्तं परमेश्वराधनिप्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग-कार्यं संसारवृक्षकल्पनया वर्णयति वैराग्याय ॥ The conception of the World-Cycle (जगच्चक्र) in the III Adhyāya which for sometime even Mr. Gandhi was trying to identify with his national panacea of the spinning wheel (charkha), is an allegory far ahead of any -Miltonic, Shakespearean or Kalidasian ! Elsewhere the critic remarks, "the way in which the artist deals with these topics would show his mettle. Even Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Bāṇa,

Shakespeare, Milton or Shelley would have been on [their trial and yet there is no doubt that they would have acquitted themselves worthily." (p. 333.) Indian poets have never claimed precedence over the authors of the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata. They have all recognised their unchallengeable superiority. Bāṇa himself bows down to Vyāsa in an introductory verse of the Harsacarita. It is mischievously out of place to pit against each other the author of the Gītā and Milton, Shelley or Shakespeare. They are not *in pari materia*. They have no common ground.

Lastly, the chapter of the Universal Vision in which is seen the whole Cosmos, the fight of the Kurukṣētra, the sight of the armies being devoured by the awful jaws of the Great One is an allegory akin to the one presented in the Purusa Sūkta with an immediate coloring. The essence of that allegory notwithstanding disorderly groupings which the critic points out, is contained in two verses which emphasise the highest doctrine of the Gītā—the Immanence of God in all things, that He is the sole Ruler and the One Independent Reality, that the whole scheme of organic and inorganic life derives its support from Him.

यद्यद्विभूतिमत्स्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेव वा ।
तत्तदेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोऽशंसम्वं ।
यच्चापि सर्वभूतानां बीजं तदहमूर्जुन ।
न तदस्ति विना यत्स्यान्मया भूतं चराचरं ॥

This grand truth of things is the peculiar pride of the Gītā. No world-poet save the author of the Gītā has ever declared so solemn a truth in so impressive a manner. Not Kalidāsa, not Bhavabhūti not Shakespeare not Shelley not even Milton has approached to anything like a glimpse of it.

And as against this a mendacious list of misused words, misplaced compounds, irregular forms, archaisms, absence of sandhi etc., weighs nowhere. The author of the Gītā himself is not likely to be perturbed by such puerilities. His is the vantage of an overflowing philosophical lay the burden of which would run :—

यावानर्थं उदपाने सर्वतः संपुतोदके ।
तावान्सर्वेषु वेदेषु ब्राह्मणस्य विजानतः ॥

(IL 46)

And this is bound to be the motto of his countless followers still in the land of Bhārata Varṣa.

REVIEWS

Eleven Lessons in Karma Yoga by YOGI BHIKSHU : The Yogi Publication Society, 1928, Chicago, U. S. A., Price \$. 2.00 or Rs. 6/4.

The sub-title of this little quarto volume of 140 pages reads—"The Yogi Philosophy of Correct Thought-use and the Yogin Doctrine of Work." The book is written in the traditional theosophic style, and if there are parts of it that you do not understand, the only remedy is to re-read it until understanding ensues. The author delights in obscurity, and as a Mystic he seems to have regarded it as a part of his duty to bring together the most incongruous, as for instance when he describes the Parsis as Dravidian (p. 28). The original Sanskrit where quoted—apart from absence of any diacritical marks—is almost invariably incorrect and misinterpreted. For example, *Ishia Poorti* (p. 33), *Adhishtanta* (p. 37), *Matrasparsa* [= mā + atra + asparśa] on p. 59, *Srardhas* (p. 96), etc.; and even in the English we have noticed not a few misprints: thus, *weaver* (for *waverer*, p. 27), *quaintness* (for *quintessence*, p. 120), *tho* (for *thou*, p. 133), etc.; while we must frankly confess that the syntax of the "Mantra" on p. 34—Do what thou wilt shalt.....—is beyond our power of understanding. Fortunately, the class of readers—in India or in America—to which the book is likely to make an appeal does not constitute a majority, nor even an influential minority; and that must be our only consolation.

S. K. B.

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
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CONTENTS

VOL. XI, PART IV (30-8-30)

ARTICLES :	Pages
1 Proof of Possession under the Smrtis by Dr. Amareshwar Thakur, M. A., Ph. D. ...	301-335
2. Dravidian Culture by Dr. R. Shamshastri, B. A., Ph. D. ...	336-360
3. Yuvarājadeva I of Tripuri by Prof. V. V. Mirashi, M. A. ...	361-373
4. Kanarese Influence on Old Marathi with special Reference to Jñānesvari by R. V. Jahagirdar, M. A. ...	374-397
MISCELLANEA :	
5. The Jayanagar Image Inscription of Palapāla by Prof. R. D. Banerji, M. A. ...	398-400
APPENDICES :	
I List of Journals, Periodicals, and Institutions on Exchange. ...	i
II List of the Members of the Institute. ...	v

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona

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[Part IV

PROOF OF POSSESSION UNDER THE SMṚTIS
BY

DR. AMARESWAR THAKUR, M. A., PH. D.

आगमेऽपि बलं नैव भुक्तिः स्तोकापि यत्र नो¹ ॥

‘Where there is not the least possession, there the title is not weighty.’ This is how the importance of the proof of possession is recognised by Yājñavalkya. Vijñāneśvara understands this statement to mean that transfer of ownership is not complete without the transfer of possession. We give here the substance of the gloss he puts upon it. “By whichever of the derivative means a property is acquired, proprietary right to it is created only when it is accepted by the acquirer. The loss of property by the original owner is implied finally by this acceptance. Now acceptance may be effected by a mental, a verbal and a physical act. What is meant by the mental act? The will to accept. The verbal acceptance is distinguished from the mental by such formal declarations as ‘I accept,’ ‘This is mine’ and the like. The acceptance by a physical act consists in actually taking the thing in question by the hand or formally touching it. The conveyance is completed by this last act. In the case of landed property the acceptance by a physical act as described above is not practicable and is to be signified by the assumption of possession and an actual enjoyment of the produce of the land after it has been transferred. The legal form of transfer of an immovable property is not complete until and unless possession is taken over in respect of it by the transferee.”² The verse in Nārada’s text bearing upon the point is as follows :

1. Yāj. II 27.

2. Mit. on Yāj II. 27.

विद्यमानेऽपि लिखिते जीवत्स्वपि हि साक्षिषु ।
विशेषतः स्थावराणां यन्न भुक्तं तन्न स्थिरम् ॥ ¹

‘Though a document be in existence and witnesses living that is no true property of which possession is not actually held. This is specially true as regards immovables.’ Nārada evidently intends to show the weakness of proof by witnesses and documents where the proprietary right of an immovable property is in dispute. Asahāya in commenting on this verse raises another point of law, viz., generally any of these three kinds of proof is invalid where it is not accompanied by any of the other kinds. ² The proposition that a transfer of ownership is not complete without delivery of possession does not mean, however, that the latter is an essential condition for the former. What Vijñāneśvara means by it is that delivery of possession puts a title on a sound basis and enhances its value. He describes only the usefulness of possession by saying that a title unaccompanied by physical acceptance consisting in the assumption of possession and consequent enjoyment of the produce is weaker than a title accompanied by such an acceptance. ³ This too will be the case, he adds, when of these two it is not known which is anterior or which is posterior in point of date. When it is known, then the prior title though deficient in not being accompanied by possession will be regarded as a stronger evidence than the title which is accompanied by it but posterior. ⁴ Viśveśvara in his Subodhini makes it clear that the rule cannot be otherwise. We all know that mortgage is one of the means of acquiring title. Now suppose a plot of land is mortgaged to a person who has by chance not the possession of it. The same plot of land is mortgaged a second time and possession delivered to the mortgagee. Now if it be the rule that title with possession is invariably superior to one without possession then the second mortgage will prevail over the first one and thus the rule that in the case of pledge a gift or a sale the prior contract has the greater force will have no meaning

1 Nār. I. 77.

2 एकैक प्रमाणमप्यप्रमाणम् । यदुभयप्रमाणसंपन्नं वस्तु तदाविचल प्रमाणमिति । on Nār. I. 77.

3 फलोपयोगलक्षणकार्यिकस्वीकारविकल भागमो दुर्बली भवति तद् संहितादागमात् । Mit on Yāj. II. 27.

4 एतच्च द्वयोः पूर्वापरकालपरिज्ञाने पूर्वापरकालपरिज्ञाने तु विद्युणोऽपि पूर्वकालागम एव बलीयान्... Mit. on Yāj II. 27.

at all.¹ The texts of Yājñavalkya and Nārada do not promulgate therefore that delivery of possession is an indispensable element for a valid transfer but only point to the risky nature of the transfer of ownership without the transfer of possession. It is undoubtedly true that when a transferee continues to remain without any control over the property transferred to him for a long time, it may give rise to the presumption that he has parted with his title in favour of the person in actual possession of the same

It is mentioned in the Dharmaśāstras that possession is an independent means of proof. Its value, therefore, cannot lie merely in augmenting the force of title. It thus requires to be seen under what circumstances it can independently be a proof. As this question is closely connected with another, viz., the question of the general relation existing between the proof of possession and title, we shall first of all try to ascertain this relation. The relation between the two may be characterised in a word as one of mutual support. We have just seen that title in order to be able to prove ownership is to be attended with possession. Title is to that extent supported by possession. There are several *smṛti* texts which declare that possession also in order to be proof of right by itself should be based upon title. Brhaspati says that only that possession which is founded on a legitimate title such as grant, inheritance, purchase or hypothecation can prove right,² and further that it is not by mere force of possession that land becomes a man's property; it becomes property only when legitimate title also has been proved and not otherwise.³ Hārta and Nārada are also very emphatic on the point that possession without title is no proof at all. Hārta shows the complete dependence of possession on title by describing title as the root and possession as the branch of a tree.⁴ In the opinion of Nārada possession acquires validity by the production of a clear title and when it is without title it does not constitute proof of ownership.⁵ He further says that he who can only plead possession without being able to adduce any title has to be considered as a thief in

1. नदूपभोगसहितागमापेक्षया भोगसहितागमस्य दुर्बलत्वे यत्रैकमेव क्षेत्रमेकस्याधीकृत्याऽवस्थापि-
करोति तत्र यदि दैवात् पूर्वस्य भोगाभावः उत्तरस्य भोगोऽस्ति तादृश्यपि स्थले भोगसहितागमस्य दीर्घत्व
स्यात् । तथा चाद्यौ प्रतिग्रहे कृति इत्यादिचवचनविरोधः स्यादित्याशङ्क्य परिहरति एतच्च द्वयोस्त्रिणादिना ।

2. Viram P. 203, भोगः सागम सिद्धिमानुयात् ।

3. Sc. P. 161, मुख्यतः केवलया नैव etc.

4. आगमस्तु मवेन्मूलं युक्तिः शास्त्रा प्रकीर्तिता Sc. P. 160.

5. Nar. IV. 85

consequence of his pleading such an illegitimate possession.¹ He ends by saying that title is required to prove proprietary right even when there is enjoyment consequent upon possession.²

The sum and substance of what has been said is that a person pleading possession is required to prove that it has a legal origin also, or in other words that he has acted under a good title. In this sense possession is to be supported by title. The relation of their mutual support is vividly described by a text attributed to Pitāmaha. This text declares that possession is no proof without title and title is no proof without possession; each of them becomes a proof only when it is helped by the other.³

The nature of each individual case will determine which of them is to preponderate over the other. The text of Yājñavalkya declares that generally title is to prevail over possession unless the latter is hereditary.⁴ Nārada also expresses the same idea by saying that for the first acquirer gift (i. e., a good title) is a cause.⁵ The Mitākṣarā explains that when the first acquirer is impeached after a short period of his acquisition there is nothing to prove his ownership except his title-deed. A good title, the soundness of which is proved by documents and witnesses, affords a stronger evidence in his case than mere possession.⁶ What the commentary wants to say is that 'if a person proves his possession over a property but cannot show how he acquired it, and another although not in possession proves his title by showing that he acquired the property in some recognised way of acquiring ownership such as sale, gift etc., then the title so proved will prevail over possession under ordinary circumstances.' For an intermediate claimant, however, Nārada lays down, *bhukti* (possession) which is *sāgamā* (based on a legitimate title) is a stronger proof than title.⁷ By the expression 'intermediate claimant' is meant a possessor up to the third generation excluding the original acquirer. This we know from the following text of an anonymous *smṛti* writer. "Up to the third generation from the acquirer possession is the principal thing to be looked into but it should be ascertained at the same time that it

1 Nār IV. 86.

2 Nār. IV. 84.

3 So. p. 161

4 Yāj II. 27.

5 आदौ तु कारणं दानम्...Mit. on Yāj II 27, and Vm. p. 344.

6 आद्ये पुरुषे साक्षिर्निर्भावित आगमो भोगादभ्याधिको बलवान्...Mit on Yāj II. 27.

7 मध्ये भुक्तिस्तु सागमा.....Vm. p. 344

has a clear title behind it." ¹ The exact relation between possession and title therefore may thus be briefly indicated : when possession is for a comparatively long period it will prove right but not quite independently of title; title will have to help it. But when possession is for a short period, its usefulness will lie in strengthening title which will be the main thing to rely on; or in other words, when possession is comparatively modern so much importance should not be attached to it as to title when ownership is sought to be proved.

We thus see and it is expressed in so many words by the Vivādacandra that possession when modern and at the same time unaccompanied by title does not constitute an evidence of property. ² When, however, it is proved to be ancient its value is immensely increased. Thus one of the main conditions of effective possession is that it should be long-continued (*dirghakālā*). ³ The expression *dirghakālabhoga* seems to correspond to *tripuruṣabhoga*. We have already referred to the text of Yājñavalkya which states that title is a more powerful evidence than possession when it is unaccompanied by hereditary succession (*pūrvakramāgatabhogāt vinā*). The Mitākṣarā takes *pūrvakramāgatabhoga* as meaning *tripuruṣabhoga* ⁴ i.e., possession continued through three successive generations in the past. We shall see later on what the exact significance of this latter expression is. It may, however, be stated here that *tripuruṣabhoga* does not import anything very different from possession that has come down from time immemorial, that is to say, from possession which has its beginning not within human recollection (*smṛtakālā*). ⁵ Yājñavalkya's rule evidently provides for an exception in favour of such a possession. Thus the Mitākṣarā comments that the superiority of title over possession intends a case within human memory and the exception applies to cases beyond it. In cases falling within the memory of man it is possible to produce a title if such a title really exists and hence if it is not produced it may give rise to a presumption of its non-existence. ⁶ Here an enquiry into the question of title is not superseded by possession. But when possession is being held from time immemorial it cannot be said that there is no title merely because it is not

1. तत्त्वैवात्मवृत्तीयस्य प्रस्युक्तिः स्फुटागमा ... Sc. P. 172.

2. न्यूनकालभोगो निरागमो न प्रमाणम् ।

3. Vm. P. 342

4. पूर्वेषां पित्रादीनां त्रयाणां क्रमः पूर्वक्रमस्तेनागती यो भोगः ... Mit. on Yāj II, 2

5. तथापि क्रमादिपुरुषांगतमित्यस्यास्मार्तकालोपभोगलक्षणम् ... Mit. on Yāj II, 2.

6 आगमोऽन्याधिको भोगादिति च स्मार्तकालविषयः.....etc. Mit. on Yāj II 27.

produced. Here the strength of presumption in favour of legitimate title is greatly increased by the length of the time of enjoyment and hence the proof of title is rendered superfluous. Herein we get an answer of the question when can possession be an independent means of proof ?

Now what is the meaning of the expression *smārtakāla* (a period of human memory)? The *Mitāksarā* understands it to cover a period of one hundred years¹ which is considered to be the utmost extent of human life on the authority of the vedic text शतायुर्वै पुरुषः (the life of a man extends over hundred years). This commentary evidently takes the extreme range of human memory into account and thus the period fixed may justly be called a period of legal memory in contradistinction to that of living memory. We shall just see that a similar if not an identical period is intended to be signified by *tripuruṣabhoga* (possession passing through three generations). Such a possession has been much extolled by our *smṛti* writers and is given the same importance in law as immemorial possession. It is said that when a property has already been enjoyed by three generations and passed to the successor fourth in descent the fact of his mere inheriting the property is sufficient proof of his right and no title is required to be produced. Thus says Viṣṇu 'the land enjoyed by three immediate ancestors passes to the fourth in descent even without a document.'² Brhaspati also is not for enquiring into the title when possession has already passed three generations.³ *Tripuruṣabhoga* has been thus defined by Vyāsa "when a property being enjoyed by the great grandfather passes at his death to the grandfather and after his death to the father, then after the death of the father too, the son's possession may be termed 'possession continued through three successive generations.'⁴ To put it in a simpler form, when a property has already passed three ancestors one after another, the possession of the fourth in descent is technically called *tripuruṣabhoga*. The rule that a person having such a possession is not required to produce title to have his ownership established seems to be contradicted by another text of Brhaspati which seems to declare that the possession by three generations *when accompanied*

1 स्मार्तकालो वर्षशतपर्यन्त.....Mit. on Yāj II 27.

2 V. 189.

3 Sc. p. 167

4 Vt. p. 50.

by documents makes an evidence of property.¹ There is, however, no real contradiction, for this rule of Brhaspati applies, according to commentators, to cases where three generations do not exceed the period of human memory.² It becomes thus evident that the period of possession for three generations does not signify the exact period during which such a possession may actually be held. It has been rightly observed by the Mitākṣarā that sometimes three generations may be finished even within a year and if it be accepted as a rule that mere continuance of possession through three generations without any reference to time is sufficient to establish proprietary right, then it would follow that second year's possession even being unaccompanied by title affords evidence and thus it will be contrary to the spirit of the rule which declares that within the period of human recollection possession accompanied by title only may prove ownership.³ The conclusion, therefore, is that a specific period of time is meant by the expression possession for three generations.⁴ We may call it a prescriptive period. It is thus recognised that possession already held by three generations one after the other is also not sufficient evidence of property without length of time. The length of the period which has been taken as an equivalent of *tripuruṣabhoga* (possession for three generations) is different according to different authorities. According to Brhaspati possession for one generation covers thirty years and thus the possession for three generations means at least a period of ninety years.⁵ An anonymous *smṛti* writer thinks that such a period is to cover one hundred and five years.⁶ Vyāsa and Kātyāyana consider twenty years for one generation quite sufficient and thus according to them sixty years constitute the period of *tripuruṣabhoga*.⁷ We have already remarked and our remark is fully borne out by a text of Kātyāyana that possession extending over three previous generations imports a possession which has not its beginning within human memory.⁸ It follows, therefore, that the period of human recollection should be the same as that of the possession of three previous generations. But we have seen that the period of human recollec-

1 Sc. p. 169.

2 तत् स्मार्तकालातिक्रान्तिरुपलक्षणविषयम्.....Sc. p. 169.

3 Mit. on Yāj II 27.

4 Pds, p. 142.

5 Pds, p. 142, Sc. p. 164; वर्षाणि पञ्चत्रिंशत् पौरुषो भोग इष्यते ।

6 Sc. p. 172, Viram. p. 206.

7 i. e., within 60 years; Viram, p. 206

tion has been taken to be one hundred years. It should, however, be remembered that Vijñāneśvara has computed this period not on the basis of any legal text but from a Vedic text which seems to have very little connection with the subject of law. The difference between several text-writers as to the period of *tripuruṣabhoga* may be explained by a consideration of time and place.

Jimūtavāhana who accepts the view of Kātyāyana and Vyāsa regarding the period of *tripurusabhoga* expresses the opinion that if three generations be living then possession for sixty years even will not be regarded conclusive. The reason is that in such a case ownership is still with the original acquirer and thus the significance of the term *tripuruṣabhoga* is totally absent there.¹ Thus neither mere possession for three generations without length of time nor the length of time without actual possession by three immediate ancestors will prove ownership. The proof of ownership in the absence of title requires therefore that there should be a possession for the full prescriptive period (i. e., the period of *tripurusabhoga*) and further that this period should see the demise of three immediate ancestors one after another.

It must be understood, however, that unauthorised or mala fide possession, however, long it be, is not sought to be recognised by such a rule as ripening into legal title. Long-continued possession presumes the existence of title only when the non-existence of its contrary (i. e. of *āgamābhāva*) is practically certain. Thus, as the Mitākṣarā puts it, possession is proof independently of the knowledge of title but not of its existence.² When possession is long-continued the existence of title may, however, be inferred from it. Thus the whole thing being analysed comes to this: title is inferred to exist at least in certain circumstances from possession and possession as a rule becomes proof being coupled with the existence of title. The Subodhini observes that this process does not give rise to the fault which goes by name of *anyonyāśraya* (interdependence) for title is presumed to exist not directly from possession but from *arthāpatti* (implication) being propped up by

1. प्रवितामहस्येव तत्र स्वातन्त्र्यात्तस्यैव भोगः Vm. p. 341.

2. तत्राप्यत्यन्तागमं विनोति अत्यन्तमुपलभ्यमानमागमं विनोति व्याख्येयं न पुनरागमस्वरूपं विनोति it. on Yāj II. 27.

a consideration that long continued possession cannot be accounted for otherwise. ¹

When, however, there is a positive knowledge of bad title or traditional proof of the absence of title, possession for hundreds of years even will not serve as a proof of right. On the principle, the Mitākṣarā explains, is founded the rule :

अनागमं तु यो भुङ्क्ते बहुन्यब्दशतान्यपि ।
चौरदण्डेन तं पापं दण्डयेत् पृथिवीपतिः ॥ ²

‘He whose possession is proved to extend over hundreds of years even, without a title, the ruler of the earth will inflict on that sinner the punishment of a thief.’ In this connection it becomes necessary to take into consideration two more verses; one of Nārada and other attributed to Hārita, which are as follows :

अन्यायेनापि यद्भुक्तं पित्रा भ्रात्राऽथवाऽपि च ।
न तच्छक्यं पराहर्तुं तृतीयं समुपागतम् ॥³
अन्यायेनापि यद्भुक्तं पित्रा पूर्वतरैस्त्रिभिः ।
न तच्छक्यमपाहर्तुं कमात्रिपुरुषागतम् ॥⁴

Here तृतीयं समुपागतम् in the first verse should be explained as तृतीयमतिक्रम्य समुपागतम् and पित्रा पूर्वतरैस्त्रिभिः in the second verse as पित्रासह पूर्वतरैस्त्रिभिः ⁵ and thus the apparent meaning of these texts will be this: when possession has been successively held even unlawfully (अन्यायेनापि) by three ancestors of the present possessor in respect of a certain property, it cannot be taken away from him for the simple reason that it has already passed through three lives. This is how Asahāya explains Nārada’s verse taking the expression अन्यायेनापि as implying absence of title.⁶ Asahāya’s explanation is supported after all by another text of Hārita which declares that possession held by three successive ancestors makes good evidence of property even if there be no title.⁷ The defect of this interpretation is that it goes to contradict the rule just referred to, viz., that when a person enjoys a

1. भवितद्वृत्तपपन्नमन्योन्याश्रयप्रसङ्गात् तथाहि प्रमाणसूत्रेन भोगनागमसत्तावगति आगमसत्तायामवगताया तत् सद्वृत्तस्य भोगस्य प्रामाण्यमिति । उच्यते विरकालोपभोगादुपपत्तिरूपयार्थपित्यागमसत्तावगति. ... इति साक्षात् प्रामाण्यसूत्रेन भोगेनागमसत्ताया अनवगमात् नान्योन्याश्रयप्रसङ्गः ।

2. Nār. I. 87.

3. Hārita in Sc. P. 168

4. Nār. IV. 91; So. reads पराहर्तुं for अपाहर्तुम्.

5. Mit. on Yāj II. 27, and Sc. P. 168

6. अन्यायेन विनागममपि ... Asahāya on Nār. IV. 91.

7. यद्विनागममव्यन्तं भुक्तं पूर्वैस्त्रिभिर्भवेत् । न तच्छक्यमपाह कमात्रिपुरुषागतम् ॥

Mit. on Yāj II. 27.

property the title of which is known to be non-existent, he shall be punished like a thief even if his possession can be traced back to a very early period. Vijñāneśvara seems to say that the contradiction is more apparent than real, for the real import of the two verses just quoted is not what it appears to be. The word *api* used therein indicates that if a property cannot be alienated when possession in respect of it is even illegal, it follows *a fortiori* that it cannot be alienated when there is no certainty of illegality.¹ So according to him these texts only emphasise that in order to rebut a presumption created by long possession it is necessary for the opposite party to show either from his own knowledge or from the knowledge of others that such a possession had no *bonafide* beginning or to be more clear, that it had not commenced in a legal mode of acquiring property. Devanabhatta's explanation also is not very different from that of Vijñāneśvara in substance. He says that the rule अनागमं तु यो भुङ्क्ते etc., should be taken as referring to a case where the absence of title is absolutely certain² and thus his idea about the two other texts is that they are to apply where there is no certainty about the absence of title, or in other words, when there is no recollection of the time when such a title did not exist. The import of the expression अन्यायेनापि as given by him is that a possession passing through three generations in the past is a good evidence of property and such a possession is even incapable of being characterised as unlawfully held, what to speak of the alienation of the property possessed.³ It thus appears that Devanabhatta takes those two texts merely as *arthavādas* in praise of possession for three generations. Sūlapāṇi takes these texts in a quite different light. He reads अनागमम् instead of अन्यायेन⁴ in the two texts of Nārada and Hārīta and says that these two texts are of the Dharmaśāstra, while the text prescribing punishment for wrongful possession belongs to the Arthaśāstra and as such the former are to prevail over the latter according to the maxim 'Dharmaśāstra is to be regarded as of greater authority than Arthaśāstra when there is a conflict between the two.'⁵ Thus it

1. 'अन्यायेनापि यद्भुक्त' इत्येतच्चान्यायेनापि भुक्तमपहर्तुं न शक्य किं पुनरन्यायानिश्चये इति व्याख्येयमपिशब्दश्रवणात् । Mit. on Yāj II. 27.

2. तद् येन केनचित् प्रमाणेन निश्चितानागमभोगविषयम् ... Sc. P. 169.

3. तदन्यायेनापि वक्तुमशक्यं किं पुनरपहर्तुम् ... Sc. P. 168.

4. अन्यायेनेत्यत्रानागममिति कुलपाणिधृतपाठः । Vt. P. 52.

5. Vt. p. 53

seems that in his opinion possession for three generations even when based on bad or no title will be a sufficient proof of right. It should here be noted that the jurists who have been characterised by Vācaspati as *navya* i. e., belonging to the new school of thought did entertain exactly such a view. Vācaspati tells us that in the opinion of these jurists sixty years' possession, which, it should be remembered, covers according to some authorities the period of *tripuruṣabhoga* (possession for three generations) is a very conclusive proof of ownership even when the absence of title is well known.¹ Raghunandana thinks that the text of Nārada prescribing punishment for possession without title refers specially to the possession of such property as *strīdhana* (woman's property) and *nṛpadhana* (king's property).² His authority for this explanation is another verse of Nārada which states that the property of woman and of the king is never alienated though possessed for hundreds of years without clear title.³ This explanation would certainly not be liked by the *āgamavādin*, because according to them a good title is necessary not only in the case of *strīdhana* or *nṛpadhana* but in all kinds of properties.

It is indeed very interesting that we find the subject of ancient possession briefly discussed in the *jayapitra* which we have already referred to⁴ and which contains a decision from a Hindu tribunal composed of several judges. The view taken by the judges about the applicability of the rule अनागमम् etc. does not go much against that of the *Mitākṣarā* or of the *Smṛticandrikā*. It is held by them that this rule is to apply when there is a total want of title.⁵ They express the opinion, however, that, in order to make the trespasser liable to be punished this want of title requires to be ascertained at some previous occasion. Thus if it is decided after a short time of a man's assuming possession of a property that he has no real title to it and in spite of that if he continues to enjoy the property by stealth or by force then his enjoyment will not be an evidence of his right even after a very long period and he will be punished; but if the want of title has not been previously decided then its contrary, namely the existence of title will be presumed from

1 आगमाभावनिश्चयेऽपि षष्ट्याब्दिकी भोगः स्वत्वे प्रमाणम् । अन्येऽपि यद्भुक्तं पित्रा पूर्वतरुणिमिति स्मरणादिति नव्याः ।

2 Vt. p. 53.

3 Nār. I. 83.

4 Calcutta weekly Notes, vol XXIV No. 38

5 न चैवमनागममित्यादिबहुविधवचनव्याघात इति देख्यम् । तस्य निश्चितागमाभाववद् बहुविधवक्तव्यम् ।

long-continued possession; or in other words, possession and enjoyment which are acts of ownership will be regarded as the best proofs of title in that case ¹ It is further pointed out that possession can be a proof of ownership not only when it is based on title, for in that case it would not have been spoken of by the authorities as an independent means of proof at all. ²

The various explanations and counter explanations of the legal texts referred to make it clear that there were two schools of thought among our jurists. We may call them *bhuktivāda* school and *āgamavāda* school. So far as the *bhuktivāda* is concerned, it is very old and we have seen that its history goes back to the time of Asahāya. It remained in abeyance for a long time and came to be recognised not long before Vācaspati. This is evident from Vācaspati's giving the epithet *navya* to the *bhuktivādins*. They maintained that possession when proved to be long-continued was a prima-facie evidence of property. They did not think it necessary to presume a legal origin from such a possession but on the contrary went so far to say, of course on the authority of some legal texts, that a possession that has passed through three immediate ancestors was quite sufficient for the fourth in descent to prove his right even if such a possession was known to have no title at all. Among the later *bhuktivādins* we may name Śūlapāni and Raghunandana. Among the *āgamavādins* on the other hand stand prominent Vijñāneśvara, Jīmūtavāhana, Vācaspati and Devanabhatta. According to the *āgamavādins* a title or at least a knowledge of the absence of its non-existence was essential to establish right and possession alone, however ancient, was quite powerless as against the total absence of title when known. They really found it difficult to understand how the right of the real owner could be destroyed by its non-assertion and how possession which was known to be illegitimate could by mere continuance change its character and become a proof of right after a certain period.

As a matter of fact cases of illegitimate possession are not rare and we find some of them mentioned in a text of Nārada. ³ When a certain thing is deposited with a third person to be

1 प्रकृते प्रत्यर्थिनः स्वत्वे यथोक्तभोगरूपागमानिश्चयसत्त्वात् वस्तुतस्तु चौरत्यादिश्रवणात् न्यूनतमभोगे भोगकर्तुः स्वत्वाभावनिश्चये विवादकाले याते पश्चात् अपहृत्वबलात्कारादिना शतवर्षाधिकं भुक्तवस्तुविषयत्वं तेषां वचनानामिति सत्यम् प्रतीतम् ।

2 कथमन्यथा सागममात्रभोगप्राप्त्यै प्रमाणपार्थक्येन भोगप्राप्त्यै मुनयो निबन्धकाराश्चोदाजुः ।

3 IV. 92.

delivered ultimately to its owner the thing so deposited is termed *anvāhita*.¹ If the person with whom such a thing is deposited enjoys it as his own for a very long time he or his heir cannot claim proprietary right to it on the grounds of prescription and long user, because title is known to be absolutely absent there. Similarly stolen goods, ordinary deposit, what is held by force, loans for use and what is enjoyed during the absence of the owner these are things possessed without title.² The idea is that when a possession is known to have begun from an illegal source length of time cannot give it the stamp of legality. In determining the legality of possession under a gift the intention and right of the donor also should be taken into account. If it is proved that the donor, even if he be the king himself, acted illegally in respect of the gift made by him, the plea of long-continued possession taken by the donee against the real owner will be of no avail. Sāṃvartta and Nārada are very emphatic on this point. Sāṃvartta says 'when the king out of wrath or greed, or showing some semblance of reason gives the property of one to another, the donee, though he enjoys it for a long time, cannot acquire title to it.'³ Nārada says "the immemorial possession of a thing acquired by the unjust and illegal favour of the king even 'cannot produce ownership in respect of it.'⁴

We know from some authoritative legal texts that possession in order to be a proof of right is to conform to five conditions. Besides being titled and long-continued, it should be uninterrupted, uncontradicted and held within the observation of the adverse party.⁵ Devanabhatta observes that all these conditions should combine in order to place possession on a strong basis. He goes on to say that when any of them is found wanting possession will lose much of its force as a proof of right.⁶ Another *smṛti* text requires that that possession should be *sāmāntopetā*, that is to say, known to the neighbouring land-holders.⁷ This requirement may be explained on the ground that the value of possession as a proof

1 Mit on Yāj II. 67.

2. Asahāya on Nār. IV. 92.

3. Sc. P. 170

4. Sc. p. 170

5. Vīram P. 204, Sc. P. 161.

6. पञ्चाङ्ग इति षट् एकद्वयैकल्येऽपि अप्रामाण्यमेव भोगस्येति ... Sc. P. 162,

7. Sc. P. 160

is naturally much increased when attended with certainty and notoriety.

Brhaspati describes the value of uninterrupted possession by saying that if a person's possession has been continuous from the time of acquisition and has never been interrupted for a period of thirty years, he should not be deprived of the property possessed.¹ We know further from him that when a possession is unjustly and illegally interrupted, the right acquired is not destroyed and the possessor is not left without remedy. He may undertake to prove his right by means of documents, the depositions of persons knowing him to be the possessor and other witnesses. In a dispute of this kind those persons should be witnesses who know the name, (of the country in which the land in dispute lies) the boundary of the land, the title of acquisition, the measure of the land, the time of its acquisition, the region in which that particular land is situated and above all the cause of interruption.² It has also been said by Brhaspati that interrupted possession even can be regarded as valid if it has been substantiated by an ancestor, i.e. if a previous possessor has adduced a legitimate title.³ In this Brhaspati agrees with Vyāsa who also says that when a particular ancestor has proved his title to a property, his sons and successors cannot be ousted from it on any ground.⁴

Much stress has been put upon the proposition as pointed out above, that possession, especially when it is modern, does not afford any presumption of ownership. This has very materially affected the question of burden of proof. Thus when a plaintiff seeks to eject a defendant from property of which the latter is in possession and to obtain possession thereof for himself the burden of proving his ownership is on the defendant. This is evidently due to the absence of any presumption in his favour. The rules laid down by Nārada and Brhaspati are quite convincing on this point. Nārada says, 'when an occupant is impeached by an opponent who calls himself the legitimate owner, the former is to refute the charge. For possession proves right only when it has been inherited from an ancestor who has already established his right.'⁵ Brhaspati also says, 'the land is not to be taken away from the son of the first

1. Vīram P. 204

2. Vīram P. 222

3. Pds. P. 145, Sc. P. 170 & 171

4. Sc. P. 171

5. Nār. IV. 90.

acquirer who being sued *has established his right by adducing proof.* He further opines that when the first acquirer is sought to be ousted he is to prove his title by documents and witnesses and when it is once done his sons, grandsons or other heirs will be quite safe and in their case possession will alone prove their respective rights.¹ It is also stated both by Yājñavalkya and Nārada that if an usurper or other person makes a claim against the present possessor and if the present possessor dies in the course of the law-suit pending against him, the burden of proving ownership by the production of title deeds or by means of the depositions of witnesses will fall on his son or heir.² The plea of uninterrupted and long possession, if taken, will be quite futile. On this Devanabhatta comments that possession held already by three generations even will be of no avail in deciding such a law-suit. For, possession by three generations is evidence only when it is uncontradicted. So a person whose three generations have already passed being in possession of the property in dispute will be under the necessity of proving his right in respect of it by having recourse to documents and witnesses.³

When a title-deed being lost cannot be produced in court the possessor in order to have his ownership established will have to prove first that his possession has so long been adequate in all other respects. That is to say, he will be required to show that it has been uninterrupted, uncontradicted, held for a long time and known to the adverse party. He will have to make a statement to the effect that he came into possession at such a time that such is the quantity of the things possessed and that such and such were the means by which he acquired title to it.⁴ The fact of his possession and all these collateral circumstances will best be proved by witnesses and the persons most competent to be witnesses in this case will be the peasants, headman of the village and the owners of the neighbouring lands.⁵

Turning to the English law on the subject we find that our law compares very favourably with it. Hindu law obviously

1. S. B. E. (Vol. XXXIII, P. 313)

2. Nār. IV 93, Yāj II. 29.

तस्य रिक्थी पुत्रादिस्तमागममुद्धरेत् । यस्माच्च तस्मिन् व्यवहारे भुक्तिरागमरहिता साक्ष्यादिभिः साविताऽपि न प्रमाणम् । Mit. on Yāj II. 29.

3. तमागमं चतुर्थ्यादिरवपुष्यं समुद्धरेत् । यस्मात् स्वतन्त्रा भुक्तिस्तत्राप्रमाणम् । अविगीतत्वाभावादित्यर्थः Sc. p. 172.

4. Sc. p. 162

5. भुक्तिप्रसाधने मुख्याः प्रथमं तत् कृषीबलाः ।

ग्रामपञ्चैकसामन्तास्तत् संस्थापयतः क्रमात् ॥ Sc. p. 162.

bases the operations of long enjoyment on a presumption of legal origin, a presumption which had long been absent in the old English law and was introduced only after Littleton. The English lawyers continued, however, to adopt enjoyment from time immemorial (i.e., from time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary) as the basis of their law and after the statute of Westminster had fixed a time of limitation they by an equitable construction of the same fixed upon a point of time, viz., the first day of the reign of Richard I (A. D. 1189) as the furthest limit of human memory by which 'every prescriptive claim was deemed indefensible if it had existed from that date and to be at an end if shown to have had its commencement since that date'. It must thus be admitted that the protection afforded by the English law to long enjoyment was not so certain and effectual as that afforded to it by the Hindu law. Under the former the difficulty of strictly proving the exercise of a right up to the time of Richard I must have become greater and greater with each successive generation on account of the possible loss of evidence consequent upon the lapse of time, while under the latter this difficulty was much lessened by the fact of the period of legal memory being reduced to a certain period of years which did not make the attainment of evidence absolutely impossible. The judges about the end of the 18th century tried to improve the condition of the English law by introducing the presumption of a lost grant, but this contrivance was thought inconvenient on various grounds and it became apparent that the evil could only be remedied by legislation. As a consequence, was passed the Prescription Act of 1832 by the provisions of which the presumption of legal title arising from an enjoyment extending over a certain period of years and fulfilling certain other conditions obtains a conclusive character.¹

ADVERSE POSSESSION

The Principal text which relates the effect of adverse possession is that of Yajñavalkya. The text is as follows:—

पश्यतोऽब्रुवतो भूमेर्हानिर्विशतिवार्षिकी ।

परेण भुज्यमानाया धनस्य दशवार्षिकी ॥²

'He who sees his land possessed by a stranger for twenty years and his personal estate for ten years without any opposition or verbal protest will incur a loss (*hāni*) in respect of them.' The

1. Best on Evidence, pp. 361-372

See also Sen's Hindu Jurisprudence pp. 122-123.

2. Yaj II. 24

word *dhana* in the text refers to properties other than land and includes all kinds of movable possessions, such as cow, horse, elephant and the like. ¹ So the plain meaning of Yājñavalkya's text is that when movable property is enjoyed for ten years and immovable property for twenty years adversely, the owner will be put under a certain loss if the enjoyment takes place uncontradicted and with his knowledge. As the matter relates to a worldly concern, the years have to be calculated, Raghunandana thinks, on the basis of a solar month, i. e., a month of full thirty days. ²

There is another text, and it is of Brhaspati, which fixes the period required for ripening adverse possession at thirty years. ³ Śrīkaramiśra who is undoubtedly an earlier jurist than Jīmūtavāhana reconciles this text with the text of Yājñavalkya. ⁴ He holds that the expression *abruvataḥ* in Yājñavalkya's text is sufficient to indicate that the rule contained in this text will apply when there is even no verbal protest to the enjoyment of the stranger. In the text of Brhaspati, on the other hand, occurs the expression *aviḥātini* instead of *abruvataḥ*. *Vighāta* means obstruction in the shape of *kalaha* (quarrel) or *melaka* (assembly) and hence the occasion for the application of Brhaspati's rule will arise when there is verbal protest but no quarrel or organised effort to recover the lost possession. ⁵

A great deal of discussion has centred round the verse of Yājñavalkya and the opinions of our jurists are sharply divided as to the true import of the expression *hāni* (loss). There are mainly three different theories that have clustered around it and we may name them the theory of the loss of property (*svatvaḥāni*), the theory of the loss of remedy (*vijavahārahāni*) and the theory of the loss of usufruct (*phalahāni*).

There are other theories also. Many of these theories we find recorded in the Manubhāṣya of Medhātithi ⁶ and thus are

1. धनस्य तु हस्त्यन्वादे:—Mitākṣarā.

एव भूव्यातिरिक्तस्य धनस्य Aparārka

धने च गवादी—Vm. p. 342

धनस्य गवादे:—(Vācaspati)

2. अत्र लोक व्यवहारकर्मत्वात् वर्षगणना साधनेन—vt. p. 46

3. Vm. p. 342

4. Vm. p. 342

5. पर्यतोऽनुवत इति निर्देशात् बाह्यमात्रेणाप्यविरोधे विंशतिवचनं बोद्धव्यं त्रिंशद्वर्षवचने त्वविधा-
तिनीति अतर्विंशदो वातः विधातः कलहमेलकादिरूपः स यत्र नास्ति वाचनिकमात्रस्तु विधते तादृश-
इत्यविरोधः?... Vm. p. 342.

6. On Manu VIII. 148.

very old. We shall presently see that commentators and digest-makers of later times tried to explain the text of Yājñavalkya just quoted on the basis of one or other of these theories.

The theory of *svatvahāni* - - - According to this theory adverse possession of a property for the prescribed period held to the knowledge of the owner but without any protest or opposition from him extinguishes his title to it. This theory is very old and was known to Medhātithi. We may trace it back to Asahāya, who is considered by J. Jolly as the oldest of the writers of Law Bhāṣyas. Asahāya in commenting on verse 1.78 of Nārada distinctly says that title may be extinguished by adverse possession held for a long period.¹ This commentator further expresses the opinion, and it is based on the expression *tūṣṇīm* occurring in the next verse of Nārada and similar in meaning with *abruvataḥ* of Yājñavalkya's text, that when such a possession is contradicted, that is, when, though unable to obtain possession of the property the party kept out of possession asserts his right every now and then in opposition to the stranger, then his title will not be lost.²

Medhātithi raises the following objections against the theory of the loss of property :³

1. Possession does not lead to ownership but it is ownership that leads to possession.

2. The text of Yājñavalkya, if understood in this light, will in reality be in conflict with the texts of Nārada which declare that (a) enjoyment without title even for hundreds of years makes the enjoyer liable to be punished like a thief and (b) title should form the real ground of ownership and not possession.

3. There are other texts which declare that if a property has been in the possession of strangers for three generations, then and then only it is lost to the original owner. If ten or twenty years' adverse possession is regarded quite sufficient to destroy the right of the original owner, then the texts in favour of possession for three generations will have no meaning.

Jīmūtavāhana also raises the question of conflict between the text of Yājñavalkya understood in the light of the theory of *svatvahāni* and those texts which lay down that possession for three

1. स्वकीयानर्थान् द्विपदचतुष्पदस्थावरादिकान् प्रीतिसमर्पितबलात्कारयुहितश्रुत्याक्रान्तादिप्रपञ्चेः परैर्भुज्यमानानुपेक्षते । तस्य जीवतोऽपि चिरकालातिक्रान्ता भुक्तिस्तान् पराणामेव वशीकुरुते ।

2. प्रतिवच प्रतिदिन प्रतिमासं प्रतिवर्षं च करोति ततः कालान्तरेऽपि तत्तस्य न प्रणश्यति ।

3. Medh. on Manu VII, 148.

generations only may serve as proof of right. He adds further that the position taken up by Śrīkaramiśra that ten or twenty years' possession in order to be able to create ownership requires to be held with the knowledge of the owner, while possession for three generations will create ownership, in the possessor even if it is held without his knowledge, is untenable in the face of the text of Vyāsa which declares that possession in order to be an evidence of right ought to be among other things uninterrupted and held with the knowledge of the original owner.¹ It may be noted here that Jimūtavāhana sustains the position that an owner who has been kept out of his property without his knowledge ought not to lose his title thereto.² It has further been suggested by some, Jimūtavāhana informs us, that ten or twenty years' possession is in reality a very strong evidence of property for the simple reason that it cannot be accounted for otherwise and *tripuruṣabhoga* (possession for three generations) indicates only a possession for a period in excess of that and nothing more.³ This suggestion does not deserve any serious notice evidently for the reason that the definite mention of *tripuruṣa* (three generations) in various texts would lose all its significance. Jimūtavāhana ends by saying that the views of those who maintain that प्रमाणात् in relation to 'possession' does either signify creation of right or is indicative of something else in its favour are to be discarded.⁴

Viśvarūpa attacks the theory of the loss of right from another standpoint. The extinction of the title of one person will necessarily imply the creation of the title in another person. Now, it may be asked, Viśvarūpa seems to say, who is that another person to be? Is it the possessor? It cannot be so because he himself knows fully well that he is holding possession of the property not belonging to himself but to a quite different person and as such proprietary right, if it is to go to him, will in a way be thrust upon him. Will the right then pass to the king on the ground that the king is to become the owner of an ownerless property? Viśvarūpa maintains that there is hardly any reason for the original owner kept out of possession to be deprived of his right.⁵

1. Vm. p 342 and 343

2. Vm. ii

3. Vm. p. 347

4. किंच प्रमाणात् कर्णत्वमुपलक्षणत्वं वा इत्युभयवादी हेय एव ।

Vm. p. 347.

5. Bṛākrīḍā. p. 211

Vijñāneśvara's arguments against the theory of the loss of right are mainly based on a consideration of the means of acquiring ownership. He says if it be admitted that ten or twenty years' adverse possession is sufficient to invest the possessor with ownership when the owner omits to assert his right, then it must also at the same time be admitted that non-assertion of right on the part of the owner and enjoyment on the part of the possessor are among the sources of acquisition of ownership. The absurdity of such a position is apparent, for neither of those two has been recognised as a lawful means of acquiring property. Possession, Vijñāneśvara further points out, is merely an evidence of right and not the creator thereof. ¹

The theory of *Vyavahārahāni*.....According to this theory Yājñavalkya's text promulgates loss of remedy to the owner on the ground of his passiveness when his property has been adversely enjoyed for ten or twenty years. This theory is elaborated by Viśvarūpa, ² and apparently owes its origin to the following text of Nārada:

उपेक्षां कुर्वतस्तस्य तूष्णींभूतस्य तिष्ठतः ।

काले विपन्ने पूर्वोक्ते व्यवहारो न सिध्यति ॥³

'The suit of a person practising indifference and remaining silent does not succeed after the expiry of the prescribed period. ³ The distinction between *upekṣā* and *tūṣṇīmbhāva* is that the former implies the absence of physical efforts and the latter of verbal protests. ⁴ It is evident that these expressions correspond to *paśyataḥ* and *abruvataḥ* in Yājñavalkya's text. The main point of Viśvarūpa is that non-resistance and absence of protests on the part of the owner within the limited period are the causes of his losing remedy against the adverse possessor. Loss of remedy (*vyavahārahāni*) means not the total failure of remedial measures that the ousted person may adopt for the restoration of his right, because in that case loss of remedy will involve loss of property and thus there would practically be no difference for him between the two. By it should be understood, therefore,

1. Mit. on Yāj II. 24

2. हानिवचनं तु निन्दाभात्रत्वेनोपेक्षकस्य व्यवहारप्रवृत्त्ययोग्यता मात्रज्ञातिफलम् ।

Bālakridā p. 211

3. Quoted in the Mitakṣarā on Yāj II. 24

4. उपेक्षामित्यनेन शरीरव्यापारश्च तूष्णीमित्यनेन वाग्व्यापारश्चत्यत्र

Bālabhāṭṭi— P. 100.

Devanabhatta makes it clear, the loss or defeat in a law-suit from human modes of proof. ¹ To be more explicit, the text of Yājñavalkya explained on the basis of *Vyavahārakāni* enunciates that by remaining passive for ten or twenty years in respect of a property which is being adversely enjoyed, the owner loses the advantage of having his right restored with the aid of human proofs. It is, however, open to him to establish his right by means of the divine mode of proof. ² This view is supported by a *smṛti* text which declares that documents and witnesses are of no use in the matter of proving a claim against the adverse possessor. ³

Aparārka seems to be almost of the same view. In his opinion the loss of title resulting from adverse possession is due to a presumption of legal ownership on the part of the possessor and of the absence thereof on the part of the party dispossessed. ⁴ This statement about the loss, he continues, is, however, not from the standpoint of the direction the property is to take but from that of the course of *vyavahāra*. ⁵ Now *vyavahāra* means a legal procedure founded on human evidence, i. e., deposition of witnesses and documents. ⁶ What Aparārka means to say therefore is that so far as the court acting on human evidence is concerned, it will be guided by a presumption of ownership on the part of the person in enjoyment and give verdict to him and thus will not give any relief to the dispossessed owner. To this extent the dispossessed owner is put under a loss. Aparārka does not advocate divine means of proof for the restoration of his right but says that for this the moral compunctions of the stranger should be relied on. For apart from legal questions there are moral considerations also. So the stranger who knows fully well that the property which he is enjoying in reality belongs to another, though it has been acquired by him through *vyavahāra*, should return it to its owner from fear of committing a sin. ⁷ The conclusion on

1. मातुषप्रमाणान्तस्य स्वार्थो न सिध्यति

Sc. p. 156 and 157

2. तेनात्र न वर्माख्यनिर्णयशातुपेक्षकस्य हानिः Sc. p. 156.

3. अद्वक्तिरागमो मोक्षो भुज्यमाने परैरपि । आगमशब्देनात्र तत् प्रमाणीयतल्लिखितसाक्षिणादुक्तौ
... .. Sc. p. 157.

4. Aparārka p. 631.

5. एवं च व्यवहारस्थितिमाश्रित्योच्यते न भूमिगतित् Aparārka p. 632

6. प्रमाणनिश्चितो यस्तु व्यवहारः स उच्यते । प्रमाणनिश्चितौ मातुषप्रमाणनिश्चितः । Sc. p. 156,

7. तथा च यत् परमार्थतः परकीयनेव व्यवहारेणैवाजितं तत् प्रत्यवायमयादेव यथास्मान्न न भवितव्यम् ...
Aparārka p. 632.

the whole seems to be that according to the theory of *vyavahārahāni*, the text of Yājñavalkya contains a rule of limitation which is for the guidance of the court only but is not to operate by putting an end to the title of the real owner, the restoration of which can be effected either by some divine mode of proof resorted to by him or by depending upon the conscientious scruples of the stranger in possession.

The theory of *vyavahārahāni* is exposed to a severe refutation by Vijñāneśvara.¹ His point that inaction (*upekṣā*) and silence (*tūṣṇīmbhāva*) apart from all other considerations cannot be regarded as sufficient grounds for the loss of remedy, because they may be due to causes over which the owners have no control such as idiocy and minority. These two have been specially mentioned by Manu and Nārada as the ground in the absence of which only adverse possession may assert its force.² They both say that when the owner is neither an idiot nor an infant and if his property is adversely enjoyed in a place where he may see it then only its recovery becomes impossible by legal procedure and it may pass to the person in enjoyment. Medhātithi observes that all the conditions which incapacitate a man to protect his interest are implied by the terms idiocy (*jaḍatva*) and minority (*apogaṇḍatva*). These conditions may be complete helplessness arising out of gambling or drinking, illness of a long duration, devotion to austerities and penance, natural inaptitude for litigation, want of the organs of speech, hearing and the like.³ Vijñāneśvara says that when any of these causes of inaction and silence exists loss of remedy will not ensue and thus the intention of Manu and Nārada is to declare loss of remedy arising from the absence of the familiar causes of passiveness and not from mere passiveness or the absence of the exercise of right for any period. When any of these causes do not exist, as for instance, when the owner is neither an idiot nor an infant, the adverse possessor may justly take the following plea: 'the plaintiff is neither an idiot nor a boy; in his presence I enjoyed the property for twenty years without interruption. Had I unjustly got possession of the property why did he remain indifferent and silent all the time? To the truth of my assertion I

1. Mit. on Yāj. II. 24

2. Manu VIII. 148; Nār. IV. 80

3. Medh. on Manu VIII. 148.

have many witnesses. ¹ In such a case the plaintiff will be unable to rejoin and it appears probable that his defeat will ensue. ² Vijñāneśvara says that this apprehension of the loss of remedy from the absence of the causes of inaction and silence is also groundless because a person is not to lose a suit only on ground of his inability to rejoin. ³ It is laid down by Yājñavalkya that it is the duty of the king himself to investigate judicial proceedings in a bonafide manner, i.e., according to the real circumstances of the case rejecting all ambiguities. ⁴ When nothing can be ascertained by judicial investigation even, then and then only the defeat of the person unable to meet the pleas of the adverse party will be declared.

Jīmūtavāhana's theory is also the theory of loss of remedy but with a slight variation. In his opinion the text of Yājñavalkya promulgates this loss not to the owner but to a person entering into a posterior contract of sale, gift and pledge as against a former purchaser, donee and pledgee. ⁵ In order to properly understand Jīmūtavāhana's interpretation of Yājñavalkya's text we should know something about what the latter says regarding the law of relative superiority in contracts. It is directed by Yājñavalkya that generally speaking in all disputes regarding contracts, the last act will be considered as of greater validity, but in the three instances of pledge, gift and sale the prior contract will have the greater force. ⁶ Thus, for instance, if a person having borrowed one hundred coins at one per cent should agree to pay three per cent at a subsequent period and if there exists evidence on both sides, the posterior act will supersede the prior one, that is to say, the contract of three per cent will nullify that of one per cent. But if a person having pledged, given or sold a piece of land to one person for a valuable consideration should subsequently pledge, give or sell the same piece of land to another, superiority will be attached to the claims of the first pledgee, the first donee or the first purchaser as the case may be. ⁷ The twenty year text of Yājñavalkya, according to Jīmūtavāhana forms an exception to this rule. To be more explicit the text of Yājñavalkya should

1. Mit. on Yāj II. 24

2. Mit. on Yāj II. 24

3. यत्र निरुचरस्यापि वास्तवो व्यवहारो भवत्येव Mit. on Yāj II. 24.

4. Yāj II. 19.

5. Vm. p. 348

6. Yāj II. 23

7. Mit. on Yāj II. 23.

be interpreted, he says, as enjoining that though as a general rule a prior contract has greater weight in pledge gift or sale, yet when the first pledge, donee or purchaser allows with his full knowledge the landed property pledged, given or sold to him to be enjoyed by a new pledgee, donee or purchaser for a period of twenty years without any protest, then the posterior contract will prevail. In the case of pledge, gift or sale of a movable property, however, uncontradicted possession for ten years by the second pledgee, donee or purchaser with the full knowledge of the first pledgee, donee or purchaser will give the transaction of the former a greater force.

It is evident that this theory may better be called the theory of exception to the general rule regarding the relative validity of contracts. We may note here that this theory or at least a part of it, viz, so far as it relates to pledge is very old as we find it mentioned and refuted by Medhātithi in his *Manubhāṣya*.¹ His argument against it is that the acceptance of a pledge involves a desire for possession and in the case of land specially the fact of its having been pledged cannot be established without possession.² It may be noted here that the Hindu law is not in favour of recognising the validity of a pledge which is not accompanied by possession.³ So when a property is pledged the natural inference is that it is in possession of the pledgee and thus it does not matter if the pledger ignoring his first transaction pledges his property a second time to another person even during the period of its possession by the first pledgee. Medhātithi further observes that when the first pledgee owing to distraction of other business or distance of the place or on account of some other cause over which he had no control such as banishment by the king, serious illness etc., has not been able actually to accept and take possession of the property pledged to him and if in the meantime it has been pledged to a second person by the pledger then also the first pledgee will not be debarred from obtaining possession of the same provided he can prove his title to it.⁴

1. Medh. on Manu VIII. 148

2. अमिस्तु सर्वदा फलमेति । भोगलाभमन्तरेण न बन्धत्वसिद्धिः

Medh. on Manu VIII. 148.

3. Sen's Hindu Jurisprudence, Lecture VI.

See Nār. IV. 125,

स पुनर्द्विविधः प्रोक्तो गोप्यो भोग्यस्तथैवच ॥

4. Medh. on Manu VIII. 148

Vijñāneśvara refutes the theory as we find it developed by Jimūtavāhana, author of the Vyavahāramātrkā. As Jimūtavāhana author of the Dāyabhāga is thought to have belonged to a later period than Vijñāneśvara¹ it must be assumed either that the author of the Vyavahāramātrkā is a different person from the author of the Dāyabhāga or, what is more probable, that Vijñāneśvara attacks the very source from which the Vyavahāramātrkā has drawn its own conclusion. Vijñāneśvara's contention is that all subsequent transactions in respect of a property with a person who has once pledged, given or sold it are in themselves invalid for the plain reason that he ceases to be the owner of such property just after the transfer is finished. Now if he pledges, gives or sells that property in spite of the fact that he has lost his interest in it, then he will be doing a highly illegal act by interfering with the right of the transferee and in the case of gift at least a penalty is prescribed for both the giver and acceptor of a thing over which there is no ownership on the part of the former.* What Vijñāneśvara wants to say is that all posterior transactions of pledge, gift and sale being invalid possession on the part of the second pledgee, donee or purchaser, however long, continuous peaceable and open it be, will not be regarded competent to call in question the right of the first pledgee, donee or purchaser and hence the text of Yājñavalkya cannot be explained on the basis of the theory of exception to the rule of relative validity of contracts. Vijñāneśvara further goes on to say that if this ten or twenty year rule of Yājñavalkya be taken as an exception to the general rule regarding the relative validity of contracts in the three cases of pledge, gift and sale then the immediately following rule of Yājñavalkya will be irrelevant for the reason that it intends to exclude some cases from the operation of the ten or twenty year rule and the case of pledge is one of them.² The relevancy will thus occur at least in part.

There are other intermediate theories also.⁴ According to one of them the text of Yājñavalkya prescribes the period of

1. Tagore Law Lectures (Jolly), pp. 12, 21 and 22.

2. यनस्तेषु चरेव क्रिया तत्पतो नोपपद्यते... न चाहितस्य ददस्मि विक्रीतस्य वा स्वत्वमस्ति ।
अस्वत्वदानेनातिग्रहे च दण्डः स्मर्यते ।

Mit. on Yāj II. 24

3. तथाप्यादीनां त्रयाणामपवादेष्वेव श्लोकेत्यादिसिद्धिनामुच्यते अपवादो नोपपद्यते ।

Mit. on Yāj II. 24

4. Enumerated in Manubhāṣya of Medhatithi (VIII. 148)

limitation in the matter of partition of property among brothers. Thus if a brother has not got equal share with his other brothers and has remained without any action for ten years in the case of movable property and twenty years in the case of immovable property, his application for the revision of shares will be dismissed. According to another theory limitation is prescribed in favour of the possessor of a piece of land which though previously uncultivated has been cultivated by him. After twenty years its extent cannot be checked. A third theory states that when two persons have equal interest in a piece of land and when they, though not related with each other, are inhabitants of the same place, have similar powers, similar wealth and are of similar disposition and if one of them allows the property to be enjoyed by the other for twenty years, then the former will be deprived of his right. This theory practically coincides with the theory of the loss of property with this modification that here the loss is not to be suffered by the owner in favour of a stranger but by a partner in favour of another partner. Medhātithi rejects this theory on the ground of its incogruity with the rule in favour of possession for three generations. Medhātithi's theory about the text of Yājñavalkya is that it promulgates a loss for one aggressor against another. Thus when two persons are known to have no title over a property and are asserting themselves by mere force, the prior possession though of longer duration is set aside by ten or twenty years' possession which is more recent and free from all kinds of suspicion.¹ This commentator seems further to say that this text may also apply when one person has title and another person has open and uncontradicted possession for twenty years. In such a case the former will lose his interest in the property which will be presumed to have been given in pledge to the latter.² We know that pledge is one of the means of acquiring title and so what Medhātithi intends to say is that the loss of title for the owner is not due to his remaining indifferent for a certain period while his property is being adversely enjoyed, but is the result of the presumption of his giving the property in pledge to the person in possession. Bhavadeva also favours the doctrine of

1. यत्रोभावप्यागममन्तरेण भोगमात्रबलात् प्रवृत्तौ तत्र पूर्वभोगश्चिरतनोऽपि विशतिवर्षभोगेन साम्प्रतिकेन निरुपाधिना बाध्यते ।

Medh. on Manu VIII. 148.

2. विशतिवार्षिकभोगेऽन्तरादर्शिताविषये बन्धरूपतास्थपगन्तु युक्ता

Medh. on Manu VIII. 148

See Dr. Jha's Manusmṛti, Vol IV. pt I. p. 182

presumption but maintains that the presumption raised is one of abandonment on the part of the owner and appropriation on the part of the possessor.¹ Pradīpakāra adds that the presumption raised may either be of transfer or of abandonment on the part of the owner.² Mitrāmīśra criticises the views of Bhavadēva and Pradīpakāra and says that the doctrine of presumption cannot be sustained. The reason is that the period of ten or twenty years falls within the period of human memory. Hence if there had been any transfer or abandonment on the part of the owner it would have been remembered. As it is not remembered so it must be inferred that the owner has neither transferred nor abandoned his property. So the presumption of transfer or abandonment if raised at all is apt to be easily rebutted.³

Another theory is that the text of Yājñavalkya warns the owner against remaining indifferent in asserting his right, for if he does not do it while his property is being enjoyed by another he may give to the possessor an opportunity of bringing forth his claim in consequence of his enjoyment for the prescribed period.⁴ Among the latter jurists Vācaspatimīśra seems to be much in favour of this theory. The sum and substance of this theory is that the owner should always be very careful in preserving the evidence of his title by asserting it in proper time as otherwise he may have to run the risk of losing his property.⁵ This theory is apparently supported by a text of Vyāsa which states that a piece of land possessed in the presence of the owner without any opposition from him is alienated just as a cow becomes the property of another when it is not taken care of by its owner." Vijñāneśvara refutes this theory by saying that if the text of Yājñavalkya is interpreted as conveying an injunction for the

1. Vīram p. 213

2. Vīram p. 215

3. Vīram p. 216

4. यद्यपि न वस्तुहानिर्नापि व्यवहारहानिस्तथापि पश्यतोऽनित्येयतो व्यवहारहानिशङ्का भवतीति तानिष्टुक्तये तूष्णीं न स्थातव्यमित्युपादिश्यत इति ।

Mit. on Yāj II. 24

5. वस्तुतस्तु हानिबोधकसूतीनां प्रमाणपरिपालनकर्तव्यताविशिष्टेण तस्मात् स्वप्रमाणं सर्वथा परिपालनीयं न तत्रोदासितव्यमित्यत्र तात्पर्यम्.....

Vyavahāracintāmaṇi (in manuscript.)

6. उपेक्षिता यथा वेदुर्विना पालेन नश्यति । पश्यतोऽन्यैस्तथा शूद्रा भूमिः कालेन हीयते ।

(Vyavahāracintāmaṇi)

The reading of the second line in Sc. is much better and it is as follows : पश्यतोऽन्यैस्तथा भूमिर्शूद्रा तेन तु हीयते । P. 155

owner not to remain passive then there would be no satisfactory explanation for the special mention of ten or twenty years in the text, because it is clear that there cannot be any apprehension that adverse possession for such a period will raise any presumption in favour of the claim of the possessor on account of the fact that it falls within the period of human recollection. ¹ The text of Vyāsa above referred to intends a case, we may assume, beyond the period of human recollection. We know that the *smṛti* writers have accepted it as a general principle that possession destitute of title is not an evidence of right within such a period.

The theory of *phalahāni*.....After criticising several of these theories Vijñāneśvara sets forth his own. His theory is the theory of *phalahāni*. According to it loss of the profits accruing from the real and personal property is intended by the text of Yājñavalkya. Although the rightful owner may regain his property after ten or twenty years' possession (ten years in the case of movable and twenty years in the case of immovable property) by a stranger, he loses the intermediate profits. This loss is due to his fault of remaining indifferent. Vijñāneśvara further observes that such a loss also does not follow in all cases. When the profit remains in *status quo*, the owner does not lose his claim thereto but when there is an absolute destruction of the profit from a consumption thereof, then and then only the owner's claim to it is forfeited. ²

This theory, we know from the *Vīramitrodaya* is not much liked by such later writers on law as the authors of *Kalpataru*, *Ratnākara*, *Smṛtitattva* and *Smṛticandrikā*. They are of opinion that loss not only of usufruct but of property itself is intended by the text of Yājñavalkya. Their arguments are that loss of usufruct which according to Vijñāneśvara follows from adverse possession must be said to be due either to the fault of the owner consisting in his omission to oppose the possession which is being enjoyed by another in his presence or to the authority of the text of the *Sāstra*. To assert that the loss is the result of the owner's negligence to offer resistance cannot satis-

1. तच्च न स्मार्तकालाया मुक्तेर्हानिशङ्का कारणत्वाभावात् दूष्णी न स्यात्तद्व्यभिच्येतावन्मात्राभिधि-
हारां विशतिग्रहणमविवाक्षितं स्यात् ।

Mit. on Yāj II. 24.

2. भूमेर्धनस्य कलहानिरिह विवाक्षिता न वस्तुहानिर्नापि व्यवहारहानिः

Mit. on Yāj II. 24. (p. 137)

factorily explain the utility of the mention of the specific period (ten or twenty years) in the text, for it is evident that there was such a negligence on the part of the owner before the expiry of such period even. Now if the authority of the text is sought to produce the desired effect it must be seen first of all that the text itself is interpreted in its obvious sense. To explain *hāni* by *phalahāni* is undoubtedly far-fetched if not absurd. The obvious and natural meaning of the expression *hāni* is loss and used in respect of *bhūmi* it would mean loss of land or property itself.¹ This is why the authors named above maintain that adverse possession fulfilling the required conditions has the capacity of extinguishing title not only to the usufruct but to the property itself. As a matter of fact we have other texts also which clearly indicate that acquisition and extinction of title may be effected by possession and enjoyment, that is, by prescription. We quote these texts below for ready reference :

अजडापोगण्डधनं दशवर्षमुक्तं परैः संनिधौ भोक्तुः ।²

“The property of a person who is neither an idiot nor a minor having been used by strangers before his eyes for ten years belongs to him who uses it.”

यत् किञ्चिद् दशवर्षाणि संनिधौ प्रेक्षते धनी ।
भुज्यमानं परैस्तूष्णीं न स तद्वद्भुमर्हति ॥³

“Whatever an owner sees enjoyed by others for ten years in his presence without any protest, that he shall never recover.”

As in Yājñavalky's text, so in these texts also ten years' enjoyment must be understood as referring to movable properties of small value. This we know from the commentaries of Medhātithi and Haradatta.⁴ Haradatta says further that in such cases the presumption that the ownership of the property has passed to the possessor by any such means as purchase or gift

1. Viram p. 212

2. Gau. XII. 34.

भोक्तुर्वै स्वामिति निश्चीयते ।

Haradatta on Gau. X. II34.

3. Manu VIII: 147

Medh. I. 79.

4. यत् किञ्चिदिति दासीदासासारभाण्डादि सर्वं ग्राहयति
Medh. on Manu VIII. 147.

अत्र क्षेत्रविषये दाशवत्त्वः

Haradatta on Gau. XII. 34.

will be raised by reason of the absolute passiveness of the owner, for such a long period as ten years. ¹ The point to be noticed is that the texts just quoted do not contain any ambiguous word like the text of Yājñavalkya and as such do not admit of different interpretations. The doctrine of extinctive prescription, that is, loss of title through dispossession for a particular length of time is after all not really in conflict with the text which prescribes punishment for unauthorised possession, however, long it be. This text may be taken as referring to a case of trespass and indirectly insisting that possession in order to be a proof of ownership should have a valid origin, or to express it otherwise, that the usurper can never be the owner merely by lapse of time. This doctrine is not opposed also to the spirit of the texts in favour of possession for three generations. The interpretation of these texts by Śrīkara may be accepted as final. We have already seen that according to him possession continuing through three generations in order to prove title requires not to be held with the knowledge of the previous owner as possession for ten or twenty years does. ² The rule that every possession should invariably conform to the five conditions, one of them being that it should be in presence of the claimant, is indeed too exacting and may be regarded as setting forth an ideal case of possession only.

Another text, and it is of Marīci, limits the period of prescription to five years in respect of cattle, conveyance, ornaments and such other things that may be borrowed for use through friendship. ³ This text distinctly recognises extinctive prescription and to take it is referring to the loss of produce would be simply absurd. Moreover, if it be accepted as a general rule that loss of title cannot follow from dispossession then the various other texts which undoubtedly provide for exceptions to the rule of extinctive prescription cannot be explained. First of all we find Manu laying down that things such as a milch cow, a camel, an ox or a riding horse and an animal made over for breaking in are never lost to the owner if used with friendly

1. स एव भोगः स्वामिनः सकाशात् दानादिरूपेण तस्य धनस्य निर्गतं सूचयति । कथमपरैथितावन्तं कालमेवमर्थमपरलोके तूष्णीमासीतिति ।

Haradatta on Gan. XII. 34.

2. Vm. P. 342 and 343

3. देवुबाह्यालंकरणं याचितं प्रीतिकर्मणा ।

चतुः पञ्चादिकं देयमन्वया शप्तिमाप्नुयात् ॥ Pds. P. 148, Sc. P. 159.

assent.¹ Vyāsa adds that a thing is not also lost to the owner when it is adversely enjoyed by a *śrotriya* a *rājapuruṣa* (the king's official) and friends and relatives.² Devanabhāṭṭa comments that the idea underlying is that there can be no prescription against the owner when he remains indifferent out of some consideration.³ He quotes another text of Vyāsa which shows that the owner's consideration in remaining passive in respect of a *śrotriya* may be the acquiring of eternal merit, in respect of a *rājapuruṣa* it may be fear and in respect of friends and relatives it may be affection.⁴ Pitāmaha expresses the same idea in a different way. He says that possession will assert its force only when the possessor is a stranger (*para*), but when he happens to be a near relative then possession for a very long time even will not deprive the owner of his right.⁵ Medhātithi gives us a long note on the word *para* which occurs in a similar text of Manu already referred to.⁶ Some earlier commentators have taken the word to mean 'those who are not collaterals and relatives.' Medhātithi says that this explanation is after all unsatisfactory for it is difficult to ascertain who are relatives and collaterals and who are not. If these terms be taken to imply relationship in general then there would be none fit to be designated *para* because some sort of relationship may be said always to exist between one and another. Medhātithi says therefore that *para* must be taken to imply every one other than one's own self. Now there are texts in which wife and son are spoken of as one's own self and hence it is concluded that between husband and wife and between father and son only mere enjoyment on the part of one cannot be regarded as a ground of ownership against the other. He continues, however, to say that when they are separated then omission to assert right on the part of either of them will be a precluder of his ownership.⁷ Authorities are

1. Manu VIII. 146

2. याश्चाधर्मेण यदभ्युक्तं श्रोत्रियैः राजपुरुषैः ।
सुहृद्भिर्बान्धवैर्वापि न तद्भोगिनः हीयते ॥

Pds. p. 149, Sc. p. 157.

3. अनेन सकारणोपेक्षायां न कदाचिद्भानिखिक्तम्.....Sc P. 157.

4. धर्मोऽक्षयः श्रोत्रिये स्यात् भयं स्याद्राजपुरुषे ।

ज्जेहः सुहृद्बान्धवेषु भुक्तनेतैर्न हीयते ॥ Sc. P. 157.

Pds. reads धर्मोऽक्षयः श्रोत्रियस्य अमय राजपुरुषेP. 149.

5. भुक्तिर्बलवती तत्र भोक्ता यत्र परो भवेत् । स्वगोत्रे भोगिनां भुक्तिर्न शक्ता शाश्वती नृणाम् ॥
Sc. P. 158.

6. Manu VIII. 146

7. Medh. on Manu VIII. 146.

also of opinion as already noted that when the owner suffers under a disability such as minority, idiocy and the like, he is not to be affected by any adverse possession which he may be ignoring. The reason, according to the *Mitākṣarā* is his minority or idiocy. ¹ Protection is also to be affected to women on account of, as the *Mitākṣarā* puts it, their ignorance and inexperience (अज्ञानादप्रागल्भ्याच्च). ² The real ground on which idiots, minors and women are exempted from the operation of the rule of prescription is that they do not know their own interest and thus deserve protection from law. The texts of *Manu* and *Yājñavalkya* further provide that there cannot be prescription against the properties of the *rājā* and of the *śrotriya*. ³ *Medhātithi* says that *rājā* means 'rulers of provinces.' Now these people have vast properties which it is impossible for them to watch over carefully and thus they will shortly be reduced to poverty if they are to lose their properties one by one through adverse possession. ⁴ The *Mitākṣarā* explains that neglect to watch over his property is excusable for the king on account of his multifarious duties. ⁵ In modern jurisprudence though the right of government is extinguished by adverse possession, yet its position is more favourable than that of a private owner inasmuch as the period of limitation for the former is sixty years and for the latter only twelve years. *Śrotriyas* are absorbed in spiritual studies, take part in learned disquisitions and instruct people. They may thus be naturally unmindful to worldly concerns and so will not lose the property held adversely against them. ⁶ The principle underlying the various cases of exception evidently is that possession in order to be able to lead to ownership must be as of right and not held under leave or license. It is interesting to note that this principle is adopted in other systems of jurisprudence also and is not peculiar to the Hindu Law.

1. जडबालयोजितत्वाद् बालत्वाद्युपेक्षा युक्तैव ।

Mit. on Yāj II. 25.

2. Mit. on Yāj II. 25

3. VIII, 149 (*Manu*); Yāj II. 25, Nār. I. 81.

4. देशधरा राजानस्तेषां धनं ते हि महाधनत्वादुच्चत्वान्वयं धनमन्विच्छन्तो विरुतमेवादानिर्निबन्धीक्रियन्ते
Medh. on *Manu* VIII 149.

5. राज्ञो बहुकार्यव्याकुलत्वात्.....Mit. on Yāj II. 25.

6. श्रोत्रियस्याभ्ययनाभ्यापनतदर्थविचारानुष्ठानव्याकुलत्वाद्युपेक्षा युक्तैव ।

Mit. on Yāj II. 25.

Exceptions are also made in the case of intermediate boundary as well as in the cases of *ādhi*, *upanidhi*, *nikṣepa* and *strī*.¹ Medhātithi remarks that on account of the boundary mark between villages being a public concern men may naturally ignore encroachment upon it. As to the boundary line between houses marked by ditches or walls two or three cubits in size and common to two persons, the fact of its being in possession of one of them can be ignored by the other if such possession is short. Possession for a long period may give rise to the presumption that the ownership has passed to the possessor by reason of gift or any other mode of acquiring property but it will even then not be very harmful, for, Medhātithi goes on to say, the son and grandson of the person who omitted to protest against such a possession will easily be able to discover some hidden marks of the original boundary and thereby to have their claims established.² Viṇāśvara also puts forward similar grounds. He says that neglect to watch over the boundaries may be allowed for the simple reason that they can easily be ascertained by permanent boundary marks of chaff, ashes or other articles.³ *Strī* means a slave girl or wife.⁴ What is intended by Manu's text is that she can never be lost to the original owner through adverse possession.

Exceptions in the cases of *ādhi*, *upanidhi* and *nikṣepa* amply prove the adoption by our law-makers of the principle that prescription cannot be caused by derivative possession. *Ādhi* (pledge) has been defined by Nārada as that to which a secondary title is created.⁵ Medhātithi explains the term more fully. According to him *ādhi* is 'an article given as pledge, such as cattle, land, gold and so forth, to the creditor and recovered from him upon repayment of the debt.'⁶ The *Mitākṣarā* also makes it clear that *ādhi* is nothing but a security given by the debtor for the thing lent to him by the creditor for the

1. Manu VIII. 149, Yāj II. 25, Nār. I. 81.

2. Medh. on Manu VIII. 149

3. Mit. on Yāj II. 25

4. स्त्रियो दास्यः भार्या वा (Medh). Asahāya explains the term as 'निक्षेपयुक्ता वा युक्ता', i.e., 'a woman who has been delivered to a stranger as a deposit, and enjoyed by him'.

5. आधिक्रियत इत्यादि:.....Nār. I. 124

6. आधीयत इत्यादिर्बन्धकद्रव्यं गोधूहिण्याद्युच्यते Medh. on Manu VIII 149

purpose of creating confidence in the latter.¹ Both *upanidhi* and *nikṣepa* are deposits. The difference between the two is that the former is enclosed in a vessel, its quantity, kind and form are not disclosed and it is sealed; while the latter is specified as to its quality and quantity.² We may thus call *upanidhi* a sealed or unspecified deposit and *nikṣepa* a specified deposit.

We may conclude this chapter by saying that some of the views about the effect of adverse possession noted above have their parallel in other systems of jurisprudence. The doctrine of extinctive prescription, it is needless to say, represents a very developed stage of *bhuktivāda* and shows a sentiment of great respect for the fact of possession. The Roman Law also reveals the same state of things by recognising that title is extinguished by prescription. Savigny making a statement about the origin of property in the Roman Law has gone so far as to say that all property is founded on adverse possession.³ It is indeed interesting to note that the Roman Law just like the Hindu Law made a difference between the periods of prescription as regards movables and immovables. In its earliest phase a prescriptive title to movables was acquired by one year's possession and to immovables by possession for two years. In Justinian's time these periods were extended to three and ten years respectively. In the Roman Law the general rule, of course, was that a title to the thing possessed could be acquired by one who obtained possession in good faith and under a sale, gift or other just means of acquiring property. When however, the possessor had come in under no title the Roman Law did not totally ignore his right but demanded a longer prescription of thirty years in case of certain class of properties and of forty years in case of others. Another point to be noted is that the Roman Law also required a possession to be peaceable and uninterrupted for the period prescribed. We have seen that under the Hindu Law prescription could not be claimed against properties stolen or possessed by force. By the Roman

1. आधिर्नामगृहीतस्य द्रव्यस्योपरि विश्वासार्थमवमर्णेनोत्तमर्णोऽधिक्रियते आधीयते इत्यादि ।

Mit. on Yāj II 25.

2. स्वं द्रव्यं यत्र विश्रम्भाक्षिपत्यविशङ्कितः ।

निक्षिपो नाम तत् प्रोक्त व्यवहारपदं बुधैः ॥

अन्यद्रव्यव्यवहारेण द्रव्यमव्याहृतं च यत् ।

निक्षिप्यते परगृहे तदौपनिषिक्तं स्मृतम् ॥ Nār. II. 1 and 5

(उपानिधिप्रकरणम्)

असख्यातमाविज्ञातं समुद्रं यन्निधीयते ।

तज्जानान्यादुपनिधिं निक्षिप गणितं विदुः ॥ Nār. quoted in Mit. on Yāj II. 65.

3. Maine's Ancient Law, Ch. VIII.

Law also thing stolen or possessed by violence were considered so far *extra commercium* that they could not be acquired by the ordinary prescription even by a bonafide possessor.¹

We have seen that according to some authoritative texts of the Hindu Law there are shorter prescriptions which are applicable to certain classes of property. This has a striking similarity with the modern French Code. It is also interesting to note that in this system of jurisprudence in order to prescribe the property of an immovable subject one is to acquire it in good faith and upon an ostensible title and a title defective in form cannot serve as a basis for prescription. This is *āgamavāda* pure and simple of Hindu Law. The French Law further recognises that all real and personal actions are barred by the lapse of a certain period of time.² This also is not very different from the theory of *vyavahārahāni* of the Hindus noted above.

Another point that we have noticed is that adverse possession does not operate against minors and those who are under any legal incapacity to sue. The English and the Scottish Law of prescription recognises exactly an identical principle. The text of Yājñavalkya, we have further noticed, does not, according to some authorities advocate extinction of title or bar the remedy by action but is intended '*to limit the mode of proof*' so that claims which might be proved within the period of prescription by legal evidence such as witnesses and documents can only be established after the expiry of that period by having recourse to oath and ordeal. Exactly a similar view is held by the Scottish law also.³

These resemblances, though accidental, go to show that our system of law does not suffer by comparison and may be placed side by side with any system of law in the world.

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1. Roman Law (Lord Mackenzie), ch. VIII. pp. 194-196
 2. Roman Law (Lord Mackenzie), ch. VIII, p. 198
 3. Roman Law (Lord Mackenzie), ch. VIII, pp. 198-201.

DRAVIDIAN CULTURE

BY

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It has been the serious belief of many scholars, both Eastern and Western, that before the Vedic Aryans had entered into India, it had been inhabited by a race of people called the Dravidian whose culture totally differed from that of the invaders. It is also believed that the Vedic Aryans were so powerful as to occupy the whole of India and supplant the Dravidian culture by their own Vedic and Sanskrit culture. Attempts have also been made here and there to distinguish between the Aryan and the Dravidian cultures and to make an estimate of the influence exerted by the Dravidian upon the Aryan. Yet no attempt seems to have succeeded in presenting the two pictures in their true colours and in making it possible to compare and contrast them in definite and precise terms. It is not yet definitely known how these two races differed in social, religious, and ethical ideas, convictions and sentiments. Nor is it found possible to classify the Hindus into Aryans and Dravidians as precisely as we can classify the Indians into the Hindus, the Mahamadands, and the Christians.

It is also believed that the Brāhmans are the real representatives of the ancient Aryans and that their customs are more or less Vedic. As Brāhmans officiate as priests in the house of almost all the non-Brahman Hindus with the exception of the Lingayats and the outcastes, nothing in their social and religious customs is found to be indicative of any social distinction. If we leave out the nominal distinction of the people into castes and the use and disuse of vedic chants in religious rites, there is no criterion whatever to distinguish them either as Dravidian or Aryan.

Such being the condition of the Hindus, it may seem to be a vain attempt to define the Dravidian culture and distinguish it from that of the ancient Aryans. But if we take the earliest religious books of the Aryans and make a list of the religious and social customs enjoined upon them in those books, we can draw a true picture of the Vedic Aryan in his religious and social aspects. His religion is fire-worship and his Gods are earthly atmospheric and celestial. With the exception of the fire, almost all other gods are natural forces incapable of being represented in any definite form. It is true that the Vedic Aryans worship-

ped the rivers, trees, bows, arrows, the war-drum and other fetishes. Still there is no evidence whatever available in the early religious books to assert that he worshipped idols in a temple or at home. His Rudra or Śiva was the wind or storm god, and not the epic Liṅga or Śiva with a trident in one of his hands. His Viṣṇu was the sun and not at all a stone or metallic image with four arms. His daily routine consisted of a round of sacrificial offerings into the fire on the altar in his house. While worshipping his fire in the morning, midday or evening, he called upon all his earthly, atmospherical, and celestial Gods to partake of the offerings put into the fire. His one religious formula regulating his offerings was "Agnimukhā vai devāḥ", "Gods have the fire for their mouth". Hence he believed that the offerings put into the fire were carried on to all the Gods addressed to by him while "making the offering.

In none of the rites which are observed by him in his life, there is room for the observance of any form of idolatry or of the customs connected with it. The domestic rites that are enjoined upon him in the Vedas and Sūtras are forty in all. They are:—

- (1) The Garbhādhāna or ceremony to cause conception,
- (2) The pūṁsavāna, or ceremony to cause the birth of a male child,
- (3) The śmantonnayana or arranging the parting of the pregnant wife's hair,
- (4) The Jātakarana, or ceremony on the birth of the child,
- (5) The ceremony of naming the child,
- (6) The first feeding,
- (7) The tonsure of the head of the child,
- (8) The rite of initiation,
- (9 to 12) the four vows for the study of the Veda,
- (13) the bath on completion of the studentship,
- (14) the marriage ritual,
- (15 to 19) the five sacrifices to Gods, manes, men, goblins and Brāhmins,
- (20-26) the seven pākayajñas or small sacrifices, such as the Astakā, the pārvana, the ancestral oblations, the śrāvanī, the Āgrahāyanī, the Caitrī, and the Āsvayugi, (27-33) the seven Haviryajñas such as the Agnyādheya, the Agnihotra, the Darśapūrnamāsa, the Āgrayana, the Cāturmāsya, the Nirūdha paśubadha and the sautra maṇī and (34-40) the seven soma sacrifices, such as the Agnistoma, the Atyagnistoma, the Uktha, the soḍaśin, the Atirātra, and the Aptoryāma.

In none of these sacramentary rites either Śiva or Visnu is invoked as a prominent god. The śatarudriyahoma performed in some of the sacrifices plays an insignificant part in the main body of the ritual. The Visnu-kramana or performance of Visnu's stepping is likewise a part of the main ritual. Even in those constituent rites neither Śiva nor Visnu is invoked after the fashion of Śaivite or Vaisnavite Āgamas. Nor is there any reference to Śaivite or Vaisnavite marks, symbols or dress worn by the persons taking part in the ritual. There is no mention of stigmatization of the body of the priests and other persons performing the ritual.

Even in the daily rites enjoined upon a Vedic Aryan there is no reference to Śiva or Visnu and to the marks and symbols which are usually worn by modern Śaivites and Vaisnavites. The daily routine of the rites performed by a Vedic Aryan is as follows :—

Bathing in the early morning, the morning, midday and evening prayer to Sāvitrī, the Sun, the Aupāsana or fire-worship both in the morning and evening, the five Mahāyajñas or sacrifices, the Vaiśvadeva or the worship of the All-gods, the Baliharana sacrifice, the entertainment of guests, and the study of the Vedas. In all these rites the appropriate Vedic mantras are recited. There is no reference to the worship of Śiva or Visnu. Nor is there on the other hand any Vedic chant or mantras enjoined to be recited in these Āgamic worships. The modern Śaivites and Vaisnavites recite Āgama verses in classic Sanskrit while worshipping these later gods. The Vedic mantras usually recited while offering sandal, incense, flowers, fruits, and other things to Śiva or Visnu have no connection with the things offered. For example while offering sandal, it is usual to recite the Āraṇyaka mantra "Gandhadvārām etc.," Though the word 'gandha' meaning scent appears in the mantra, it has no bearing on the offering of scent to any god. It is an invocation to Śrī, goddess of wealth and prosperity. Thus many Vedic mantras are recited in the worship of Śiva or Visnu, though their original application was quite different.

The early Vedic Aryan had no need for temples, images, scents, incense, flowers, lights, camphor and other materials of worship. His worship was quite simple : He had his fire in the altar; he had rice, ghee, milk or butter for offering. He had his fuel-sticks to kindle the fire, and his fresh or dry kuśa grass and water. These were all his materials of fire-worship which

he daily observed. For costly sacrifices he needed large sums of money to purchase his sacrificial animals, his soma, rice, wheat and grains to feed and reward his priests and guests. He succeeded in getting necessary pecuniary help from the Aryan kings so long as he had a sympathetic king interested in the animal sacrifices. But in the course of about a thousand years according to others, there occurred a schism among the Aryans. First the Jainas and then the Buddhists revolted against the animal sacrifices and succeeded in converting to their new faiths most of the Aryan kings. Those that were strictly conservatives and adhered to their Vedic sacrificial religion seem to have been very few in number.

By the time the Mauryas established their empire in Pataliputra, the whole of northern India was more under the influence of Buddhism than Jainism or Vedic Brahmanism. The adherents of the Vedic sacrificial cult seem to have received no support to their sacrificial rites at any king's court. Meanwhile both the Buddhists and the Jainas began to carry on their propaganda work in the south. The Brāhmanas had either followed them or preceded them in their migration to the Deccan. The country below the Vindhya was at that time partly Śaivite and partly Vaisnavite. There is no reason to doubt that the Dravidians both in the north and the south were divided into six religious groups, such as saura, the sun-worshippers, śakta, the Śakti worshippers, the Śaiva, the Liṅga-worshippers, the Vaisnavas, the worshippers of Viṣṇu, and Gāṇapatya, worshippers of Gaṇapati. Both the Buddhists and the Jainas showed no regard either to their ancestral animal sacrifices or to the theistic idolatry of the Dravidians. Their new cults were a revolt against the sordid passions of humanity and aimed at purging the human mind of all passionate impulses. Hence there was a conflict between the new cults and the Dravidian idolatry. The Brāhman seems to have espoused the cause of the Dravidians and changed his sacrificial cult to idolatry or interpreted it so as to be in harmony with idolatry. This is the beginning of the era of the Purāṇas, the Āgamas, and the Tantras.

It is true that there were some Purāṇas as old in their origin as the Vedas. But such Purāṇas were either explanatory of Vedic or sacrificial myths or of sorcery. At the critical period we are speaking of, there seem to have been made large additions to the Purāṇas and the epics mostly in praise of either Śaivism or

Vaiṣṇavism. And a few new Purāṇas seem to have been written in praise of Śakti, Gaṇapati, and the sun. While the Purāṇas were devoted to the praise of idolatry, the Āgamas and the Tantras were written to explain the forms of worship. With a view to hide the modernness of these writings, these works seem to have been described either as a dialogue between Śiva and Pārvatī or as the compilations of Vyāsa, Nārada, and other old sages

They did not stop with the literary propagandic work. They embraced the cults with zeal and unswerving faith and became leaders of the cults which they adopted. Their bigotry in these new faiths seem to have been so great and the observance of the customs connected with the Dravidian cults so unquestionable that Saṃkarācārya in the 9th century found it hard to persuade the zealots to give up at least some obscene customs in each of the six Dravidian cults. Under his logical persuasion many seem to have abandoned the observance of almost all the horrible or obscene customs and continued to practise such customs as appeared inoffensive. The profane customs are spoken of as Vāmācāras or left-hand acts and the inoffensive customs as Dakṣiṇācāras or right-hand acts. Some of them are shedding of blood, drinking of wine or liquor, eating of fish or flesh, worship of and intercourse with women, and other obscene customs narrated in several Tantra works. Some of the customs as appeared inoffensive are stigmatization of the body, wearing of caste marks, sipping the water with which the feet of the Guru is washed, worship of images and the like.

Thus abandoning the costly Vedic animal sacrifices and also the philosophical religion of the Upanisads, almost all the Brāhmins embraced one or the other or all of the six Dravidian cults enumerated above and interpreted their Vedas and Upanisads in support of these new cults. The epoch of this voluntary adoption by Brāhmins of these new cults may be said to be between the 4th century B. C. and the 8th century A. D. when the purāṇas, Āgamas and Tantras were compiled and recited as old sacred works under the patronage of Dravidian kings. As a fitting reward for the zeal, faith, and sincerity of the self-elective converts, the Dravidian kings of those days seem to have not only entrusted their temples to them, but also appointed them as priests and worshippers. It is also more than probable that at the same time rich land-endowments were also granted to the temples and placed in the custody of Brāhman worshippers and managers.

That this is a correct and reliable history of the transformation of the Vedic fire cult into Dravidian idolatry is clearly betrayed in the many polemical works written by Brāhmins Śaivites and Vaiṣṇavites against the customs of each other. Some of the polemical works written by Śaivites condemning the customs of the Vaiṣṇavites, unconscious of their own departure from pure Vedic customs are the following available in the Mysore Oriental Library.

(1)	Ūrdhvaṇḍra vicāra.	No.	C	1405.
(2)	Punḍranirṇaya Candrikā.	„	B	920.
(3)	Vaidikaviṇḍayadhvaṇa.	„		725.
(4)	Vaidikācāranirṇaya.	„		2849.
(5)	Vaidikācāramarma,	„		4616.
(6)	Vaidikasiddhānta.	„		399.
(7)	Taptamudrā vidrāvāṇa.	„		594.

The Vaiṣṇavite works directed against the Śaivites are

(1)	Dramiḍācāra pramāṇa Samgraha.	No.	2380.
(2)	Tapta cakrāṇkita smṛtisāra-		
	Samgraha.	„	B 975.
(3)	Tapta cakrāṇkana pramāṇa-Vivṛti.	„	2411.
(4)	Saccaritra paritrāṇam.	„	1405.
(5)	Pañcarātra raksā.	„	A 215.

The Punḍranirṇaya candrikā (920-P. 56) classifies the Hindus into four divisions :—(1) Those that follow only the Vedas (Śuddha Vaidika); (2) those that attach more importance to the Vedas and still observe harmless Tāntric customs in addition to the Vedic rites (Vaidikatāntrika); (3) Those that observe Tāntric customs as more important, upholding at the same time the sanctity of the Vedas and Vedic customs (Tāntrika-Vaidikas); and (4) those that observe only the Tāntric customs discarding almost all the Vedic customs.

The last two classes are stated in the above work (pp. 36-39) to have abandoned the Vedic customs, and adopted new customs. The new customs are said to be such as follows :—

- (1) Change of name due to initiation in Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism.
- (2) Change of prayer, i. e., learning a Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite prayer abandoning the Vedic Gāyatrī prayer.
- (3) The abandonment of the Vedic customs such as Garbhādhāna or ceremony to cause conception etc., and adoption of Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite customs.

- (4) Stigmatization of the body.
- (5) Wearing on the face, arms and breast, marks of Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite weapons with grey or white earth.
- (6) Reading and reciting Vernacular hymns called prabandhas in praise of Viṣṇu or Śiva and abandonment of Vedic recitation.
- (7) Drinking, or sipping the water with which a Guru's feet are washed.
- (8) Wearing a necklace of Rudrākṣa or Tulasī beads.

The author of the Puṇḍranirnaya candrikā quotes many verses from the purāṇas in support of his views. The Dravidācāra pramāṇasaṃgraha (A 731.) quotes from many Āgama works in support of the sanctity of the Vaiṣṇavite customs specified above.

In praise of the Prabandhas or Dravidāmnāya as they are called, it quotes from Brahma-Saṃhitā as follows :—

“ Dravidāmnāya Vedānta ghoso yatrāsti sarvadā
tasmin mumuksubhirgrāme sthātavyamitaratra na...

Those who are desirous of attaining emancipation shall reside where the sound of recitation of the Dravida Vedas is heard and nowhere else.

The following verses are quoted from Īśvarasaṃhitā in praise of those who are well versed in the Prabandhas :—

“ Yastu Drāvidavedārthajñatā sa puruṣas smṛtaḥ | dānapā-
traṃ sa sampūjyaḥ viśeṣācca mumuksubhiḥ || Vetti
Drāvidavedārtham yastu tasya padadvayam.

Samkṣālayitvā pādāmbu peyam moksaphalārthibhiḥ.

Whoever knows the meaning of the Dravida Veda deserves gifts from those who desire emancipation. Those who desire to attain salvation shall drink of the water with which the feet of the person learned in the Dravida Veda are washed.

The following verse condemning the disregard of the Drāvida Veda on the part of a Brāhman is attributed to the Āḍityapurāṇa :—

Svasakhadhyayanam kṛtvā Vaiṣṇavo Drāvidaśrutim |
anadhītya śraṃan śāstre yaḥ karoti sa durmatih.

“ He who takes the troubles of studying śāstra in perference to Drāvidaveda after learning his family Veda is a man of profane mind. ”

The following verses enjoining the five Saṁskāras are quoted from Pañcarātra works in the Dravidācārapramāṇa Saṁgraha :—

Prapanna kulasambhūtaḥ devatāntara dūragaḥ
homādikam vinā kuryāttesāṁ tādipañcakam
yaddrstvā Vaisnavas̥ceti nissam̐deho bhavenmune
Tadr̥sam laksanam vaksye Vaisnavānāṁ viśesataḥ
Vaisnavau dvau yadā sadyah saṁgatsau tu parasparam
pranāmaṁ kurutastatra tayormadhye sthito hariḥ
tasmādavaśyam kartavyam Vaisnavasya tu laksanam
Vaisnavo Vaisnavam drstvā dandavatpranamedbhuvī

Those who are born of Vaisnavite devotees and who worship no other god than Visnu shall go through stigamatization and other five sacramentary rites without performing any oblation into the fire. A Vaisnavite shall bear such marks on his body as will remove all doubts as to whether the person seen with the marks is a Vaisnavite or not. When two Vaisnavites meet together, they should bow to each other, for there is Visnu between them. Hence it is necessary for Vaisnavite to bear Vaisnavite marks. When a Vaisnavite meets another Vaisnavite, he should prostrate before the other.

The five rites referred to in the above verses are (1) stigmatization (2) wearing marks on the forehead, arms, and breast in white and red earth, (3) service under a Vaisnavite teacher, (4) sipping the water with which a Vaisnavite teacher's feet are washed, and (5) repeating the name of Visnu as taught. Another noteworthy fact in the above verses is fidelity to Visnu alone exclusive of all other gods, whether Vedic or not Vedic. The Pundranirnaya-candrikā points out the inconsistency of exclusive fidelity to Visnu with the performance of such Vedic rites as Saṁdhyāvandana, Agnihotra and the like necessitating the worship of other gods.

The author of the Dravidācārapramāṇa saṁgraha quotes verses in support of the view that the daily rite called Vaiśvadeva is not obligatory on a Vaisnavite :—

Pravāpe ca prabodhe ca pūjito yena keśavaḥ.
Kiṁ kāryam Vaiśvadevena devapūjaparasya vai
Kiṁ vā yajñena dānena Vaiśvadevena bhūmipa
Vaiśvadevahutocchistaṁ no bhuñjyād Vaisnavottamaḥ

“ Whoever worships Keśava both in sleep and waking state will have no benefit to derive from the performance of Vaiśvadeva; nor from the performance of Vedic sacrifices nor from

making gifts. No true Vaisnavite should partake of the food that remains.....after Vaiśvadeva oblation is performed.

The author of the *Drāṇidacārapramāṇa-samgraha* goes still farther and gives expression to a theory which shatters the very foundation of the Vedic cult. He says (15) :—

Adhyayanasya kāmratvāt tadangasyopanayanasyāpi
kāmratvam adhyayanasya kāmratvāt varnāśramata-
danga Karmanām
sarveśāmapī kāmratvam siddhamiti vaiśvadeva-
syāpi kāmratvam.....
tasmādvārṇānubandhīni ṣoḍaśa karmāṇi kāmāni. ”

“ Study of the Vedas is an optional duty (and not an obligatory duty). Hence Upanayana, the rite of investiture of the sacred thread as a part of the rite performed for the study of the Vedas, is also optional. Since the study of the Vedas is optional, the duties enjoined upon castes and other religious divisions must necessarily be optional. Hence the sixteen rites laid down for the higher castes are also optional. ”

From this it is clear that in the opinion of the author of the above work there is no obligatory Vedic rite to be performed by a Vaiṣṇavite. The Śāivites hold similar arguments and confine their attention to rites laid down in Āgamic works abandoning Vedic rites.

Speaking of the Vaisnavites and of their opinion on their religion the Vaidikavijayadhvaṇa says as follows:—“The Vaisnavites have Pāñcarātrāgama as their authority. They are chiefly found on the banks of Tāmraparnī, in the Cola territory (Trichy and Tanjore) and in Kanjivaram, and in other places sacred to Visnu. Questioned about their religion the learned among them say that their teachers are Aupagāyana, Śāndilya, Bharadvāja, Kauśika, and Mañjāyaka, all well-versed in the Pāñcarātra cult. The religion and philosophy established by Rāmānuṇa is quite different from their cult. In the system of Rāmānuṇa, Nammālvar and others are worshipped as saints. Before they became Vaiṣṇavites, the Rāmānuṇīyas and the Mādhvas were Smārtas. They are therefore new Vaisnavites with their religion and philosophy based upon both the Upanisads and the Pāñcarātra works. The old Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavites have however nothing to do with the Vedas and the Vedānta. These are racially the Āndhras and others. ” (p 13-14)

Again " The Vaisnavites who follow Rāmānujācārya reject the Śivapurāṇas as unauthoritative, regard the Drāviḍa prabandha as important as the Upanisads, look upon Nammālvar and other non-Brāhman sages as their saints, and hold their sayings as being more authoritative than even the Vedas, and stigmatise their body with brand marks of Visnu's weapons. They have two Vedāntas, one of the Upanisads and the other of the Prabandhas. " (p 46-47)

In support of the rejection of the vernacular prabandhas to which the Vaisnavites attach as much importance as to the Upanisads, the Vaidikavijayadhvaja quotes some verses from the Sesadharma meaning that " Those who listen to the hymns composed in Kanarese, Tamil, Telugu languages in praise of god instead of Sanskrit are destined to go to the hell. "

Speaking of the rise of Vaisnavism in the south the Pundraminayacandrikā says : " They (the Vaisnavites) are modern ; pressed by poverty and desirous of finding wealth some how or other they sought for pecuniary help from those who styled themselves as Prabhus, chiefs, whose religion is now Tāntric. The chiefs prior to Acyutarāya (of Vijayanagar) followed the Vedic religion and observed Vedic customs. Their copper plate grants bear the symbol of Virūpākṣa. But the modern chiefs have abandoned the ancient Vedic customs and observe Tāntric customs, such as stigmatization, bearing caste marks in white earth and the like. " (p 54-55)

Comparing the customs of the early Śaivites and Vaisnavites, the Pundra nirṇayacandrikā says as follows ;—(p. 97) " The Śaivāgama is of two kinds : (1) Vedic, and (2) Independent. What is not based upon the Vedas is called Independent. The latter which was once of ten different kinds is now of eighteen kinds, known as Kāmikāgama and the like. Like the followers of Pāñcarātra cult, the Pāsupatas also perform no funeral rites. The former believe that their dead have attained to Vaikunṭha, the world of Visnu, and the latter think that their dead have become one with Śiva. Both bury their dead, abandoning the Vedic rite of cremation. The Vaisnavites brand their body with the marks of Visnu's weapons and the Śaivites bear the Linga mark. Both despise the Vedic Brāhmanas. In their annual ancestral rites which consist in making an offering of cooked rice to Visnu or Śiva in the temple, the Vaisnavites recite the Tamil Prabandha and the Śaivites sing songs in praise of Śiva in Kanarese. "

Discussing the origin and age of Pāñcarātra the Pundranirnayacandrikā says (p. 63) that "Their is no reliable evidence to prove that the Pāñcarātra works are the productions of Visnu. According to the Śrīmadbhāgavata Upaśloka, son of Trivikrama and disciple of Nārada, is the author of what is called Sātvata Tantra, which is another name of Pāñcarātra. According to the Mahābhārata, Saṁkarsana composed the Pāñcarātra works following the mode of worship described in the Sātvata Samhitā at the close of the Dvāpara age and the beginning of the Kali age."

On page 98 the same work distinguishing between Vaidic and Tāntric Vaisnavites and Śaivites says that "Those Vaisnavites who observe Vedic rites and customs with faith in Visnu are termed Bhāgavatas and form a large sect residing beyond the border of the Dravidian land. On the banks of the Gautamī river in the Āndhra country there is a sect of people called Ārādhya who follow the Pāsūpata cult. Besides these, there are Tāntric Vaisnavites in the Tamil land and Tāntric Śaivites called Jangamas in the Karnāta land. These observe no Vedic rites and customs."

It may be reasonably inferred from the above that long before the immigration of the Vedic Brāhmins there were in the south two important sects known as Vaisnavites and Śaivites at war with each other. Both were a sect of idolatrous people with religious marks and stigmas on their body indicative of their respective religious belief. They had their own religious literature consisting of hymns in Dravidian vernaculars in praise of Visnu or of Śiva and religious myths. They had their own kingdoms with powerful kings and armies to repel the attacks of the Aryans from the north. The armies of Aśoka could only conquer the northern parts of Telugu and Karnāta lands leaving the Tamils and the Cheras unconquered. Aśoka had however given up the idea of war and conquest after he had embraced Buddhism and begun to rule the land following the Buddhist principles of Dhamma Chakka. It is at this time that the Buddhists and the Jainas poured into the Dravidian land on their propagandistic work. The Brāhmins who also migrated thither from the north probably in search of employment as teachers took the side of the Śaivites or of the Vaisnavites against their own religious opponents, the Buddhists and the Jainas. They discontinued the observance of costly Vedic sacrifices for want of funds and retained only cheap Gṛhya

rites. It is probable that those who had no education in their own religious literature gave up both the Śrauta and Grhya rites and adopted the simple Vaisnavite or Śaivite customs paying homage to Dravidian religious teachers and saints. Those who were well versed in Vedic and Upaniṣadic religion and philosophy as well as those who had no opportunity to go through their course of religious studies seem to have identified themselves with the natives of the land and learnt their vernaculars and practised their customs to show their love of the people and their religion and arts. It is more than certain that the immigrant families of the Brāhmanas were so dispersed as to have none to talk in their Aryan tongue, Pali or Prakrit or Sanskrit outside their family circles. This seems to be the reason for their neglecting their own language and adoption of the vernaculars instead. To please their patrons, the Dravidian kings, and wealthy men, they seem to have composed Purāṇas and Āgamas extolling and explaining the merits of the new religions they adopted. Such religious observances as are mentioned neither in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas nor in the Grhya sūtra may be said to have been borrowed by them and practised with zeal. The Holly feast in February, Purpu feast in honour of the Kāverī floods in the rainy season, Gaurī and the Gaṇeśa feasts, the Kālī festivities, the Kṛttikā feast, and the periodical festivals of idolatry seem to be new accretions.

Among the sixty three Śaivite saints who flourished during the reign of the Pallavas in the south, there are also a few Brāhmanas who appear to have been raised to the status of saints in virtue of their earnest and sincere devotion to Śiva. One of them is known as Gugguliya who is said to have sold the sacred necklace of his wife to find money for purchasing incense to burn before the image of Śiva. Another celebrated Brāhman Śaivite is known as Appar. He was a learned Brāhman. He was first converted into Jaina faith and was reconverted again to Śaivism under the influence of his widowed sister. As a Jaina he was called Dharma Sena, author of a number of Sanskrit works on Jaina religion and philosophy. After his reconversion to Śaivism he is said to have composed a number of hymns in praise of Śiva and to have accompanied Tirugnāna Sambandhiyar, another Brāhman-Śaiva saint in his pilgrimage to the temples of Śiva in the south. Another Brāhman saint known as Rudrapasūpati is said to have recited the Vedic hymns on Rudra and charmed the people by his sweet recitation. The story of Somayāji, another Brāhman Śaivite saint, is very interesting and it illustrates the

disbelief of the Śaivites in caste distinctions. Once Somayāji undertook the performance of Soma sacrifice. During the performance a Cāṇḍāla Śaivite with his wife came into the sacrificial hall. Following the customs of the Śaivites Somayāji received the outcaste couple and fed them, thus making a sinful departure from Brāhman customs. The priests engaged for the sacrifice were aghast and left the sacrificial hall in a body. The legend goes on to say that the Cāṇḍāla couple disappeared and there stood in the centre of the hall Śiva with his consort Pārvatī. Hearing of this, the priests returned and completed the sacrifice.

The Chief characteristic of Śaivism or of Vaisnavism is the formulae of gift which seems to have been an important means for the spread of these religions. It is the gift of food, personal safety, medicine, and knowledge. It is expressed in Sanskrit as "Ahārābhayaabhesajyaśāstradānāni; the ancient Jainas regarded this gift as a sacred duty to be observed by the Jainas at all costs. The Buddhists also followed the same rules. It is a historical fact that but for the observance of these gifts, neither the Jainas nor the Buddhists would have succeeded in spreading their religion throughout India. It is probable that in the interest of their own religions, both the Śaivites and the Vaisnavites borrowed this principle of gift and observed the same. It is also this economical aspect that rendered these religions more attractive and acceptable to Brāhman than Jainism and Buddhism which were hostile to the Vedic religion from the start.

The Vaisnavites quote verses from the Bhagavadgītā in justification of their abandonment of their Vedic sacrificial customs and their exclusive devotion to Viṣṇu :—

- (1) "Those who worship me leaving other gods and exclusively devoted to me—I shall bear the burden of maintaining the well-being and progress of such true devotees.
- (2) Having given up all Dharmas, i. e. Vedic sacrifices, seek shelter in me alone: I shall free thee, O, descendant of Bharata, from all sins."

Here the word dharma conveys the sense given to it by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsā sūtras 'Codanālakṣaṇo artho dharmah', 'That desirable sacrificial act which is enjoined by the Vedas is called the Dharma'. The Vaisnavite cult taught in the Bhagavadgītā is a simple religion of devotion to Viṣṇu.

Likewise the Śaivites also declare devotion to Śiva as an essential religious principle. The Puṇḍranirṇaya candrikā quotes Purāṇic verses in support of the above doctrine of the Śaivites (97).

“ Whether a sinner or a cruel man not observing the duties and customs of his caste, he becomes worthy of worship and honour if he is only devoted to me. ” Such is the excellence of a Śaivite devotee confirmed by Purāṇic sayings.

It may be presumed that at the commencement of their voluntary conversion to Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism, they abandoned all sacrificial customs in their entirety and that when a call back to the Vedas was sounded under the Aryan kings in some localities, the sacrificial cult was taken up again along with Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism or both as among the Smārta sect. This was an age of confusion and compromise. It was difficult to say which is true and which false. The political, social and economical conditions of the time were such as to force the Brāhmanas to accept all ancient sacred scriptures as good and find harmony among the conflicting doctrines. This is called Samanvaya-vāda or theory of reconciliation of contradicting texts, doctrines and customs, as stated by Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma Sūtras (I. 3). This theory gave sanctity to all hoary texts and ancient customs and made them obligatory inspite of explicit contradictions. Thus an Advaitin with no belief in a personal god acts like a true believer in a personal god. He professes to follow Vedic customs and yet goes to temples to worship images. The Vaiṣṇavites and the Śaivites recite Prabandhas or vernacular hymns along with some Vedic hymns, no matter whether the latter are appropriate to the occasion or not. If they are Vedic they can have no bearing on idol worship and if they are from Upanisads, they can have no application to such personal deities as Śiva or Viṣṇu. Besides worshipping Śiva or Viṣṇu, saints also are worshipped. But there is no reference to the worship of saints either in the Vedas or in the Brāhmanas. Such a worship is quite inconsistent with the spirit of the Upanisads. Ancestral worship is quite different from the worship of the saints. As a Vedic rite, ancestral worship requires fire and offerings to ancestors made into the fire. The worship of the saints on the other hand is entirely Āgamic and requires, no fire but images, cars, palanquins, incense, flowers, fruits, cooked rice and the like.

The relation between the Vedic sacrificers and their gods is more or less what exists between international traders. It is an exchange of commodities. The sacrificers transmit their offering through fire to their Gods who in return send their blessings in the form of rain, crops, cattle, children and victory in battle. In the Upaniṣads this relation is changed into a kind of identity of the Universal consciousness with the individual consciousness. There is no prayer nor response to prayer. By constant meditation the individual self can become as mighty as the Universal self and can get rid of its meanness and limitation. The gain is internal and not external. According to the Buddhists and the Jainas also it can become omniscient and Universal by getting rid of the stains that have soiled consciousness.

In Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism on the other hand the relation between the god and his devotee is that which prevails between a master and his slave. The devotee is a *dāsa* or slave not only to his god, but also to the confirmed devotee called Guru or teacher. Every individual soul is called Cit, consciousness and matter is called Acit or inert. Both these are regarded as the body of the god, Śiva or Viṣṇu. God is conceived as being possessed of all the qualities and free from whatever is mean and condemnable. As all individual souls are endowed with free will, they are all at liberty to do whatever pleases them. Their happiness and suffering depend upon the good and bad actions they do. Saṃsāra or the chain of birth is due to worldly activity. Exclusive devotion (*bhakti*) to god with renunciation of worldly activity or action without attachment to the fruits of action leads to emancipation from further birth and death. It is his duty to make pilgrimage to all the temples of his god Śiva, or Viṣṇu. All his earnings together movable and immovable properties form the property of god. He should make no caste distinctions among his coreligionists. It is his duty to defend a coreligionist against all enemies.

Thus there exists a religious brotherhood among the Śaivites as well as among the Vaiṣṇavites. There is however no love lost between the two religions. Each is ever on a war path against the other. In the Vedic sacrifices Śiva and Viṣṇu are called upon together with the other gods. They are given an equal status and there is no enmity between them. According to the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, all the other gods conspired to bring about the severance of Viṣṇu's head by his own bow. This conspiracy is said to be due to the arrogance of Viṣṇu. It may

be that Śiva was one of the other gods concerned in the conspiracy. Apart from this single incident, there is nothing to show any trace of enmity between the two gods. It may therefore be said to be Dravidian in its origin. Being a personification of storm, Rudra-Śiva is a terrible and cruel god. In keeping with his destructive power he is regarded as being very fond of cremation ground. As Kālarudra he destroys the world at the close of an aeon. Visnu is a sun-god and peaceful. It is not possible to decide whether this difference in the origin of these two gods is one of the causes of the split between the followers of these two religions or whether it was tribal in its origin. There is however evidence to show that attempts have been made now and then to make peace between the two cults. The conception of Hari-hara and construction of temples dedicated to the combined form of Śiva and Visnu so far back as the 12th century A. D. is a sure indication of the endeavour made to bring the warring cults on the same platform.

What however encouraged the growth of the two religions is the material property of the temples. Both kings and rich land-lords and merchants seem to have vied with each other in endowing the temples with fertile lands and money grants for the purpose of conducting not only the daily worship but also the periodical festivals both in Śiva and Visnu temples. There were also free feeding houses attached to the temples. Irrespective of caste all devotees coming on pilgrimage to a temple seem to have been fed. According to inscriptions many temples had colleges of learning attached to them. It is certain that at the hands of the Professors of such colleges the mythic and philosophic aspects of the religion received considerable development. Having the Dravidian and Vedic myths for their basis, the two religions have their high and imposing towers formed of the philosophy of the Upanisads. In their philosophical development the phallic aspect of their origin is almost lost sight of. Purāṇas and Āgamas were composed to narrate stories illustrative of the supernatural powers of the deities and capable of making deep impressions on the minds of the illiterate. The Upanisadic words such as Īśa, Īśvara, Brahma, and the like have been interpreted in terms of Śiva or Visnu and the metaphysics, ethics, and psychology of the Upanisads have been explained with Śiva or Visnu as a central figure so as to delude the reader into the

1 Epi connection, Madras No. 182, and No. 518 for 1915 and No. 338 for 1917.

belief, that the authors of the Upanisads had the same sectarian cult in their view. We are concerned here only with the new turn given to the theory of ethics in these religions. Both the religions have one and the same form of ethics which is more practical than the Advaitic theory of morality noticed in the first chapter.

Whatever is laid down in the Vedas, the Upanisads, the Purāṇas and Āgamas is dharma and is to be observed with mind devoted to Viṣṇu. The Vedas are the utterances of Śiva or Viṣṇu and the Purāṇas and the Āgamas are the inspired sayings of holy men and are therefore equally sacred. He, the Lord, resides in the heart of every individual as Antaryāmin or Sākṣi (witness), and guides the true believer only towards good action. To the unbeliever the Antaryāmin or Sākṣi is lost and he is therefore destined to be addicted to wickedness. Without the thought of his Lord none should proceed to do anything. According to the Bhagavadgītā whatever a man does, eats, talks, thinks or meditates upon, he should make an offering of the same to the Lord. Whether the offering is a leaf, a flower, fruit, a drop of water, it pleases the Lord, if it is offered with true and sincere devotion. So far as the acts enjoined in the sacred texts are concerned, he will do only those which are obligatory, omitting those which are laid down for the purpose of attaining certain worldly ends. The one end which a devotee should have in mind is liberation from the bondage of the world and this will be realised with perfect devotion to the Lord. Hence he is required to set aside minor ends before this paramount end. In his worldly activity, he has to undertake only such acts as are in keeping with the spirit of his exclusive devotion to his Lord who then becoming manifest in his heart guides him. So far as moral theory is concerned, the conception of Antaryāmin in the Viśiṣṭādvaita system and the conception of Sākṣin in the Dvaita philosophy appears to be identical with what is called conscience or intuition. The uneducated call the Antaryāmin or Sākṣi "Paramātmā or Bhagavanta." If an uneducated man in a village is warned against the possibility of his going wrong, he is accustomed to reply touching his breast, how can Paramātmā or Bhagavanta approve of such wrong, implying that he will only do what his conscience or intuition suggests and approves of.

In his Vidhiviveka Maṇḍana-Miśra refers to the theory of instinct called Pratibhā, which suggests even to an infant or a

young animal or bird what it ought to do or avoid in its own interests. Here Pratibhā is evidently instinct. According to him whatever one "ought to" *or "ought not to" is suggested by Pratibhā, instinct, and in the case of grown up men language confirms what instinct suggests. This portion of the text rendered in English runs as follows :—

" Well, the motive for action is the conviction that it ought to be done. How can a man who has come to know that a thing ought to be done, cease to act ? What kind of reply can there be to him who finding gold calls it stone ? The question that crops up is what is the cause of the idea of "ought to" ? It is caused by Pratibhā. What is Pratibhā ? It is intuition or instinct (*Prajñā*) conducive to the knowledge of the relation of cause and effect between various things. The sense of motive for action is dependent upon Pratibhā, instinct ; for it is the cause of action. Doubt, mistake, and distrust are the causes of inaction. But instinct is quite different from them. Unless a man intuitively knows that such an act ought to be done in such a manner by such a man, he will not proceed though the nature of action is perceived by him. Instinct is thus the source of conviction. It is as it were a second eye to the world in undertaking its moral or imperative acts. What is the source of instinct itself ? It is sound or organ of sound. It is through sound (a verb in the imperative mood) in the case of those who are experienced, and through the excitement (*bhāvanā*) of the eternal sound-organ in the case of the young having no experience of sound and language, that instinct comes out to act. If this were not so, there would be no manifestation of the first steps in life's activity among living beings. This is summarised in the following traditional verses : " The first movement of functional organs, respiration and adjustment of organs to cause sound, cannot take place without a sense of sound and sound-organ. It is instinct which without any deliberation brings about the sense of causal relation between things, as if it has identified itself with external things. It has its origin in sound in the inherited organ of sound ; without its voice no living being attends to his imperative call. The world looks upon it as its only guide. It is through intuition or instinct that even lower animals go to their work. Otherwise how can a male cuckoo modify its voice in the spring ? How can the birds in general get their knowledge of building their nests and how can

animals and birds become aware of food, love, hatred, swimming and other acts peculiar to their species ? ”

In the statement made in the above verses that the cause of intuitive or instinctive knowledge is Śabdabhāvanā, Vācaspati-miśra interprets it as sense of sound or sound-organ when sound is not manifested. Here sound stands both for human language and the cries of birds and animals. I do not know whether there is any excitement in the sound organ preparatory to instinctive action of living beings and whether it can be scientifically verified.

There can however be no doubt that human society is indebted to its language for its conception of good and bad and right and wrong. I presume that there exists synchronism between the development of moral notions of a nation and that of its language. The moral sense of savages is as crude as their expressive power through their dialect. There is no absolute standard of morality. The notions of good and bad, right and wrong, true and false, and just and unjust are all relative and are susceptible of changes temporal and local. We have in the language of each nation a permanent record of the changes that have taken place in its notions of good and bad. There was a time when fetishism, human sacrifice, burning of heretics at the stakes, torture of enemies and other acts were considered good. In the course of time sense of humanity and human brotherhood dawned in the breast of man and banished all these notions as cruel and immoral. It follows therefore that there is no absolute standard of morality and that it cannot be defined so as to apply to all nations and at all times. It also follows that since the sense of good and bad is changeable, neither conscience nor intuition can be looked to for guidance. Nor are the hedonistic and Utilitarian theories of morality helpful in the matter. As mankind advances in its knowledge of nature and humanity, its sense of the nature of pleasure and utility undergoes a vast change. During the period of Upaniṣads both kings and people set a high premium on spiritual pleasure and looked upon sensual pleasure as vulgar and hurtful. During the Buddhistic period the Buddhists did the same in effect. Who knows whether the present European outlook of life and civilization may not undergo a perceptible change ? Whatever may be the future of the world which is now testing its well-being on the touch-stone of Western material sciences, this much is certain that changing as is the world's sense of good and bad, man can derive his

sense of good and bad for the time being only through the categorical imperative as reflected in the language of his fellow-beings. The moralists of the Āgamic period have called this imperative, Vidhi, command. The commentators on Kaṇāda's logic define Vidhi or spring of action as follows :—

Balavadanistānanubandhitve sati kṛtisādhyestāsādhana-tājñānam vidhiḥ.

This means that whatever is not productive of serious evil consequences and possibly and surely leads to the attainment of the desired end is a Vidhi or imperative cause or spring of action.

This view of right course of action is summarised in his " Vākyaṛtha " by Ahobila, a Mīmāṃsā scholar. The following are some of the verses throwing a flood of light on this intricate subject —

I. 3 I am going to make a presentation to the learned of the gem called Vākyaṛtha, meaning of a sentence, taken out of the great ocean of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, as explained by Guru (Prabhākara).

I. 4 The Śāstra called Mīmāṃsā treats of the nature of Dharma (good act); That Dharma is according to Jaimini a command or injunction.

5 The Vedic sentence which prompts a man to do a work is in the view of Śābara a command.

6 It is but proper to regard as commands only those sentences which, through their meaning lead a man to action, but not those which are unintelligible.

7 We are going to enter upon a discussion here as to what kind of meanings of sentences leads to action. On this question scholars hold different views.

Some, i. e., the Vedāntins, say that the meaning of a verbal root signifying the means to attain an end is what leads a man to act.

8 Others, i. e., the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, are of opinion that the intrinsic power of such words as are used in the imperative or obligatory sense impells a man to work.

9 Some others, i. e., the Vaiśeṣikas hold that since a man sets to work only after understanding the speaker's or commander's meaning or intention, it is the meaning of the speaker alone that leads a man to action.

10 Others, i. e., some logicians, say that usually man attempts to work for a thing which he thinks to be desirable and that it is therefore *desire* that is incentive for action.

11 But Guru thinks that (so far as secular acts are concerned,) whatever is fit and possible to be worked out (Kārya i. e. duty) as exemplified by the opinion of elders in society, is an incentive for work. Hence he says that workability or sense of duty is the incentive for work and this is as follows.

12 Some one orders some one else, as usual (in the world), ' Fetch a cow. ' The person, so ordered, sets out to bring a cow.

13 On that occasion, a person standing by, understands that this man's move must necessarily be preceded by a certain idea in his mind just as my own act in the past was preceded by a certain idea in my mind.

14 The idea is in its turn brought about by his hearing of sentence, ' Fetch a cow ' : because there is no other cause.

16 Having thus ascertained (the relation of cause to effect) and seen a cow fetched by the person ordered, the bystander comes to know that the act of fetching the cow is verily the meaning of the sentence, ' Fetch a cow. '

17 Then by such substitution of words in the sentence as ' Tie the cow, ' and ' Release the cow, ' he succeeds in ascertaining the meaning of each of the words composing the sentence.

18 Hence in accordance with worldly experience workability (Kārya) alone is the real incentive for work; but never do ' the means to attain a desired end or mere desire, and the like ' prompt a man to work.

19 If the means to attain a desired end were the incentive for work, then why should not a man attempt at catching hold of the disc of the moon, which is also a means to attain a desired end ?

20 If such means to attain a desired end as is signified by a verbal root were the incentive for work, then why should not a man make attempts at what is past or what is to come, (i. e. past or future showers of rain).

21 If what is signified by a verbal root as means possible to be employed to attain a desired end (i. e., workability) were regarded as an incentive for work and if what is past is not possibly a means to be employed, (i. e. workable).

22 Then what is the meaning of 'workability' of a thing as a means? Does it mean the consequence of one's own action or does it mean fitness of a thing to be worked out as a means? If it were the former, then what is past might also be attempted, to be employed as a means.

23 If, on the other hand, it were fitness to be worked out as a means, then it is not against the view of Guru, for he has said, that the notion that something is fit and possible to be worked out is due to its being recognised as a possible means to attain the desired end. Nor is the intention of a speaker or commander an incentive for work; for the intention of others is never comprehensible.

41 If it be asserted that it is possible to understand the intention of others from their speeches, there crop up two questions.

42 (1) Is that intention denoted by words or (2) by sentences? It cannot be the meaning of words, for words have their own meaning and never denote the intention of the speaker

43 Nor is it the meaning of a sentence; for the meaning of a sentence is either a combination of the meanings of individual words composing it or a combined sense of the meanings of words.

44 In neither case the meaning of a sentence can possibly be the intention of the speaker.

45 Nor is it possible to infer the intention of a speaker, for what may be inferred may be either a specified intention or an intention in general.

46 There is no datum to infer a special intention of a speaker. As to the inference of an intention in general, it will serve no purpose. Hence a speaker's intention is not at all an incentive for work.

47 As to the theory stated by some that desire is an incentive for work, it does not hold good, for it cannot stand to reason.

48 It is true that (according to the theory that knowledge, desire, and action follow one after another in order) desire prompts a man to work. But what we are considering here is not whether there exists desire as an incentive for work, but whether desire as the meaning of a commander's commanding

sentence, is an incentive for work; and desire as the meaning of a sentence is not at all incentive.

49 The incentive for work is therefore only the notion of work.

50 For the double reason known to all in the form of both positive and negative aspects of cause and effect that where there is a notion of workability (Kārya or sense of duty), there follows action, and where there is no such notion there follows no action. We hold that the notion of workability alone is an incentive for action, *whether it is secular or religious*.

51 Workability is the direct literal meaning of all imperative suffixes; and other words composing an imperative sentence indirectly convey the same meaning.

52 Thus in both secular matters pertaining to this world and religious matters referring to the other world, sense of duty and workability alone is the incentive for man's action. There is however this much distinction between these two. In all secular matters 'Kārya' or 'workable' means in conformity to usage among the elders a mere act.

68 Hence it has to be admitted in consideration of uniformity both in social (worldly) and religious activities that what is obligatory and workable (Kārya) is the incentive for work and nothing else.

III. 71 Thus the concept of workability is of a uniform type both in social and religious worlds. But the religious concept differs from the social in that the former is one of lasting efficacy and far removed from all proofs.

III. 72 The conception of the workable is in entire accordance with exemplary conduct of elders. But only the formation of the religious concept is arrived at from a careful study of Vedic sentences.

III. 73 Thus there is no trace of illogicalness in the conclusion that as in the world so in the Vedas also the concept of the workable is the incentive for work.

Accordingly this view is in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the discourse on the world and the Vedas in the Sūtras of Jaimini.

Thus the Kārya or an obligatory act workable to bring about a desired end signified by the imperative suffixes is an

action and there can be no action without an object to be acted upon. IV. 35. Nor can there be an object to be acted upon without an agent to act upon it. Nor can there be an agent who will do the work with no interest in the result. There will be no interested person having no specified interest. That interest is Svarga, specified in the sentence itself. IV 35-37

The meaning is this :—

Since actions are all of momentary duration, they cannot be regarded to last till their fruition in distant future. Hence acts denoted by Vedic imperatives have to be regarded as lasting till their fruition. Such acts can only be performed by such as are interested in them. The interested person is called *Niyojya* or a person ordered to undertake the work in his own interests. Work means an action which is impossible without an agent, none can be an agent, who is not interested in the act and who does not regard the work as his own. Accordingly there must be interest for him in the work; that interest is the Svarga or Heaven, which is a restricting qualification of the agent. Living and the like cannot be offered as inducement or interest. If it were an inducement, application to work would be delayed. If on the other hand the end itself be made the inducement, then application to work would be instantaneous. 38

Nor can cow, sons, and the like be offered as inducements, for such inducements do not attract all. As to Heaven, it is desired by all. Hence Heaven alone is specified as the only inducement towards the sacrificial acts signified by the Vedic imperatives. 39-40

As to those who are interested only in liberation (*Moksa*) and have no desire for Heaven, we say the sacrificial acts are not meant for them, but only to those who have a desire for Heaven.

Hence it follows that in both secular and sacred literature what is incentive for work is an obligatory act possible to be turned out.

Thus as far as is known and as far as it is understood by me, I have explained the ethical theory, as set forth in the school of *Prabhākara* Guru. IV. 41

Thus there are three distinct forms of ethical theory propounded and practised by ancient Indians; the first is the theory of inaction or abstention from all kinds of voluntary action

expounded in the Upanisads. (As a means to the attainment of emancipation from Samsāra or chain of births and deaths attentive practice of Yoga or withdrawal of mind from all kinds of mental and physical activities with the exception of an almost involuntary type of action to eke out the bare necessities of life is insisted upon.) It is well known that Vānaprasthas and Samnyāsins of ancient India as well as the Buddhist monks and Jaina ascetics brought this theory into practice by living a life of inaction.

The second is the theory of work with no desire for the results accruing from it. The underlying principle of this theory is that the observance of duty for duty's sake will involve the doer in no breach of moral law. Nor is there any possibility of his risking his spiritual interests.

The third is what is taught in Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā sūtras*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Āgamas*. It is the doing of such works as are approved of and abstention from those which are condemned by the society, of which the doer is a member. By propounding such a theory of right course of action the followers of Saivism, Vaisnavism and other *Āgamic* cults as well as the followers of the ancient Vedic sacrificial cult seem to have thought it easy to maintain the discipline of each and every member of their religious communities or castes. There is no doubt that the appearance of rigid castes in India is coeval with the rise of *Āgamic* cults.

YUVARĀJADEVA I OF TRIPURI

BY

PROF. V. V. MIRASHI, M. A.

From inscriptions and coins brought to light from time to time it is now well known that the Imperial dynasty of the Kalacuris ruled at Tripurī, now a village at a distance of about six miles from Jubbalpore. In this illustrious dynasty there flourished in the first half of the 10th century Yuvarājadeva I who raided all parts of India and seems to have assumed the Imperial titles of Parameśvara and Cakravartin.¹ From inscriptions as well as a drama of Rājasekhara, a Sanskrit poet patronised by him, it is now possible to determine the main events of his reign.

Yuvarājadeva was the grandson of Kokkalla who seems to have been the founder of the Tripurī branch of the Kalacuri dynasty. Kokkalla flourished in the second half of the 9th century; for in the Bilhāri Stone Inscription of the reign of Yuvarājadeva II and the Benares copperplate inscription² of Karṇa he is said to have been a contemporary of Bhoja of Kanauj (862, 876 and 882 A. D.) and also of Vallabharāja who is identified with Kṛṣṇa II of the Rāstrakūta dynasty (875-911 A. D.). He was succeeded by his son who is named Mugdhatunga in the Bilhāri inscription and Prasiddhadhavalā in the Benares copperplate inscription. He signalised his reign by extending his sway to the eastern coast and depriving the lord of Kosala (modern chattisgadha) of Pall. After him his son Bālaharṣa, came to the throne. The Benares copperplates which name him, mention no noteworthy event of his reign, while the Bilhāri inscription omits him altogether, probably because his reign was very short. He was succeeded by his younger brother Yuvarājadeva I alias Keyūravarsa.

No inscriptions of the reign of Yuvarājadeva have yet been recovered. From the Bilhāri stone inscription, however we learn that ' he fulfilled the ardent wishes of the women of Gauḍa, sported with the damsels of Karṇāta, ornamented the foreheads of the women of Lāṭa, was engaged in amorous dalliance with the women of Kāśmīr and was fond of the charming songs of

1 यः साक्षात्परमेश्वरः समभवत्सम्यक्शिवाराधनात् । Ep Ind. Vol. I. p. 266.

करञ्जुलितिलको वर्तते चक्रवर्ती । विदुशालभञ्जिका V. 21 (Prof. Arte's Ed.)

2 Ep. Ind. Vol. II pp. 297 ff.

the women of Kalinga.'¹ This shows that Yuvarājadeva had raided Bengal, Karnatak, Gujerat, Kaśmīr and the Northern Circars and had married the beautiful ladies of these provinces. This is no empty boast; for, curious as it might appear, it receives confirmation from a passage in the *Viddhaśālabhañjikā* of Rājāśekhara which was staged before his court. From the fourth act of this play we learn that the king had married the princesses of Magadha, Mālvā, Pāñcala, Avanti, Jālandhara and Kerala. Even in the inscriptions of his enemies Yuvarājadeva is referred to as having planted his foot on the rows of the heads of famous kings.² There is not, therefore, much exaggeration, when the Bilhāri stone inscription describes him as follows: 'From Kailāsa where Pārvati is incessantly engaged in sports and from the noble eastern mountain over which the Sun shines; up to the bridge of waters and as far as the western sea, the valour of his armies caused endless trouble to his enemies.'

The Kardā Rāstrakūta grant³ tells us that Yuvarājadeva gave his daughter Kandakadevi in marriage to Baḍḍiga alias Amoghavarṣa III, the Rāstrakūta king of Mānyakheta (Malkhed in the Nizam's territory). Baḍḍiga must have been an old man when he ascended the throne after his nephew Govinda IV. As he was reigning in 937 and 939 A. D.⁴ we might place Yuvarājadeva, who was his senior contemporary, in the period 910-950 A. D.

Yuvarājadeva was a patron of men of letters. The Sanskrit poet Rājāśekhara flourished at his court. The *Viddhaśālabhañjikā*, one of the dramas of this poet, contains some historical data about the reign of Yuvarājadeva. Its plot may be summarised as follows:—

King Vidyādharamalla Karpūravarṣa of Tripurī receives at his court Virapāla alias Candamahāsena, the lord of Kuntala, who has been deprived of his kingdom by his relatives, and first falls in love with his daughter Kuvalayamālā.

1 Ep. Ind. vol. I. p. 265

2. विख्यातक्षितिपालमौलिरचनाविन्यस्तपादाङ्गुजम् । सख्येऽसंख्यबल व्यज्येष्ट गतभीर्यश्चेदिराज इडात् ।
The king of Cedi spoken of here is Yuvarājadeva I as shown below.

3 युवराजदेवदुहितरि कन्दकदेव्याममोववर्षनृपात् । जातः खोद्विगदेवो नृपतिरधुर् युवनाविख्यातः ॥
Ind. Ant. Vol. XII. p. 264 ff.

4 Epigraphia Carnatica Vol. XI pp. 29-30.

His minister Bhāgurāyana, however, comes to know from astrologers that the king who would marry Mrgāṅkāvali, the daughter of king Candravarman of Lāta (central and southern Gujerat) would be the sovereign of the whole world. He, therefore, contrives to bring about a marriage between Karpūravarsa and Mrgāṅkāvali. Candravarman, her father, had no son and so had brought her up as a boy since her childhood. None but Bhāgurāyana knew of this secret. It seems that Karpūravarsa had defeated Candravarman, for we are told that the latter was obliged to keep as a hostage Mrgāṅkāvali disguised as a prince named Mrgāṅkavarman at the Kalacuri court. Karpūravarsa's chief queen, Madansundari, who though related to Candravarman, is shown to be ignorant of the personation, used to dress occasionally the pretended boy in a female garb. When the king sees her once in a dream he falls in love with her. The queen in order to play a practical joke on the king, induces him to marry a sister of the pretended boy. This sister is no other than Mrgāṅkāvali herself, though the queen who is ignorant of her real sex, takes her to be Mrgāṅkavarman in a female dress. The king agrees and the marriage is performed. In the meanwhile news comes from Candravarman that a son has been born to him. He, therefore, requests his niece the queen to bestow his daughter Mrgāṅkāvali whom he had brought up as a son on a worthy consort. The queen realises her mistake when it is too late. To make the best of the situation, however, she bestows both Mrgāṅkāvali and Kuvalayamālā the Kuntala princess on the king. Just then there comes a messenger bearing the following letter from the king's commander-in-chief Śrī Vatsa. 'By the prowess of your Majesty who are an ornament of the Karaculis, by the policy of the great minister Bhāgurāyana, as well as by the execution of your Majesty's commands by insignificant soldiers like myself, all the kings of the East, West and North were already subdued. Only those of the South had not yet submitted. Virapāla, the lord of Kuntala, who was deprived of his kingdom by his kinsmen sought your Majesty's protection. As your Majesty commanded, we placed him in front and encamped on the bank of the Payosni. There we fought with a confederacy of several kings viz: those of Karnāṭa, Simhala, Pāṇḍya, Murala, Āndhra, Kuntala, Koṅkana &c. and subdued them. We then placed Virapāla on the throne &c.' Bhāgurāyana then declares that the king, who is an ornament of the Karaculis, reigns supreme over the whole country from the milky ocean

in the north to the sea filled with the water of the Tāmraparni in the South, from the western ocean which receives the Narmadā to the eastern sea whose shore is sanctified by the fall of the Ganges.

The Viddhaśālabhañjikā is a drama of harem-intrigue. The plot summarised above resembles in some respects those of the Mālavikāgnimitra of Kālidāsa and of the Priyadarśikā and the Ratnāvalī of Harsa. Still it is likely to have a historical basis. In the Indian Antiquary Vol. XXXIV pp. 177 ff. the late Dr. Hultzscht identified Vidyādharamalla Karpūravarṣa with the Kalacuri King Yuvarājadeva I alias Keyūravarsa on the following grounds—

(1) From the prologue we learn that the play was enacted before the court of Śrī Yuvarājadeva. (2) The king is called Karaculi-tilaka, the ornament of the Karaculis and is represented as ruling in Nṛpurī which is evidently a mistake for Tripurī. (3) He is again called Trilingādhipati, which is also probably a mistake for Trikingādhipati; for we know that this title was assumed by some Kalacuri kings that ruled at Tripurī. Dr. Hultzscht could not, however, identify the other kings mentioned in the play; for he wrote 'Karpūravarṣa's alleged contemporaries Candravarman of Lāṭa and Candamahāsena or Virapāla of Kuntala are unknown to historical records.' If we could identify these kings we would be able to shed some light on the history of that period.

From the analysis of the plot given above it would be seen that it refers to the following events—

(1) Yuvarājadeva Keyūravarsa married a daughter of Candravarman the king of Lāṭa and this marriage strengthened his position.

(2) He espoused the cause of Virapāla the king of Kuntala and sent an army which fought with a confederacy of kings on the bank of the Payosnī, defeated it and placed Virapāla on the throne of Kuntala.

Let us now examine how far these events are historical. From the Bilhāri stone inscription we learn that Yuvarājadeva married Nohalā who was a Caulukya princess. Her genealogy is given there as follows :—

Sinhavarman
|
(son)
Sadhanva
|
son
Avanivarman
|
daughter
Nohalā

The inscription does not, however, state where these princes ruled. Avanivarman is described as *Sāmantacūḍāmani*, the best of feudatories. These names again do not figure in the genealogical lists of the *Čālukya* princes known to us.¹

Towards the middle of the 8th century the *Čālukyas* of *Badāmi* had lost their paramount position in the Deccan and their place was taken by the *Rāṣtrakūṭas*. The later *Čālukyas* of *Kalyāṇi* had not then (i. e. in the beginning of the 10th century) risen into prominence. It seems, however, that there was a line of the *Čālukyas* ruling in *Gujarat* about this time. *Mūlarāja* the founder of the *Čaulukya* dynasty of *Anahilavāḍa* who came to the throne in 961 A. D. had to fight with *Bārappa* who is described in the *Dvyāśraya Kāvya* as king of *Lāta deśa*. The *Surat* grant of *Kīrtirāja*, a grandson of *Bārappa*, is dated 1018 A. D. In it *Kīrtirāja* calls himself a *Čaulukya* king. So *Bārappa* who was ruling over *Lāta* about 960 A. D. was a king of the *Čaulukya* dynasty. Unfortunately the names of *Bārappa's* ancestors are not known. But I think we shall not be wrong if we suppose that *Bārappa* was the son of *Avanivarman*. If this conjecture is correct, *Avanivarman* can be identified with *Candravarman*, the father of *Mrgankāvali*, who is represented as ruling over *Lātades'a* in the *Viddhaśālabhañjikā*.² In the *Bilhāri* inscription *Avanivarman* the father of *Nohalā* is styled the best of feudatories and we have seen that *Candravar-*

1 One *Avanivarman* (II), the son of *Balavarman* and grandson of *Avanivarman* (I) of the *Čālukya* dynasty is known to have been ruling over south *Kathiawad* in 899 A. D. But as Prof. Kielhorn has pointed out he cannot be identified with the father of *Nohalā* as the names of their ancestors do not agree. See *Ep. Ind.* vol. IX p. 3.

2 It may be noted in this connection that in the *Balarāmāyana* also *Rājasekhara* represents a *Čālukya* king as ruling over *Lāta* (III, 57). From the description of the several kings assembled for the *Svayamvara* of *Siṅga*, which is full of anachronisms, it is clear that he is referring to the state of things in his own times.

man of the Viddhaśālabhañjikā was probably a feudatory of Yuvarājadeva. The poet has not evidently used the real names of the characters that figure in the drama, but has coined others in imitation of them.¹ The heroine Mrgānkavali would thus have to be identified with Nohalā. From the Bilhari inscription we know that she was very dear to Yuvarājadeva who built a temple of Śiva called Nohaleśvara after her. She also donated several villages to the Śaiva ascetic who lived in the Matha attached to the temple. Rājasekhara seems to have composed this drama on the occasion of Yuvarājadeva's marriage with her.²

The second event also described in the play seems to have a foundation in fact. Virapāla, whose cause was espoused by Yuvarājadeva, is called king of Kuntala. Now Rājasekhara identifies Kuntala with Vidarbha as will be seen from a comparison of the following two statements that occur in his works:—

(1) अथि एत्थ वच्छोमं णाम णअरं कुन्तलेसु । तहिं सअलजणवल्लहो वल्लहराओ
णाम राजा । Karpūramañjarī Act. I³

1 The similarity between Keyūravaraṣa and Karpūravaraṣa has already been noted. Bhūgurāyaṇa, the chief minister of Karpūravaraṣa probably represents Bhakamiśra, who, as we learn from the Kāritāsi stone inscription was the chief minister of Yuvarājadeva Keyūravaraṣa.

2 It has to be noted, however, that the legendary explanation of the dynastic name 'Caulukya' given in the Bilhārī inscription does not agree with that in the inscriptions of Bārappa's descendants. (Cf. the Surat plates of the Calukya Trilocana pāladeva Ind. Ant. vol. XII p. 201). But these legendary explanations of dynastic names are in almost all cases imagined by the poets. In the Surat plates Bārappa is said to have obtained Lāṭa deśa (श्रीलटदेशमाविगम्य कृतानि येन &c.) and it is, therefore, supposed that he was the first prince of that dynasty to become king of Lāṭa) (Bom. Gazetteer vol. I part II p. 22). But a similar expression is also used in connection with his grandson Kūtīrāja and as noted above Rājasekhara also speaks of the Caulukyās as ruling over Lāṭa. Bārappa was, therefore, only the first distinguished member of the family that ruled there. The Raṣṭrakūṣas were supreme in Lāṭa till 930 A. D. (Cf. the Cambay plates of Govinda IV Ep. Ind. vol. VII p. 26). Avanivarman may have been at first a feudatory of Govind IV, but seems to have been defeated later on by Yuvarājadeva.

3 It is to be noted, however, that the Harvard Oriental Series Edition of the Karpūramañjarī reads the passage as अथि एत्थ वच्छिण्णावणे कुन्तलेसु सअलजणवल्लहो वल्लहराओ णाम राजा । Rājasekhara sometimes identifies Vidarbha with Kuntala (Cf. Bālarāmāyaṇa III, 50-52, X, 74-75) and sometimes mentions the two countries separately. (Cf. Kāvya-mīmāṃsā p. 93). Kuntala is generally taken to refer to the Southern Maratha Country. The identification of the lord of Kuntala with a Raṣṭrakūṣa king is not, however, affected thereby as Mānyakheta, the capital of the Raṣṭrakūṣas was situated in the country of Kuntala even in this second

(2) तत्रास्ति मनोजन्मनो देवस्य कडिवासो विदर्भेषु वत्सगुप्तं नाम नगरम्
Kāvyamīmāṃsā p. 10 (Gaikwad's Oriental Series First Edition).

The first of these passages places Vatsagulma (modern Vāśīm in Berar) in Kuntala and the second in Vidarbha. We know that Vidarbha was conquered by the Rāstrakūtas as early as 772 A. D. in the reign of Kṛṣṇa I¹ and the Deoli plates show that it continued in their possession till the reign of Kṛṣṇa III.² Again from the Karpūramañjarī we learn that there was a king named Vallabharāja ruling in Kuntala. The name Vallabharāja was assumed by many Rāstrakūta kings. The Arabs called the Rāstrakūtas by the name of Balhārā which is admitted to be a corruption of Vallabharāja.³ It would not, therefore, be wrong if we suppose that Virapāla was a claimant for the Rāstrakūta throne. His claims were superseded and so he sought Yuvarājadeva's help to gain his kingdom. Was there such a trouble in respect of succession about this time in the history of the Rāstrakūtas? The Karhād⁴ and Deoli plates of Kṛṣṇa III tell us that Govinda IV, whose known dates are 918, 929, 930 and 933 A. D. was 'the source of the sportive pleasures of love, that his mind was enchained by the eyes of women and' he displeased all men by his vicious courses and his health being undermined he met with untimely death'. The latest date for Govinda IV, viz. 933 A. D., falls in the reign of Yuvarājadeva. The same inscriptions again tell us that after the death of Govinda IV, the feudatory princes entreated Baddiga alias Amoghavarsa, the uncle of Govinda IV to ascend the throne.⁵ This shows that there was some trouble about succession at this time. Virapāla must have been a claimant for the throne and when he could not gain it he sought Yuvarājadeva's help. Yuvarājadeva had by this time, made extensive conquests in the North, East and West but as

1 Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference p. 625.

2 Ep. Ind. vol. V p. 188.

3 Early History of the Deccan p. 209.

4 Ep. Ind. vol. IV p. 278.

5 सामन्तरथ रत्नाकरादिनालक्षार्थमन्यार्थितो &c. Prof. K. B. Pathak has drawn the attention of scholars to an important passage in the Vikramārjunavijaya of a Kanarese poet Pampa, where it is said that 'Arikesarin conquered the great feudatories sent by the emperor named Gojjiga, and destroying the emperor who offered opposition gave universal sovereignty to Baddigadeva who came placing confidence in him. Arikesarin was a Gālukya chieftain ruling over Jola country (Dharwar District) Ep. Ind. vol. VII p. 34.

the Viddhaśālabhañjikā tells us he could not, for some time, gain a footing in the South. This was probably due to the increasing power of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas. He must have, therefore, thought this to be a very good opportunity to have his own nominee on the Rāṣṭrakūṭa throne. He despatched a large army under his trusted general who fought a battle with the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king¹ and his allies on the bank of the Payosnī (modern Paingāṅgā, a tributary of the Wardhā). The allies of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king are enumerated in the following verse in the Viddhaśālabhañjikā—

कार्णाटो युद्धतन्त्रे चतुरतरमतिः सिंहलः सिंहकर्मा
पाण्ड्यश्चण्डासियष्टिर्मुलपरिवृढः कार्मुकप्रौढबाहः ।
आन्ध्रो नीरन्ध्रसारः समरभुवि पुरः कुन्तलः कुन्तशाली
किंचान्ये कोङ्कणाद्या अपि नरपतयः संश्रिताः संघवृत्तिम् ॥

This description of the allies is evidently dictated by alliteration; but it is quite likely that they assisted Baddiga Amoghavarṣa and his son and crown-prince Kṛṣṇa in this battle; for from the later inscriptions of Kṛṣṇa III we know that they were his feudatories.

(1) Karnāṭa—This may be either Arikesarin, the Cālukya king of Jola and patron of the Kanarese poet Pampa, who we know,² helped Baddiga to gain the throne, or more probably Buṭuga the western Gaṅga king who ruled over Mysore and who was a son-in-law of Baddiga³. The Atakur inscription tells us that Buṭuga, who killed the Cola prince Rājāditya (947 A. D.), was a feudatory of Kṛṣṇa III and received the gift of a province and four districts for the help that he rendered to him.³

1 This may have been either Baddiga Amoghavarṣa or his able son and crown prince, who afterwards ascended the throne as Kṛṣṇa III. It may, at first sight, appear improbable that Yuvarājadeva should have waged war on his own son-in-law, Baddiga. He was, however, a man of very quiet and saintly nature. (Cf. the epithets विवेकिष्ठ प्रथमः & प्रज्ञामिनामायः applied to him in the Deoli and Karhād plates). He was entirely guided by his ambitious and able son Kṛṣṇa III. As the late Dr. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar conjectured Kṛṣṇa III was not the son of Yuvarājadeva's daughter Kandakadevi. (Cf. Early History of the Deccan p. 205) Yuvarājadeva must have, therefore, felt that if his son-in-law Baddiga ascended the throne, he would be entirely under the control of his eldest son Kṛṣṇa. Hence he seems to have decided to back up some other more tractable claimant for the throne.

2 Cf. the Hebbal inscription of 975 A. D. Ep. Ind. vol. IV. p. 350.

3 Ep. Ind. vol. II p. 167 ff.

(2) *Simhala* is the king of Ceylon. *Parāntaka* the powerful Cola king (907-949 A. D.) had invaded ceylon. ¹ So this king must have sought the help of the *Rāstrakūtas*, the only other powerful dynasty of that time. The *Karhād* plates of *Kṛṣṇa III* mention *Simhala* as a feudatory. ²

(3) *Pāṇḍya*- This king also must have been an ally of *Kṛṣṇa III* in that battle. The *Pāṇḍya* prince who ruled at this time in *Madura* was driven into exile by *Parāntaka Cola* ¹. The *Karhād* plates of *Kṛṣṇa III* say that after overthrowing the Cola king *Kṛṣṇa III* divided his territory among the *Ceranmas*, *Pāṇḍya* and other kings. ²

(4) The Lord of *Murala*- In the *Uttararāmacarita* *Muralā* appears as a tributary river of the *Godāvarī*. Again the present battle seems to have been fought in the country of the *Muralas*, as *Yuvarājadeva's* commander-in-chief writes of the wives of the *Muralas* as fixing their eyes on the feet of *Yuvarājadeva*. ³ From the *Sangamner* plates of the *Yādava Mahāsāmanta Bhīllama II* it appears that *Vandiga* who ruled over this country was a feudatory of *Kṛṣṇa III*. ⁴

(5) *Āndhra*- The Eastern *Ālūkyas* of *Vengi* were often at war with the *Rāstrakūtas*. From one of their records we learn that *Ālūkyā Bhīma II* (934-945 A. D.) destroyed a great army that was sent against him by *Govinda IV*. ⁵ Like *Arikesarin*, he also may have assisted *Baddiga Amoghavarṣa* the adversary of *Govinda IV*.

(6) *Koṅkana*- The *Śīlāhāras* of *Koṅkana* were feudatories of the *Rāstrakūtas* till their overthrow by the later *Ālūkyas* of *Kalyāṇi*. ⁶

We have thus seen that all the 'allies mentioned by *Rājasekhara* were later on the feudatories of *Kṛṣṇa III* and may have, therefore, assisted him and his father in the battle of the *Payoṣṇī*. This battle resulted in a victory for *Yuvarājadeva*

1 V. Smith—Early History of India third Ed. p. 464.

2 Cf. कृत्वा दक्षिणदिग्जयोद्यतधिया चैलान्वयोन्युल्लनम्, तद्भूमिं निजभृत्यवर्मपरितःश्वेरन्म-पाण्ड्यादिकान् । येनोच्चैः सह सिंहलेन करदान् सन्मण्डलाधीश्वरान् न्यस्तः कीर्तिलनाङ्कुरप्रतिक्रान्तिः स्वभक्त्य-रामेश्वरे ॥

3 श्रीवत्सो वल्ललत्वान्मुरलजनवधूलोचनैरर्च्यमाने पादद्वन्द्वारविन्दे क्षयमभिरचयत्यञ्जलिं शुभिं भक्त्या IV 18.

4 Ep. Ind. Vol. II p.214.

5 Fleet—Dynasties of the Kanarese districts p. 417.

6 Rom. Gazetteer Vol. I p. II p. 23

who placed Virapāla¹ on the throne of the Rāstrakūtas. He also married his daughter to cement that alliance. The last known date for Govinda IV is 933 A. D. while the earliest known date for Baddiga Amoghavarasa is 937 A. D. So the battle of the Payosni must have been fought in the period between 933-937 A. D., probably about 935 A. D. The Viddhaśālabhañjikā seems to have been staged at Tripuri in jubilation at this great victory over a formidable confederacy of the southern kings. Yuvarājadeva was now at the height of his power, for he had attained the enviable position of Cakravartin or lord paramount of the whole of India.

This success seems, however, to have been only temporary; for we find that Baddiga Amoghavarasa soon regained his throne with the help of his feudatories and was firmly established on it in 937 A. D. Baddiga was a saintly king; his son Krsna III seems to have been the *de facto* ruler during his life time. He soon took revenge by raiding the Cedi country and defeating Yuvarājadeva. The Karhād plates of Krsna III dated Śaka 880 (958 A. D.) tell us that Krsna III, while he was Yuvarāja, defeated a Sahasrārjuna, who was an elderly relative of his mother and wife.² Now the Kalacuris called themselves Haihayas and traced their descent from Sahasrārjuna Kārtavīrya. So a Kalacuri king is evidently referred to here. Dr. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar who edited the Karhād plates in the Ep. Ind. Vol. IV p. 278 observed as follows:—“Who the particular prince conquered by Krsna III was it is difficult to say.” I would identify him with Yuvarājadeva I. We know that Yuvarājadeva's daughter Kandakadevi was married to (Baddiga) Amoghavarasa, the father of Krsna III. From the references to the two brothers Krsna III and Khottiga in Karda plates³ Dr. Sir. R. G. Bhandarkar conjectured that Kandaka-

1 As Rājasekhara has coined the names of almost all the characters in the play, the real name of this prince cannot be determined at present. As Yuvarājadeva is shown in the play to have married his daughter he seems to have been an elderly person and may have been another uncle of Govinda IV. My Friend Prof. A. S. Altekar of the Benares Hindu University suggests that he may be Bappuga who was vanquished by Kṛṣṇa while he was a crown prince. (See the Deoli and Karhād plates).

2 रामहतसहस्रयुजो युजत्रयाकालितसमद्रामेण ॥ जननीपत्नीयुररपि येन सहस्राजुनो विजितः ॥

3 रेन्द्रपद्मजिगीषसेव स्वर्गमधिष्ठे च ज्येष्ठे भ्रातरि श्रमिकृष्णराजदेवे,
युवराजदेशबुद्धितरि कन्दकदेव्याममोचवर्षनृपात् ।
जातः खोद्विगदेवो नृपातिरयुद्धयुवनविव्यातः ॥

Early History of the Deccan p. 205

devī was the mother of Khottiga but the step-mother of Kṛṣṇa III. The elderly relative of Kandakdevī who was on the throne of the Kalacuris and who was defeated by Kṛṣṇa could have been none other than Yuvarājadeva I. This invasion of the Cedi country must have occurred before 940 A. D. the date of Kṛṣṇa's accession i. e. in the first or second year of his father's reign; for it is mentioned first in list of the achievements of Kṛṣṇa III while he was a crown-prince.

It seems that there was another reason also for the invasion of the Cedi country undertaken by Kṛṣṇa III. In the *Viddhaśālabhañjikā* the hero, whom we have identified with Yuvarājadeva I is called 'Ujjayinībhujaṅga' the paramour of Ujjayinī.¹ On this Dr. Hultzsck has remarked as follows:— "this *biruda* suggests an ungratified desire for the conquest of Malwa'. I would rather see in this expression a reference to Yuvarājadeva's invasion of Ujjayinī, which must have taken place just about that time. As Yuvarājadeva did not annex it he is called the 'paramour,' and not 'the lord' of the city. From the Cambay plates² of Govind IV we learn that Indra III had captured Ujjayinī. Since then the Paramāra kings who ruled there seem to have owned allegiance to the Rāṣṭrakūṭas. The recently discovered Harsola plates³ of Śīyaka show that Śīyaka who ruled in 949 A. D. acknowledged the suzerainty of Kṛṣṇa III. There were constant wars going on between the neighbouring kings the Kalacuris of Tripuri and the Paramāras of Malwa. When, therefore, Yuvarājadeva attacked and captured Ujjayinī, the Paramāras must have sought the protection of their overlord the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king. The northern campaign of Kṛṣṇa III must therefore, have been undertaken to punish the Kalacuri king Yuvarājadeva for meddling in the matter of succession to the Rāṣṭrakūṭa throne as well as for invading the capital of his feudatory the Paramāra king.

Yuvarājadeva seems to have suffered another defeat at the hands of Yaśovarman the Candella king who ruled over the neighbouring province of Jejakabhukti. Yaśovarman was a contemporary of Devapāla (948 A. D.) from whom he obtained

1 जय जयोऽजयिनीभुजङ्ग इत्येवमिति भवति । विद्वद्शालमञ्जिका I, 20.

2 Ep. Ind. vol. VII p. 26.

3 Ep. Ind. vol. XIX p. 236 ff.

the beautiful image of Vaikuntha (Visṇu). In the Khajuraho inscription¹ we are told that Yaśovarman vanquished in battle, 'a Cedi king who had countless forces and who was being protected by a multitude of angry and invincible bowmen riding elephants in rut that resembled huge mountains of collyrium as they moved about and who had planted his lotus-like foot on a row of the heads of famous kings'. This description can apply only to Yuvarājadeva I who flourished about that time; for his son and successor Lakṣmanarājadeva does not seem to have been so famous. R. B. Hiralal says that this conflict apparently took place at the time of the succession of Yuvarājadeva I.² As we have placed Yuvarājadeva in the first half of the 10th century and as he is described in the above inscription as having already defeated a number of famous kings, we must date this battle towards the end of his reign when he had lost his prestige perhaps owing to the defeat he had suffered at the hands of Kṛṣṇa III.

There is another inscription³ recently found at Jurā, 12 miles from the Maihar Railway station, which shows that Kṛṣṇa III led one more expedition in the north after he ascended the throne and set up a monument at Jubbalpore. As it mentions his extermination of the Cola king it must be dated after 947 A. D. As R. B. Hiralal has pointed out there is a much defaced inscription of Kṛṣṇa III at Nilakanṭhi in the Ohhindwara district.⁴ He seems, therefore, to have wrested some part of his dominions from a Kalacuri king. Whether this second invasion of Kṛṣṇa III took place in the reign of Yuvarājadeva I cannot be determined at present.

Yuvarājadeva was a great patron of religion and literature. His patronage of Rājasekhara, the author of the *Viddhaśāla-bhañjikā* has been noted above. Rājasekhara's ancestors Akālaśalada, Tarala and Surānanda were patronised by the Kalacuri kings.⁵ Rājasekhara was, however, at first attracted by the more prosperous court of Kanauj under Mahendrapāla I and his son Mahipāla and wrote his earlier works

1 Ep. Ind. vol. I p. 24—

उत्तुङ्गाज्जशिलसन्निभचलन्मत्तद्विप्रेन्द्रस्थितकुम्भद्वर्धुरधन्विमार्गगणप्राग्बन्धरक्षाक्रियम् ।

विख्यातक्षितिपालमौलिरचनाविन्यस्तपादाब्जसख्येऽसंख्यबलं व्यजेष्ट गतभीर्यश्चेदिराज हटात् ॥

2 *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute* vol IX p. 287.

3 Ep. Ind. Vol. XIX p. 287.

4 List of Inscriptions in O. P. and Berar. First Ed. p. 81-82.

5 मन्दाना मेकलसुता वृषाणा रणाविग्रहः । कविना च सुरानन्दश्चेदिमण्डलमण्डनम् ॥ *Sūktimu**

Bālarāmayāna, Bālabhārata and Karpūramañjarī while at Kanauj. After the defeat of Mahīpāla by Indra III (the grandfather of Kṛṣṇa III) in 916 A. D. the empire of Kanauj must have declined in power. Rājasekhara must have, therefore, returned to the court of Tripurī which was then prospering under Yuvarājadeva I. Here he wrote his Viddhaśālabhañjikā and Kāvyaṁimāmsā. There were other poets also at the Cedi Court, for we find that the Karitalai inscription¹ which was engraved in the reign of Lakṣmanarāja, the son and successor of Yuvarājadeva is written in a beautiful Kāvya style. Yuvarājadeva, like most of his contemporaries, patronised Śaivism and made large donations to the temple of Nohaleśvara. Rai Bahadur Hiralal has shown that he endowed the matha attached to it with the munificent gift of three lakhs of villages.² His ministers Bhākamiśra and Someśvara were devotees of Viṣṇu. The latter erected the temple of Someśvara at Karitalai.

1 Ep. Ind. Vol. II P. 174 ff.

The Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute Vol. IX p. 288 ff.

KANARESE INFLUENCE ON OLD MARATHI WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JÑĀNESVARĪ*

BY

R. V. JAHAGIRDAR, M. A.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Modern Indo-Aryan languages is one of extension and supersession. From the Vedic times to the present day, the tongue of the earliest conquerors of India has been advancing in territory and influence. In its march, it came into contact with other languages. The result of this linguistic clash was two-fold. Firstly, "when an Aryan tongue comes in contact with an uncivilised aboriginal one, it is invariably the latter which goes to the wall. It is only in the South of India, where aboriginal languages are associated with a high degree of culture, that they have held their own." (Imperial Gazetteer, Vol I. pp. 351-2). Secondly, the Aryan speech itself did not remain unaffected. In dissolving the less civilised speeches, it assimilated certain of their characteristics. It may be mentioned as a passing instance that even in its earliest days, Indo-Aryan possessed "a second series of dental letters, the so-called cerebrata foreign to Indo-European languages generally and characteristic of Dravidian. We may conclude, then, that the earlier forms of speech, by which Indo-European was modified in the various stages of its progress from the North-West, were predominantly Dravidian." (Cambridge History of India. Vol. I. p. 49).

The Dravidian languages at the present time are confined to the South where inspite of their powerful Indo-Aryan neighbours like Marathi and Gujrati they have not only retained their individuality but developed a vast literature. No doubt they have been influenced to a considerable extent by their foreign neighbours; but they themselves have exercised a good deal of influence on the Indo-Aryan languages in vocabulary, phonology, inflexional system, the order of words in a sentence and so on. (cf. Linguistic Survey of India Vol IV. p. 31 ff and Vol I. pp. 130-1) Thus e. g. Dr. Earnest Trumpp attributes to Dravidian influences the pronunciation of च and छ as TS and DZ in Marathi (See Caldwell; Comparative

*Based on the Thesis as approved by the senate of the University of London.

Grammar of Dravidian languages, p. 61). That Marathi which for a long time has been the Southern boundary of the Indo-Aryan languages should influence and be influenced by Dravidian is but natural. Even to the present day Marathi and Kanarese are next neighbours and the process of mutual influence is going on under our very eyes. The present object, however, is to examine the influence, if any, of a particular Dravidian language viz. Kanarese on a particular Indo-Aryan language—Marathi—at a particular time—the time of ज्ञानदेव, author of ज्ञानेश्वरी, who flourished in the thirteenth century of our era.

A reference has been made above to the Dravidian influence on Indo-Aryan phonology. From an early time Indo-Aryan possessed cerebrals. But these were not cerebrals proper but only dental stops which were cerebralised under certain conditions. (Wackernagel. Section 144). Marathi has retained the old cerebrals, at the same time cerebralising, not uniformly, the old intervocalic -rt- (-र्त्त-) group. (Block; Formation de la langue Marathe; Sect. 108-14). But the frequency with which we meet cerebral ढ़ (l) and ङ़ (d) is held to be due—along with the double pronunciation of च् and ञ् to Dravidian influence. (L. S. I. Vol. IV. p. 31 ff).

DECLENSION

Whatever the general influence of the Dravidian on the Indo-Aryan languages, it is interesting to note parallelism in the details of both Marathi and Kanarese. Where, however, a particular trait of the former can be definitely proved to be of a non-Indo-Aryan type, the question of parallelism merges into that of influence. The present object is to note and point out such striking similarities as would enable one in considering the mutual influence of these two languages.

POST-POSITIONS

In its declension, Marathi has partly retained the old inflexional system. (Block. F. L. M. 181). Like a great number of languages of its group, it reduced the number of old case-forms to only two viz. the direct and the oblique (ibid. 184). On this reduction, the need to express the various case-relations was filled by using certain accessory words. This device of using accessory words is not peculiar to Marathi. Its process can be traced to a period as early as that of classical Sanskrit. A word e. g. like Skt. मध्य- "Middle" is used in its locative after another word to express the locative sense of the latter. Thus Skt. वने, "In the forest" was expressed as वनस्य

मध्ये "in (the middle of) the forest", and so on. The use of such accessory words became more and more frequent till ultimately they lost their original form and sense and became what were called case-terminations or post-positions. (cf. Block F. L. M. 197.)

Thus in ज्ञानेश्वरी we have post-positions like सहिते, "with", बांचुनि, "without", पासूनि, "from" etc. In modern Marathi these are appended to the oblique of the nouns. But with ज्ञानेश्वरी "there was no question of a general oblique form to which to append post-positions" (Doderet; School of Oriental Studies Bulletin. Vol. IV. part III. p. 553). The various post-positions are used with the following cases:—

- (a) सहितें, बांचुनि, वरि, with the direct case, usually the Accusative e. g.

तैं नित्ययाग-सहितें । सृजिलीं समस्तें भूतें ।

"All the beings are created *along with* periodical sacrifices" (III-86), or,

तैसा ईश्वरू-बांचुनि काहीं । जिये आणीक लागी नाही ।

"(That) for which there is no other acquisition than that of (except) God" (II-42); हें बांचुनि, "except this" (II-33);

हा ठावो वरि, "Up to this place" (XI-36-386).

- (b) सी, सहितें, सर्वें, नि, न, नें, वनि and हनि with the instrumental e. g.

जीवितें-सी, "with life" (II-45) where जीवितें is the instrumental of जीवित भरंवसे-नी, "with confidence". (II-82) (N. B. भरंवसे has lost its nasalisation probably on account of the following नी.). इहीं नानाभूतें सहितें, with these various creatures". (XI-275). भर्तारें हीन वनिता, Woman without a husband" (II-199); and तेणें अर्जुनाचळ निवेल, by that the mountain in the form of Arjuna will be quenched" (II-79). (N. B. तेणें consists of the instrumental तें and the post-position नें).

- (c) सी, लागी, प्रति, सम and पासी with the dative (the old genitive) e. g.

ना तरी पवन मेघासी बिहे, or does the wind dread the clouds? (II-14) हें असतिये कीर्तीसी नाशु, "this (mercy) is ruin to existing fame." (II-20). जया लागीं आले पांडवा, "to which, O Pāṇḍava, they have come," (VII-105), आणि तूचि नीति सांगसी । आह्मां-प्रति, "On the other hand, you are

advising me." (II-101).

(d) मार्जी, आन, with the locative.

It is not the present object to trace each and every one of the above post-positions to its origin. What is important for the moment is to see if there are any peculiarities in their use and secondly, if there are any among them that cannot be taken back to an indo-Aryan source; in other words, is there any foreign influence on ज्ञानेश्वरी in the use and type of its post-positions?

It would be well to state at the outset that some of these accessory words are clearly intelligible. e. g. सहितें, मार्जी, आन, प्रति etc. (See Block F. L. M, p. 195) But there are others that are not only difficult to trace to their origin but peculiar in their use as will be shown below. The majority of them are either in the instrumental or in the locative like सहितें, मार्जी, लागी etc; the two cases in which ज्ञानेश्वरी forms adverbs from nouns or adjectives. (Doderet: S. O. S. B. P. 560; and cf. the discussion below).

(a) Let us take सहितें and वरि for example, from the first group and examine their use. Skt. सह- to which Marathi सहितें is related, is used in Sanskrit only with the instrumental (later with the genitive as well). How did this come to be used with the accusative as in the above instance? Similarly वरि means not only "on" or "upon" but, as can be seen in the above quotations, "till, as far as, so long" etc. In its first sense it is derived, as Block says (p 195), from Skt उपरि. But how can its second sense be accounted for? Are there two different वरि in Marathi, one from Skt. उपरि and the other from some other word? In attempting an explanation, it is impossible to overlook the similarity of certain Kanarese post-positions, their use and their meaning with some of those to be found in ज्ञानेश्वरी. In old Kanarese certain adverbs of place and time are used as post-positions. Usually adverbs of place are in the locative and adverbs of time in the instrumental (See Kittel's Grammar p 167)—as most adverbs are in ज्ञानेश्वरी. But the parallelism between the two languages in this respect becomes even more evident from the consideration of passages like the following:—

Paḍedode Kampam baṇṇam

Baḍeyavu-, baṇṇamane paḍeduvap-paḍe Kampam

Paḍeyav ulīdalargaḷ eraḍuman-
Oḷe beḷeḍi campakakke pūgaḷ doreye ”

If they have fragrance they have no colour; if they possess colour they are not fragrant; no other flower can equal this Camapka which grows *with both* ” (Ādipurāna 941 A. D. quoted in Kavīcarita Vol. I. p. 29). Here the word “ Oḷe ”—which is equivalent to सहिते—and means “ with ” is used with “ eraḍu-m-am ” the accusative of “ eraḍu, two ”; or,

Kāveriyindam ā Godāvāri-Varam irdda nādadā Kannaḍadoḷ,
in the Kanarese language that prevails from Kāveri as far as the famous Godāvāri- (Nṛpatunga's Kavirāja Mārga, 814-876 A. D 1-36)

or,

Enne-Varam Siri tamaguntu
Anne-Varam Sevyar alte Khalaruṇ

“ As long as they have riches, so long are not the wicked to be worshipped ? ” (Kittel's Dictionary; see under “ Vara-)

In the above examples not only have “ ode with ” and “ Vara- ”, as far as “ been used with the direct case; as in ज्ञानेश्वरी, but the latter has used वरि in the same sense as Kanarese “ Vara ”

(b) More striking resemblance obtains when we pass from the post-positions of the direct case discussed above to the नी, न ने of the instrumental. They are added to the instrumental of nouns and pronouns in the following manner :—

तुझे-नि नामें अपयशी । दिशा लंघिजे ॥

“ By your name ill-fame flees the quarters ” (II-8; cf, II-11; II-97). or,

येणें संग्रामाचे-नि अवसरें ।
येथ कृपाकृपण नुपकरे ।
हे आतांचि काय सोयरे : जाहले तुज ॥

“ This mercifulness does not benefit you at the time of war; have these turned out your relations just now? ” (II-23). In these examples it is added to the possessive adjectives तुझे and संग्रामाचे (cf. Doderet S. O. S. B. p. 554),

(2) It is added to the pronouns as in the following:
ऐसे-नि तो कृपावन्तु । नानापरी असे शिकवितु ।

"The Merciful One was *thus* teaching in various ways".
(II-29-184) or,

ना तरी अपत्यानें माये । सांझीन जरी जाये ।
तरी ते कैसे-नि जिये । ऐकें कृष्णा॥

"Or, if the mother abandons her child, how, listen () Kṛṣṇa
Should it live ?" (II-61). or येणें in II-23 quoted above.

(3) To the nouns as well; e. g.

मी सर्वथा न झुंजें येथें । भरंवसे-नी॥

" by no means will I fight here with confidence " (II-89)

As regards these post-positions Block says (201) that they are found in most of the Indo-Aryan languages. He cites the following Gujrati, "ne, for"; Rajasthani, "ne, nai, for, by"; Punjabi nai, by" "nu, to". Hindi "naim, in the manner of" etc. After considering five possible explanations of their origin, as regards Marathi he says, " If faut provisoirement s'abstenir de conclure " (for the present, one must not hasten to any conclusion) (p. 205). To some views he himself has raised certain objections. Thus the view held by Sir George Grierson (quoted p. 204) that these post-positions come from Skt.—तन्—has been objected to on the ground of dental treatment in Marathi.* But in support of Sir. George's view it may be said that they may have been borrowed or as coming at the end of a word they may have undergone peculiar phonetic treatment. (cf. Prof. R. L. Turner's article. J. R. A. 5. 1927, P. 227). Further Block suggests some such Skt. word as नय or न्याय (which explains Hindi " Naim ") but the adjectival use in Marathi precludes, in his opinion, this possibility.

A different view is maintained by Joshi, a Marathi grammarian. According to him, नी or ने are double terminations. In some dialects. e. g. in Konkani, only न is found in the instrumental. He cites देवान दिखन " it was given by God ", as an example. To this न he adds, the old terminations ए and ई were affixed. Quoting forms like तेणें and येणें from ज्ञानेश्वरी he concludes that the process of double terminations started first with the pronouns and was then extended to the nouns.

* Skt. single-न्—in between vowels becomes—य्—in Marathi. e. g. Skt. जन—, Mar. जग; Skt. मनुष्य Mar. माणूस, Skt. पत्नीय Mu. पत्नी and so on.

In some Marathi dialects we not only find नी besides न but what is more interesting, this न् has been introduced into other case-forms than the instrumental. Nor is there any distinction between nouns and pronouns. Thus in Konkani we have “मीनी by me” and “मना”, to me (L. S. I. VII-66). In Rathodi (Kolaba district) we have the genitive “बास-ने, of the father” (ibid. p. 134); in Mahari (Thana district) the instrumental भुक-न, with hunger. (ibid-p. 160)* If the double termination theory held good it will have to be admitted in the last two forms that-ए is the genitive singular termination (बास+न्+ए) and-अ the instrumental singular termination (भुक+न्+अ). Nothing would be further from truth.

For the sake of clearness, the above discussions may be summarised thus :—

(a) Before certain case terminations Marathi has a न् which, however, is found only with the instrumental in ज्ञानेश्वरी ;

(b) that it was probably introduced first in pronouns and was then extended to nouns; and

(c) that the-न्-element is dialectically found in cases other than the instrumental as well.

With these three points in our mind, we shall see that old Kanarese affords another striking parallel here. In the first place, the oblique case-forms of the personal pronouns in the singular have a-न् inserted between the base and the terminations (cf. Kittel's Grammar 137). Thus “ām, I” in the nominative but in the instrumental and the ablative where the singular termination is-im, we have “en-n-im”. The locative termination is -ol and the locative form is “en-n-ol” (N. B. “en” is the oblique of “ām-”), the genitive is “en-n-a”—a, being the termination of that case. Similarly, ni, thou, but nin-n-a, thy; nin-n-im, by or from thee; nin-n-ol, in thee. Avam, he; but ava-n a, his, ava-nim, by or from him; ava-n-ol, in him. But in the third person feminine and neuter we do not find this-n.—Probably there was a न् in the beginning even in the case of feminine and neuter pronouns. Cf. ada-n-am; it acc. of ada-m, it, side by side with ada-m, it, acc. (The न्) however later on may have formed a part of the termination

*For further examples of the kind the reader is referred to the extracts in that valuable compendium *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. VII.

itself and in connection with *nā*, *I*; *ni*, then, and *ava-m*, he, might have been associated only with the masculine.

But it is when we come to the nouns that we meet more frequently the suffix-*न्*. Old Kanarese formed its other oblique cases from the genitive. In the case of masculine and neuter nouns ending in-*अ*, ancient Kanarese, to avoid hiatus, inserted -*न्*-suffix in the genitive more frequently than *इ*. In modern Kanarese practically all masculine nouns ending in-*अ*- have the suffix-*न्*-between the base and the genitive termination. As regards neuter nouns ending in-*अ*-old Kanarese had probably-*न्*-more frequently than at present. Thus Kittel quotes from the शब्दमणिदर्पण the form "pada-n-a, of the foot" genitive singular of the neuter noun "pada, foot" while in modern Kanarese the form is "pad-a-da" (Kittle's grammar 109-a-vii; 117-a-vi) Masculine and neuter nouns ending in-*उ* and dissyllabic and trisyllabic neuter bases have a genitive termination -*इन्** (ibid. 121). This-*न्*-is found with certain feminine words as well. Thus "akka-, elder sister", gen-sing. akka-n-a, similarly "avva-n-a, mother's" from "avva-mother."

Mention may be made of the fact that in Kanarese man is masculine, woman feminine, and the rest including children neuter. Kanarese hence offers more oblique forms with-*न्*-or *इन्*, than without.

Now we are in a position to consider once more the Marathi dialects mentioned above. One of these viz. Konkani has forms like घोड्याक , to a horse, and घोड्याक "to horses", dative singular and plural respectively of घोडा , a horse. Mr. Shinde supposes this-*क* to be the old Kanarese dative singular termination-*के* (Joshi p. 569). Kanarese, in those days prevailed in the North as far as the Kolaba, Thana and Kalyan districts (ibid, p.561) and lived side by side with Marathi. A person undoubtedly uses in his daily conversations scores of personal pronominal forms and hundreds of nominal forms. In trying to speak an Indo-Aryan language a Kanarese man would naturally commit mistakes but mistakes which would be fairly common to his Kanarese brothers and mistakes under the influence, and in favour, of his own tongue. Thus, for instance he may use Marathi stems and Kanarese terminations. This is an

* The termination proper is *अ*. As for the Suffix-in-see appendix.

intelligible phenomenon that happens at the present time in many parts of India in the case of the English language.* This fact alone can better explain forms quoted above like बासनें (cf. Kan. Appa-n-a), of the father, or मी-नी (cf. Kan. en-n-im), by me, etc.

POSSESSIVE ADJECTIVES

Along with post-positional forms we have, in ज्ञानेश्वरी what are called the possessive adjectives. These end in च and agree with the substantive they refer to in number, gender and case. This च is added to the oblique of nouns and pronouns as can be seen from the following examples :—

हृदय तया-चें, his heart (II-3); निवातकवचां-चा ठाय, the abode of the Nivātakavacas (II-10); आजि-चें हें झुंज, this to-day's fight (II-25); संग्रामा-चे-नि अवसरें, at the time of the battle. (II. 23).

The origin of this च has been found difficult to explain. Though such "possessive adjectives" are common to Indo-Aryan languages, the palatal च appears 'only in Marathi (Block 202) and in old Gujarathi (Doderet p. 551) Beames and Bhandarkar take this च back to Skt. त्य in forms like अत्र-त्य, तत्र-त्य, दक्षिणा-त्य etc.

Sir George Grierson derives this च from Skt. कृत्य (Pkt. किच्च; for this and the following remarks see Doderet. p. 551) Commenting upon the form राया-जा प्रधानु "the king's minister" found in the Nāgaon inscription of A. D. 1367, Sir George says :

"There are two well-known progenitors of the genitive suffixes. One is कृत which is responsible for Hindi का, Punjabi दा (through शौरसेनी Prakrit कद्) and so on. The other is कार्य (Pkt. केर and also कज्ज) responsible for Hindi केर, कर; Bengali, र; Marwari रो and so on.....there remaining the Marathi-च unaccounted for". The usual explanation is that it is derived from the Skt. suffix त्य (Pkt-च). Another explanation is that it might come from Skt. कृत्य "a synonym for कार्य". "The Nāgaon inscription makes me think that the latter explanation is the correct one. Apparently old Marathi used both-च and-ज. This would represent कृत्य (किच्च) and its synonym, कार्य (कज्ज)... We cannot of course be absolutely certain till we come across further instances of-ज".

* The following, from the foot-note to p. 165 of the Linguistic Survey of India Vol I. Part I, would be an apt illustration.

"The 1911 census Report of the United Provinces (p. 284) quotes an Indian Vakil, or Attorney, saying in Court 'इस् पोझिशन्का इन्कोन्ट्रोवर्टिबल् प्रूफ दे सकता हूं, और मेरा ओपिनियन् ये है कि डिफेन्सका आग्युमेन्ट बाटरोल्ड नहीं कर सकता है.'

So far this is the only acceptable view on this question. Phonetically the explanation does stand; we must remember as well the fact that post-positions, like terminations, are likely to undergo, by their peculiar position, a different phonetic treatment than other words. (Prof. Turner, J. R. A. S. 1927). Forms from Skt. कृ can be seen used as post-positions in old as well as in modern Marathi. Thus in ज्ञानेश्वरी (II-85) we have मौनै-करुनि, " with silence " where the gerundive of कृ is used with the instrumental. In the modern language, too we have expressions as त्याच्या करितां and so on. Hindi का may as well come from Skt. कृते. There is no need to assume that Hindi, का, Punjabi दा etc. should come from one and the same Skt. word. They may have different developments. Thus forms like Marathi आमुचा " ours ", तुमचा " yours " can be traced back to Pkt. अह्मच्चेय and तुह्मच्चेय quoted by the grammarian Hemacandra. (II-149; See Block. 202).

Whatever the origin of these Prakrit forms one is tempted to ask whether Marathi has extended by analogy this - च from the pronominal to the nominal possessive adjectives. Besides these possessive adjectives we have, in ज्ञानेश्वरी a declinable genitive singular of the first and second personal pronouns which is used as an adjective (Doderet. p. 561; See the foot note). The use of the genitive as an adjective is characteristic of the Dravidian group. (L. S.I. Vol. IV p. 29). In old Kanarese possessive pronouns are formed from the genitive (Kittel 273). Thus " en-na, my " but " en-n-adu (which really means my + it), mine ". With this we can compare a Marathi form like तुझ, thine. This form whenever not used as an adjective is unaspirated, e. g. तुज सागे काय झाले, say, what has happened to you ? (II-7). हे आताचि काय सोयरे । जाहले तुज, " have they become relatives to you just now ? or, तुज नव्हे हे उचित, this is not proper for you (II-22) etc.

On the other hand, when used as an adjective it has the aspirated झ e. g. ऐसें पुरुषत्व चोखंडे । पार्थो तुझे, So good, O Pārtha, is your valour (II-11). तुझिया वाक्या-वांचुनी, without your words (II-64) and so on. Though the aspirated forms can be taken to Pkt. forms like तुज्झ etc. the distinction shown above is interesting. It offers a tempting similarity with Kanarese possessive pronouns like " en-n-adu, (enna + adu; mine + it), mine by splitting तुझा and तुझे etc. as तुज + हा (thy + that masc.) and तुज + हे (thy + it) etc.

This similarity helps us to consider the nominal possessive adjectives. Among the many ways in which these are formed in old Kanarese one—viz by adding *ica*. (-इच्)—can be noted here. Kittel, in his dictionary, interprets *-ica*, as “coming from, related to, born of”. He quotes as examples formed from the शब्दमणिदर्पण like the following:— *Kālur*, a rustic place; but *Kālūr-ica*, a rustic, a Villager; Similarly *Kannad-ica*, of Kanarese language and so on.

Whatever the origin of this *-ica*, its meaning at once reminds us of the form in the Nāgaon inscription, राजा प्रधानु, the King’s Minister. If this ज has anything to do with Skt. ज “born of”, then it would be practically identical with *-ica*. The ordinary man may have used *-ica*—itself without any hesitation; a popular writer, too, may have followed suit; but a learned writer would go back to its Sanskrit equivalent ज. ज्ञानेश्वरी claiming to be written in popular language (cf. III-17 ff), uses forms in च; but the pedantic writer of the Nāgaon inscription uses Sanskritised words in his royal eulogy. “We cannot of course be certain till we come across further instances of ज”. That forms in *ica* do not survive in modern Kanarese is no objection to the suggestion made above; on the other hand, it is a strong argument in its support. Kanarese has been gradually driven lower to the South. The *ica* forms may have been prevalent in its Northern dialects. They disappeared with its retreat to the South*.

CONJUGATION.

(A) Present Indicative

In II-71, ज्ञानेश्वरी has a verbal form—and there are many others similar as will be shown below—which is interesting from the point of view of the development of the old Sanskrit present tense. The passage reads :

दिठी सूनि जयातें ॥ ब्रह्मचर्यादि व्रतें ।
मुनीश्वर तपातें । आचरताती

“fixing their attention on which, great sages practise austerities by means of vows like celibacy etc”.

*In this connection may be mentioned the fact that even now a Kanarese man from Bombay Karnatak trying to speak Marathi uses incorrect forms like वरी- (for वरा-) चा etc.

आचरताती is the third plural present indicative of आचरणे, to practise. The old termination for the third present plural is not ताति or तति but अति or इति (Doderet p. 563). The form should, therefore, be something like आचर (or रा, or री) ति. How can the additional त् between the root and the termination be explained ? One explanation (Doderet p. 566) is that in ज्ञानेश्वरी the त् participle was frequently used in combination with the old present of अस्, " to be " and conveyed the present indicative sense. Thus आचरताति would stand for आचरत आहति. In support of his view Mr. Doderet quotes examples (p. 566) wherein the त् participles have been used with the verbal forms of अस्. " The third plural of the modern present indicative ", he adds " is already evolved ".

Working back from the modern present Indicative forms can it be said that they go back to the old त् participle forms plus the verbal forms of अस् ? (cf, Joshi p. 123). The modern forms, for example of a root like सांगणे to tell, are :—

Singular	Plural
1. सांगतो	सांगतो
2. सांगतोस	सांगतात
3. सांगतो (m.)	सांगतात
सांगते (f.)	
सांगतें (neu.)	

It should be noted in the first place that in many dialects a. g. Konkani, Gomantaki Malavni and Chitpavni there is no distinction of forms according to gender. (Joshi p. 124). " It is due " says Joshi, " to the deliberate efforts of the learned and some unnatural conservations occur ". But that does not satisfactorily explain the distinction in forms according to gender. Whence did this distinction arise, that is our first important question. Nor is Mr. Joshi convincing in explaining the ओ-element in the singulars of the first, second and third masculine (p. 124). His explanation accords more with the fixed rules of classical Samdhi than with the natural phonetic changes. Can it be said, as Mr. Doderet does (p. 567), that this ओ-element is extended from the first person plural to others by analogy.* But that the analogy, if any, should work only in the singular masculine makes one consider if there is any other possibility for the

*For, according to him, the form would be the combination of the —त्-participle plus the form of अस्. Thus from करणे 1st plur. करित आहों and then through stages करितो

origin of these forms. What is the explanation of the -ओ- element? This is our second important question.

To answer these questions it would be better to review for a moment the history of the old present Indicative upto, and during, the time of, ज्ञानेश्वरी. The old present has, in ज्ञानेश्वरी, lost its original sense; in other words, it does not denote the same tense as before. It expresses, as Block Says (237), present, future or past tense according to the context. Thus in ज्ञानेश्वरी we have examples like the following;

(a) Present tense :

पार्था आणीक ही एक । नेणसी तूं हें कवातिक ।

“ O Pārtha, you *do not know* this other marvel” (III-79) or,

तूं अनुचिता चित्त नेदिसी । धीर कहीं न संडिसी ।

तुझनि नामें अपयशी । दिशा लंघिजे ॥

“ you *do not* give heed to improper things, nor *do* you ever *give up* your courage; by your name, ill-fame flees the quarters ” (II-8); or,

तूं जाणता तरी म्हणविसी । परी नेणिवेतें न संडिसी ।

आणि शिकवूं ह्मणों तरी बोलसी । बहुसाल नीति ॥

“ you *call* yourself wise, and you *do not discard* your ignorance, and if I were to teach you, you *lecture* moral lessons to me ! (II-93).

(b) Future tense :

जें येणे करुनि समस्तां । परितोष होईल देवतां ।

मग ते तुझां ईप्सिता । अर्थोर्ते देती ॥

“ By this all the Gods will be pleased, then they *will give* you desired objects ”. (III-95); or,

जैसीं बीजें सर्वथा आहाळिली । तीं सुक्षेत्रीं जही पेरिली ।

तरीन विरूढती सिचलीं । आवडे तैसी ॥

“ Like the burned seeds which though sown into proper soil *will not grow* although you water them as much as you like ”. (II-66), or,

आहकें सखंद बोले श्रीकृष्णातें । आतां नाळवावें तुझीं मानें ।

मी सर्वथा न झुजें येथें । भरंवसेनी ॥

“ Listen, sorrowfully ” he said to श्रीकृष्ण “ you should not compel me now. By no means *will* I fight here with confidence ”. (11-82); or,

येथ कौमारत्व दिसे । मग तारुण्यी तें भ्रंशे ।

“ Here boyhood appears (first); then it *will disappear* into youth ”. (II-109).

(c) Past Tense :—

मग संजयो म्हणें रायातें, then Samjaya *said* to the King (II-I); cf. बोले in II-82 quoted under (b) above.

With these various senses, it is not then unusual that in ज्ञानेश्वरी the present should be expressed more frequently in other ways than by the old present. The-त्-participle, as Mr. Doderet says, is used with the present indicative forms of अस्, to be—for this purpose. Thus :—

तू अद्युनि कां न विचारिशी । काय हें चिन्तितु आहासि ।
स्वधर्म तो विसरलासी । तरावें जेणें ॥

“ Why don't you consider even now ? What *do* you *think* about ? You have forgotten your duty which would give you salvation (II-180). Often the participle is combined with the forms of अस् as ”.

हें झुंज नह्ने प्रमाद । एथ प्रवर्तलिया दिसतसे बाध ।

“ This is not war; this is a blunder in committing which there *is* (lit. *appears*) sin ” (II-31 ; cf. II-93); or,

आतां आणिकाचिया गोठी । कासया सांगों किरीटी ।
देखें मांच इथें राहार्टी । वर्ततसे ॥

“ O Arjuna, why should I go on telling you about others' affairs ? Look, I myself *live* this way ”.

History, however, repeated itself. Even by the time of ज्ञानेश्वरी, the-त्-participial use with the root अस्, like the old present, underwent changes in meaning. Thus :—

तरी निहीं येतुला अवसरों । काय किजत असे येरयेरों ।
तें झडकरी कथन करों । मजप्रति ॥

“ Up till now what *were* they *doing* to each other ? Tell me that quickly ” (I. 87); or,

तैसें विवरीत असे श्रीअनन्त । तथा दोहीं सैन्यां आंत ।
जयापरी पार्थ । भ्रान्ति सोडी ॥

“ There, in the midst of, the two armies, श्रीअनन्त *was determining* a way by which Arjuna would overcome his ignorance (II-87); or,

तें देखिलिया अर्जुन । सन्तोष घेऊनि मन ।
मग संभ्रमें सेने । दिठी घालीतसे ॥

“ At the sight of it Arjuna was pleased in his mind ; then he cast a joyful glance at the two armies ”. (I-167) ; or,

म्हणोनि कृपां आकळिला । दिसतसे अति कोमाइला ।
जैसा कर्दमीं रुपला । राजहंस ॥

“ Therefore overcome with pity he looked very much dejected like a swan stuck into mud ” (II-4)

In the last two examples the participle has been combined with the अस् form. This fact goes against the suggestion that the modern forms developed from this combination. For, with the change in meaning from the present to “ *passe* ’ d’*habitude* ” it is hardly probable that those forms should evolve into the modern present.

Where then is the trace, if any of the modern forms in ज्ञानेश्वरी ? This is the place to consider another important factor. In ज्ञानेश्वरी we find the-त्—participle itself “ Standing detached and used as the equivalent of a present definite.” (Doderet, p. 565) e. g.

तेथ तिन्ही लोक डळमळित । मेरु मन्दार आन्दोलत ।
समुद्रजळ उसळत । कैलासवरी ॥

“ There the three worlds tremble ; the mountains Meru and Mandāra are rocking, and the sea-water is foaming as far as कैलास.”
“ (I,-155 ; cf. I-156) or,

देखे देह कांपत । तोंड असे कोरडें होत ।
विकळता उपजत । गात्रांसी ॥

“ Look my body trembles, my mouth is being parched and my limbs are weak ” (I-196) ; or,

पाहें पां तरंग तरी होत जात । परी तेथ उदक तें अखंड असत ।

“ Behold the water is indestructible though waves come and go ” (VIII-177) ; or,

हैं अनादिसिद्ध आघवें । होत जात स्वभावें ।
तरी तुवां कां शोचावें । सांगें मज ॥

“ All this established from Eternity arises and fades away naturally. Why, then, tell me, should you grieve ? ” (II-100).

But such use of the -त्-participle alone, though common to many Indo-Aryan languages (Block. 249; Doderet p. 565), was not, in Marathi, immune from ambiguity as can be seen from passages like :—

म्हणोनि ते न मानिती । आणि निंदाहि कहूं लागती ।
सार्णें पतंग काय साहाती । प्रकाशार्ते ॥

“Therefore they do not admit it; on the other hand they even criticise; say, does the moth stand sunshine?” (III-200).

In the above example मानिती and लागती are old present Indicative third plural. On the other hand, साहाती which is *not* a participial attribute of पतंग the latter being masculine—expresses the third singular sense. How can this साहाती be explained? Can it be said that this is a further development of the त् participle by adding to it the old present terminations? Does that explain the modern Marathi present indicative forms?

That in ज्ञानेश्वरी there were two main developments of the old present Indicative is the suggestion made here. One was, as explained above, the use of the त् participle with the verbal forms of असणें, to be. That, as illustrated, underwent a radical change in its meaning. But at the same time the त् participle was used by itself for the present definite. This was the transitional period. Now it will be maintained here that the use of the mere त् participle being likely to result in ambiguity of meaning or probably as an attempt to fix the present tense forms by its old characteristics, the old present terminations were added on to it. The modern forms can be easily proved to have evolved from this process.

The old present terminations for verbs transitive and intransitive were as follows:—

Singular	Plural
1. -ए, -इ	-उं, -ओं
2. -असि -इसि	-आ
3. -ए, -इ, -रे	-अति, -इति

If we take a participle like करित and add on to it these terminations, we should have

Sing.	(1) करिते,	(2) करितसि,	(3) करिते
Plur.	(1) करितों,	(2) करिता,	(3) करिताति (etc.)

of the above the plural of all the three persons can be found practically identical with that in modern Marathi. As

regards the first singular it may be mentioned that a speaker, in the ordinary course of his speech, refers to himself either in singular or in the plural without any attempt at distinction. Therefore there is no difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Doderet that the first singular and plural are frequently confused. (p. 566). There remains, however, two more things to be explained; viz, the-ओ-element and the distinction in the third singular and subsequently in others of forms according to gender. The modern-तो-in the three singulars masculine may be regarded as probably influenced by the masculine pronoun तो, " he ". Similarly, as in old Marathi ते not ती meant " she ", we find the modern feminine forms ending in ते; likewise may be explained a verbal form, when governing a neuter subject, ending in ते (ते, it). The reasons for this change will be mentioned below.

That the process of adding on old present terminations to the-त्- participle was going on at the time of ज्ञानेश्वरी is borne out by the following examples :

The form आचरताति in the passage quoted at the beginning of the discussion (II-71) is आचरत + अति. (cf. वर्षताति in I-166). Similarly in,

सुगंध आणि दुर्गन्ध । हा परिमळाचा भेद ।
जो घ्राणसंगे विषाद । तोष देता ॥

" fragrance and odour is the (two-fold) division of smell, (which i. e. division) by means of the nose gives pleasure and pain ". (II-117). Here देता is governed by the singular जो " that " which refers to the हा भेद " this division " of the previous clause देता can better be explained as देत + ऐ, ऐ being one of the third singular terminations mentioned above.

Thus we find in ज्ञानेश्वरी (1) the त् participles used with the old present forms of असू, to be (2) the participles used by themselves as equivalent to finite verbs in the same tense, and (3) further the old present terminations added to the-त्-participles, the new forms conveying the present Indicative sense. The presence of the first two features is warranted in many modern Indo-Aryan languages. (cf. Block. 249; Doderet p. 565 and the authorities mentioned there). But old Marathi is found alone in further adding to the त् participles the old present terminations and thus forming a new present tense. Can this

peculiarity be explained? Is the process indigenous or influenced by other sources?

Rev. Kittel states in his grammar (p. 128) that in old Kanarese the present indicative was formed by adding pronominal endings to the present-future participle. As a matter of fact, all the three tenses the present future and past indicative were formed in that language by adding pronominal endings to the participles in the last case the past participle being the stem (ibid. cf. the discussion that follows). Thus he quotes forms like "Arivon, he knows" (Inscription of 680-696 A. D.); "Kidip-om, he spoils" (Inscription 707 A. D.); "emb-ol she says" (Inscrip-778 A. D.) In the first two examples "Ariva, {knowing", and "Kidipa, spoiling" are the present future participles and 'om' is the third person masculine singular pronominal ending the pronoun being "Avam, he". In the last example, similarly, "emba" is the present future participle and "ol" is the third person feminine pronominal ending the pronoun being "avāl", she (cf. ibid. 186). Thus in the Mantravādi inscription of 865 A. D. (Epi-Ind. Vol. VII p. 201 line 19) we have "Kaḷe-Var, they reject" where "Kaḷeva" is the participle and "avar or-ar" the ending from the pronoun "avar, they."

Side by side with such old Kanarese forms can be placed expressions in *ज्ञानेश्वरी* like *पुरविता 'तो, he fulfills', (I-27)* and *अनुभवि तो he experiences (V-157)*. In the first the pronoun is placed after the *तृ* participle and in the second after the old present form- in both cases the sense expressed being the present Indicative. It is not probable as Block suggests (248) that the modern forms like *पुरवितो "he fulfills"* go back to combinations like *पुरविता + तो*. But in such forms one may observe the tentative efforts of old Marathi in evolving forms by adding pronouns (or pronominal endings) to the old forms which were fast changing in meaning. Those efforts can be said to have culminated in the modern present Indicative in which the masculine form has been characterised by *तो*, the feminine by *ते* and the neuter by *ते* (a feature completely identical with that in old and modern Kanarese) these three endings being the old third personal pronouns "he, she, it" respectively. But the language of *ज्ञानेश्वरी* offers in this respect a parallel to old Kanarese only in so far as the *तृ* participles are used as stems to which terminations can be added. This feature taken in combination with the fact that that Marathi is not only alone among the

Indo-Aryan languages in this respect but in later days used endings which can be easily traced to personal pronouns—only one conclusion seems probable viz that in the development of the present Indicative, Marathi, from the days of ज्ञानेश्वरी has been influenced by Kanarese.

(B) The इञ् forms and the Optative.

Like the old present, the old passive Indicative too has in ज्ञानेश्वरी undergone a change in its meaning. Frequently we have to translate the forms in इञ् which represent the old passive indicative, by an optative meaning. The following examples will make the point clear:—

देखें मातापितरें आर्विजती । सर्वस्वें तोष पावविजती ।
तियें पाटीं केवीं वधिजती । आपुलिया हातीं ॥

See, parents *are to be respected and pleased* by every means ; *Should* they, on the other hand, *be killed* by our own hands ? ” (II-32) ; or,

कर्मघारें राहाटिजे । परी कर्मफळ न निरीक्षिजे ।
जैसा मंत्रजु न बाधिजे । भूतबाधा ॥

“ One *should live* by means of actions ; but one *should not expect* the fruits of actions ; like the charmer who is not harmed by the spirits ”. (II-234 ; Note बाधिजे in the same verse has the original passive indicative sense) ; or,

म्हणती संसारीं जन्मिजे । यज्ञादिक कर्म कीजे ।
मग सर्वसुख भोगिजे । मनोहर ॥

“ They say that one *should be born* into the world, *should perform* actions like sacrifice and others and, then *should enjoy* every pleasing happiness”. (II-246)

It is evident from the above quotations that in ज्ञानेश्वरी verbal forms in इञ् have sometimes an optative meaning’ Do these forms come from the इञ्-*passive* forms of the Prakrit ? If they do, the second question arises, how did the passive indicative come to have an optative sense while the active indicative still remains an indicative ?

In Maharashtrai Prakrit the optative forms of a root like वट् e. g. (Skt. वृत्) are :—

Singular : (1) वट्जा ; (2) वट्ज्जासि ; (3) वट्ज्ज

Plural : (1) वट्ज्जाम ; (2) वट्ज्जाह ; (3) वट्ज्ज. (Woolner p. 44

Forms like these have offered Beames an explanation for those of the-इज्- forms which, in old Marathi, have sometimes an optative meaning. Block, however, agrees (p. 231) with Sir George Grierson (J. R. A. S. 1910. p. 163) in deriving them from the western Prakrit passive forms in-इज्-. There are reasonable objections to Beames' contention. Linguistic development is a process of simplification. It is unlikely, therefore, for a language to retain two forms phonetically identical but entirely different in meaning. The Prakrit passive and optative forms would be composed, in Marathi, of the same and similar sounds. Perhaps that is the reason why Marathi, even in its earlier stages has formed optatives in-अव् etc. from Sanskrit potential participles in-त्तव्य etc. Moreover from a passage like II-234 quoted above one can say that the -इज्- forms in ज्ञानेश्वरी come from-इज्ज passive forms in Prakrit (Note बाधिजे side by side with राहाटिजे and निरीक्षिजे).

But in that case a more difficult question arises, how did this passive indicative acquire an optative meaning? Of the -इज्ज forms in ज्ञानेश्वरी it is more frequently the transitive roots—which fact, by the way, proves to an extent that they are passive forms that have an optative meaning. Thus e. g. in the verse,

तेणें तिया आवरिजे । भीष्मातळी राहिजे ।
द्रोणातें क्षणें पाहिजे । तुझीं सकळ ॥

“ Therefore you *should take* that into your hands, you *should stay* near भष्मि. (Then he said) to द्रोण “ you *should look* to every thing ”; आवरणें and पाहणें are transitive verbs. Even in modern Marathi the form पाहिजे is used, as an auxiliary to express “ should, must ” etc.

Emphasis is laid on this point as it helps us in seeking for a possible source of influence; whether there is any influence, it is not easy to decide at this stage. But attention may legitimately be drawn to an identical phenomenon that obtains in Kanarese. Passive forms as such Kanarese has none. There is no distinctive suffix for the passive as Sanskrit has-य् or as Prakrit uses-इज्ज.—But of the several ways in which passive sense is expressed in old Kanarese, the one that would interest us is the one in which a transitive root, used intransitively, conveys a passive meaning. (Kittel. Gram. 315). Thus e. g. a root like “ Oḍe-, to break ” in the following examples :

Avam (he) adam (it) Oḍevam (breaks), he breaks it, but
 Adam (it) Oḍeduda (breaks), it is broken.
 (N. B. " oḍe " is a transitive root); or,
 Adarind alasade pīnam
 P-aḍeyade Pangaridu dōsamam pingisi tap—
 Pade bagedu *peḷvudāgamam*
 Udāra-nopatunga-deva-vidita-kramadim

" Therefore without any slackness; not exerting too much in a proper manner, this work is *written*, according to the rules known to the noble Nṛpatunga, after due consideration and without any faults " (Kavirājamārga I. 44). Āgamam is the nominative of " ā-gama, a work " and Pēḷvudu (which will be explained below) from " Pēḷ-, to tell " is used intransitively; the meaning, as shown, is in the passive ; or,

Kaḷidavarg *aḷvudu* aḷtoḍavarēḷvoḍam antavarim, " Worthy people cry for the dead (lit. it is cried by the worthy) if the dead would come to life on their grief ". (Ādipurāna quoted Kavicarite p. 30). Here " antavar-im " is in the instrumental and " aḷvudu " is used intransitively.

The Kanarese termination, as can be seen from the above examples, for an impersonal form is-उदु (udu) (Kittel 200). This same termination is found in the case of the third singular imperative-वि (Imperative-Potential) tense (ibid 205). Thus from a root " Māl, to do " the third imperative would be " māḷp-udu, let him do, he should do " and so on. When it is remembered that in Kanarese neuter words form by far the greatest number of substantives (cf. p. 19) it would be easy to realise the confusion between the impersonal and the third singular imperative potential. Thus the two forms " Pēḷv-udu " and " aḷv-udu " quoted above may mean in another connection " one should tell " and " one should cry ", respectively. Here there is the point of similarity ; in ज्ञानेश्वरी as well as in old Kanarese we find in some cases one and the same form for the indicative passive and the optative.

Before arriving at any conclusion, another point may be noted. Old Kanarese expresses the negative optative in a different and peculiar manner. The sense of " should not ", " must not " and " ought not to " in the case of a root is expressed by using the infinitive of the root with the negative verbal forms of the root " bā (baru), to come " (Kittel p. 336) e. g. uccarisa

bāradu, " should not pronounce " where " uccarisa " is the infinitive (original uccarisa) of uccarisa, to pronounce. A like phenomenon is to be met with in ज्ञानेश्वरी e. g. II-238.

जैसी दीपकळिका धाकुटी । परी बहु तेजातें प्रकटी ।
तैसी सदबुद्धि ही थेकुटी । म्हणों नये ॥

" the flame of a lamp though small gives much light ; so this good knowledge *should not be said* (let one should not say) to be small " ; or, एथ हें वाचुनी काहीं ! बोलों नये, " here 'one *should not say anything except this* ". The two forms म्हणों नये and बोलों नये are each comprised of two elements (1) the infinitive म्हणों in the first, and बोलों in the second and (2) नये which seems to be न + ये, ये being probably connected to the root येणें, to come. This identity of using an infinitive with the negative forms of the root " to come " to express the negative optative sense in Kanarese and ज्ञानेश्वरी (and modern Marathi too) has led a Marathi writer to conclude that Marathi has here been influenced by Kanarese. (Joshi p. 571) Influenced in the negative optative forms, it might have been influenced in the case of the affirmative as well. This much, however, can be asserted with safety, that old Kanarese has some roots which have the same form for the passive indicative and the optative, and that ज्ञानेश्वरी not only offers a similar phenomenon in this respect but is one with the former in expressing the negative optative.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is more of a suggestion than an exposition of the influence of old Kanarese on ज्ञानेश्वरी. Nevertheless it is sufficient to show how even in details can a language influence a foreign language. Linguistic influence, as mentioned at the beginning, is mutual. It is true that in India it is the Aryan tongue that survives and the non-Aryan that suffers. But the above sketch, however brief, enables one to maintain that any language, in its transitional period, is most likely to be influenced by another language of a greater development. Marathi has always been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, an Indo-Aryan language. But the influence it has experienced from other sources has formed, and will most certainly continue to form, a part and parcel of it.

APPENDIX

Under the word Im- (इम्-) Kittel, in his dictionary has the following remarks :—

“ Im- an auxiliary syllable for the formation of,

- (a) The genitive singular preceding its final-अ
- (b) The instrumental (and the ablative which has the same form) singular ”.

We have said in the text of our thesis (p. 10) that this suffix is not Im- (इम्) but In (-इन्-). The following examples will bear out our contention.

- (a) *Kaḍav-in-a* Kampu aḍangidudu, the fragrance of the Kadava (a particular deer) has disappeared. (Ādipurāṇa Kavīcarite p. 31). Here Kadavina, is the genitive singular of Kaḍava and can be analysed as Kaḍava + in + a. Hundreds of similar forms can be mentioned. cf. *guruṇa*, *Sokkīna* (used adjectively; “ haughty ”) etc.

- (b) *Otti tarumb-in-inda* ripu-bhūja-samājada.

bergalam nabhakke, lifting by means of a lever the foundations of the group of enemy dynasties to the 'sky. (ibid. p. 30). Tarumbu “ a lever ” with the instrumental termination-inda is not “ tarumb-inda ” or “ tarumb-im-inda ” but “ tarumb-in-inda ”. These passages have been selected at a glance; this fact alone is quite sufficient to show that -In (-इन्) and not Im- (इम्) is the suffix.

Kittel's remarks can be supplemented in another way. Along with the genitive, the instrumental and the ablative singulars the suffix-in- (इन्) is used in the formation of the locative singular as well e. g.

Talir-ol *Komb-in-ol*, among the flowers and 'in the branches etc. The locative termination in the singular is ol. “ Kombinol ” the locative of “ Kombu ”, a branch can be analysed as Kombu + in + ol.

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1. Cambridge History of India Vol. I
2. Imperial Gazetteer-Vol. I
3. Linguistic Survey of India (L. S. I.-Vols. IV and VII)
4. Block, Jules : Formation de la langue Marathe, 1914 (figures refer to Sections unless otherwise mentioned)
5. Doderet ; the Grammar of ज्ञानेश्वरी published in the School of the Oriental Studies Bulletin (S-0-5-B) 1927, Vol. IV Part III.

6. Joshi R. B. मराठी भाषेची घटना 2nd Edition 1923.
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11. Caldwell ; Comparative Grammar of Dravidian Languages 1913.
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13. Nṛpatunga Kavirājamārga ; a work of the 9th century A. D. Text of ज्ञानेश्वरी as published by the निर्णयसागर Press.

MISCELLANEA

THE JAYNAGAR IMAGE INSCRIPTION OF PALAPĀLA.

BY

THE LATE PROF. R. D. BANERJI, M. A.

—:o:—

An inscribed image, the inscription on which contained the name of a Pāla king and a date in his regnal years, was discovered by Cunnigham at Jaynagar, a village close to Lakhisarai railway station on the E. I. R., in the Munger District, some time in the working season of 1871-72. Cunnigham evidently could not read this inscription and did not refer to it in his account of Jaynagar. But he has furnished us with an eye-copy of this inscription.¹ Seventeen years ago when I was compiling the monograph on the Pālas of Bengal I tried to find this inscription at Jaynagar and paid two visits to it in 1910 and 1911. But the image in question could not be found in any of the neighbouring villages around Jaynagar, such as Lakhisarai, Kiul etc. For this reason I could not include this inscription in my monograph.² My attention was directed to the Jaynagar inscription because an eye-copy of another Pāla inscription was given by Cunnigham by its side on the same plate and this inscription, of the year 19 of Madanapāla, cannot be traced even now. I could read the second inscription with the help of the photograph taken in Cunnigham's time. In 1923 three pencil-rubbings of the Pāla inscription was brought to me by Professor Suniti Kumar Chatterji, M. A., Litt. D., Khaira Professor of Indian Linguistics and Phonetics in the University of Calcutta, with a letter from Dr. L. D. Barnett of the British Museum stating that this inscription was found in the Victoria and Albert Museum, South Kensington, London, and that Dr. Barnett would be glad if some of Dr. Chatterji's colleagues would undertake to decipher it. I recognised the inscription immediately and showed Cunnigham's eye-copy to Professor Chatterji who was pleased to hand over the three pencil-rubbings of this inscription received from Dr. Barnett to me.

1. Cunnigham, *Archaeological Survey Reports*, Vol III, pp. 159-60; pl. XLV, No. 33.

2. *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* Vol. V.

The inscription is an important record for the history of Bengal, as it supplies us with the name and date of a new king of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal. The king's name is difficult to read as the script is slightly different from that of the Chandimau image inscription of the year 42 of Rāmapāla¹ and the recently rediscovered female image dedicated in the year 3 of Madanapāla.² The scripts of the two Jaynagar image inscriptions are, however, quite similar. This is to be noticed in the form of *la*. At first I was inclined to read the name of the new king of the Jaynagar inscription as Paṇapāla, which would give a better meaning but comparison of the second and fourth letters with the later *la* in the name Madanapāla of the second Jaynagar inscription showed that this name must be Palapāla. The second Jaynagar inscription I can read from Cunnigham's eye-copy :

1. *Ye dharmā hetuprabhavā hetuṃ teṣāṃ Tathāgato hy avadat*
2. *Teṣāṃ ca yo nirodha evaṃ vādī Mahāśramaṇaḥ*
3. *Deyadharmmoyaṃ dānapati-Tarudra-vadhū-Ilīmākāyāḥ*
4. *Śrī-man-Madanapāla-deva-rājya-samvat 19 Asmin 30*

The first two lines contain the Buddhist formula. The last two lines give the name of the donor and the date : "In the year 19 of the reign of the illustrious Madanapāla on the 30th day of (the month of) Asmin (*Āśvin*), (this is) the religious gift of Ilīmākā, the spouse of the donor (*dānapati*) Tarudra."

The second numerals of the date was read as 9 by Cunnigham but its form in the eye-copy indicates that it may be 4. This portion is indistinct in the photograph and therefore I dare not make any change. If this inscribed image is discovered anywhere outside India then a facsimile should be published. Cunnigham's eye-copy of this Jaynagar inscription of Palapāla shows the usual mistakes of all eye-copies. For example the 4th letter of the king's name looks like *na* but it is really the same as the second letter and is *la*.

The Jaynagar image inscription now in the Victoria and Albert Museum, South Kensington, proves the existence of a new king of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal. This is indicated by the affix *Pāla* and the adjective *Gauḍeśvara*. The script shows that this king must be placed in the 12th century. The Manahali

1, Ibid. pp. 93-94.

2. Cunnigham, *Archaeological Survey Reports*, Vol. III, p. 124, No. 16.

plate of Madanapāla and the *Rāmacarita* prove that his place lies after Madanapāla and not before him. The Gayā inscription of V. S. 1232 and the manuscripts copied during the reign of Govindpāla prove that Palapāla can not be placed at any time between 1161 and 1199 A. D. His place, therefore, seems to be in the first half of the 12th century as according to the new inscription from Jaynagar he ruled for at least 35 years. The inscription reads :

- 1 *Om Śrī Gai(Gau)ḍeśara-Palapāla-pādānām saṁ 35*
- 2 *Ca(tra dī 3) Śrī-Campāyāyaṁ.....bhaṭṭā*
- 3 *rikā Puṇḍeśvarī.....Sāmaṇa*
- 4 *Sāṁghāṇā..... Vāsava-kutumbā ja(ya)d-atra*
- 5 *Puṇyaṁ*

“ In the year 35 of the illustrious Lord of Gauḍa, Palapāla, on the third day of (the month of) Caitra, in illustrious Campā.....the lady Puṇḍeśvarī.....of the assembly of Sāmaṇas (*Śramaṇas*), the wife of Vāsava, whatever merit there may be. ”

The inscription will be shortly published in the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol XIV, with facsimiles. The discovery or the rediscovery of this inscription proves that scholars who were inclined to place Madanapāla, the second son of Rāmapāla, in the second quarter of the 12th century are wrong, because even if we take 35 years to be the maximum length of the reign of Palapāla then we have to admit that Madanapāla died at least in 1126 A. D., and as he ruled for at least 19 years, his accession cannot be placed later than 1106 A. D.

APPENDIX I

List of Journals, Periodicals, And Institutions on Exchange.

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(upto 6th July 1930)

- 1 The " Man ", Royal Anthropological Institute, 50, Great Russell Street, London (England).
- 2 Journal of the R. A. Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 74, Grosvenor Street, London (England).
- 3 Asiatic Review, 3, Victoria Street, London, S. W. I.
- 4 The Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 41, Great Russell Street, London, W. C. I.
- 5 Beacon, C/o Messrs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, 40, Museum Street, London W. C. 1. (England).
- 6 The Librarian, School of Oriental Studies, London Institution, Finsbury Circus, London E. C. 2 (England).
- 7 " The Shrine of Wisdom ", Aahlu, 6, Hermon Hill, London, E. II.
- 8 Zeitschrift der Deutschen, Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Leipzig, (Germany).
- 9 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften N. W. 7, Unter den Linden 38, Berlin, (Germany).
- 10 Universitäts-Bibliothek, Göttingen, (Germany).
- 11 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München, (Germany).
- 12 Zeitschrift für Buddhismus Oskar Schloss Verlag, Münchener Neubiberg, (Germany).
- 13 Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik, Deutschen Morgenländischen, Gesellschaft, Leipzig, (Germany).
- 14 Berlin Academy of Science, Berlin.
- 15 Bavarian Academy of Science, Munich.
- 16 " The Journal Asiatique " Société Asiatique, Rue Jacob No. 13 (VI^e) Paris.
- 17 Académie des Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres, 82 Rue Bonaparte, 82 Paris (France).
- 18 Mémoires de la Société, de Linguistique de Paris, 5, Quai Maloquis, Paris, (France).
- 19 L'Instruction Publique et Des Beaux-Arts Musée Guimet, 6 Place d'Iéna-Paris (XVII^e).
- 20 L'Ecole Française, d'Extrême-Orient, Hanoi, (French Indo-China).
- 21 " The New Orient ", 12 Fifth Avenue, New York City, (U. S. A.).
- 22 Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. C. (U. S. A.).
- 23 " The Theosophical Path ", International Theosophical Headquarters, Point Loma, California, (U. S. A.).
- 24 " Rays from the Rose Cross ", The Rosicrucian Fellowship, Oceanside, California (U. S. A.)
- 25 Museum of Fine Arts Bulletin, Boston, Massachusetts, (U. S. A.).

- 26 The Museum Journal, University Museum, Philadelphia, Pa, (U. S. A.).
- 27 The Political Science Quarterly, C/o The Academy of Political Science, Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, (U.S. A.).
- 28 The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 104, South 5th Street, Philadelphia, (U. S. A.).
- 29 The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Yale University Press, Connecticut, (U. S. A.)
- 30 The American Anthropologist, C/o American Anthropological Association, 41, North Queen St. Lancaster, (U. S. A.).
- 31 The Ohio Journal of Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, (U. S. A.).
- 32 The Journal of Society of Oriental Research, Trinity College. Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
- 33 " Nuova Cultura " Della R. Università di Napoli, Via Sanita No 131, Napoli, (Italy).
- 34 Oriental School, University of Rome, Rome (Italy).
- 35 Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien, Wien, (Austria).
- 36 Journal of Oriental Institute, Universität, Wien, (Austria).
- 37 Archives Orientalis, Uppsala, (Sweden).
- 38 Kungl Universitetes Bibliotek, Uppsala, (Sweden).
- 39 " Kern Institute ", Leiden, (Holland).
- 40 Section d' Etudes Orientales Societe des Sciences de Varsovie Varsovie, Rue Sniadeckich 8 (Poland).
- 41 The Journal of the Java Institute, Weltevreden, (Java).
- 42 Royal Batavia Society, Museum, Konigsplein West 12, Batavia, (Java).
- 43 The Buddhist Chronicle, Ananda College, Colombo.
- 44 The Eastern Buddhist, C/o The Library, Otani University, Muromachi-Kashira, Kyoto, Japan.
- 45 " Revista Teosofica ", Official Organ of the " Section Cubana " of the " Sociedad Teosofica ", Apartado 365, Habana Cuba.
- 46 " Theosophy in Australia ", 114, Hunter Street, Sydney, N. S. W.
- 47 Fundamental Library of the Central Asian State University, Tashkent, U. S. S. Russia.
- 48 Arhatamat Prabhakar Karyalaya, Poona No. 2.
- 49 The Jain Sahitya Samshodhan, C/o Bharat Jain Vidyalaya, Bhandarkar Institute Road, Poona No. 4.
- 50 " Progress of Education ", C/o Aryabhushana Press, Poona No. 4.
- 51 Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Town Hall, Bombay.
- 52 " Vividha-jñāna-vistār ", 81, Phanaswadi, Bombay No. 2.
- 53 The Journal of the Anthropological Society, Town Hall, Bombay.
- 54 The Indian Antiquary, C/o British India Press, Mazgaon, Bombay.
- 55 Journal of the K. R. Kama Oriental Institute, 172, Hornby Road, Sukhadwalla Buildings, Fort Bombay.
- 56 The Jain Hitaishi, C/o Manager, Jain Grantha Ratnakar Karyalaya, Hirabag, Girgaon, Bombay.

- 57 The Iranian Association, Alice Buildings, Hornby Road, Fort, Bombay.
- 58 University of Bombay, Bombay.
- 59 " Jain Gazette ", Office, 21 Parish Venkatachala Iyer Street, G. T. Madras.
- 60 " The Shamma ", Aghore Mandir, Mount Road, Madras.
- 61 Madras University Library, Madras.
- 62 The Indian Review, C/o G. B. Natesan and Co., Madras.
- 63 The " Kalpaka ", The Latent Light culture, (Tinnevely), Madras.
- 64 Educational Review, No. 4 Mount Road, Madras
- 65 Shri Vaisnava Siddhanta Sabha, 5/11 Adiappa Mudaly Street Purasawalkam Vepery, P. O. Madras.
- 66 " Vedanta Kesari ", Shri Ramkrishna Matha, Mylapore, Madras.
- 67 " The Current Thought ", 29 Pycroft Road, Triplicane, Madras.
- 68 Journal of Oriental Research, Mylapore, Madras.
- 69 The Indian Historical Quarterly, C/o The Calcutta Oriental Press, 107 Mechuabazar Street, Calcutta.
- 70 " The Sanskrit Sahityaparishat ", Shyambazar, Calcutta.
- 71 Journal of Department of Letters, Calcutta University, Calcutta.
- 72 The Calcutta Review, Senate House, Calcutta.
- 73 Journal of the Mahabodhi Society, 4A College Square, Calcutta.
- 74 " The People ", 12, Court Street, Lahore.
- 75 Journal of the Punjab Historical Society, C/o The University, Lahore, (Punjab).
- 76 The Central Museum, Lahore.
- 77 The Vedic Magazine, the Vedic Magazine Office, Lahore.
- 78 Journal of Indian History, History Department, Allahabad University, Allahabad.
- 79 Allahabad University Journal, Department of English, Allahabad University, Allahabad.
- 80 Mysore University Journal, Mysore.
- 81 Sanskrit College Magazine, Government Sanskrit College, Mysore.
- 82 " The Karnataka ", P. O. Basavangudi, Bangalore City.
- 83 The Journal of the Mythic Society, Mysore Road, Bangalore.
- 84 Indian Review of Reviews, Basavangudi Post, Bangalore City.
- 85 Puratattva, Gujarat Puratattva Mandir, Ellis Bridge, Ahmedabad.
- 86 " The Philosophical Quarterly ", C/o Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner (East Khandesh).
- 87 Baioda Library, Baroda.
- 88 The Vishvabharati, Shantiniketan, Bolpur (Bengal).
- 89 The " Sanskrit Bharati ", Burdwan (Bengal).
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